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PREFACE
Desta Mebratu and Mark Swilling
Our knowledge and understanding of the natural environment and its interaction 
with our socio-economic systems have significantly expanded over the last couple 
of decades. However, we have not been able to go beyond incremental gains, 
which have limited capacity to contain and reverse the unsustainable trends of 
development. This is manifested through a deepening socio-economic and social-
ecological crisis expressed in the form of growing environmental degradation, 
persistent economic stagnation, increasing unemployment and growing disparities 
between and within countries. Recognition of these challenges provided the basis 
for the development of Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals at the 
global level and Agenda 2063 on the Africa We Want by the African Union. Both 
of these agendas focus on the continuous improvement of human wellbeing while 
preserving the natural ecosystem as its foundation. 
This book project was conceived with the belief that Africa’s ability to make any 
progress towards meeting the Sustainable Development Goals and fulfil its aspiration 
of Agenda 2063 will largely depend on the kind of infrastructure it develops in 
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the coming years and decades. We also recognise that emerging technologies and 
knowledge systems coupled with Africa’s early stage of development provide the 
continent with unique leapfrogging opportunities. To this effect, the book provides 
a transformational framework for Africa’s transition to a wellbeing economy that is 
inclusive, climate-resilient and resource-efficient.
The core chapters of the book cover the main issues and tools which African 
countries should consider in developing their ecological, energy, industrial, urban 
and governance infrastructure. The book is a collective product of African scholars 
who have extensive academic and development experience on the topics covered 
in the book. While African policymakers and planners are its primary target 
audiences, the book can also be used as a source reference for academic education 
and research work.
The book project was developed and implemented by the Centre for Complex 
Systems in Transition at Stellenbosch University in collaboration with Stellenbosch 
Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS). On behalf of the research group, we wish 
to thank the management of STIAS for the financial and institutional support 
provided for the book project. We also wish to thank the staff of our publisher, 
African Sun Media, who provided the required editing and back-up support, and 
the anonymous reviewers who provided valuable feedback and comments on the 
book. We particularly wish to thank Dr Christoff Pauw from STIAS and Mr Wikus 
van  Zyl of African Sun Media for their consistent support for the publication of 
the book. Finally, we wish to thank Ms Davida van Zyl for the excellent formatting 
and editing support to the book project.
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FOREWORD
H.E. Mrs Sahlework Zewde1
1 President of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
African countries have been collectively making numerous efforts to develop 
their economies since independence. The Lagos Plan of Action that was 
developed under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity in 
1981 was the first continent-wide initiative that was aimed at heralding the 
economic independence of Africa in parallel with its political independence. 
This was followed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development that was 
endorsed by the African Union at the dawn of the new millennium to promote 
a comprehensive and integrated sustainable development initiative for the 
revival of Africa through a constructive partnership. As a continuation of the 
Pan African drive for self-determination, freedom, progress and collective 
prosperity, the African Union, at its 50th anniversary, adopted Agenda 2063 
as an endogenous, shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and 
sustainable development for Africa’s transformation. 
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These three regional development initiatives have their own specificities in terms 
of their strategic focus. However, they all share and reflect the collective aspirations 
of Africans to get rid of poverty and achieve a more healthy and secured wellbeing 
for their people. A more detailed look at the process that led to their development 
also shows that there has been a progressively growing sense of ownership and 
endogenisation of the regional initiatives. Agenda 2063 notes that humanity today 
has the capacities, technology and know-how to ensure a decent standard of living 
and human security for all inhabitants of our earth. It also recognises the critical 
importance of having world-class infrastructure and human capital developed 
through quality education. Understanding existing and emerging knowledge 
and technology systems with their attendant positive and negative consequences 
is a critical first step for African countries to make the right policy and planning 
decisions. In this regard, this book makes a valuable contribution in enhancing our 
understanding of the key elements of developing transformational infrastructure 
for sustainable development. 
Creating jobs and making development more inclusive are the two prominent 
challenges that are faced by all countries in the twenty-first century. These challenges 
are significantly pronounced in Africa, where there is a high level of poverty and 
unemployment. This book shows that the kind of infrastructure we develop today 
will determine the number of jobs we create and the economic and environmental 
wellbeing we provide for the coming decades. More specifically, it advocates for 
the promotion of distributed renewable energy systems and development of 
distributed economy networks that create jobs and add value at the local level as 
a preferred development path for African countries. I believe this path could also 
be a valuable vehicle for the economic empowerment of women at the local level 
besides contributing to social inclusivity and environmental sustainability. Shifting 
the overall focus of development from growth to wellbeing economy resonates well 
with the needs and aspirations of Africans.
This book, as an intellectual product of African scholars, makes a valuable 
contribution to the realisation of the objectives of Africa’s Agenda 2063 on 
industrialisation, urbanisation, energy, and the environment. I encourage all African 
policymakers, planners, and academics to make good use of the knowledge in 
this book and make Africa the shining star of global sustainability in the twenty-
first century. 
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FOREWORD
Ibrahim Thiaw1
1 Undersecretary General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the  
UN Convention to Combat Desertification.
Africa is a land of incredible complexities and contradictions. It has diverse ecolo­
gical systems and is rich in natural assets but is battered by weather and poverty. It 
has enough farmland and water to feed its people but is plagued by malnutrition 
and drought. And it has massive renewable energy potential, but more than half of 
its population are powerless to connect with this life­changing resource. This book 
is a welcome reminder of how we can use ecological, physical and institutional 
infrastructure to redress that balance and build the foundations for wellbeing and 
economic development.
Africa certainly has its challenges. However, with Agenda 2063, this extraordinary 
continent also has a set of ambitious, but achievable, strategic goals to provide a 
better future for its people; one that will ripple out to generate benefits for the 
entire world. Achieving those goals depends on the ability of all stakeholders to 
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combine the very best of nature and technology with strong governance and 
efficient knowledge management. If they succeed, Africa’s towns, farms, industries 
and infrastructure could make enormous strides in the transition towards more 
sustainable development. 
Take the ecosystem services that not only make communities more resilient to 
threats such as desertification, biodiversity loss and global warming but also reduce 
those threats in the first place. For example, while cutting trees provides limited 
energy and fragile farmland in the short term, research in Ethiopia has shown that 
preserving them sequesters carbon, feeds livestock, pollinates crops, retains soil 
and protects water systems. Likewise, the falling cost of developing and distributing 
clean energy and connectivity can not only reduce deforestation, pollution and 
global warming but also nurtures a healthier, better­educated population that can 
make the most of emerging trends for dispersed design and production across a 
range of industries. With affordable pay­as­you­go and off­grid solutions spreading 
fast, agricultural technology improving yields and reducing waste, and machine 
learning hubs taking root, there are some real opportunities for the eleven million 
young Africans entering the workforce every year.
Above all, while there is no single solution to Africa’s challenges, there are many 
individual opportunities that can and must be connected to increase the speed 
and scale of their impact, particularly through the eradication of poverty and 
inequality. With so many of those solutions inextricably linked to the natural capital 
that accounts for up to 50 percent of the continent’s wealth, the African Research 
Group does well to highlight the role of infrastructure and life­cycle planning and 
development can play in their success and will make a valuable contribution to the 
work of anyone seeking to improve wellbeing and economic progress. 
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INTRODUCTION
Mark Swilling and Desta Mebratu
The global economic crisis has generated new literature that draws on long-
wave theory to re-imagine present and future landscapes. The writers in this 
neo-Polanyian tradition include consultant’s advisories and popular literature 
aimed at business audiences (Allianz Global Investors, 2010; Bradfield-Moody 
& Nogrady, 2010; Rifkin, 2011); the policy-oriented research-based literature 
generated from a variety of academic, United Nations, and advisory and consulting 
agencies (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011; United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2011; Von Weizsacker, Hargroves, Smith, Desha 
& Stasinopoulos, 2009); the theory-laden academic literature (Drucker,  1993; 
Gore, 2010; Mason, 2015; Pearson & Foxon, 2012; Perez, 2009, 2010; Smith, Voss 
& Grin, 2010; Swilling & Annecke, 2012); and the post-developmental ‘transition 
discourses’ (Escobar, 2015). These texts have all to a greater or lesser extent 
drawn on a tradition (originating in the works of Nikolai Kondratieff and Joseph 
Schumpeter), which depict economic history in terms of a succession of long-term 
waves or cycles of economic development lasting between 40 and 60 years. 
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Karl Polanyi was interested in a ‘double movement’ – the divisive fragmentary 
nature of laissez-faire capitalism, which emerged in the late nineteenth century 
and led up to the Second World War, and the integrative dynamics of micro-level 
pacts and associations – and proposed the coming of a ‘grand transformation’. 
Social democracy after WWII realised this grand prophecy. The conditions today 
exhibit the same double movement – crisis, inequality, division and potential 
collapse, versus the power of global grassroots movements expressing real liveable 
alternatives. 
Nowadays, there is increasing interest in the possibility of some sort of epochal 
shift, leading to a post-industrial world that is more or less sustainable. This 
is the ‘transformed world’ referred to in the Preamble to the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Schot and Kanger (2018) refer to this as the ‘second 
deep transition’, while the German Advisory Council on Climate Change (explicitly 
invoking Polanyi) refer to another ‘great transformation’ similar in significance to 
the eighteenth century agricultural and industrial revolutions (German Advisory 
Council on Climate Change, 2011). For Mason, this is a ‘post-capitalist’ epoch, 
and similarly for Nafeez Ahmed who envisages a ‘civilizational transition’ that will 
of necessity need to transcend capitalism (Ahmed, 2017). For Mazzucato and 
Perez, capitalism can be reformed around new developmental and environmentally 
sustainable imperatives (Mazzucato, 2016; Perez, 2016). It is worth considering 
Schot and Kanger’s definition of a ‘deep transition’: 
A Deep Transition is formally defined as a series of connected and sustained 
fundamental transformations of a wide range of socio-technical systems in 
a similar direction. Examples of this directionality include (the post-WWII) 
move towards increased labour productivity, mechanization, reliance on 
fossil fuels, resource-intensity, energy-intensity, and reliance on global value 
chains. Our assumption is that this process of building connections between 
change processes in multiple systems takes on wave-type properties, unfolds 
through centuries, and is implicated in broader transformations of societies 
and economies. In this conceptualization each wave is broadening and 
deepened in the Deep Transition but should not be seen as a Deep Transition 
in itself. The Deep Transition refers to the overall change process and is thus 
comparable to what Polanyi (2001 [1944]) called the Great Transformation. 
(Schot & Kanger, 2018:1 – emphasis added) 
This definition of ‘deep transition’ is remarkably similar to Swilling and Annecke’s 
conception of ‘epochal transition’ from an African perspective (Swilling & 
Annecke, 2012). When integrated in this way into a deep epochal transition, the 
following proposition becomes possible: the ‘deep transition’ from industrial 
modernity to the ‘transformed world’ referred to in the preamble of the SDGs is not 
merely about the extended survival of industrial modernity (embodied in its current 
financialised form of global capitalism with its various national manifestations), but 
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rather it is about catalysing a deep (socio-metabolic) transition to a new sustainable 
epoch whose directionality and pace will depend on the policy choices made by 
policymakers. Depending on existing social struggles for change and how, in 
particular, the renewable energy transition pans out over time, the outcome will be 
more or less just. A just transition may well need to be an information-based hybrid 
with capitalist features (e.g., a socially-embedded market, subordination of finance 
to the ‘real economy’, continuation of aspects of private ownership and private 
investment) and post-capitalist features (significantly expanded ‘commons’ where 
ownership is neither state nor private, socially and/or publicly-owned financial 
institutions with major investment resources, expanded non-market transactions, 
burgeoning social entrepreneurship sector, and a non-exploitative non-extractive 
relationship with natural systems). How exactly this turns out will more than likely 
be very different to what can be imagined from ‘this side of history’ (Frase, 2016).
Africa, as a developing region, has a unique opportunity to take advantage of this 
wider deep transition, or it could drown in the complexities and messiness and 
once again miss out on a major long-term development cycle. Much will depend on 
how the African policy community deals with the critical transition elements and 
drivers in the coming decades. This must include a critical reflection on the kind 
of development narratives that each African country should adopt and uphold as 
an alternative to the neo-liberal ‘growth economy’ narrative which has resulted in 
social exclusion and environmental degradation. 
Furthermore, the type of infrastructures that are designed and built in the coming 
years will determine whether African countries have the capacity to manage a 
long-term commitment to sustainability-oriented inclusive development. The 
conceptualisation and design of these infrastructures must take into account 
the longer-term impact of the new advanced information and communication 
technologies (variously referred to as Web 3.0, Second Machine Age or the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Schwab, 2017) and their 
potential for catalysing more inclusive commons-based peer-to-peer economies 
(Murdock, 2018). If African countries want to be active contributors and partners 
in the twenty-first-century global economy, information-rich sustainability-
oriented infrastructure development strategies will be essential. The fact that 
most of the sub-Saharan African countries are at the early stage of economic 
development allows them to leapfrog into a more inclusive and sustainable 
development trajectory. 
In relation to the development narrative, the first chapter of this book presents 
the ‘wellbeing economy’ as an alternative development narrative that enables 
African countries to transition to inclusive, low-carbon, and resource-efficient 
economies. It highlights the major technological drivers that are shaping economic 
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development in the twenty-first century and the specific opportunities and threats 
related to these technologies. It further underlines the critical importance for 
African countries of the promotion of transformative leapfrogging that is internally-
driven and context-relevant rather than subscribing to incidental leapfrogging that 
is externally-driven and sub-optimal in its outcome. 
The second chapter focuses on demonstrating the critical importance of 
maintaining the resilience of ecological infrastructures as a foundation for 
achieving the SDGs with a particular focus on food security. It also presents the 
major tools which African countries can deploy for ensuring the resilience of their 
social-ecological systems for the wellbeing of its population which is growing at an 
alarming rate. 
The third chapter presents the critical importance of addressing energy poverty 
in Africa through the development of sustainable energy systems. It focuses 
particularly on the development of distributed renewable energy systems that 
enable African countries to utilise their renewable energy resources for the 
development of an inclusive and low-carbon local economic development. 
While recognising the critical need and aspirations of African countries to 
industrialise, the fourth chapter argues that attempting to industrialise with the 
same industrialisation pattern of the twentieth century is not only unsustainable 
but is also unattainable in the twenty-first century. Hence, Africa’s industrialisation 
efforts should be focused on making the maximum use of the opportunities created 
by resource-efficient and disruptive technologies while building on its comparative 
resource advantage.
Unplanned urbanisation leading to urban sprawl characterised by the expansion of 
slums is another major challenge facing African countries in the coming decades. 
Chapter five deals with factors that ensure sustainable urban development in 
Africa, with a particular focus on how to carry out sustainable urban planning and 
development using resource-efficient urban economic strategies that provide for 
jobs and livelihood creation. 
Life-cycle management of the planning and development of economic infrastructure 
is one of the most useful tools for building and managing inclusive and resource-
efficient regional and local economies. Chapter six presents the major tools and 
techniques that could be utilised to ensure the development of transformative 
infrastructure that facilitates the development of a wellbeing economy.
One of the major effects of the disruptive technologies, including information and 
communication and renewable energy technologies, is the transition from mass 
production to mass customisation of production systems. Chapter seven provides 
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some guidance on how African countries can utilise these opportunities and 
develop distributed economy networks that create jobs and provide livelihoods at 
the local level. 
Governance has been one of the major developmental challenges faced by most 
African countries over the past decades. Chapter eight reconceptualises what a 
sustainability-oriented developmental state could mean in the African context. 
The chapter proposes an alternative to state-centric and market-centric modes of 
governance. This alternative mode of governance is one that respects the reality of 
increasing complexity while providing for ways of ensuring directionality over the 
long term. 
The development of an economy that satisfies the requirements for both human 
and ecosystem wellbeing will require a different set of indicators than gross 
domestic product, which is a measure of misconceived economic growth. Chapter 
nine presents some of the key principles and methods used in developing alternative 
indicators for sustainable development, including key procedures for sustainability 
assessment and selection criteria for indicators. It also proposes a framework of 
indicators that could be adapted and used by African countries with a particular 
focus on measuring progress in developing transformative infrastructures for 
wellbeing-oriented economic development in Africa. 
This publication attempts to tackle the challenges of building wellbeing economies 
in Africa. We recognise that it is far from complete; nonetheless, we believe that the 
book provides comprehensive coverage of all the major issues related to building a 
transformational infrastructure for the transition to an inclusive, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient economy. The book also provides valuable insights that could 
be used by African policymakers and planners to develop a new development 
trajectory that would assist them to meet the SDGs and fulfil the aspiration of 
Agenda 2063. We sincerely hope that the ideas presented in this book will be 
further refined and expanded through academic and field research that will be 
carried out by Africans in the coming years.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Desta Mebratu and Mark Swilling
African countries face unprecedented challenges of defining a future development 
pathway in a resource- and carbon-constrained world. This book addresses these 
challenges, with special reference to the set of infrastructure that most African 
countries require to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and fulfil 
the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Infrastructure is a key factor that determines 
how resource and energy flow and transform through socio-economic systems. 
Decisions made today by African countries on their infrastructural configuration 
will determine the inclusivity, resource intensity and climate resilience of their 
development pathways for decades to come. This book is a product of a two-year 
research conducted by a group of African scholars who have extensive academic 
and practical experience on the development of key infrastructure sectors in Africa. 
This executive summary highlights the key conclusions and recommendations 
made in each chapter of the book.
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Chapter 1:  Transformative leapfrogging to a wellbeing economy  
in Africa
Social transformations of different proportions and scope have shaped human 
history over millennia. Two of the most significant social transformations are the 
agricultural and industrial transformations. These transformational processes 
radically redefined human society and determined the future critical features of 
socio-economic relationships within communities and across nations. Furthermore, 
they fundamentally redefined our relationship with the natural environment. 
The confluence of economic, social and environmental challenges that humanity 
currently faces require a transformational transition towards an inclusive, climate-
resilient, and resource-efficient economy. This is a global transition with significant 
impact on Africa as a region.
The dominant development narrative of the ‘growth economy’ is driven by the neo-
liberal economics of the market. This not only led to environmental destruction on 
a global scale but also miserably failed in ensuring social justice across the world and 
within communities. The transformational transition of the twenty-first century 
requires a new development narrative that ensures environmental sustainability and 
social inclusivity while promoting economic development. This book proposes the 
notion of the ‘wellbeing economy’ as an alternative. This approach envisages the 
continuous fulfilment of human wellbeing, with primary attention on job creation, 
poverty eradication and gender equality, while maintaining the sustainability of 
the ecosystems. 
The Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030, the Paris Declaration 
on Climate Change and the emerging possibilities created by the accelerated 
application of renewable energy and IT-based technologies have created new 
opportunities for African countries to move to inclusive, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient economies. This evolution is also characterised by forces of 
lock-in, which actively work to maintain the status quo. At the same time, the 
drivers of leapfrogging that continuously develop and introduce new systems and 
technologies are also acknowledged as equally significant. Managing the tension 
between the lock-in and leapfrogging factors – and moving beyond incidental 
leapfrogging that is often externally driven and at best incremental – is the critical 
challenge that African countries currently face.
The recent developments in disruptive technologies such as information and 
communication, manufacturing, and renewable energy technologies, which are 
more distributive, coupled with the early stage of economic development of most 
African countries, opens-up tremendous leapfrogging opportunities for these 
countries. However, African countries should actively promote transformative 
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leapfrogging that is internally driven and responsive to the national context as the 
critical success factor for the development of a wellbeing economy that is inclusive, 
climate-resilient and resource-efficient.
One of the critical domains which will determine the development trajectory of 
African countries for the coming decades is the strategic choice and decisions 
they make on how to develop their socio-economic infrastructure for the coming 
decades. Developing a wellbeing economy by capturing and utilising the available 
opportunities provides a strong basis for fulfilling the aspirations of Agenda 2063 
and the ‘Africa We Want’ campaign. The fundamental basis for this transition 
process is maintaining its ecological infrastructure, which provides the foundation 
for the development of a wellbeing economy. Development of the energy, 
industrial and urban infrastructures from a life-cycle management perspective will 
also determine the pace of their transition to an inclusive, climate-resilient and 
resource-efficient economy. 
Chapter 2:  Ecological infrastructure as a basis for the African  
wellbeing economy
Sustainable development relies on a balanced relationship between addressing 
social and economic growth within the boundaries of the environment. The 
environment not only presents the foundation that creates and sustains life 
on earth but also provides the assets upon which to build a country’s economic 
development. The production of food, provision of water and natural resources 
for industrial activities, regulation of climate and purification of air rely on the 
sustainable management of the natural world. Natural resources, however, are 
limited and are decreasing rapidly. If they are not sustainably managed, the system 
in which they are embedded will collapse. Building a wellbeing economy across the 
continent depends explicitly on the protection and integrity of the natural resources 
that are critical life-support systems for sustained development. A powerful way 
of approaching this is to consider that ecological infrastructure needs to be at the 
forefront when thinking about the wellbeing economy. Ecological infrastructure is 
the nature-based equivalent of built or hard infrastructure.
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
more than 50 million hectares of forests have been lost in Africa between 1990 
and 2000, representing an average deforestation rate of nearly 0.8 percent 
per year (UNECA,  2011). Land degradation is a severe threat in Africa, with 
about 500 000  km2 of land estimated to be degraded due to soil erosion, 
salinisation, pollution and desertification (United Nations Environment 
Programme [UNEP], 2013). This is primarily driven by deforestation, forest fires, 
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over-cultivation, inefficient irrigation practices, overgrazing, over-exploitation of 
resources (including mining), and climate (UNECA, 2011). Land degradation 
reduces agricultural productivity and directly impacts on food availability, nutrition 
and human health. Land degradation in drylands can result in desertification. The 
desert lands of the Sahara, Namib and the Kalahari, and the drylands of northern 
Kenya, southern Ethiopia and Somalia cover around 40 percent of Africa’s land 
surface area (International Soil Reference and Information Centre [ISRIC], 2013).
A significant share of the continent’s natural resources is used unsustainably, with 
some lost through illegal activities. This means that the stream of benefits generated 
from these resources is being reduced over time. This has serious implications for 
the long-term wellbeing of the population, as natural capital accounts for between 
30 and 50 percent of total wealth. Population growth will also have significant 
implications for building resilient social-ecological systems. Population growth in 
Africa is likely to continue to put pressure on food, land and water resources. 
While the inherent uncertainty and diversity in potential futures across the 
continent makes it tenuous for a set of prescriptive policies to be established, policy 
decisions should aim to minimise environmental and developmental trade-offs 
and maximise Africa’s ability to safeguard its natural capital adequately. Living with 
such complexity and uncertainty requires resilience-building approaches to the 
management and governance of social-ecological systems. The social-ecological 
systems approach emphasises the role that people, communities, economies, 
societies and cultures play in the natural environment. Ecosystem-based adaptation 
is a nature-based solution that uses biodiversity and ecosystem services to support 
communities to adapt and build resilience in the face of disturbance.
Underpinning an economic trajectory that will lead to a continent-wide wellbeing 
economy comes with significant challenges, not least of which is the need to reduce 
the region’s ecological footprint and safeguard the life-support system provided by 
healthy land, water, air and biodiversity. Ecosystem-based adaptation is recognised 
for its ability to offer co-benefits in helping society adapt to changes, including 
climate change. Agricultural biodiversity is vital to the functioning of agro-
ecosystems, to ensure food and nutrition security and to cope with the challenges 
of climate change. African farming systems can build on a fundamentally different 
model of agriculture based on diversifying farms and farming landscapes, replacing 
chemical inputs, optimising biodiversity and stimulating interactions between 
different species, as part of holistic strategies to build long-term fertility, healthy 
agro-ecosystems and secure livelihoods.
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Chapter 3: Sustainable energy systems in Africa
Africa has the largest share of the population without access to energy and 
addressing energy poverty is central to the eradication of poverty in Africa. The 
region has a significant volume of renewable energy resources that are yet to be 
developed. Almost every country that has achieved universal access has reached this 
goal with the support of strong leadership that can establish a shared vision of the 
benefits of enhanced energy systems for equitable wellbeing. Leadership is critical 
to driving through comprehensive long-term planning in partnership with public, 
private and civil society stakeholders. Visionary political leadership supported by 
public energy administration systems that embody long-term visions are critical for 
a successful transition to sustainable energy.
Costs for new energy options are falling and technologies such as wind turbines and 
grid-based PV systems are becoming competitive. Feed-in tariffs have been the most 
widely used government support mechanism for accelerating private investment in 
renewable energy generation. Competitive tenders or auctions have also emerged 
in various countries as acceptable instruments. Country-level experience has shown 
the importance of strong banking, legal and other advisory resources in rolling out 
effective renewable energy programmes. However, there is much more that must be 
done, particularly in the area of promoting the development of distributed energy 
systems that are critical for Africa’s development. In this regard, it will be necessary 
to replicate and scale-up proven policy instruments and financing mechanisms.
It has long been evident that low levels of transformative knowledge and skills 
across sectors account for Africa’s overwhelming dependence on prescriptive 
solutions imported from abroad. This applies as much to sustainable energy efforts 
as to other efforts at improving living conditions on the continent. The success of 
sustainable energy initiatives depends on how well they are aligned with domestic 
needs and resources. There is, therefore, an urgent need to build domestic 
capacities for multi-level design and management of sustainable energy transitions. 
Academic and professional institutions can play fundamental roles in creating 
and disseminating the necessary knowledge and skills within political, business-
entrepreneurial, civil society and the general public. 
Domestic social entrepreneurs across Africa can help fill the gaps across the 
sustainable energy supply and value chains and this needs to be further strengthened 
by recognising and nurturing domestic sustainable energy enterprises. Private 
entrepreneurs are successfully deploying innovative business models that are 
unlocking internal and external investments, creating jobs, catalysing local 
economic growth, and making measurable impacts on poverty reduction. This 
effort needs to be scaled up to unlock real social innovations that can sustain action 
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and transform the energy landscape. Providing systematic support to renewable 
energy service cooperatives could make a significant contribution to job creation, 
value addition and women’s empowerment at the local level. 
Agro-industries, such as tea, coffee and sugar estates, already utilise energy for 
their processing and, on occasions, supply power to their employees within their 
estates. In the event of non-access to the grid, scaling up electricity service would 
have direct economic and social benefits to rural communities in the vicinity of 
these estates, while it offers the agro-businesses a potentially attractive commercial 
opportunity for diversifying into the energy market. Supporting agro-industrial 
co-generation and anchor clients as a local solution could contribute to sustainable 
energy transitions in the region. In situations where the industry is connected 
to the grid, it creates the possibility to feed into the grid in times of surplus and 
drawing from it when supplies are low. 
Chapter 4: Inclusive and sustainable industrial development for Africa
The industrial revolution, which started in the eighteenth century in England, 
has gone through different stages of development. By the middle of the twentieth 
century, industrial modernity was a global phenomenon. Compared to previous 
centuries, the twentieth century was a time of unprecedented economic growth 
driven by accelerated industrialisation and globalisation. However, it was also a 
century that saw exponential growth in the volume of resources extracted from 
the natural environment and the related environmental degradation. The Global 
Resource Outlook produced by the International Resource Panel (IRP) stated 
that the decoupling of natural resource use and environmental impacts from 
economic activity and human wellbeing is an essential element in the transition to 
a sustainable future (IRP, 2019). Reducing the emissions of greenhouse gasses has 
become the major environmental challenge that needs to be addressed to mitigate 
the adverse effects of climate change.
The Malthusian theory of ‘environmental limits’ and Schumacher’s ‘small is 
beautiful’ concept are perhaps the early precursors of sustainable development 
within the disciplines of economics and political economy. Since the middle of 
the twentieth century, many concepts and tools that focused on reducing and 
containing the adverse impacts of industrialisation on the environment have 
been developed. These ranges from different sets of end-of-pipe management 
technologies to technologies aimed at improving the resource efficiency of 
industries from micro to systemic levels. Different economic development models 
have also been developed with the purpose of transitioning to more sustainable 
consumption and production patterns. Africa’s industrialisation can benefit from 
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these technologies and knowledge systems, leading potentially to improvements in 
industrial efficiency.
African countries have been aspiring to industrialise their economies since their 
early years of liberation. This has led to the development of numerous regional 
and national economic development strategies that place significant emphasis 
on industrialisation. Ironically, despite all the efforts and investment since 
liberation, most African countries have been through decades of premature de-
industrialisation. Industrialisation is still an economic imperative for Africa to 
meet the needs and aspirations of its people, as outlined in Agenda 2063. However, 
neither the European model nor the ‘exemplary’ Asian models of industrialisation 
are appropriate for Africa for the following two main reasons. Firstly, attempting 
to industrialise through the conventional model of industrialisation is neither 
feasible nor sustainable within the available regenerative and assimilative capacity 
of the already constrained planetary ecosystem. Secondly, the industrialisation of 
the twenty-first century is fundamentally different from previous industrialisation 
paths both in terms of its technological drivers and the expected socio-economic 
outcome and impacts.
In the twenty-first century, the traditional top-down organisation of society that 
characterised much of the economic, social, and political life of the fossil-fuel-based 
industrial revolution is giving way to a distributed and collaborative relationship in 
the emerging green industrial era. Furthermore, the new industrialisation path has 
to utilise the opportunities provided by the so-called ‘machine age’ (often referred 
to as the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ (Industry 4.0) while withstanding its adverse 
impacts. This includes employing the potential of distributed manufacturing as 
a basis for developing distributed economic networks that create jobs, empower 
women and promote local value addition. The transition from mass production to 
mass customisation as a result of digitisation of the supply chain also provides new 
opportunities for industrialisation in Africa.
The development of eco-industrial parks that are seamlessly integrated, both 
horizontally and vertically, into the local and national economy provides a strong 
basis for inclusive and sustainable industrialisation. Leveraging and utilising 
all the available opportunities while containing the related adverse effects will 
require putting the appropriate institutional, physical and human infrastructure 
in place. Creating a dynamic innovation space with the right combination of 
institutional, physical and social infrastructure is an essential prerequisite for being 
an active player in the global economy of the twenty-first century. In this context, 
African countries need to give maximum attention and support to university-
industry linkages and partnerships as a key institutional pillar for sustainable 
industrialisation.
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Chapter 5: Sustainable urban development in Africa
Urbanisation is among the megatrends shaping Africa’s economic, social and 
environmental transformation. Though countries differ considerably, urban Africa 
is well below the global average in resource consumption. Even if the average per 
capita energy consumption and carbon emission of Africa are low in comparison 
to developed economies, energy intensity level remains significantly higher than 
the world average. Further, a growing urban population lack access to energy, basic 
infrastructure and services. African cities, therefore, face triple challenges: meeting 
the growing demand for resources to drive their economies, expanding access to 
the urban poor, and improving resource efficiency. African cities and urban system 
are critical in achieving low-carbon job-rich inclusive growth and accelerating the 
transition to sustainability. However, this requires a rethink in the way African cities 
are conceived, designed, built and managed. 
With many African countries on a rapid urban and economic growth trajectory, 
Africa’s resource consumption and carbon emissions are likely to increase in the 
following decades. However, its low stock of capital and existing technology and the 
promising prospect of environmentally sustainable technologies such as renewable 
energy gives Africa a ‘late-comer’ advantage to leverage urbanisation for sustainable 
development. The system of cities in many African countries is characterised 
by primacy, missing middle and rapidly growing small towns, weak economic 
bases and inadequate rates of job creation. The urban system is imbalanced, 
underperforming and unsustainable. Decongesting and improving principal 
cities is necessary, but not sufficient. Investment in connectivity infrastructure, 
decentralised energy systems, and leveraging ICT to promote distributed service 
and industrial economies should help to accelerate progress to economic de-
concentration and a balanced spatial system constituting villages, towns and cities 
across the human settlements continuum.
There is the opportunity to reap a ‘sustainability dividend’ by adopting a compact 
and dense urban form and by shifting to cheaper and cleaner energy. Moving to 
smart urban infrastructure design and technology can be a game-changer. At a 
more fundamental level, three issues are critical. Firstly, urban form and design 
which determine the nature and configuration of urban infrastructures. The 
built environment of today’s cities is the product of urban vision and design 
implemented generations ago. The ‘lock-in effect’ of urban form is long-lasting. 
Secondly, considering severe resource scarcities and the long life-cycle of 
infrastructure, project prioritisation should be considered within appropriate 
strategic frameworks. Even within energy or connectivity sectors, there are 
multiple decision issues that matter, such as choice of technology or energy mix, or 
scale and location. Thirdly, in the context of sustainability transitions, investment 
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decisions involve shifting to new technologies or future technologies. Policy inertia 
and powerful stakeholder interests can constrain these decisions if not effectively 
countered. This kind of obduracy could hamper the necessary technological shift 
and increase the stock of ‘stranded capital’ thus making ‘leapfrog’ transformation 
increasingly difficult or costly. 
Sustainable infrastructure design and implementation can also facilitate investment 
in affordable housing. The price-to-income ratio of housing in Africa is much higher 
than the world average. The prevalence of slums and informality in African cities is 
to some extent due to the disconnect between planning, infrastructure and housing 
construction. Studies show that if land is efficiently laid out, housing and service 
provision can be incrementally improved at much less cost than retrofitting slums. 
Neither shack formation in the middle of the city, nor mega housing projects on the 
urban edge disconnected from job and economic opportunities or without access 
to public transport is sustainable. The anomaly of ‘ housing without people’ and the 
problem of ‘ people without housing’ observed in many cities around the world is 
symptomatic of fundamental urban development flaws and resource inefficiencies 
that Africa should strive to prevent or mitigate. Effective housing solutions require 
multiple front interventions in, for example, land and housing regulations, housing 
finance and building technology.
Many African cities had master plans, but by the time the plans were completed, the 
realities on the ground had utterly changed as the rapid forces of urbanisation took 
their course. The plans remained static and rigid, while the realities continuously 
evolved. The dynamism and ingenuity generated in bottom-up approaches and the 
static and rigid planning and control interventions struggling to cope with old and 
new challenges coexist with limited interaction on the margin. This all results in 
chaotic urban development. The solution does not lie in the top-down command 
and control system nor in the bottom-up self-development. What is needed is 
light-touch top-down planning to provide guidance and structure while allowing 
adaptation and innovation to suit diverse needs and bottom-up initiatives that are 
spontaneous, adaptive and collaborative. In a nutshell, business-as-usual does not 
work. However, action is needed before the window of opportunity closes.
Chapter 6:  Life-cycle management for sustainable infrastructure 
planning and development in Africa
At the heart of global and national socio-economic development are:
  mobility of people, goods and services;
  information through transport, energy, water and wastewater; and
  information and communication technology infrastructure.
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How these people, goods and services, and information are moved from one place 
to another and how the choice affects economic, social and environmental quality 
continues to be the subject of inquiry of many fields of research and practice. 
The type and spread of infrastructure systems in different parts of Africa play a 
strategic role in influencing its path to sustainable development and will determine 
whether its diverse national, continental and global commitments, such as Africa’s 
Agenda 2063 and UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 2030, will be met. It 
will also ultimately determine the progress of each country in creating jobs and 
eradicating poverty.
As indicated in many reports on the continent, Africa’s infrastructure gap is 
enormous. Leaving this infrastructural deficit unaddressed for so long or addressing 
it in a business-as-usual way will pose significant threats to the region’s sustainable 
economic development. The long lifespan of infrastructure systems and the fact 
that the bulk of Africa’ infrastructure requirements to 2050 is yet to be developed, 
provides a vast opportunity for planning and laying out the systems sustainably. 
Africa needs to ensure its new infrastructure systems leapfrog the inefficient, 
sprawling and polluting systems of the past, and develop systems that are inclusive, 
resource-efficient, low-carbon and climate-resilient. Sustainable infrastructure 
systems in the continent will be critical elements of achieving a more sustainable 
form of economic development adaptable to global changes and the changing 
needs of its population. 
The most significant opportunities for improving the overall outcome of planning 
for sustainable infrastructure systems could result in higher positive impacts 
without the negative consequences of sub-optimal solutions that are prone to 
problem shifting. These opportunities must be exploited during the earlier stages 
of the planning process and at the very start of each stage. A review of existing 
evaluation tools shows significant gaps in the coverage of sustainability principles 
at the upstream planning stage. This is because the focus of sustainability analyses 
are mainly or entirely on later stages in the value chain (‘end of pipe’) after 
important decisions have already been made. By this stage, it is too late to make 
positive interventions. Emerging knowledge for creating sustainable infrastructures 
can be found in the procedural and analytical tools of life-cycle management. 
These tools support the mitigation of problems associated with the conventional 
‘silo’ approach. 
As key policy and strategic issues for African countries, there is a need for articulating 
national strategies and fostering leadership for sustainable infrastructures. It is 
essential to link urban planning with a higher level of integrated infrastructure 
planning while working on institutional reforms and capacity building to increase 
access to life-cycle management skills. There is a need to focus on prioritising 
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strategic partnerships and implementing knowledge management and community 
engagement systems that are critical for transforming the conventional planning 
process to be compatible with the requirements of planning for sustainable 
infrastructure in African countries. To this end, realigning available resources is as 
important as creating new resources.
The framework proposed in this book in support of strategic planning of sustainable 
infrastructure in Africa is structured to show the different levels of planning from 
the national to the local level. While recognising the whole planning ecosystem 
as a continuum, the framework identifies where broader qualitative life-cycle 
management elements and specific quantitative life-cycle management elements 
can be used to take infrastructure planning to the next level. Broader qualitative 
aspects, such as life-cycle strategies, programmes, systems, processes and concepts, 
can be used at the highest level, such as national planning, and at the early stages 
of subnational planning and decision-making. The specific quantitative life-cycle 
management elements consisting of analytical tools and techniques supported by 
quantitative data, information and models are better used at the local level and in 
planning and decision-making circumstances where a higher resolution of planning 
outcomes are sought. The conditions for a successful application of the proposed 
framework include aspects of the planning process, assessment and institutional 
architecture. There is a need for the implementation of a life-cycle-driven adaptive 
strategic planning process, a strategic environmental assessment with a life-cycle 
sustainability assessment content, and life-cycle management-based institutional 
architecture to support the evaluation and the planning process.
Chapter 7:  Distributed renewable economy for Africa as a basis for 
wellbeing economy development
The unprecedented economic growth registered through the agricultural 
transformation and the successive stages of the industrial revolution led to new 
sets of environmental scarcities and crises on a global scale. These scarcities grew 
exponentially with the fast pace of industrialisation and globalisation that was 
registered during the second half of the twentieth century. The globalisation of the 
twentieth century did not only globalise national economies but it also globalised 
environmental pollution and degradation, which had remained local for millennia. 
This has resulted in global challenges such as climate change. The exponential 
increase in inequality between and within countries is another worrying social 
outcome of unbridled globalisation. As reported in an Oxfam Briefing Paper, the 
26 wealthiest people on earth in 2018 had the same net worth as the poorest half 
of the world’s population, some 3.8 billion people (Vázquez Pimentel, Ayma & 
Lawson, 2018).
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The emerging disruptive technologies, which are inherently distributive, provide 
excellent opportunities for the economic empowerment of people provided 
that they are utilised innovatively. This includes technologies such as artificial 
intelligence, robotisation and block-chain technology driven by digitisation, 
renewable energy technology systems and distributed manufacturing systems. 
However, the possible impacts and benefits of these disruptive technologies will 
mostly depend on who controls the use of these technologies. The battle is already 
on between the corporate establishments that are bent on maximising profit and 
their market position by exploiting the emerging disruptive technologies and the 
advocates for the transformational utility of these technologies for the broader 
and higher benefit of humanity through, for example, open-source knowledge 
commons-based ‘prosumer’ systems.
Given the major economic, social, environmental and technological factors that 
are at play, the twenty-first century will be registered as the century of the most 
significant social transformation in human history. This transformation on a global 
scale will have significant immediate and long-term impacts on the ability of African 
countries to develop their respective economies. As was noted earlier, Africa has a 
unique opportunity to be a significant beneficiary of this transformation. However, 
for Africa to reduce the adverse impact of this transformation on its people and 
maximise its benefit, it has to break away from its ‘passive recipient’ status and 
prepare itself to be an active player of this global transformation by seizing the 
available opportunities.
’Distributed economies’ generally promote small-scale, flexible networks of local 
socio-economic actors using local resources according to local needs, in the spirit 
of sustainable development. Besides the direct economic and environmental 
benefits, this approach provides a robust socio-economic basis for job creation, 
empowerment of women and broad participation of local communities in 
development management. It also provides fertile ground for socio-technical 
innovations driven by local needs and conditions. Thus, the promotion of networks 
of local economies that create more jobs and add more value to local economies 
need to be at the centre of promoting sustainable development in Africa. This 
can be driven by distributed renewable energy (DRE) systems, which offer an 
unprecedented opportunity to address energy poverty and accelerate the transition 
to modern energy services for rural communities.
Planning for a distributed renewable economy is aimed at creating a local, 
sustainable economy network as a foundation for developing a wellbeing economy 
that continuously fulfils the needs and aspirations of its people while ensuring 
the wellbeing of the natural ecosystem. The crucial first step of the whole process 
is to identify a natural resource sector and or an economic actor which could be 
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used as an anchor for the development of the distributed economy network. The 
next step is to organise an innovation incubation space to identify the specific 
economic activity that may lead to higher value addition and job creation for the 
local economy. Development of the first tier of the economic network around 
the most promising resource and economic actors by ensuring optimal vertical 
and horizontal integration across the value chain is at the core of planning for a 
distributed renewable economy. This will be further consolidated by replicating 
the economic network into a second-tier of economic activities.
Chapter 8: Inclusive governance for sustainable development in Africa
The discourses around developmental states and sustainable transition have 
gained increasing prominence in development studies over the last couple of 
decades. Proponents of both developmental states (DS) and sustainability 
transition (ST) agree on the need for profound structural transformation, but with 
two different ends in mind. For proponents of developmental states, the end is 
accelerated economic ‘Development’ (big ‘D’) that substantially raises the average 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita with a focus on industrialisation and 
urbanisation. On the other hand, the end state for proponents of sustainability 
transition is a socio-technical transition that results in a low-carbon and resource-
efficient economy. This chapter argues that the synthesis of these two bodies 
of scholarship needs to open up a space for a more detailed discussion about 
governance for a just transition, with particular reference to how we deepen our 
understanding of the dynamics of the polity in African governance systems.
A new kind of political leadership is required that strikes a very delicate balance 
between regulation of shared norms/values and self-managed implementation. It 
also needs to recognise that there are emergent properties that stem from dense 
networks of people, working together across institutional boundaries within well-
defined institutional ecosystems, unconstrained by outdated, usually hierarchically 
organised, norms or an atmosphere of fear and conformity. Furthermore, 
embeddedness for the twenty-first-century developmental states might mean 
building a polity that broadens out developmental partnering with networks of 
civil society formations and smaller entrepreneurs rather than focusing only on the 
investment strategies of large corporates.
To ensure that the directionality of the transition to more sustainable modes 
of production and consumption is also oriented towards a just transition will 
depend on power dynamics within the polity. The rise of governance since the 
1970s is primarily about the organisation and outward expansion of the polity to 
incorporate policy actors that were previously excluded from having any influence 
on policy. Much of this was to compensate for the weakening of the state as 
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complexities mounted. However, ‘collibration’ is the counter-trend, referring to 
the way key actors within the polity seek – with varying degrees of success – to 
harness and mobilise governance and complexity more generally. It is this kind 
of ‘governance of governance’ that has the potential to guide and shape long-term 
structural transformation that would be required in the African context to drive a 
just transition. The core skill required for this is process facilitation. 
It is necessary to move away from a ‘black box’ approach to the African polity. 
Detailed granular analyses of the inner dynamics of the polity will be required. This 
will need to include, firstly, an understanding of the underlying power relations 
at the very heart of the polity. Without this, facilitated collibratory governance 
to widen stakeholder involvement in the polity will be impossible. Secondly, an 
understanding of the potential and limitations of the paradigm(s) shared by key 
actors within the polity will be required. Without this, learning and innovation will 
be difficult to achieve. Thirdly, how state/government institutions are organised, 
funded and operated is critical. This is where ‘lock-in’ and path dependency sets 
in, often conditioning constrained parameters within which policy alternatives are 
considered. Fourthly, how policies are formulated and the potential futures they 
express is also critical for success. 
To effectively implement the SDGs, the traditional debate about African 
developmental states must incorporate sustainability transitions and conceptualise 
sustainability-oriented developmental states. The need for purposive directionality 
to tackle the tremendous African challenges of inequality and unsustainability has 
never been greater. Collibratory governance in practice is about building a new 
generation of meta-governance institutions with a mandate and capabilities to 
facilitate new modes of partnering within reconfigured more inclusive polities. 
Chapter 9:  Indicators on transformational infrastructure for a  
wellbeing economy
The most dominant economic development indicator since the middle of the 
twentieth century is gross domestic product. This indicator has served well for the 
promotion of the free-market economy in the twentieth century and subsequently 
globalisation during the second half of the century. GDP, as a measure of the 
market value of goods and services produced within an economy in a given period, 
has been a reasonable indicator to measure the level of economic production in a 
region or country. The limitation of GDP as a measure for development was well 
recognised even by its creator back in the 1930s and 1940s. However, since the 
second half of the twentieth century, it garnered a disproportionate amount of 
attention and influence from both policymakers and the general public as a measure 
of human wellbeing and social progress. The mounting evidence from countries 
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has shown that a narrow focus on GDP is at odds with the broader outcomes of 
sustainable development, particularly those relating to environmental wellbeing 
and social equity.
The need for developing alternative indicators to GDP has been recognised 
for many decades. The most notable challenge came from the global effort to 
develop sustainable development indicators that address the economic, social 
and environmental dimension of sustainable development. This effort received a 
new push since the 1990s and led to the development of different methodologies 
and hundreds of indicator sets including composite indicators. These include 
ecological footprint (EF), environmental sustainability index (ESI), wellbeing 
index (WI), human development index (HDI), global happiness index (GHI), and 
green economy indicators (GEI).
The various sustainability assessment approaches and development indicators 
provide valuable insight into how to navigate through development and utilisation 
of alternative indicators. The key selection criteria African countries are advised 
to consider in selecting an indicator set are policy relevance, the utility for policy 
and decision-making, soundness of the methodology, interpretability of generated 
information and availability of relevant data. While many lessons could be drawn 
from existing literature and practical experience in developing and utilising 
sustainability-related indicators, the indicator framework proposed in this book is 
specifically focused on assessing the leapfrogging possibilities from a transformative 
infrastructure perspective. 
The guiding vision of the indicator framework is that African countries can 
transition to a wellbeing economy that will enable them to fulfil the basic needs 
and aspirations of their people while sustaining the wellbeing of the natural 
ecosystem as a foundation for their development. The scope of the framework is 
that the investment decisions to be made on essential infrastructure development 
within the coming five to ten years will determine the leapfrogging opportunity of 
African countries to a wellbeing economy both in the medium and long term. The 
framework also recognises that the ability of countries to effectively integrate the 
above consideration into their policy, planning and budgeting process is a crucial 
factor in determining their leapfrogging potential.
The proposed set of indicators are clustered under transformative policy formula-
tion, transformative infrastructure development, and transformative governance. 
The policy component looks at the high-level political commitment for a 
transformational transition to a wellbeing economy expressed in different forms 
in national policy and strategy documents. The infrastructure component looks 
at the level of commitment for transformational infrastructure and the lifecycle 
consideration in the planning and development of energy, industry and urban 
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infrastructure as the primary drivers. Finally, the governance component looks at 
the fulfilment of both distributional and representational justice for communities 
as fundamental prerequisites for achieving transformational development in the 
twenty-first century. The proposed framework needs to be further adapted and 
developed according to the specific context of each country. 
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TRANSFORMATIVE LEAPFROGGING 




2015 was a year during which a broader global consensus was reached across 
science, politics and morality on the need for transformational change. The 
adoption of Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 
Paris Declaration on Climate Change together with the Encyclical issued by Pope 
Francis on climate change, which happened during the same year, represents this 
development. In essence, all these and other declarations recognised the urgency 
for the transition to inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient economies at the 
global level. The declarations underline that such a transformation is critical if 
humanity was to avoid an irreversible natural disaster of a global scale and make 
progress towards a more inclusive society. The path to be followed by each country 
and regions could be different from one to the other. This is because each path is 
dependent on the current level of development and the specific socio-economic and 
socio-ecological challenges faced by the respective countries and regions. Broadly 
categorised, countries with developed economies would require to deconstruct 
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and retrofit their existing infrastructural base while countries that are at an early 
stage of development have the opportunity to build their infrastructure on a more 
inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient basis. By doing so, they maximise their 
leapfrogging opportunity into a more sustainable development trajectory.
Besides what has been agreed at a global level, Africa as a region developed its 
own Agenda 2063 that aims to transform the development visions and aspirations 
of its people into reality and improve the wellbeing of its people. Many African 
countries have been developing ambitious development visions and strategies 
that align with Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. However, most of these countries 
are facing severe challenges in making progress in implementing their visions and 
strategies. Much of these challenges are associated with the fact that most of these 
national efforts are locked in the conventional economic development models of 
the twentieth century that has some fundamental limitations. In light of the early 
stage of development of most African countries, the region is believed to have the 
largest leapfrogging potential to an economy that is inclusive, climate-resilient and 
resource-efficient. Putting Africa on a more sustainable development trajectory is a 
global opportunity that should not be missed by the international community. 
This chapter provides an overall conceptual framework for transformative 
leapfrogging of African economies and presents the key drivers and elements of 
such leapfrogging opportunities. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the 
conceptual basis for the transition to an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient 
economy and critical aspects of leapfrogging including the qualitative distinction 
between incidental and transformative leapfrogging. This is followed by a section 
that highlights the key drivers that favour transformative leapfrogging in Africa and 
the related constraints that need to be addressed by African countries.  
Environment and economic development 
For millennia, the interaction between human society and its natural environment 
had been primarily governed by adherence to the limits and correcting conditions 
imposed by the natural systems. This relationship started to change with the 
onset of the agricultural revolution and subsequently took a new proportion with 
the industrial revolution. While these changes were initially driven mainly by the 
Judeo-Christian beliefs of ‘man’s right to master the earth’, it was later given an 
economic rationale of wealth creation for economic development. This subsection 
provides an overview of the perceived dichotomy between economic growth and 
the environment followed by a synoptic review of the concept of sustainability and 
sustainable development.
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Economic growth and environment
One of the major myths that have adversely affected progress in sustainable 
development policy-making is the perceived dichotomy between the environment 
and the economy that is dominant in neo-classical economics. This resulted in 
continuous depletion and degradation of the natural ecosystem as a consequence 
of externalising all costs associated with environmental inputs and services. The 
concept of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which became popular in 
the 1990s, attempted to describe the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental pollution by applying Kuznets’ theory. The Kuznets curve, which is 
an inverted U-shaped curve, is based on the hypothesis that was first advanced by 
economist Simon Kuznets stating that as an economy develops, market forces first 
increase and then decrease economic inequality (Munasinghe, 1999). According 
to the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, economic growth increases 
environmental pressures at early stages of development, but after a turning 
point, high per capita income levels enable societies to reduce their ecological 
impact (Padilla, 2017). In a nutshell, EKC states that indicators of environmental 
degradation tend to get worse as new economic growth occurs until average income 
reaches a certain point over the course of development (Shafik, 1994). 
The World Bank’s World Development Report 1992 (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], 1992) argued that as incomes rise, 
the demand for improvements in environmental quality will increase resulting in 
more resources being made available for environmental investment. The assertion 
is that once countries reach a certain level of growth, they will be in a position 
to invest in environmental protection measures, which will result in improved 
environmental quality. This has been a mantra that has been fiercely advocated 
by some international development organisations and development experts in 
the last decade of the twentieth century. Even if the overall assertion of the EKC 
might have been correct for some developed countries concerning limited types 
of environmental pollution, it cannot work ad infinitum for all countries. Besides 
the various econometric limitations outlined by Stern (2003), the foundation 
of EKC became more discredited in the last couple of decades, mainly for the 
following reasons:
  As was concluded by many international scientific panels, the existing global 
economic system has already overshot the carrying and assimilating capacity 
of the planetary system in several areas. This places an ecological limit to the 
industrialisation of developing countries’ economies following the same old 
path of industrialisation.
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 Significant progress has been made in developing more resource-efficient and 
environmentally-sound technologies across sectors since the 1990s. This created 
opportunities for newly industrialising countries to develop their economy in a 
more economically and ecologically efficient way. These opportunities led to the 
possibility of tunnelling through the environmental Kuznets curve and achieving 
economic growth with reduced environmental impacts.
  The long-standing dichotomy between environment and economic develop-
ment, which has been misguiding policy development in most countries, has 
been debunked in the subsequent decades. This has resulted in global consensus 
documents aimed at promoting alternative development pathways that meet 
the multiple economic, social and environmental objectives of a country.
Development level










Figure 1.1  Tunnelling through the environmental Kuznets curve using sustainable 
development strategies (Source: Munasinghe, 1999:95)
All African countries have signed up to the most recent global sustainable 
development consensus documents including Agenda 2030 on Sustainable 
Development Goals and the Paris Declaration on Climate Change. Despite their 
full endorsement of these documents, many African countries are still trapped in 
the idea of ‘industrialise first and deal with the environment later’. The first major 
step to getting ready for the opportunities from transformative leapfrogging is to 
get rid of such an obsolete notion of industrialisation which does not fit well with 
the reality of the twenty-first century.
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Sustainability and sustainable development
Major social transformation processes have shaped human history over millennia. 
These transformational processes determined the critical features of socio-
economic relationships both within communities and across nations. However, 
they also fundamentally redefined our relationship with the natural environment. 
Two of the most significant social transformations are the agricultural and industrial 
transformations, which radically redefined human society. Both of these transitions 
were driven by confluences of crisis which include the environmental crisis of 
various dimensions. The dynamic relationship between society and its natural 
environment had been one of the critical drivers of these social transformations 
while their outcomes had also redefined it. The agricultural transformation, as a 
successful response to wildlife scarcity faced by the hunter-gatherer society, resulted 
in slow population growth from about 10 million to approximately 800 million by 
1750 (Meadows, Meadows & Randers, 1992). This created new scarcities and 
social conflict, especially in land and energy, which led to the industrial revolution 
that began in England with the substitution of abundant coal for vanishing biomass 
resulting in the introduction of the steam engine.
Compared to previous centuries, the twentieth century had been a period of 
unprecedented economic growth and development driven by a faster pace 
of industrialisation and globalisation. However, it was also a century that 
saw exponential growth in the volume of resource extracted from the natural 
environment and the related environmental degradation. The International 
Resource Panel (IRP) reported that over the past five decades, our global 
population has doubled, the extraction of materials has tripled and the gross 
domestic product (GDP) has quadrupled. The report further concluded that the 
extraction and processing of natural resources have accelerated over the last two 
decades, and accounts for more than 90 percent of our biodiversity loss and water 
stress and approximately half of our climate change impacts (IRP, 2019). On the 
other hand, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that 
if humanity is to avoid irreversible change, it has to limit global warming to 20C 
relative to the period 1861–1880 and reach carbon neutrality by the second half 
of this century (IPCC, 2014). French economist Thomas Piketty maintains that 
on the social front, while social inequality seemed to narrow down in developed 
countries in the decades immediately after the Second World War, it became 
significantly wide across the world with the increased globalisation of national 
economies (Piketty, 2014). 
The relationship and interaction between the natural environment and society 
have been a subject of discourse for thousands of years, be it in philosophy or 
religion. However, it took a different scope and dimensions since the middle 
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of the twentieth century due to the global proportion of the environmental 
impacts that were being faced by humanity. In this context, it has been more 
than 30 years since the terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ rose 
to the prominence in international development discourse. Although the terms 
are more recent terminologies, there are important schools of thoughts that are 
considered as historical precursors to the current discourse (Mebratu, 1998). 
This ranges from the traditional conceptualisation of ‘living in harmony with 
nature’ adhered to by indigenous communities across the world, to the various 
religions which represented the ‘voice of nature to humanity’ by celebrating and 
consecrating our ties with the non-human world (Gottlieb, 1996). The relative 
vagueness of the concept coupled with its increasing importance in national and 
international policies led to the proliferation of definitions and interpretations that 
emphasise one or the other aspect of sustainability and sustainable development 
(Mebratu, 1998).
Over the subsequent decades, numerous processes were initiated from global 
to local levels focussing on different aspects of sustainability and sustainable 
development. As a result of these initiatives and processes, our knowledge and 
understanding of the natural environment and its interaction with our socio-
economic systems have significantly expanded. Despite the progress made so far, 
we have not been able to go beyond incremental gains which have limited capacity 
to contain and reverse the unsustainable momentum that is building up. This is 
manifested through the deepening socio-economic and social-ecological crisis 
expressed in the form of growing environmental degradation, persistent economic 
stagnation, increasing unemployment and growing disparities between and within 
countries. These and other global and regional developments have brought the 
transition to inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient economies to the centre 
of national and international development discourse. 
Swilling and Annecke (2012) argue that sustainability is a challenge that is difficult 
to comprehend through disciplinary lenses and the significance of complexity 
theory lies in the fact that it shows how to make this break from reductionism. 
Applying principles of systems dynamics based on key principles of systems 
thinking could help us to better understand sustainability as an organising principle 
of any system. Mebratu (2000) proposed a planetary sustainability matrix aimed at 
highlighting the hierarchical relationships and interactions between the different 
dimensions of the cosmic universe as presented in the sustainability matrix shown 
in Table 1.1. 
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(Source: Adapted from Mebratu, 2000:67)
The horizontal axis of the sustainability matrix consists of the subsidiary process, 
measurable flows, regulating mechanisms, non-stable scenarios and default 
corrections while the vertical axis represents the hierarchical spheres of our 
planetary universe. The subsidiary processes are those processes that inherently 
determine stability within the planetary regimes while the measurable flows are 
the characteristic flows (of energy, material and information) that help to describe 
the planetary entity. The regulating mechanisms are the mechanisms which 
determine its functional stability. The non-stable scenarios are indicators of effects 
of persistent offshoots of the measurable parameters, while the default corrections 
are the systemic corrective mechanisms that restore the stability of the system.
In this context, social transformations are systemic responses that are necessitated 
by the dynamic interaction between the socio-ecological and socio-economic 
factors of a given society. The specific scope and nature of the transformation 
process shall be determined by the particular dynamics of the socio-economic 
and socio-ecological interactions. Such social transformation could happen either 
through a smart and creative response to non-stable scenarios or as an outcome of 
the default corrections of the system which will be beyond anybody’s control. The 
stark choice that humanity is faced with today is whether it will act timely and take 
the necessary action to bring about a desirable social transformation outcome or 
be at the receiving end of the default corrective action by the system, which would 
have its undesirable consequences.
As noted by Swilling and Annecke (2012), the evolution of new modes of 
existences instigated by innovations that partially or provisionally resolved the 
crisis and destroyed the basis for pre-existing modes of operations, technologies 
and hierarchies of power were crucial prerequisites for social transformations. 
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All  major  socio-economic transformations are characterised by changes that 
happened in leaps and bounds. The transformational impact we see with the 
exponential developments in the field of information and communication 
technology  (ICT), including the application of artificial intelligence, and the 
progress made on renewable energy development are some of the critical factors 
that determine the nature and pace of the transition in the coming decades. In a 
nutshell, we live in an era that provides numerous transformative leapfrogging 
opportunities towards a society that is more inclusive, low-carbon and resource-
efficient. This is particularly true for most African countries at the early stage 
of industrial development since they have a higher opportunity to build their 
economy on a more sustainable basis. 
Leapfrogging and social transformations
Moments of social transformation in human history are mainly characterised by 
the various tensions between the old and dominant system that strives to maintain 
the status quo and the new system that emerges as a result of the system dynamics. 
These tensions are usually resolved with the new techno-economic system taking 
the upper hand by meeting the required threshold of transformational change. In 
the next section, we look at the key features of lock-in and leapfrogging followed 
by the distinction between incidental leapfrogging and transformative leapfrogging 
supported with some case studies. The last subsection covers some of the key 
drivers and factors of transformative leapfrogging.
The concept of lock‑in and leapfrogging
From a technological progress perspective, the dynamics between lock-in and 
leapfrogging scenarios has been central to all forms of social transformations, 
including the agricultural and industrial transformations. These dynamics become 
even more critical for the transition to inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient 
economies given the dominant role of technology in today’s economies. Hence, it 
will be essential to understanding the relationship and distinction between these 
two critical factors of technological transition. Corvellec, Campos and Zapata 
(2012) note that the notion of lock-in originates from historical studies of science 
and technology. The idea of path-dependence (Corvellec et al., 2012; Liebowitz 
& Margolis,  1995; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010) is close to the notion of lock-in. 
Both ideas underscore that today’s solutions are constrained by yesterday’s choices 
and decisions even if these choices have lost their relevance and new alternatives 
have emerged that are more efficient and effective than the solutions that currently 
dominate. However, there are some distinctions in the sense that while path-
dependence focuses on the constraints that the past puts on present decisions, 
lock-in describes a current state of things (Corvellec et al., 2012). Once it is set, 
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it is not easy to break-up a lock-in due to stiff resistance for any change that will 
be created by the coalitions of interested groups and forces that benefit from 
the status quo.
However, as suggested by Cowan and Hulten (1996), possibilities of unlocking 
technologies can emerge from a combination of events, just as the process of 
lock-in can start with a small historical event or sequence of events. Grabher (1993) 
identifies three types of lock-in. These are: (i) functional, as in the case of personal 
ties and joint investment; (ii) cognitive, because of common ways of interpreting 
or envisioning things; (iii) and political, through associations or coalitions 
of industrialists or politicians. Corvellec et al. (2012) identified four types of 
rationales for a given state of infrastructural lock-in, taking the lock-in effect of waste 
incineration infrastructure as a basis. These are: (i) institutional rationale that are 
determined by existing policy and institutional frameworks; (ii) technical rationale 
justified through economic and technological factors that create a stalemate on 
identifying and accepting a new alternative; (iii) cultural rationale that leads to 
the establishment of a culture-bound cognitive lock-in; and (iv) material rationale 
associated with the physical infrastructure and related resource flow which may 
require a radical redesign of this network.
The concept of leapfrogging was initially used in the context of economic growth 
theories and industrial-organisation innovation studies with a specific focus on 
competition among firms. In the field of industrial organisation (IO), the leading 
work on leapfrogging was developed by Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole 
(1983) who analysed the conditions under which a new entrant can leapfrog 
an established firm. However, Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of ‘gales of creative 
destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942) provided the conceptual foundation for this and 
other subsequent works on innovation and leapfrogging. Schumpeter proposed 
that companies holding monopolies based on incumbent technologies have less 
incentive to innovate than potential rivals, and therefore they eventually lose their 
technological leadership role when new radical technological innovations are 
adopted by new firms which are ready to take risks (Schumpeter, 1942). According 
to Schumpeter, the gale of creative destruction describes the process of industrial 
mutation that incessantly revolutionises the economic structure from within, 
steadily destroying the old one, creating a new one (1942, cited in Tirole, 1988). 
The concept of creative destruction as defined by Schumpeter became a powerful 
concept in the field of economic research because it can explain many of the 
dynamics or kinetics of industrial change: the transition from a competitive to 
a monopolistic market, and back again (Sidak & Teece, 2009). Nelson and 
Nelson (2002) noted that it has also been the inspiration of endogenous growth 
theory and evolutionary economics. 
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Table 1.2 has been developed building upon the classification of the rationales for 
lock-in described earlier to further clarify the similarity and distinction between 
technological and infrastructural lock-in and leapfrogging.
Table 1.2 Comparison of the rationales of lock‑in and leapfrogging
The rationale Lock-in Leapfrogging
Temporal Managing the present within the 
boundaries and constraints of the past
Creating a new future by breaking out of the 
boundaries and constraints of the present
Institutional Viability of the status quo under existing 
policies, regulations and institutional 
procedures 
More economical, social, and environmental 
benefits could be achieved
Technical Focus on incremental efficiency gain within 
a piecemeal and stand-alone operational 
objective 
Drive for systems-wide transformational 
outcomes by redefining the operational 
boundaries
Cultural Cognitive and institutional inertia caused 
by fear of the unknown
Preparedness to be innovative and disruptive 
with focus on higher and broader outcomes
Material Rehabilitating and retrofitting of existing 
physical infrastructure with an emphasis on 
optimising resource flow
Deconstructing and replacing existing 
physical infrastructure with a new 
infrastructure of a higher metabolic function
As the table shows, concerning the time dimension, a lock-in situation is more 
focused on managing the present within the boundaries and constraints of the past 
while the leapfrog scenario focusses on creating a new future by breaking out of 
the boundaries and constraints of the present. At the institutional level, the lock-in 
scenario strives to ensure and secure the viability of the status quo under existing 
policies, regulations and institutional procedures while the leapfrog scenario aims 
at breaking the dominant institutional framework with a focus on creating multiple 
economic, social, and environmental benefits. 
On the cultural front, the lock-in scenario is characterised by cognitive and 
institutional inertia driven by fear of the unknown, while the leapfrog scenario is 
characterised by the drive to be innovative and disruptive with focus on higher 
and broader outcomes. Finally, on the material front, the lock-in scenario invests 
on rehabilitating and retrofitting existing physical infrastructure with an emphasis 
on optimising resource flow, while the leapfrog scenario invests on deconstructing 
and replacing existing physical infrastructure with a new infrastructure of a higher 
metabolic function.
Transformational moments are typically characterised by the increasing tension 
between lock-in and leapfrog scenarios in various forms. A closer look at the 
current tension between the oil and gas industry, which has been the dominant 
energy sector for more than a century, and the emerging renewable energy sector 
provides a clear demonstration of the above comparison at the sectoral level. Until 
recently, the oil and gas industry has been actively undermining the advancement 
of renewable energy technologies both through its covert and overt actions. As the 
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build-up of the facts from climate science on the increasing adverse impact of carbon 
emission on the environment become indisputable, and the global consensus on 
climate change became stronger, the oil and gas sector started to invest in becoming 
a renewable energy company too. In recent years, an increasing number of major 
financing institutions have decided to disinvest from the use of coal for power 
generation and shift their investment to renewable energy development. Such 
moments represent a tipping point from a lock-in to a leapfrog scenario.
Incidental and transformative leapfrogging
The term ‘leapfrogging’ has been used in different contexts in development 
discourse, particularly in relation to development pathways that need to be 
followed by developing countries. Munasinghe (1999) and Goldemberg  (2011) 
note that developing countries can either choose to mimic industrialised nations 
and undergo an economic development that is dirty, wasteful and that creates an 
enormous legacy of environmental pollution or to leapfrog over some of the steps 
of development. Some experts tend to confuse leapfrogging with a conventional 
process of transferring technology. Goldemberg (2011) notes that technological 
learning and innovation, which lead to lower costs for existing and new products 
and enhances productivity and competitiveness, are not synonymous with 
leapfrogging. The World Bank Group (2018) noted that Africa’s massive 
infrastructure, technology, and policy gaps require disruptive solutions and 
thinking outside of the box, yet development policies have often been primarily 
programmatic and mostly incremental.
One of the critical distinctions we need to understand when we talk about 
leapfrogging is the distinction between an incidental leapfrogging, which is mainly 
incremental, and transformative leapfrogging. An incidental leapfrogging is the 
application and utilisation of a new generation of know-how and technology that 
has become available on the market as a result of externally driven innovation 
and operational factors. On the other hand, transformative leapfrogging is 
innovative and need responsive application and utilisation of a new generation 
of knowledge and technology for broader and transformative impacts. To 
illustrate with an example, the improvement of access to communication through 
mobile connectivity without the need to have an elaborate copper-wire based 
communication infrastructure for landline connectivity is a typical example of 
incremental leapfrogging. On the other hand, the innovative application and 
utilisation of the same mobile communication technology for financial inclusivity, 
agricultural productivity and health services to tens and hundreds of millions of 
people are examples of transformative leapfrogging.
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A more detailed look at the distinction between incidental and transformative 
leapfrogging (refer to Table 1.3) shows that the focus for incidental leapfrogging 
is more on acquiring the technology (hardware), while the focus for the 
transformative leapfrogging is on the development of a socio-technological 
regime that is more relevant and impactful to the specific context. In terms of the 
driving factors, incidental leapfrogging is mainly driven by external driving factors, 
which includes the availability of technology and finance, while transformative 
leapfrogging is primarily driven by contextually-defined and demand-driven 
internal factors linked to broad development objectives. 
Table 1.3 Comparative analysis between incidental and transformative leapfrogging
Key features Incidental leapfrogging Transformative leapfrogging
Dominant mechanism Diffusion of new technologies Development of new socio-technological 
regimes
Driving factors Mostly supply driven by external push 
factors 
Contextually-defined and demand-driven 
by internal factors
Level of impact At best segmented and incremental Society-wide and transformative impacts 
Innovation Minimal innovation as the technology 
end-user
Unpacking of technology with a strong 
dimension of socio-technical innovation
Empowering potential Higher potential of disempowering people Provides more empowerment to society
In terms of its ultimate impact, incremental leapfrogging may, at best, result in 
segments of incremental progress that are of limited impacts, while transformative 
leapfrogging has high possibility to lead to society-wide and transformative 
impacts. In terms of innovation, incremental leapfrogging has a minimal element 
of innovation as it tends to focus on transferring the technology as an end-user 
while unpacking the technology with a purpose of enhancing the socio-technical 
innovation is key for transformative leapfrogging. Finally, incremental leapfrogging 
has high disempowering potential as it promotes dependency on providers and 
external players, while transformative leapfrogging empowers countries through a 
continuous build-up and accumulation of knowledge.
One can find a sufficient number of cases to illustrate incidental leapfrogging in 
all spheres of African socio-economic textures. To start with, there is very strong 
evidence that our education system is mostly suffering from all the malaise 
of incidental leapfrogging. This is because our modern education system was 
designed to either serve the neo-colonial governance agenda of the post-colonial 
era (in the field of social sciences) or feed the best and the brightest of the region’s 
children to the economies of the developed world (through the fields of science 
and engineering). Hence, despite decades of effort, African education and 
research institutions have not been able even to identify the source of the critical 
development challenges that Africa is facing, let alone provide solutions for its 
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underdevelopment. Overcoming these challenges would require fundamentally 
rebooting our knowledge system in such a way that it becomes responsive to the 
specific needs and demands of the respective countries.
On the technology front, there have been numerous regional and national efforts 
to transfer technology to African countries since the middle of the twentieth 
centuries. Most of our technology transfer efforts over the last five to six decades, 
however, have been mainly determined either by external push factors or misguided 
ambitions of the ruling elite. As a result, their outcome and developmental impact 
have been mostly marginal, and in some cases detrimental to the respective 
countries. As we move to the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0), 
in which the role of technology is becoming exponential, the success of any country 
will be determined by the way it manages and utilises the opportunities from these 
technologies. The examples in the two boxes that follow provide insight into the 
benefits and damages of transformative and incremental leapfrogging respectively. 
Box 1.1:  The case of M‑Pesa, Kenya
M‑Pesa, which was launched in 2007 by Safaricom in Kenya, ignited the mobile money 
revolution in Africa. The service allows customers to use their mobile phones to, for 
example, deposit and withdraw funds from banks, make money transfers, pay bills and 
purchase airtime. M‑Pesa’s initial innovation was leapfrogging the lack of financial services 
by exploiting existing telecommunications infrastructure and network subscriptions in 
Kenya, circumventing the expenses associated with storefronts and in‑cash transactions 
(World Bank Group, 2018). Nearly two‑thirds of Kenya’s adult population, which comprise 
a quarter of the country’s GNP, use mobile payments and M‑Pesa has been a lifeline for the 
unbanked (Brugmans, Van Dinteren & Hajer, 2016). The service has expanded to include 
more advanced offerings, including ATM cash withdrawals, savings accounts, on‑site retail 
payments, mobile ticketing for events, and corporate banking accounts. M‑Pesa spawned 
competing mobile money services. 
By 2016, 75 percent of the country’s adult population had a mobile money account, with 
transactions amounting to the equivalent of 4.5 percent of annualised GDP per day. M‑Pesa 
is a disruptive innovation that transformed banking in other countries, leading to an 
explosion of mobile money services across Africa, enhancing financial inclusion. Besides 
promoting inclusiveness and broader social justice, such transformative innovation makes 
a significant contribution to the growth of revenue and profitability of private companies. 
According to the annual report of Safaricom (2017), M‑Pesa has become Safaricom’s 
most significant driver of revenue growth in just a decade, contributing to over a quarter 
of its fiscal year 2017 revenue, with the mobile money service generating KSh 55 billion 
(US$103 million).                      (Sources: Safaricom, 2017:11; Brugmans, Van Dinteren & Hajer, 2016:33)
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Box 1.2: Reppie Waste‑to‑Energy facility, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Like most of the African urban centres, Addis Ababa, which does not have a single sanitary 
landfill, is faced with the growing challenge of managing the domestic waste generated by 
its residents. The city is estimated to create 1 400 tons of household waste every day. The 
Reppie Waste‑to‑Energy facility is a plant located at an open‑dump site of Addis Ababa city. 
According to the information released during the inauguration, the plant cost about Birr 
2.6 billion (approximately 95 million USD) and can generate 50 MW/year, which could 
cover about 30 percent of all household electricity consumption of Addis Ababa.
The waste incineration technology that forms the basis for this project is considered to 
be an obsolete technology since the introduction of the programme of ‘reduce, reuse and 
recycle’ of waste in the 1990s. Furthermore, for such a facility to be operationally efficient 
and economically viable, it primarily needs to have a waste volume containing a significant 
proportion of energy‑rich combustible waste. In addition, the city has to have a relatively 
efficient waste segregation facility, as well as a collection infrastructure that ensures 
collection and sorting of the waste at a minimal cost. The plant should also have a co‑
generation possibility that will enable it to make use of the steam/hot water that comes out 
after driving the turbine.
The situation in Addis Ababa clearly shows that the city does not meet any of the above 
fundamental prerequisites. Actually, except for a couple of towns in South Africa, none 
of the urban centres in sub‑Saharan Africa would fulfil any of the three operational 
requirements. Even those cities that may have a higher percentage of combustible waste 
can make higher values through recycling and re‑using rather than incinerating the waste 
for energy generation. Considering the composition of the domestic waste of African 
urban centres, which is mostly (60–75 percent) dirt and biodegradable debris, burning of 
household waste for energy generation is a fundamentally wrong and is a misplaced choice 
of technology for the region.
The decision to invest in this facility has all the hallmarks for an incremental 
leapfrogging that is driven by external factors. It is a sunk investment that resulted in 
an infrastructural lock‑in with significant financial consequences for decades to come. 
                                                                                                      (Source: Adapted from Mebratu, 2018)
The two cases clearly show how Africa can either achieve a more transformative 
outcome through an innovative application of an emerging technology or get 
trapped in a detrimental infrastructural lock-in by acquiring an obsolete technology 
as a result of submitting to external drivers. Ill-informed investment decisions 
made by African countries on major infrastructure may trap these countries with 
a significant volume of stranded assets that would have substantial operational and 
decommissioning costs besides the attendant social and environmental cost. The 
only way African countries can avoid such unsustainable scenarios is through active 
and strategic measures that favour transformative leapfrogging, which is needed 
responsive and internally driven, over incidental leapfrogging, which is supply-
oriented and externally driven.
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Drivers and factors of transformative leapfrogging 
Transformative leapfrogging is part of a broader transformational process 
that happens within a given socio-economic system. The nature of such a 
transformational process is mainly defined by some major driving factors that 
have their own dynamics, while the paths that are to be followed are determined 
by the specific elements of the socio-economic system under consideration. 
The unprecedented global economic growth witnessed since the middle of the 
twentieth century resulted in significant improvement in human wellbeing as seen 
in key human development indicators. However, it also resulted in a substantial rise 
of environmental pollution, natural resource degradation and widening income 
inequality both within and between countries. The ecological and social challenges 
faced by the global community continued to build up over the last couple of decades 
leading to an unprecedented confluence of economic, environmental and social 
challenges. This led to a broader recognition of the need for a transformational 
process at a global level, which resulted in the adoption of Agenda 2030 on 
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The 
following are some of the critical global drivers that necessitate the transition to 
an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient economy and provide the basis for 
transformative leapfrogging:
  Environmental drivers: From a systems perspective, the relation between the 
natural and socio-economic systems is defined by the source function, which 
includes the provision of required resource inputs, and the sink function, which 
consists of the regulating function of the natural system (Mebratu, 2000). From 
a source function perspective, annual extraction of natural resources grew 
from 7 billion tons in 1900 to 60 billion tons in 2010 and, with the Business 
as Usual (BaU) scenario, this is projected to reach 140  billion tons by 2050 
(United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], 2012:15). According to 
IPCC (2014), keeping global warming within 20C would require limiting global 
CO2 emission at 47 GTCO2e by 2025, which is about the level of CO2  by 2010, 
and reduce it to 22 GTCO2e by 2050. However, according to the Emissions Gap 
Report 2014 produced UNEP, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission is expected to 
grow to an average of 68 GTCO2e by 2030 and 87 GTCO2e by 2050 under the 
current development scenario (UNEP, 2014).
  Economic drivers: Based on comprehensive economic data, Picketty (2014) 
showed that the economic development of the last two centuries has led to 
wider economic inequalities even in most developed economies. This has 
demonstrated the complete failure of the trickle-down theory of neo-liberal 
economists. He further noted that the inimical economic recession faced 
by almost all of the major OECD countries as a result of the economic and 
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financial crisis of 2008, which is dubbed as the ‘Great Recession’, indicates the 
urgent need for transforming the global economy. The failure of neo-classical 
economics that takes growth in GDP as the primary measure for economic 
development has been increasingly recognised in the last decade.
  Social drivers: The two major factors underlying the social driver are the 
issue of widening social inequality and job creation. Oxfam (2016) declares 
that, just 62 individuals had the same wealth as 3.6  billion people in 2015, 
which is the bottom half of humanity. According to the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), global unemployment reached 197.1 million, 27 million 
higher than in 2007 (ILO, 2016). More disturbingly, vulnerable employment 
reached 1.5 billion people or over 46 percent of the total employment. Coming 
to the specific case of inequality in resource consumption, the average use of 
resources in some developed countries is as high as 30 to 40 tonnes/person/
year compared to two tonnes/person/year for some developing countries 
(IRP, 2019). An average citizen in a developed country uses each year nearly 
12 times as much energy as one would in a developing country.
  Technological drivers: Technological progress made in the last couple of 
decades has created new opportunities and challenges that may fundamentally 
reshape the currently dominant global economy. The progress made in ICT has 
created significant transformational opportunities that empower individuals 
with information and knowledge. On the other hand, the increasing application 
of artificial intelligence (AI) in the industrial sector is a source of major threats 
as much as it is a source of opportunities. Progress made in areas such as 
materials science and engineering and nanotechnologies have also created new 
opportunities and challenges.
  Energy drivers: Since time immemorial, the provision of energy has been at 
the centre of all major social transformations. Notable among these were the 
discovery of fire, bioenergy, coal and petroleum, which were the main drivers 
for the advent of sedentary settlements, agricultural revolution and industrial 
revolutions respectively. As noted in the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030, 
it is urgent that we move to a low-carbon economy to help reduce the impact 
of climate change. From a social development perspective, addressing the 
widespread energy poverty across developing countries is a fundamental 
prerequisite for achieving poverty eradication. In this regard, the transition 
to an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient society shall be driven by 
increasing share of renewable energy resources in national economies. This 
development would make renewable energy resources the next energy frontiers 
of this century.
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 Political drivers: The currently dominant nation-state governance that is based 
on the principle of electoral democracy together with the global governance 
structure that emerged after the Second World War have been instrumental for 
the fastest economic growth witnessed in human history. However, it has also 
led to systemic governance failure that subjected billions to absolute poverty 
and created environmental damages of global proportion. This systemic 
governance failure is expressed in increasing level of public discontent and 
dissatisfaction that manifest themselves in civil conflicts and political unrests 
across the world. Addressing this challenge would require a transition towards 
participatory development governance that empowers people and local 
communities in determining and shaping their future.
Coming to the specific case of Africa, after decades of decline and stagnation, 
economies of African countries showed significant turnaround towards positive 
economic growth around the turn of the twenty-first century. Once written off as a 
continent uniquely suffering from structural impediments to economic growth and 
development, there is now widening optimism about the future of the continent 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA], 2016). The talk 
of the ‘doomed continent’ and ‘African growth tragedy’ are now being replaced by 
metaphors such as the ‘Rising continent’ and the ‘African lions’ respectively. The 
African Development Report concludes that Africa’s growth momentum in the past 
25 years has been remarkable by historical standards. The report further states that 
in at least two-thirds of the African countries with data, per capita income rose for 
eight consecutive years between 1950-2016 at a rate of 3.5 percent per year or more 
(African Development Bank [Af DB], 2018:33). According to United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2015 statistics, annual 
GDP growth in Africa was 4.6 percent on average between 2000 and 2014 (cited 
in UNECA, 2015) making it one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. As a 
result of these development trends, the region has been increasingly touted as the 
next frontier for global economic growth and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
While Africa is recognised as a continent that is on the rise, it is also faced with 
enormous environmental and social challenges that pose significant threats to the 
livelihood of its population. Despite the low level of development, the ecological 
footprint of the region increased by 240 percent between 1961 to 2008 and the 
overall carbon footprint of the region increased by eight-fold during the same four 
decades (Af DB & World Wide Fund [WWF], 2012). Furthermore, the ecological 
footprint of most of the African countries is expected to double by 2040 under 
the business as usual scenario. More than 640 million Africans have no access to 
energy, giving an electricity access rate for African countries at just over 40 percent, 
which is the lowest in the world. Africa’s energy potential, especially renewable 
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energy, is enormous, yet only a fraction is employed. Hydropower provides around 
a fifth of current capacity, but not even a tenth of its potential is utilised. Similarly, 
the technical potential of solar, biomass, wind and geothermal energy is huge 
(Af DB, 2018).
In terms of job creation, between 2000 and 2008, employment in the region grew at 
an annual average of 2.8 percent, which is roughly half the rate of economic growth 
(Af DB,  2018). Despite slower economic growth, yearly employment growth 
increased at an average of 3.1 percent from 2009 to 2014. However, this figure was 
still 1.4 percentage points below average economic growth. Africa is projected to 
have the highest population growth of any geographical region by 2050, which will 
have major implications for the continent’s economic development. According to 
UNCTAD (2018), the population of Africa is projected to increase from 1.2 billion 
in 2017 to 2.5 billion in 2050, while its rate of urbanisation is expected to increase 
from 40 percent in 2015 to 56 percent of its population in 2050. Furthermore, its 
youth population is forecasted to grow from 231 million in 2015 to 461 million in 
2050, while its working-age population (15–64 years) is predicted to grow by 2050.
While Africa is equally, if not more, challenged by the emerging global drivers/
pressures, including climate change, it has a unique opportunity of leapfrogging to 
a more inclusive, sustainable and resource-efficient society that eradicates poverty 
and ensures improved wellbeing to its population. The following are some of 
the key factors that favour Africa’s leapfrogging to an inclusive, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient society: 
  Resource endowment: Despite its fragility, Africa is endowed with relatively 
abundant natural resources that provide a solid ecological foundation for its 
development. This includes the renewable energy resource of the continent.
  Low lock‑in inertia: Related to its early stage of development, Africa has a 
low lock-in inertia from unsustainable physical and institutional infrastructure. 
This allows the country  the opportunity to develop an economic development 
infrastructure that is climate-resilient and resource-efficient.
  Technology beneficiary: Most of the technical and technological solutions 
that are needed for the transition are already developed and available for use. 
Through an effective social innovation regime, Africa could be a primary 
beneficiary of these emerging and resource-efficient technologies and 
techniques.
  Affinity to sustainability: The widely prevalent communal philosophy known 
as Ubuntu in southern and eastern Africa, which is based on the principle of 
‘I am because of who you are’ and the concept of Ukama, which represents 
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African culture of environmental conservation through the relations between 
nature, society and ancestors, give African communities better affinity to 
sustainability (Murove, 2009).
Even if Africa has a substantial leapfrogging potential, changing this potential 
into a transformational opportunity would require various levels of innovations 
at the countries level. The World Bank Group (2018) noted that embracing and 
leveraging innovation and building the momentum to leapfrog will be critical for 
Africa to create the jobs its youth so desperately need. The Africa 2063 Agenda, 
endorsed by the African Union Summit in 2015, expresses the collective aspiration 
of African countries to further promote sustainable development of the region. 
It is now a matter of creating the required innovation space for countries and its 
people to be active economic players and contributors to the twenty-first century. 
Africa has mostly missed out on benefiting from the industrial revolution of the 
twentieth century. It cannot afford to miss out on the economic transformation of 
the twenty-first century.
Transformative leapfrogging to wellbeing economy
The preceding section highlighted the critical importance of focusing on 
transformative leapfrogging for African countries not to be left out and to secure 
their share of benefit from the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This section focuses on 
describing the macro-economic context that facilitates transformative leapfrogging 
in Africa and highlights the specific issues that African countries need to consider 
to have an effective transformative leapfrogging. 
The macro‑economic argument
Transformational changes happen when the organising principles of an existing 
system persistently fail to address existing and emerging challenges and an 
alternative organising principle emerges as a basis for a systemic transition. There 
has been a growing consensus over the last couple of decades which indicated 
that the organising principle of the self-regulating market, as dictated by the neo-
liberal economic thinking, has persistently failed. This failure has been manifested 
through the numerous socio-economic and socio-ecological challenges faced across 
the world that have become increasingly complex both in scope and frequency. 
American economist Joseph E. Stiglitz writes:
The current situation reminds me of the world some seventy years ago. As the 
world plummeted into the Great Depression, advocates of the free market 
said that ‘Not to worry; markets are self-regulating, and given time, economic 
prosperity will resume’. Never mind the misery of those whose lives are 
destroyed waiting for this so-called eventuality. (Stiglitz, 2002:249)
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Piketty concluded:
[A] market economy based on private property, if left for itself, contains 
powerful forces of convergence, associated in particular with the diffusion 
of knowledge and skills; but it also contains powerful forces of divergence, 
which are potentially threatening to democratic societies and to the values of 
social justice on which they are based. (Piketty, 2014:571)
There have been many attempts made by various groups and institutions over the 
years to provide alternative organising principles for the global economic system. 
These attempts can be broadly categorised under the following three groups: 
  The first group consists of those schools of thought that consider market 
forces as the most efficient and effective organising principles for economic 
growth and prosperity and deploy macro-economic instruments to address 
environmental externalities. This covers the various schools of environmental 
economics that attempted to provide market-based solutions to environmental 
pollution and degradation problems while having neo-liberal economics as its 
foundation. 
  The second group consists of those schools of thought that recognise the 
exclusion of the inputs and services obtained from the natural ecosystem in the 
overall economic calculation and attempt to rectify this limitation by putting a 
market value on natural resources. This covers the various schools of ecological 
economics that gave rise to multiple shades and colours of economies, including 
Green Economy, Blue Economy, etc.
  The third group, which is the most recent and still an emerging one, consists 
of those schools of thought that recognise the fundamental deficiency of the 
currently dominant organising principle of the neo-liberal schools of thought 
and advocate the need for a more transformational organising principle. This 
has given rise to more transformational economic models for continuous 
fulfilment of human wellbeing, while maintaining a healthy ecosystem as its 
foundation.
One of the emerging schools of thoughts that are based on recognising the critical 
importance of a transformational change is the concept of wellbeing economy. 
For this chapter, we will focus on the concept of wellbeing economy, which is 
recognised as the more transformational school of thought that belongs to the third 
group. Fioramonti (2017) notes that societies have adopted a narrow definition 
of economic growth as the route to development for the past couple of centuries 
thereby making the economy the most fundamental decision-making system 
in contemporary societies. He further notes that the transition from a growth 
economy that overemphasises the primary importance of large corporations 
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to wellbeing economy that emphasises the critical role of distributed economy 
networks at the local level is imperative.
Table  1.4 shows some of the major distinctions between growth and wellbeing 
economies based on a comparison of some of the key features. 
Table 1.4 Comparison between a growth economy and a wellbeing economy
Key features Growth economy Wellbeing economy 
Organising principle Linear, extractive and isolated Circular, adaptable and integrated 
Primary drivers Large corporations Distributed economy networks 
Natural ecosystems Unlimited Providers of input Provider of ecosystem services as the 
foundation for the economy 
Primary measurement Gross domestic product  Wellbeing improvement/gross happiness 
Distributional outcome Concentration of wealth under a  
few corporate companies
Inclusive economic opportunity across 
communities 
To start with the major organising principles, the growth economy is organised 
as a linear economic system that is primarily based on the extraction of inputs, 
production, consumption and disposal structure that concentrates economic 
power. Conversely, a wellbeing economy strives to develop a circular economy that 
is adaptable and integrated with the local community and the natural ecosystems. 
Similarly, a growth economy takes large corporations as the major driver of 
development and prosperity, while a wellbeing economy considers distributed 
economy networks as the primary drivers. Concerning natural ecosystems, a 
growth economy is the unlimited provider of inputs and services, while a wellbeing 
economy takes the wellbeing of the ecosystem as the essential foundation for 
economic development and prosperity.
The most important distinction between growth and wellbeing economies is their 
position on the role of gross domestic product in measuring economic progress. 
One of the major successes of neo-liberal economics during the second half of the 
twentieth century was their success in elevating growth in GDP as the ultimate 
measurement of economic development by countries. While recognising the 
specific role of GDP as a measure for economic productivity, wellbeing economics 
recognises the limitation of GDP as the primary measurement for development 
and advocates for alternative indicators that measure the wellbeing of people and 
the natural ecosystem. Finally, from a distributional justice perspective, a growth 
economy primarily results in the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few as 
a result of its exclusionary structure, while wellbeing economy aims at creating an 
inclusive economic opportunity to all members of the community. 
In a nutshell, a wellbeing economy is an economy that strives for continuous 
fulfilment of basic human needs and aspirations of its people within the limits 
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and possibilities of its resource and available external opportunities. As noted 
by Swilling and Annecke (2012), a sustainable society must be both equitable in 
social terms and more respectful of the fact that human survival depends on the 
natural systems that have emerged from the evolutionary process. This would 
require deploying a national development strategy that is home-grown and organic 
but at the same time adaptive to the global dynamics. It also involves governance 
mechanisms that are equipped with transformative leadership based on adaptive 
learning and inclusivity. A wellbeing economy addresses both distributive and 
participatory justice of its people through their active involvement in the planning 
and management of the development process. Progress towards a wellbeing 
economy is measured by an actual and perceived improvement in the wellbeing of 
its people rather than solely relying on growth rate in GDP and FDI.
For most developing countries, progress towards a wellbeing economy requires 
the development of distributed local economy networks in combination with 
low-carbon and resource-efficient national backbone industries. The primary 
operational objectives of the distributed economy would be the creation of jobs 
and adding of value at the local level, which are extremely crucial for African 
countries. Such an economy also recognises the critical importance of maintaining 
the wellbeing of the natural ecosystem as the foundation for the fulfilment of its 
developmental objectives on a sustainable basis. In essence, a wellbeing economy 
provides a fundamentally new vehicle for the effective implementation of Agenda 
2030 on sustainable development goals with a qualitatively higher outcome.
The foundations for transformative leapfrogging
Tan, Ng and Jiang (2018) concluded that the process of technology Leapfrogging is 
analogous to the mechanics of a physical leapfrog and traverses across four stages: 
psyching, planting, propelling, and perpetuating. The psyching stage primarily 
covers the broad institutional framework that is required for a transformative 
leapfrogging. The planting stage focuses on establishing the foundation upon 
which the leapfrogging will be grounded. The propelling stage is the stage at 
which the technological leapfrogging is actualised, while the perpetuating stage is 
the stage at which the transformative impact of the leapfrogging process results in 
a new trajectory of development with multiple benefits. Taking the four stages of 
leapfrogging as a basis, Table 1.5 presents the key features and related outcomes of 
actions taken at the different stages of leapfrogging. 
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Table 1.5 Cycles of transformative leapfrogging 
Stages Focus Mechanisms Outcomes
Psyching Developing a strategic 
framework aligned with 
national development 
goals
 ■ Defining clear strategic 
objectives
 ■ Translating it into concrete 
action plans
 ■ Clarity of vision and commitment
 ■ Platform for collaborative actions
Planting Building the foundation 
for leapfrogging
 ■ Defining the partnership 
modality with external 
partners 
 ■ Developing the required 
local skillsets
 ■ Repurposing of existing capacity 
and creating new ones
 ■ Establishment of an 
organisational anchor for the 
leapfrogging process
Propelling Actualising the 
leapfrogging process
 ■ Choosing the right set of 
technologies
 ■ Contextualization of 
technologies to local needs 
 ■ Innovative application of acquired 
technologies
 ■ Effective assimilation of 
transferred technologies
Perpetuating Consolidating 
the trajectory for 
transformative change
 ■ Leveraging the symbiotic 
impact 
 ■ Consolidating the path-
dependent gains 
 ■ Optimising the transformative 
impact
 ■ Setting the scene for the next 
leapfrogging
The first stage of the transformative leapfrogging cycle is the psyching stage, 
which involves developing a strategic technology framework aligned with national 
development goals that provide clarity on the vision and commitment of the 
government and create the platform for collaborative actions between the key 
stakeholders. This has to be followed by definition of the partnership modality 
both within and outside the country and development of the required skillsets. 
This may include repurposing of existing capacity and building new ability to 
cover for the gaps and could also lead to the emergence of organisational anchors 
for the leapfrogging process. The propelling stage, which is about actualising 
the leapfrogging process, involves choosing the right set of technologies and 
contextualising them to local conditions and needs. This will, in turn, lead to 
the innovative application of acquired technologies and effective assimilation of 
transferred technologies. The final stage of perpetuating is about consolidating 
the trajectory for transformative change by leveraging the symbiotic impact of the 
transferred technology and enhancing the path-dependent gains. Moreover, the 
process at this stage sets the scene for the next phase of leapfrogging.
Strategic considerations
For Africa to realise its leapfrogging potential and benefit effectively from the 
global transition, it needs to be more innovative and follow an alternative economic 
development path that takes into account the global drivers of change and the 
specific leapfrogging opportunity of the region. The critical factor that determines 
the ability of African countries to gain the maximum benefit from the existing 
leapfrogging opportunity is the strategic choice and decisions they make in building 
their socio-economic infrastructure for the coming decades.
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Figure 1.2 shows the key features of transformative infrastructure.
Figure 1.2 Key features of transformative infrastructure
The following are the key strategic areas that need to be given primary attention 
by all African countries to lay the foundation for the transition to a more inclusive, 
low-carbon and resource-efficient society:
  Ecological infrastructure: Africa’s possibility for its development on a 
sustainable basis and the future of its people for the coming decade depends 
mainly on its ability to manage and effectively utilise its natural resource base 
as the foundation for its economic development. Building the adaptive capacity 
of local communities and enhancing the resilience of the natural ecosystem is 
particularly critical in light of the growing threat from climate change and the 
pressure from a high rate of population growth. 
  Energy infrastructure: The transition in energy systems is one of the critical 
determinants of the progress towards an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-
efficient economy. According to the African Progress Panel (APP), the first 
step that needs to be taken by each African country in this regard is ensuring the 
transition to sustainable energy systems in which renewable energy resources 
shall form the core of the energy infrastructure (APP, 2016). Besides the 
resource mix, the smart combination between grid and off-grid distributed 
energy systems will be a crucial factor for ensuring the distributive impact of 
the energy system. The latter aspect is particularly critical for most countries in 
Africa as it plays a key role in promoting energy access and poverty eradication 
through inclusive socio-economic development at the local level.
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 Industrial infrastructure: An efficient transformation of finite natural resources 
through industrial processing is a fundamental prerequisite to meet the basic 
needs of a growing global population. However, such efficient conversion 
requires replacing the predominantly linear mode of industrial production 
with an industrial infrastructure that promotes a circular economy. The United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) maintains that a 
key component of such infrastructure is the development of eco-industrial 
parks as the backbone of industrialisation (UNIDO,  2016). Furthermore, 
concerted planning efforts should be made to enhance the productive capacity 
of local communities as part of a sustainable value chain by effectively linking 
the development of distributive energy systems with value  addition at the 
local level.
  Urban infrastructure: The development of urban infrastructure to facilitate 
effective and efficient flow and movement of resources and promote the 
development of socio-economically productive urban centres is another crucial 
factor of leapfrogging in Africa. Besides developing multi-modal urbanisation 
strategy that effectively manages the push and pull factors of urbanisation, 
countries need to utilise the transformational contribution of progress in ICT 
and renewable energy development to facilitate productive empowerment of 
local communities. 
  Human resource: Realising all the opportunities that are highlighted earlier 
and utilising the full potential of the region can only happen if countries have 
a working force that is equipped with the right set of skills and capability. 
This would require re-orienting existing education and training programmes 
by incorporating a new set of knowledge and skills that are necessary for the 
transformational change. The new set of skills and knowledge needs to be 
channelled towards promoting innovation at all levels of the society with a 
particular emphasis given to social innovation on which there is a significant gap.
In general, the global community is faced with a moment of another major 
social transformation in human history and Africa is uniquely positioned to lead 
this transformational process provided that it seizes the emerging leapfrogging 
opportunity. This requires effectively utilising the development possibilities that 
are created by key transformation drivers such as recent developments in renewable 
energy development and the changes driven by the development of information 
and communication technology. The progress to be made by African countries in 
this leapfrogging process will largely be determined by their success in creating the 
required physical and knowledge infrastructures for the transition to an inclusive, 
low-carbon and resource-efficient economies.
50      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Conclusion
The Sustainable Development Goals of Agenda 2030 and the Paris Declaration on 
Climate Change coupled with the emerging possibilities from the development 
in renewable energy and IT-based technologies have created new opportunities 
for African countries to transition to inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient 
economies. Capturing and utilising these opportunities will largely depend on the 
ability of countries to develop transformational infrastructure that promotes the 
development of a wellbeing economy, which provides a strong basis for fulfilling 
the aspirations of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. The following are the key 
issues that need to be considered by national governments, development financing 
institutions and international development partners as the primary drivers of 
infrastructure development in African countries: 
1. National governments: need to strategically focus on transformative leap-
frogging that is contextually relevant and internally driven rather than being 
passive recipients of incidental leapfrogging that is driven by external interest 
and influence. This will provide them with a strong basis to make the right 
investment decisions and technology selections that result in transformational 
infrastructure that promotes the wellbeing of their people on a sustainable basis.
2. Development financing institutions need to desist from pushing and 
promoting conventional infrastructure development that is unsustainable and 
economically and socially inefficient in the name of development financing. 
Instead, they need to assist and support African countries to leapfrog into 
transformational infrastructure that is low-carbon and resource-efficient while 
at the same time promote socially inclusive development that benefits current 
and future generation.
3. International development partners, including the United Nations system and 
bilateral development organisation, need to support building the capacity of 
African countries in managing the transition to inclusive, climate-resilient and 
resource-efficient economies. It is essential to recognise that getting Africa on 
a more sustainable development trajectory will significantly determine the 
success of the global effort on mitigating the effect of climate change and the 
progress towards global sustainability.
In this opening chapter to the book, a modest attempt is made to lay down the basis 
for a new development narrative with emphasis on transformational infrastructure 
development. It is hoped that this will be further enriched through lessons to be 
gained from the concrete actions that African countries will take in the coming 
years and decades.
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Introduction
Sustainable development relies on a balanced relationship between addressing 
social and economic growth within the boundaries of the environment. The 
environment not only presents the foundation that creates and sustains life 
on earth but also provides the assets upon which to build a country’s economic 
development. The production of food, provision of water and natural resources, 
regulation of climate and purification of air rely on the sustainable management of 
the natural world we live in.
Natural resources, however, are limited and decreasing rapidly. If they are not 
sustainably managed, the system in which they are embedded will collapse. The 
commercial agriculture sector, for example, which forms part of the food system, 
contributes nearly one-third of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, causing 
rapid deforestation, soil degradation, and massive biodiversity loss. These affect 
the Earth system functioning to a degree that threatens the long-term sustainability 
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of the system. Development decision-makers need to take cognisance of the 
ecological system, ecological functions and processes and treat these common 
resources sustainably.
Put simply, environmental resources are required to support economies to 
grow, while also meeting the needs of society. The imperative, therefore, is for 
sustainable development that is not only economically and socially sustainable, but 
also environmentally sustainable. It is useful to consider this through the lens of 
human wellbeing: if society collapses, the wellbeing of countless individuals will be 
reduced, if the economy collapses that society will be significantly weakened, and 
if the environment collapses, the economy will be massively damaged. For human 
wellbeing to be maximised, environment, economy and society must be in the best 
possible state without compromising each other. 
A powerful way of approaching this is to consider that ecological infrastructure 
needs to be at the forefront when thinking about the wellbeing economy. Ecological 
infrastructure is the nature-based equivalent of built or hard infrastructure. For 
example, instead of using conventional engineering solutions, such as water 
infiltration and drainage systems, rather restore the wetlands and mangrove 
forests that naturally provide these services. Nature-based solutions offer a more 
sustainable way of living, reducing the impact on the environment, and provide 
multifunctional solutions to several challenges which are also more cost-effective 
(Nesshöver et al., 2017). 
In Africa, economic growth remains heavily dependent on natural resources. Yet 
the significant degradation of the natural environment coupled with the impacts 
of climate change continue to impede sustainable human development. Achieving 
pro-poor environmentally sustainable economic growth will require an enhanced 
understanding of how sustainable use of natural resources can help reduce poverty 
and support economic growth. In this chapter, we illustrate the importance of 
maintaining and strengthening a resilient social-ecological system approach as the 
foundation of wellbeing in Africa.
A social-ecological systems approach to development
The ecological infrastructures underpinning sustainable development are 
comprised of threatened ecosystems and limited natural resources and, therefore, 
need to be managed as common-pool resources. The sustainable use of ecosystems 
relies on cooperation and trust between stakeholders. Understanding that 
resources need to be harvested sustainably, overharvesting by one actor means 
there is less of the resource available for others. In a social-ecological system, two 
social actors sharing one ecological resource implies competition that can lead to 
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overharvesting (Ostrom, 1990). Social-ecological systems are systems that include 
social, economic, and ecological elements as well as interactions between them 
(Cumming et al., 2015). The concept of a social-ecological system is useful because 
it explicitly implies that stakeholders and related institutions are part of a cohesive 
whole, the system. 
Many ecosystems and the services they provide are perceived as public goods and 
are not recognised in planning processes. For example, building infrastructure 
to provide people with water for irrigation is crucial for economic growth, for 
alleviating poverty and attaining many of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). However, this infrastructure, especially dams, has impacts on aquatic 
ecosystems, and by altering the flow of water, sediment and nutrients can weaken 
the ecosystem services on which the communities depend (McCartney et al., 2005). 
It is sometimes necessary to modify ecosystems to facilitate socio-economic 
development. However, this does not have to mean the degradation of ecosystems. 
In considering the value of ecosystems, the intent is to identify interventions that 
offer people long-term sustainable solutions to improve their livelihoods. For 
instance, by focusing more on ecosystem services, development decisions can 
incorporate human perceptions – the values people place on different parts of the 
landscape that tend to go unrecognised. Ecosystem services are the benefits people 
receive from nature. Tangible benefits include supplies of food and fresh water, 
flood mitigation and improvements to water quality. Less tangible benefits include 
contributions to cultures. This concept (ecosystem services) also offers a useful 
link between ecological and economic perspectives; by achieving a compromise 
between different approaches (valuation and markets versus biodiversity and 
system functioning), it helps ecologists and economists to communicate (Daily 
et al., 2000).
As an example, the Working Wetland Potential (WWP) is a pragmatic social-
ecological systems approach that contextualises the provisioning ecosystem 
services of a wetland in terms of agriculture, without undermining the ecological 
infrastructure (McCartney et al., 2005). WWP uses a multi-criteria analysis that 
integrates the biophysical and socio-economic aspects of wetland use to provide an 
initial assessment of the suitability of a wetland for agriculture. This assessment can 
then be used to identify, organise and analyse complex factors, which in this case 
links people, agriculture and wetlands to develop wetlands sustainably.
Africa faces enormous challenges in relation to environmental management, and 
equally huge opportunities for ‘doing things better’ (United Nations Environment 
Programme [UNEP], 2016b). Building a wellbeing economy across the continent 
depends explicitly on the protection and integrity of the natural resources that 
are critical life-support systems for sustained human wellbeing. Without the 
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understanding that clean and healthy air, water, land and biodiversity are necessary 
to support a transformation to a wellbeing economy, an integrated, prosperous and 
peaceful region, resilient to future shocks, will likely remain a pipe dream.
The current state and trends in Africa
According to the sixth edition of the Global Environment Outlook (GEO-6), Africa 
has the potential to significantly contribute to the world economy and ensure 
healthy living conditions for all its denizens (UNEP, 2016b). Africa, the second 
largest continent in the world, has a landmass of 30 million km2. Twenty-two 
percent of this land area consists of forests and woodlands, 43 percent is classified 
as desert, and 21 percent is suitable for cultivation. According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), by 1999, it was estimated that about 
32 percent (200 million ha) had already been cultivated (UNECA, 2011). At the 
same time, about 30 percent of the total land area (892 million ha) was being used 
as permanent pasture. This significant loss in biodiversity does not necessarily result 
in poverty alleviation or an increase in human wellbeing; in fact, the opposite has 
occurred. Even though the continent has abundant agricultural resources, according 
to the Africa Human Development Report 2012, millions of people remain hungry 
and malnourished (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2012). 
This was reiterated in the Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], (2017). This 
is largely a result of uneven local food production and distribution and chronically 
deficient diet. The UNDP mentions that ‘Africans have been trapped by hunger 
for decades, with millions consuming staple foods deficient in the micronutrients 
needed to sustain child growth and adult productivity. Hunger also eviscerates 
society by increasing disease, mortality and disability’ (UNDP, 2012:15).
The majority of people in Africa (approximately 85 percent) live in rural areas 
and are engaged in agricultural activities, with farming making up the main 
source of their livelihoods (World Bank, 2009). Agriculture plays a major role in 
the continent’s economy, employing nearly 70 percent of Africa’s population and 
generating 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (UNEP, 2016b). Farming 
productivity, however, is largely driven by precipitation, which has been decreasing 
over the African continent. Over the past few decades, the northern regions of 
North Africa have experienced a strong decrease in the amount of precipitation 
in winter and early spring. The Sahel has experienced an overall reduction in 
precipitation over the course of the twentieth century. The same is found in 
eastern Africa where rainfall has decreased over the past three decades, potentially 
due to an increase in convection and precipitation over the tropical Indian Ocean 
(Funk et al., 2008). Over southern Africa, a reduction in late summer precipitation 
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has been reported over the western parts, extending from Namibia, through 
Angola, and towards the Congo, associated with an upward trend in tropical Indian 
Ocean sea surface temperatures. Changes in the distribution and magnitude of 
extreme rainfall events observed in parts of Africa are associated with both climate 
and variability (Williams, Kniveton & Layberry, 2010), where Africa’s near-surface 
temperatures have increased by 0.5oC over the past 50 to 100 years. 
Land cover and land-use changes in Africa are largely driven by population 
growth, urbanisation and investments in large-scale commercial agriculture. 
Large tracts of natural land, including forests, are continuously being cleared for 
agriculture. For example, the Mwekera forest in Zambia has undergone significant 
deforestation over time with estimates ranging from 250 000 to 900 000 ha per 
year (Shawa, 2010) with the increase in demand for firewood and cultivable land 
(UNEP,  2016b). The trend of decreasing forest cover has also been recorded 
throughout north, west, central, east and southern Africa between 1950 and 2015 
(FAO,  2018). These forests are projected to continue shrinking, declining to less 
than 600  million ha by 2050 due to the rising population and growing demand 
for firewood. More than 50 million ha of forests have been lost in Africa between 
1990 and 2000, representing an average deforestation rate of nearly 0.8 percent 
per year (UNECA,  2011). Forests play an important role in the carbon cycle. 
When forests are cut down, not only does carbon absorption cease, but the carbon 
stored in the trees is released into the atmosphere, increasing carbon dioxide 
concentration levels. 
Land degradation is a serious threat in Africa, with about 500 000 km2 of 
land estimated to be degraded due to soil erosion, salinisation, pollution and 
desertification (UNEP, 2013). This is largely driven by deforestation, forest fires, 
over-cultivation, inefficient irrigation practices, overgrazing, overexploitation 
of resources, including mining, as well as climate change (UNEP,  2016b). 
Land degradation reduces agricultural productivity, directly impacting on food 
availability, nutrition and human health. Land degradation in drylands can result in 
desertification. The desert lands of the Sahara, Namib, Kalahari, and the drylands 
of northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia and Somalia cover around 40 percent of 
Africa’s land surface area ( Jones et al., 2013).
The unreliable rainfall patterns in Africa coupled with the decrease in precipitation 
over time also affects the availability of freshwater. Most countries in the arid and 
semi-arid north and southern Africa sub-regions have lower per person internal 
renewable freshwater levels than the rest of the continent. With an average annual 
per-person consumption of 31 m3, Africa uses much less water than regions such 
as North America, which consumes 221 m3 per person per year (UNEP,  2010). 
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The quantity of water available in Africa is variable, depending on the climatic and 
geological setting. Africa’s main water consumer is agriculture, which often results 
in unwanted wastage through evaporation and runoff.
There are 63 transboundary river basins in Africa, covering 64 percent of the 
continent’s land area containing 93 percent of its total surface water resource 
(UNEP, 2010). River basin commissions are responsible for managing these 
shared resources and the erection of large dams on both local and international 
rivers, which are used for irrigation and to supply water to big cities. Africa also 
has transboundary aquifers, mainly found in zones of high-water demand. Some 
transboundary aquifers, such as the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, contain 
non-renewable water that has been stored for a long time. The water demand that 
results from population increase and stress induced by climate change may increase 
aquifer users and rates of depletion (UNEP, 2016b). 
A wide range of wetlands types is found in Africa, including natural and constructed 
freshwater marshes, river floodplains, swamps and peatlands, as well as estuaries and 
coastal lagoons. Constructed wetlands are designed for the treatment of wastewater 
from settlements and mining, while natural wetlands are under immense pressure 
from human activities, including wastewater discharge from agriculture, settlements 
and industry. In South Africa, for example, wetlands are used for the treatment of 
mine-water pollution in the gold-mining areas of Witwatersrand (UNEP, 2016b). 
Mangrove forests, another threatened land-use type, inhabit many of the saline 
and brackish coastal and marine areas of the continent’s coastline. In East Africa, 
stretching from the coastal cities of Kismayu in Somalia to Maputo in Mozambique; 
on the West African coastline stretching from northern Angola to the northern 
limit of Tidra Island in Mauritania. Altogether, the mangrove forests cover an area 
of 1.7 million ha. Mangroves are threatened by overharvesting for fuelwood, timber 
and charcoal, conversion of land including agriculture, aquaculture, infrastructure 
development, tourism and salt production, pollution, increased sedimentation and 
changing hydrology (UNEP, 2016b). 
Standing back from these figures, UNEP concludes that a significant share of the 
continent’s natural resources are used unsustainably with some lost through illegal 
activities, which implies that the stream of benefits generated from these resources 
is being reduced over time (UNEP, 2016b). This has serious implications for the 
long-term wellbeing of the population, as natural capital accounts for between 
30 percent and 50 percent of total wealth. The GEO-6 Regional Assessment for Africa 
sums up the current state of these issues: the environment is deteriorating faster 
than previously thought, emphasising that African governments must act faster to 
reverse the worst trends (UNEP, 2016b). Africa’s natural capital is integral to the 
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economic growth of the continent, which hinges on its sustainable management. 
This is key to the transition to a wellbeing economy that will benefit all of Africa’s 
population and its ecological underpinning. 
Applying a social-ecological systems approach to sustainable food 
The Africa Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition stated that the number 
of undernourished people on the continent had increased mainly due to the 
impact of climate change and conflict requiring an urgent need to build affected 
communities’ resilience and to find peaceful solutions that strengthen food 
security (FAO, 2017). The impact of adverse climatic conditions, such as repeated 
droughts (often linked to the El Niño phenomenon) resulting in poor harvests and 
the loss of livestock, was of particular concern in the context of ecosystem services 
and building adaptive strategies in the face of rapid change. This was confirmed by 
the recent multi-agency publication, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the 
World. This publication argues that ‘the number of people who suffer from hunger 
has been growing over the past three years, returning to levels from a decade ago’ 
(FAO et al., 2018:xiii). The situation is worsening in most regions of Africa with 
climate variability and extremes are a key driver of severe food crises. 
Beyond climate and conflict, food and nutrition security are strongly predicated 
upon ecological resilience (International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food 
Systems [IPES-Food], 2016; UNEP, 2016a). Natural resources are heavily impacted 
by changes in population numbers, wealth, urbanisation and associated changes in 
human behaviour toward food consumption. The ultimate causes of habitat loss 
in Africa are human population growth and the resulting demand for space, food 
and other resources; widespread poverty; dependence on natural resources; and 
economic pressures to increase exports, especially agricultural produce, timber 
and minerals (UNECA, 2011:51). Population and income growth will drive food 
demand in the coming decades; nearly 80 percent more meat, almost 60 percent 
more cereals, and one-third as many roots and tubers will be required by 2050, at 
significantly higher food prices and with adverse consequences for the world’s poor 
and vulnerable populations (Rosegrant et al., 2008). 
Population growth will also have significant implications for building resilient 
social-ecological systems. Population growth in Africa is likely to continue to put 
pressure on food, land and water resources. The global population estimated at 
7.6 billion by mid-2017, 1.3 billion African, is anticipated to grow with 2.2 billion 
people by 2050. It is estimated that 1.3 billion, more than half the global growth, 
will be added in Africa (UN, 2017). The geography and demography of Africa 
are, therefore, likely to change considerably in the next few decades. The so-called 
‘youth bulge’, expected to reach over 830 million in Africa by 2050, will add to this 
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pressure (Chatterjee & Mahama, 2017). Not only will the number of mouths to 
feed increase, but many will also migrate to urban centres in search of employment 
and opportunities. This will change the dynamics of rural areas, particularly 
concerning the supply of labour and the ratio of producers to consumers. 
With such change, shifts in consumer preference will occur, leading to a demand 
for convenience and ready-prepared foods that require little or no energy for 
preparation. There is now a trend towards the homogenisation of diets and the 
greater intake of calories, animal protein and fat, and ultra-processed foods that 
are high in sugar, salt and fat (Cook, 2018). Urban living associated with changes 
in activity and dietary patterns is part of a nutrition transition – a simultaneous 
emergence of challenge in rising levels of overweight, obesity and related non-
communicable diseases along with continuous problems of undernutrition and 
micronutrient deficiencies (Bray & Popkin, 1998).
As the African population continues to grow and natural resources become scarcer, 
the need to shift towards an environmentally responsible, socially accountable, 
more equitable, and ‘greener’ economy becomes increasingly necessary. This is 
exemplified in the relationship of the social-ecological system that is the African 
food system. The International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems 
(IPES-Food) argued in a 2016 report, From Uniformity to Diversity, that we need a 
fundamentally different model of agriculture and to shift the centre of gravity. They 
stressed the need to transition to agroecological production systems stating, ‘This 
transition is viable and necessary whether the starting point is highly specialized 
industrial agriculture or forms of subsistence farming in poor, developing countries’. 
Similarly, Biodiversity maintained that ‘food systems need to be reformed so that 
they nourish people while nurturing the environment’ (Frison; IPES-Food, 2016). 
They argue that agricultural biodiversity is a source of nutritious and culturally 
acceptable foods often adapted to local and low-input agricultural systems and a 
source of important traits for breeding resilient, nutritious crops and animal breeds. 
UNEP’s 2016 Food Systems and Natural Resources called for ‘A fundamental 
transformation of our food systems … if we are to meet future demands of food 
and quality of life for present and future generations’ (UNEP, 2016a:14). Echoing 
this, the FAO 2017 report on the future of food and agriculture declares: 
High-input, resource-intensive farming systems, which have caused massive 
deforestation, water scarcities, soil depletion and high levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions, cannot deliver sustainable food and agricultural production. 
[We need] innovative systems that protect and enhance the natural resource 
base, while increasing productivity. [We need] a transformative process 
towards ‘holistic’ approaches, such as agroecology, agro-forestry ... and 
conservation agriculture, which also build upon indigenous and traditional 
knowledge. (FAO, 2017:xi)
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A recent IPES-Food report, Unravelling the Food–Health Nexus, stressed the urgency 
of reforming food and farming systems on the grounds of protecting human health: 
‘The health impacts of food systems are interconnected, self-reinforcing, and 
complex – but we know enough to act (IPES-Food, 2017:1).
A key question emerging from these reports is how can Africa practically move 
towards these stated solutions for a sustainable food system as an example of a 
resilient social-ecological system? An important opportunity lies in the application 
of social-ecological systems theory. Social-ecological resilience is the capacity to 
adapt or transform in the face of change, particularly unexpected change, in social-
ecological systems in ways that continue to support human wellbeing (Chapin 
et al.,  2010). Social-ecological systems theory draws on systems ecology and 
complexity theory – the study of how large-scale complex, organised, and adaptive 
behaviour can emerge from relatively simple interactions among individuals. 
Complex behaviours are embedded in social-ecological systems, such as non-
linearities, feedbacks, the existence of thresholds, the potential for alternative stable 
states and self-organisation (Norberg & Cumming, 2008). Complex adaptive 
systems can be distinguished from other complex systems by their capacity to 
respond to their environment through self-organisation, learning and reasoning. 
These (social and ecological) agents often interact in unplanned and unpredictable 
ways which underlie the emergence of broad-scale patterns that feedback on the 
system and influence the interactions of the agents (Levin et al., 2013). The study 
of complex adaptive systems is, therefore, directly relevant to understanding the 
environment in which society is embedded and the problems that may arise.
Living with such complexity and uncertainty requires resilience-building 
approaches to management and governance of social-ecological systems. Echoing 
the first section of this chapter, this approach relies on realising that people and 
nature are interdependent systems, conceptualising this coupling and relating it to 
human wellbeing and sustainability. The field of development research traditionally 
treated the environment as a factor contributing to human wellbeing, which meant 
that natural resources were focused on one at a time to minimise impacts on the 
environment (Folke, Biggs, Norström, Reyers & Rockström, 2016). This way of 
relating humans to the environment was reflected in the Millennium Development 
Goals. However, a need for a deeper integration with the social science featuring 
the social dynamics and features linked to the environmental challenges led to the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), which represents a paradigm shift in 
the human-nature relationship: from protecting the environment and conserving 
biodiversity to the challenge of stewardship of ecosystems and diversity and their 
services for human wellbeing (MEA, 2005).
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Emerging knowledge, techniques and best practices in sustainable 
development
The nature-based solutions concept emerged in the late 2000s  when international 
organisations searched for solutions to use nature to address societal challenges 
while protecting natural ecosystems and biodiversity and improving sustainable 
livelihoods. This concept is increasingly used by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the European Commission (EC) and other 
international organisations as well as in the scientific literature. Ecosystem-based 
adaptation (EbA), which involves the conservation, sustainable management and 
restoration of ecosystems to help people adapt to the impacts of climate change, is 
a nature-based solution that harnesses biodiversity and ecosystem services to build 
resilience to climate change. It has become increasingly more popular to construct 
wetlands, urban lakes and restore natural streams to recreate natural drainage 
and filter systems and restore and recover development conditions ( Jato-Espino, 
Sañudo-Fontaneda & Andrés Valeri, 2019)
For us to understand the ecological resilience of a system we need to understand 
and consider various ecological components as well as human influences. Natural 
environment means climate, natural resources, plant and animal life, topography, 
and natural phenomenon. The biotic and abiotic components not only provide 
us with the water we drink, the food we eat, but also regulate important cycles 
in nature. These ecological components are closely linked and intertwined with 
the social components, the human dimension in its diverse facets, including 
the economic, political, technological and cultural. Together they form a social-
ecological system, a complex adaptive system (Levin et al., 2013), a concept that 
emphasizes the human-in-nature perspective.
The social-ecological systems approach emphasizes the role that people, 
communities, economies, societies, and cultures play in the natural environment. 
These social components interact with and are inhabitants of the environment in 
which they depend on and are shaped by. Social-ecological system analysis presents 
a new way of thinking about the relationships between people and nature. This is 
based on the metaphor of resilience, defined by Folke et al. (2016), as the potential 
of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organise. Resilience is increasingly 
conceptualised not only as a property of social-ecological systems but also as an 
approach for managing these systems to ensure they continue to sustain human 
wellbeing amidst ongoing change and disturbance. 
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Ecosystem-based adaptation
Ecosystem-based adaptation is a nature-based solution that uses biodiversity and 
ecosystem services to support communities to adapt and build resilience in the face 
of disturbance. Ecosystem-based adaptation uses the range of opportunities for 
sustainable management, conservation, and restoration of ecosystems to increase 
the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of ecosystems and people. According to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), EbA is an approach to sustainable 
development that contributes to three outcomes: socio-economic benefits, climate 
change adaptation and biodiversity conservation (Midgley, Marais, Barnett & 
Wågsæther, 2012). The intersection between these three spheres is what separates 
EbA from other approaches, such as community-based adaptation (CBA), climate 
change integrated land-use strategies (CLICS) or community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM). EbA has a range of co-benefits including 
conservation of threatened species, livelihood benefits, sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources and the maintenance of ecosystem services such as water and 
food security (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], 2009). 
South Africa’s biodiversity and climate change policy provides clear support for the 
development of a coordinated programme of work on EbA, as part of an overall 
adaptation strategy envisaged in the National Climate Change Response White Paper 
(Department of Environmental Affairs [DEA], 2012). In response to the white 
paper, the 2013 Long-Term Adaptation Scenarios Flagship Research Programme 
(LTAS) highlights the ‘potential for ecological infrastructure to provide ecological 
benefits and assist in achieving development aspirations across sectors, building 
resilience of South Africa’s natural systems, working landscapes and open spaces 
to support economic sectors and local livelihoods under future climate conditions’ 
(DEA, 2013:17). EbA projects are been implemented in many provinces of South 
Africa. These are documented in the NCCR database, hosted by the DEA.
Ecosystem-based adaptation projects are also well underway in other African 
countries, including Zambia where small-scale farmers are offered economic 
incentives for improved land management and are assisted in high-end organic food 
markets (Midgely et al., 2012). This EbA project maintains ecosystem services 
essential for agriculture, reducing pressure on natural systems and supporting 
diverse rural livelihood strategies. 
Key policy and strategic issues for African countries
Underpinning an economic trajectory that will lead to a continent-wide wellbeing 
economy comes with important challenges, not least of which is the need to reduce 
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the region’s ecological footprint and safeguard the life-support system provided by 
healthy land, water, air and biodiversity. 
Ecosystem-based adaptation is strongly promoted in the international policy 
arena. It is recognised under several multilateral environmental agreements for its 
ability to offer co-benefits in helping society adapt to changes, including climate 
change. The CBD has provided specific direction on EbA to support the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The CBD’s 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity (2011–2010) and the Aichi Targets offer further 
support for EbA under Strategic Goal D which is to ‘enhance the benefits to all 
from biodiversity and ecosystem services’ (CBD, 2010:9). The UNFCCC similarly 
recognise the role of healthy, intact ecosystems in providing valuable services such 
as food, clean water, flood and erosion control. It provides national action plans 
and national adaptation programmes of action for least developed countries. 
Similarly, the African Resilient Landscapes Initiative (ARLI) facilitated by the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) emphasises forest and ecosystem 
restoration, biodiversity conservation, climate-smart agriculture, and rangeland 
management as key approaches towards nature-based solutions (NEPAD, 2017). 
Endorsed by the AU in October 2015, the ARLI and its supporting initiatives are 
contributing to improved soil fertility and food security, improve access to clean 
water, combat desertification, increase biodiversity and habitat, create green jobs, 
bolster economic growth and livelihood diversification, and increase the capacity 
for climate change resilience and adaptation (World Bank, 2015). The resilience 
of ecosystems thus cascades downwards to underpinning human wellbeing. A key 
example of this is the agri-food system. 
Agricultural biodiversity is vital to the functioning of agroecosystems, to ensure 
food and nutrition security and to cope with the challenges of climate change. Yet 
the agricultural biodiversity of Africa is currently at risk as agricultural landscapes 
become increasingly simplified and the number of crops, crop varieties and animal 
breeds on farms decline (Rockström et al., 2009). The heavy reliance on this narrow 
range of food brings long-term risks for agricultural production, biodiversity, 
livelihoods and nutrition while undermining the ability of agriculture to adapt to 
climate change (Zimmerer, 2010). African farming systems can avoid exacerbating 
this through building on a fundamentally different model of agriculture based on 
diversifying farms and farming landscapes, replacing chemical inputs, optimising 
biodiversity and stimulating interactions between different species, as part of 
holistic strategies to build long-term fertility, healthy agro-ecosystems and secure 
livelihoods (IPES-Food, 2016). 
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Diversified agro-ecological systems can also pave the way for diverse diets and 
improved health as recent evidence from across countries in Africa and South 
Asia including rural Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia reveals 
(Carletto,  Ruel, Winters & Zezza, 2015; Kumar, Harris & Rawat, 2015; Shively & 
Sununtnasik, 2015). Agricultural diversity has been linked specifically to increased 
consumption of a range of key nutritional elements often missing in diets and based 
around staple cereal crops. The consumption of legumes, fruits and vegetables 
was found to be strongly associated with greater farm diversity in Malawi ( Jones, 
Shrinivas & Bezner-Kerr, 2014), and data from Zambia indicates that there was 
a strong positive association between production diversity and dietary diversity 
(Kumar et al., 2015).
These findings have profound implications across national boundaries, underlining 
the need for holistic, innovative, and collaborative solutions, policies and strategies 
that promote agro-biodiversity. Key to this is recognition of the local crop varieties, 
animal breeds and underutilised crops in Africa that could be promoted and 
maintained, adjusting extension services and fostering synergies between scientific 
and local knowledge. Indeed, biocultural heritage and traditional knowledge 
underpin much of the remaining agricultural biodiversity in Africa and should be 
nurtured, including by protecting the rights of women.
The box that follows presents four case studies illustrating the building of social-
ecological resilience in Africa.
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Box 2.1: Case studies illustrating the building of social-ecological resilience in Africa
Livelihood diversity and redundancy in coastal communities in East Africa 
An important example of social-ecological resilience emerges from the coast of East Africa 
where households often engage in small-scale fisheries as part of a diverse livelihood 
portfolio including working in tourism, agriculture or casual labour. Households who have 
a portfolio of options tend to be more resilient, particularly if different livelihood activities 
are not affected by the same disturbances. For example, in households with diverse livelihood 
portfolios, fishing activities can continue when the tourism sector suffers low numbers 
of tourists due to global perceptions of security. It has been shown in Kenya, Tanzania, 
the Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar that coastal fishers are more likely to leave a 
fishery in response to declining catches if they come from households with more diverse 
livelihood portfolios. 
Avoiding poverty traps in Tanzania 
While feedbacks can help keep a system in a desirable regime, they can also lock a system 
into an undesirable configuration. In drought-prone areas of Tanzania, population growth 
has increased the demand for crop production and reduced fallow times. This has led to 
the depletion of organic matter in the soil and a decrease in soil fertility. This, in turn, 
means that crop harvests are low, and that farmers have little or no surplus to sell, and 
therefore no money to buy fertilisers to restore or increase soil fertility. As a result, they 
become trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. In these cases, it may be necessary to disrupt 
or weaken the feedbacks that lock the systems in an undesired configuration. In Tanzania, 
rainwater harvesting, and conservation tillage help restore soil fertility and reduce the 
impacts of drought. 
Foster complex adaptive systems thinking
There are several examples of how complex adaptive systems thinking contributes to 
enhances the resilience of a system. In the Kruger National Park in South Africa, management 
has moved away from strategies to keep ecosystem conditions, such as elephant populations 
and fire frequencies, at a fixed level and instead allows them to fluctuate between specified 
boundaries. The use of threshold indicators provides managers with warning signals when 
a component of the system is approaching a critical point. The overall intention is to 
reduce human intervention (and investment) and increase the variety of ecosystems and 
habitat types. 
Polycentric governance
Polycentric governance is well suited for the governance of social- ecological systems and 
ecosystem services because traditional and local knowledge stand a much better chance 
of being considered. This, in turn, improves sharing of knowledge and learning across 
cultures and scales. This is particularly evident in local and regional water governance, 
as in watershed management groups in Botswana, where polycentric approaches have 
facilitated participation by a broad range of actors and incorporation of local, traditional 
and scientific knowledge.                                                                                     (Source: Biggs et al., 2012)
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Conclusion
In summary, sustainable development cannot be achieved without grounding on 
an ecological foundation, but one that is not separated from the human element. 
Nature no longer simply sets the context in which social interaction takes place. 
Similarly, the human enterprise is not an external disturbance acting upon an 
ecosystem (Schoon & Van der Leeuw, 2015). The environment that underpins 
human wellbeing both responds to and influences a wide range of social, political 
and economic elements as well as the interactions between them. These interactions 
are intertwined with and ultimately framed by the capacity of the biosphere as part 
of the complex dynamics of the Earth system to sustain progress and development 
(Odum, 1989; Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, Gaffney & Ludwig, 2015). In sum, 
human development cannot be decoupled from the environment. 
Whilst the inherent uncertainty and diversity in potential futures across the 
continent makes it tenuous for a set of prescriptive policies to be established, policy 
decisions should aim to minimise environmental and developmental trade-offs and 
maximise Africa’s ability to safeguard its natural capital effectively (UNEP, 2016b). 
To achieve sustainable development and reach global biodiversity targets, nature-
based solutions, in particular, should be treated as integral to adaptation strategies at 
global, national and local levels. Indeed, as is made explicit throughout the chapters 
of this book, the low-carbon, climate-resilient choices in infrastructure, energy 
and food production, coupled with effective and sustainable natural resource 
governance are key to protecting the continent’s ecological assets that underpin a 
continent-wide wellbeing economy. 
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Persson,  Å., Chapin, F.S. et al. (2009). 
Planetary boundaries: Exploring the safe 
operating space for humanity. Ecology 
and Society 14(2): Art. 32. https://doi.
org/10.5751/ES-03180-140232
Rosegrant, M.W., Ringler, C., Msangi, S., 
Sulser, T.B., Zhu, T. et al. (2008). 
International model for policy analysis 
of agricultural commodities and trade 
(IMPACT): Model description. 
Washington, DC: International Food 
Policy Research Institute. https://bit.
ly/35me7Xp [Accessed 23 April 2018].
Schoon, M. & van der Leeuw, S. (2015). The 
shift toward social-ecological systems 
perspectives: insights into the human-
nature relationship. Natures Sciences Sociétés 
23(2): 166–174. https://doi.org/10.1051/
nss/2015034
Shawa, P. (2010). Deforestation in Mwekera 
National Forest No. 6: An ethical 
evaluation. Master’s dissertation, University 
of  Zambia, Lusaka.
Shively, G. & Sununtnasik, C. (2015). 
Agricultural diversity and child stunting in 
Nepal. The Journal of Development Studies 
51(8): 1078–1096. https://doi.org/10.108
0/00220388.2015.1018900
Steffen, W., Broadgate, W., Deutsch, L., 
Gaffney, O. & Ludwig, C. (2015). The 
trajectory of the Anthropocene: The 
great acceleration. The Anthropocene 
Review 2:81–98. https://doi.
org/10.1177/2053019614564785
United Nations. (2017). The sustainable 
development goals report 2017. New York: 
UN. https://bit.ly/2tyb1vg [Accessed 
15 September 2019]. https://doi.
org/10.18356/3cff8bc0-en
United Nations Development Programme. 
(2012). Africa human development report 
2012: Towards a food secure future. Geneva: 
UNDP. http://www.afhdr.org/the-report/ 
[Accessed 18 September 2019].
United Nations Environment Programme. 
(2010). Africa water atlas. Nairobi, 
Kenya: Division of Early Warning and 
Assessment (DEWA), UNEP.  https://doi.
org/10.18356/eaf6f03c-en
United Nations Environment Programme. 
(2013). Africa environment outlook 3: 
Our environment, our health. http://
www.unep.org/pdf/aeo3.pdf [Accessed 
12 September 2019].
United Nations Environment Programme. 
(2016a). Food systems and natural 
resources. A Report of the Working Group 
on Food Systems of the International 
Resource Panel. Westhoek, H, Ingram J., 
van Berkum, S., Özay, L. & Hajer, M.
United Nations Environment Programme. 
(2016b). GEO-6 regional assessment for 
Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP. 
Williams, C.J.R., Kniveton, D.R. & 
Layberry, R. (2010). Assessment of a 
climate model to reproduce rainfall 
variability and extremes over southern 
Africa. Theoretical and Applied Climatology 
99(1/2): 9–27. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s00704-009-0124-y
World Bank. (2009, 16 June). World day to 
combat desertification 2009. [Web log 
post]. https://bit.ly/2pej97x [Accessed 
18 September 2019].
Ecological infrastructure as a basis for the African wellbeing economy  |      71
World Bank. (2015). NEPAD launches 
initiative for the resilience and 
restoration of African landscapes. Press 
release, 6 December 2015. https://bit.
ly/35nhLA6 [Accessed 23 March 2019].
Zimmerer, K.S. (2010). Biological diversity 
in agricultural and global change. Annual 




 |      73
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SYSTEMS 
IN AFRICA
Yacob Mulugetta and Lawrence Agbemabiese
Introduction
Ever since they attained political independence from colonial rule in the post-war 
years of the twentieth century, an ‘energy imperative’ has been at the core of the 
development agenda of African governments and their international development 
partners. Yet, despite more than 50 years of effort, energy systems on the continent 
remain largely ‘under powered, inefficient, unequal’ and ultimately unsustainable 
(Africa Progress Panel [APP], 2015). These failures account largely for the 
inability of most African countries to realise long-cherished goals of economic 
growth acceleration, the reduction and eventual elimination of poverty, and overall 
transitions to equitable improvements in standards of living. The few countries 
that have successfully transitioned from low- to middle-income status have done so 
by embarking on the well-beaten path that has been followed by the high-income, 
high-energy countries of the world: the build-up of centralised large-scale energy 
systems reliant on fossil and large hydro plants and associated infrastructure. 
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Such conventional systems have fuelled rapid growth in recent years in several 
African countries while catalysing their integration into a global energy economy 
dominated by oil and gas. But, as explained in this chapter, energy systems of this 
sort are often not consistent with local needs, primarily because their design and 
construction have been directed (and continue to be governed) by a conventional 
paradigm of energy-environment-society relations that has proven problematic.
Africa thus confronts a dilemma; the resolution of which should be informed by 
recognising contemporary energy systems as themes of a complex energy story. 
One narrative presents the continent as undergoing transformation, with several 
countries following conventional development models that support a strategy of 
energising their agricultural and manufacturing sectors as part of an economic 
growth agenda, the creation of high-quality jobs on a path to achieving multiple 
SDGs. This story, however, has failed so far to provide viable explanations of, and 
solutions for, the persistent failure of most African countries to establish energy 
systems capable of delivering energy access and improved living conditions for all. 
There is another largely marginalised side of the African energy story; one that 
exposes the realities of life in a larger world beyond the affluent enclaves of large 
cities. This is the world beyond the grid; a rural world inhabited by millions of 
people with the lowest per capita use of electricity in the world. People in such 
areas rely heavily on solid biomass as a main source of household energy for 
cooking. These areas are often represented by poor access to communication 
systems, underdeveloped transport networks, and inadequate educational and 
health systems. The areas also suffer from poor income generation, largely because 
of their inability to add value through agricultural processing. The lack of energy 
access due to the combined lack of skills, finance, institutions and policies is one of 
the key reasons for these poor development outcomes. 
African governments and their development partners find themselves in a 
contradiction – between the critical nature of energy problems demanding 
quick solutions and interventions, and the complex energy system with so many 
dimensions. This requires careful planning and time-consuming studies that lead 
to concrete interventions with positive livelihood outcomes. The good news is 
that there are reasons to be optimistic about the future. Firstly, if stable enabling 
conditions are created there is a growing domestic economic wealth that can be 
unlocked and mobilised for energy investment. The growing demand for energy 
and the high tariffs that consumers already face (in addition to a frequent reliance on 
expensive electricity from back-up systems) creates opportunities for investment. 
Secondly, sub-Saharan Africa is rich in energy resources, even if it remains poor 
in energy supply. The region has significant and diverse primary energy resources, 
with sufficient coal, gas, geothermal, hydro, solar and wind resources to deliver 
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more than 11  terawatts (TW) of capacity (Castellano, Kendall, Nikomarov & 
Swemmer, 2015). Thirdly, the cost of energy technologies, especially renewable 
energy (RE) technologies, has come down rapidly over the past few years. In 
relation to this, the large capacity gaps in Africa’s energy system creates openings 
for technological leap-frogging through policy innovation and experimentation. 
Here, the contribution that distributed energy systems can make needs to be 
explored further.
This chapter reviews the opportunities and constraints that African countries and 
communities face as they explore different energy options and delivery models, 
focusing on bottom-up and distributed energy systems. 
Africa’s energy system
Nowhere is the critical nature of energy for development more pressing than 
in Africa. Part of the urgency is because the continent is under transformation, 
featuring favourable gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates over the past 
decade. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, overall, GDP 
grew at 4.6 percent in 2014, but slowed down to 3 percent in 2018 as commodity 
prices fell sharply and financing conditions became more difficult. It is expected 
rise to 3.6 percent in 2019 before stabilising at around 4 percent over the medium 
term (IMF, 2019). However, within this difficult picture, there is a considerable 
variation across the region, with growth in some countries holding steady 
at 7 percent or more in 2015 and 2016 supported by ongoing infrastructure 
investment and consumer spending. Several countries are also looking to boost 
their manufacturing sector as part of a programme of structural transformation 
by moving labour from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors. However, 
structural transformation is a double-edged sword. While it lays the foundation 
for high and sustained economic growth, it also requires increased energy use to 
maintain productivity necessitating significant investment in energy infrastructure.
Africa has significant resources. According to the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) publication Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, Africa has 
7.5 percent of the world’s proved gas reserves, 7.6 percent of its proved oil 
reserves and 3.6 percent of global coal reserves (of which South Africa alone 
accounts for 3.4 percent). The region’s renewable energy resources are diverse, 
consisting of almost unlimited solar potential (10 TW), significant hydropower 
potential (350 GW), wind (110 GW), as well as geothermal resources (15 GW) 
(UNEP,  2017:2). The challenge African countries face is how to develop the 
capability to harness sustainably their significant resources to meet their development 
objectives. At the moment, only a fraction of these resources are developed. 
76      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The practice of widening access to modern energy services across sub-Saharan 
Africa is complex, largely due to the dual nature of the energy system itself where 
traditional and modern energy systems and practices co-exist (Sokona, Mulugetta 
& Gujba, 2012). The total power generation capacity of the 48 sub-Saharan African 
countries, excluding the Republic of South Africa, stands at roughly 45 gigawatts 
(GW) (less than that of Turkey or Spain), and about a quarter of this capacity is 
not currently available, mainly due to ageing power plants and lack of maintenance. 
This case of crippling underinvestment means that more than 620 million people, 
amounting to nearly 70 percent of the total population, live without access to 
electricity. Only seven sub-Saharan countries, mostly concentrated in the west and 
southern African regions, now have electricity access rates exceeding 50 percent. 
With rapid population outpacing the rate of electrification, it is also the only region 
in the world where the number of people living without electricity is increasing. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates that between 2000 and 2014, 
the number of people without access to electricity increased in 37  countries, 
highlighting that any effort in widening energy access must take into account 
demographic as well as lifestyle changes. Furthermore, nearly 80 percent of those 
lacking access to electricity live in rural areas, which adds to the complexity of 
possible interventions, strategies and potential technical solutions (IEA, 2014). 
However, with the expected population growth of 1.5 billion by 2030, future 
growth will be almost entirely urban, implying that the number of rural households 
for which access needs to be created will stabilise (World Bank, 2017c). 
The history of electrification across Africa informs us that early electricity 
development across Africa came about for three major reasons: as a symbol of 
modernity for non-African settlers, as a source of power for mines and industry, or a 
stimulus for industrial development (Showers, 2011). As in Europe, electrification 
began with isolated, small-scale generators supplying farms, industries and 
municipalities, mostly built by the colonial powers and their associated private 
enterprises (Showers, 2011). These entities and industries were supported by the 
local supply of labour and skills, while most of its population remained dependent 
on subsistence agriculture. Today, African policymakers talk with confidence 
about the need for structural transformation. In some cases, deliberate policies 
are or are currently being implemented to support smallholder farmers to increase 
their energy use per unit of cultivated land by utlising better technologies, inputs 
and approaches. The lesson to take from history is that the electricity system in 
sub-Saharan Africa was designed as part of the integration of the continent into a 
global economic order, leaving the large rural, informal and subsistence production 
system with limited technological input from outside. The provision of modern 
energy services today has to be seen against this backdrop and contemporary 
presence of this historical legacy. 
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According to the World Bank and partners, some gains are being recorded with 
an expansion of electricity in poorer countries, even the rate of electrification 
overtaking population growth for the first time in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). As 
shown in Figure 3.1, the reason behind this is the high and continued improvement 
in electricity access in East Africa, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia.  Helped 
by the rapidly declining cost of renewables, availability of targeted grants and the 
emergence of new business models, these countries have invested significantly in 
their electrification programmes as a means to support their ambitious economic 
transformation and social wellbeing goals. 
 
Annualised average change, 2010‑2016 (percentage points)
Figure 3.1  The 20 countries with the largest electricity access-deficit  
over the 2010–2016 period (Source: World Bank, 2018:23)
The UN Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG7) focuses on a concerted global 
effort to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all. 
The other ‘branches’ of SDG7, namely, improvements in efficiency and increased 
implementation of renewables have also seen progress. Energy efficiency also 
continues to improve, driven by advances in the industrial sector and household 
appliances, which could have transformative results in doing more with less. Growth 
in renewable energy expansion across Africa also made gains in the electricity 
sector in both grid-based and off-grid systems, though much of this growth is 
concentrated in a handful of eastern and southern African countries. However, 
despite the huge attention on Africa from potential investors as a new clean energy 
frontier, the region is still struggling to shed the perception of being high-risk area 
for energy investment as well as the fact that the utility infrastructure necessary for 
large-scale renewable power plants is not fit for purpose in many African countries. 
Beyond electricity, solid biomass – including wood, charcoal, animal dung and crop 
waste – is the primary cooking and heating energy source for nearly 730 million 
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people in sub-Saharan Africa. The high level of reliance on traditional use of solid 
biomass, typically with inefficient stoves in poorly ventilated space, imposes 
immense health, environmental and social costs for households. Currently, over 
600 000  women and children die annually from indoor air pollution associated 
with the use of firewood for cooking (APP, 2015). Furthermore, energy production 
from unsustainable biomass harvesting in Africa as fuelwood and for charcoal 
production is significant. This exacerbates the strains on the forestry stock and 
contributes to rises in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Bruckner et al., 2014). 
A transition to cleaner cooking fuels and appliances faces numerous obstacles, not 
least because people who have access to modern fuels, such as low-pressure gas, 
natural gas, biogas or electricity, may also continue to use solid biomass for cultural, 
cooking or cost reasons – a phenomenon known as ‘fuel stacking’. 
Theorising Africa’s sustainable energy system, innovation  
and development
During the early post-independence years, the conventional development narrative 
described the continent as a new frontier of Western-style economic growth based 
on agricultural modernisation and expansion of the manufacturing sector, powered 
by large-scale power plants reliant on a mix of fossil and large hydro fuels. The 
model promised that such energy investments would drive the creation of high-
quality jobs, increase incomes, and facilitate access to education, health, and other 
benefits consistent with a relentless economic growth agenda. The ‘Conventional 
energy systems ’ column of Table 3.1 summarises some of the key components of 
the paradigm that, as noted earlier, has governed post-independence African energy 
initiatives. Amory Lovins provides a detailed critique of such systems, referring to 
the collection of policy, market and technology choices as constituents of a ‘hard 
energy path’ (Lovins,  1977). A recurring fact about the energy-development 
history of Africa features a succession of large-scale energy projects bearing the 
unmistakable stamp of hard energy ‘cookie cutters.’
Having been swayed to accept for decades by the premises and promises of 
hard energy path advocates and technocrats, African governments and their 
development partners today find themselves caught in a cycle of continually 
allocating disproportionate shares of national resources for energy and other 
infrastructure projects serving the minority in urban centres. Rather than build 
needs-oriented energy solutions for all, governments and their development 
partners have not been able to think outside the box of centralised and complex 
energy systems. Years of institutionalised, elite-led energy planning and policy have 
produced not the benedictions of universal energy access but the maledictions of 
deepening energy poverty and inequity. 
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Table 3.1 Conventional versus sustainable energy systems
Conventional energy systems Sustainable energy systems
Energy policy
Fossil, large-hydro, nuclear promotion
Production incentives
Reliability-focused regulation
Removal of most market barriers
Expansion of demand
Local adaptation to national choices
Standardisation of delivery systems
Renewables dominant
Efficiency incentives
Focused on end-use regulation
Creation of efficiency institutions
Expansion of end-use efficiency
Local choices and responsibility





Emphasis on near-term costing




Diversified capital investment pattern
Social/environmental cost-based prices
Emphasis on life-cycle costing














(Source: Adapted from Wang, 2001:3)
A radically different story of energy challenges and prospects in Africa has gained 
traction in recent years. Far from perceiving the unserved hinterlands of the 
continent as virgin territory ready for fossil-powered corporate profit-maximising 
energisation, the new narrative tells the truth about impoverished landscapes of 
unmet needs, lost human freedoms and the progressive decline in capacities to 
seize opportunities – the underbelly of failed national energy regimes. New and 
more accurate analyses are exposing the scourge of energy poverty, inequality 
and injustice beyond affluent urban enclaves – a world beyond the grid, inhabited 
by millions of people living in rural settlements with the lowest per capita use of 
electricity in the world. People in such areas rely heavily on inefficient biomass 
converters as their main source of household energy for cooking and other 
basic services. The multi-dimensional scope of the new narrative captures the 
deprivations suffered by Africa’s energy-poor, such as unreliable communication 
systems, weak or non-existent transport infrastructure, and inadequate educational 
and health systems, especially for women and children. Studies by scholar-
practitioners associated with a ‘bottom-up’ energy planning school of thought are 
providing a clearer picture of persistently low levels of productivity in primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors; the anaemic livelihood systems; and the erosion 
of income and wealth-creating opportunities (Practical Action, 2010). Inadequate 
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energy access – itself a function of severe deficits in knowledge, financing, enabling 
institutions and policies – is at the root of these negative development outcomes of 
the hard energy path.
These conditions have accelerated the emergence over the past several decades of 
novel schools of thought around an alternative paradigm of energy for sustainable 
development. At its most general, the new framework ‘emphasises the process of 
changing the interlocking nature of energy, economy, environment and equity (E4) 
to conform with sustainability’ (Wang, 2001:2. Branching out from the ‘seed’ idea of 
sustainable development (World Commission on Environment and Development 
[WCED], 1987) the major strands of this emergent paradigm include ‘soft energy 
paths (Lovins, 1977), Pezzey’s proposition that sustainability be understood 
as being distinct from optimality and survivability (Pezzey, 1992), and Daly’s 
definition of ‘development’ as a transformation that makes something qualitatively 
better, not simply bigger in size (Daly, 1993). From this standpoint, a sustainable 
energy system is not merely designed to drive economic growth and quantitative 
proxies of quality of life improvements. Rather, it aims to transform and re-orient 
the E4 relations in ways that increase wellbeing within the regenerative and 
assimilative capacities of the environment.  As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the strong 
interplay amongst the elements making up E4 can gather momentum over time to 
produce higher levels of wellbeing in a manner that these interactions can become 
self-organising and self-reinforcing. Of course, in order for the multiple benefits to 
be felt, policies would need to be integrated, and sectoral boundaries loosened. The 
sustain energy model thus entails properties and ‘rules of the game’ that have little, 
if anything, in common with those of the conventional (hard) energy paradigm 







Figure 3.2 E4–Wellbeing relations (Source: Wang, 2001:2)
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As part of the newly invigorated discourse on energy-development relations in 
Africa, attention has largely shifted from theoretical endeavours aimed at defining 
sustainable energy systems to action-oriented efforts seeking to operationalise the 
concepts in specific contexts. There is a growing consensus that however it might 
be defined, the common denominator of any sustainable energy transition agenda 
is to respect fundamental truths, principles, criteria and indicators that are different 
from the governing conventions of the day. Energy system transformation processes 
should diverge from the current unsustainable path. The time to operationalise a 
transition agenda is now.
A recent contribution to the energy transition literature is the Energy Transition 
Index (ETI), an empirical tool for measuring energy system performance and 
thereby ‘identify imperatives and align policy and market enablers accordingly’ 
(World Economic Forum [WEF], 2019. It emphasises the importance of 
simultaneously pursuing an energy transition on three broad variables, namely: 
Access and Security, Economic Development, and Environmental Sustainability 
(WEF, 2019). The ETI thus offers a flexible framework for elaborating context-
sensitive criteria to guide transition strategy and policy in Africa. However, when 
we consider Africa’s historical experience with authoritarian energy regimes, it 
becomes obvious that the ETI is missing a critical variable – freedom. This point 
of view is well supported by Armatya Sen’s seminal theory of ‘development-as-
freedom’ (Sen, 2000). 
The ETI has also been used to evaluate an economy’s readiness to implement 
the necessary conditions for a sustainability transition. Transition management 
theory suggests that an important measure of readiness be defined by the capacity 
of ‘societal networks of innovation’ to generate ‘sustainability visions’ based on 
which transition paths and a common transition agenda may be drawn up to guide 
planning and policy (Kemp & Loorbach, 2006). Loorbach (2010) has defined 
such networks as ‘transition arenas’ comprising small networks of frontrunners 
who, among other capabilities: (i) are able to consider complex problems at a high 
level of abstraction, (ii) are transdisciplinary thinkers, (iii) enjoy a level of authority 
within various network, (iv) are skilled communicators in explaining visions of 
sustainable energy and development to key stakeholders, (v) are willing to engage 
in group thought processes, and (vi) are open to innovative thoughts and solutions 
other than what they might have in mind.
Although particulars will vary according to context, it is difficult to exclude the 
following as the key arenas of interacting frontrunners in any assessment of an African 
country’s energy transition readiness: (i) energy-system structure transformation, 
(ii) building political commitment (regulatory policies), (iii) stimulating capital 
and impact investment, (iv) establishing enabling institutions and governance, 
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(v) mobilising human capital and stakeholder participation, and (vi) innovation 
system and infrastructure build-up.
Development of this framework is continuing to benefit from applied policy 
research and country case studies of multi-level transition management. There is 
an emerging strand of ideas from system innovation studies including the notion 
of inclusive innovation (Falcone, 2014; Foster & Heeks, 2015; Geels, 2005; 
Geels et al., 2016; Raven, Van den Bosch & Weterings, 2010). Attempts to apply 
these concepts in studies of green industrialisation in Africa have appeared in the 
literature (Okereke et al., 2019).
While casting much-needed light on energy realities beyond the purview of the 
conventional narrative, the sustainable energy paradigm also presents a more 
optimistic view of Africa’s energy future as well as practical ways of getting there. 
Highlighted already in the introduction of this chapter, some of these include: 
(i) the rising demand for energy, creating investment opportunities; (ii) a rapidly 
growing domestic economic wealth that is yet to be unlocked for energy investment; 
(iii) Africa’s significant primary energy resources, especially in renewable energy 
resources, raising the attention of investors for both domestic demand and export, 
even beyond the region; and (iv) the rapid reduction in the cost of renewables, 
making them competitive against conventional fossil fuels and also increasing the 
viability of off-grid systems to meet energy needs in rural areas. 
The energy, climate and development dilemma in Africa
Today, discussions about energy often take place in the shadows of climate 
change and development discourses. Scarcely a day passes without climate 
change being raised as an issue in energy policy debates. Sometimes the concern 
is with the implications of rising GHG emissions from fossil fuel on human and 
ecosystems or future generations. Sometimes it is directed at the financial cost of 
certain decarbonisation actions in energy development and who should pay or of 
innovations that lead to desirable outcomes. Other times, it is about what happens 
to economies under conditions of deep decarbonisation (e.g., oil producers) or how 
lifestyles would need to change to ensure consumption levels are under control 
to avoid punching through the 2°C or the 1.5°C ceiling (Mulugetta & Castan-
Broto, 2018). In this regard, policymakers across Africa now recognise that while 
Africa’s historic responsibility for current climate change is minimal (2–3 percent 
GHG and 18 percent population), this position takes a static perspective about 
Africa and assumes that the continent will remain too poor to take up a higher 
share of the global GHG footprint. Africa’s energy demands are increasing, and 
its energy mix is changing, but there is still plenty of headroom for managing the 
transition given that the region’s energy system is yet to be built, and decisions made 
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today will have repercussions for many years to come. This section explores the 
connections between climate change and Africa’s energy system and sketches out 
the opportunities for investment that would help to upgrade energy infrastructures. 
Equity considerations are crucial
The Paris Agreement confirmed the need to strengthen the global response to 
keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. According to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
voluntary pledges in nationally determined contributions are currently tracking 
toward a warming of 3–4°C above pre-industrial temperatures (UNFCCC, 2016). 
Without a profound transformation of economic and of energy systems at all 
levels, the current efforts are not sufficient to keep temperature changes under safe 
levels. The transformations required for deep decarbonisation may also have co-
benefits for energy poverty and improving energy access, and hence, they could 
have a direct impact on enhancing wellbeing and livelihoods in many countries 
(Ribera et al., 2015). The need for a realignment of current systems of production 
and consumption within ecological limits is also endorsed by the SDGs at the 
UN, emphasising the importance of ‘access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy for all’, and the recognition that none of the other SDGs can be 
achieved without adequate access to energy services. That access to modern energy 
services has gained ever greater attention globally in recent years partly reflects its 
critical importance to all three pillars of sustainable development.
While the need for decarbonisation is essential for addressing climate challenges, 
there is a disjuncture between responsibility and consequence in the way the costs 
and benefits of climate actions are distributed across space and social groups. 
Questions of justice and fairness are central to the issue of climate change and 
response efforts across geographies and generations. Several authors outline 
four key points of connection between climate change and justice from the 
international regime (UNFCCC) perspective (Harlan et al., 2015; Okereke, 2010; 
Shue, 2013).  This issue was covered well in the latest IPCC report on the 1.5°C 
warming (Allen et al., 2018). The first is the huge asymmetry in contributions to 
the problem of climate change in that the benefits of progress and development 
have been unevenly distributed and those who have benefited the most historically 
have contributed the most to the climate challenge. The second is the asymmetry 
in facing the impact of climate change – a problem which is exacerbated because 
the worst impact tends to be felt most by people and communities least responsible 
for the problem. The third is the asymmetry in power to decide solutions and 
response strategies in that the more powerful actors can use their greater influence to 
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define positions and agendas that suit them. Fourth is an asymmetry in the capacity 
of future-response whereby some states and places are at risk of being locked out 
in terms of solutions as the world progresses to a low-carbon economy (Fleurbaey 
et al., 2014; Humphreys, 2017). 
In this context, it is worth asking what are the justice implications for Africa in either 
volunteering or being pressured to take a low-carbon development route? Arguably, 
investments in low-carbon technologies offer some opportunities to tackle poverty 
while increasing mitigating or adapting to climate change. A classic example is the 
distributed renewable energies for off-grid communities, which in addition to being 
climate-friendly can increase socio-economic development and enhance adaptive 
capacity (Sokona et al., 2012). However, it is also possible that some low-carbon 
pathways may require more upfront investment than conventional pathways, and 
so there may be complex trade-offs between cost per unit of energy, biodiversity 
loss, climate change and localised air pollution (Fuso-Nerini et al., 2018). Equally, 
it is important to recognise that realising greater welfare and wellbeing cannot be 
achieved without peaceful societies and equal access to justice (SDG16). 
In relation to the above, placing the climate discussion in its historical (and 
political) context has two important functions. Firstly, it helps us to appreciate the 
genesis of the problem and the possible effect of global warming on present and 
future generations, hence situating local impacts firmly into global politics and 
economics, as well as discussing inequality in a concrete way. Secondly, history 
helps us to explain the evolution of social and environmental systems, with explicit 
consideration of relations of power thereby providing the platform to challenge 
‘dominant accounts of environmental change’ (Robbins, 2004:12). The argument 
here is that environmental change and ecological conditions are fundamentally tied 
to larger issues of economic, social and political processes within which the ‘triple 
inequality’ of vulnerability, responsibility and mitigation are embedded (Roberts 
& Parks, 2006).
Energy and climate dilemma
Globally, the key issue in energy and sustainable development is climate change. 
However, countries in Africa have very low CO2 emissions from electricity 
generation and industrial fossil-fuel use. They account for 42 of the 50 countries 
with the lowest such emissions in per capita terms in 2014, with median per capita 
emissions less than one-fiftieth of some developed countries and major oil exporters 
(Boden, Andres & Marland, 2017). Leaving aside South Africa and the North Africa 
region, emissions are low across Africa, mainly because economic activities are 
lower than other regions, and much of the population still lacks adequate and clean 
energy services (Pachauri et al., 2013). According to the World Resources Institute 
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(WRI), Africa’s per capita emissions of CO2 amounts to about 2.7 to 3.9 tonnes per 
person (tCO2/pp) per year depending on whether land-use change and forestry are 
included in the calculations (WRI, 2014). Still, these figures compare favourably 
against an annual Asian average of about 5–5.3 tCO2/pp, 9.7–10.3 tCO2/pp for 
Europe and over 20 tCO2/pp for North America. To limit global temperatures 
to 2°C, the atmospheric concentration must not exceed 450 ppm (parts/million) 
CO2 equivalent (IPCC, 2013). This means the annual average per capita emissions 
will need to converge at 2.1–2.6 tCO2/pp, and of course, staying within the 1.5°C 
global temperature limit means an even smaller ‘carbon budget’ to play with. 
Three key trends are likely to change this picture. Firstly, Africa’s population 
is growing significantly and is estimated to amount to 25 percent of the global 
population by 2100 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
[UNDESA], 2015). Secondly, Africa has the fastest-growing urban population, 
driven by internal growth and migration from rural areas, and often cities tend to 
be associated with higher levels of per capita consumption of energy. Thirdly, the 
economies of Africa have plenty of headroom to grow, which will require more 
energy to sustain growth. In short, the African emissions will rise in aggregate, 
and Africa’s share in global energy-related CO2 emissions is projected to increase 
markedly. The only questions are the size of this increase and which regions, or 
countries will experience concentrated growth. The answers to the questions depend 
on the development pathways countries choose or compelled to pursue. According 
to Lucas et al. (2015) without a climate policy that is underpinned by a robust 
strategy for sustainable energy, this increase in demand for energy services will 
most likely be supplied by fossil energy sources, which will mean that Africa’s 
energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to increase by a factor 7 to 50 between 
2010 and 2100. 
Whilst action concerning climate adaptation is critical for Africa, it is equally 
important to implement mitigation efforts to avoid a high carbon lock-in that other 
countries had experienced in their development journey. Furthermore, actions, 
such as the widespread adoption of renewable energy in power generation and 
cooking, would bring multiple benefits in health, education and energy security. 
According to the IEA (2014), the total consumption of biomass in sub-Saharan 
Africa burned directly and to produce charcoal amounted to 658  million tonnes 
in 2012. The region also represents the world’s highest regional per capita wood 
energy consumption, amounting to an average consumption of 0.69 m3 per year (or 
1.66 tonnes/year) in 2011, compared to a global average of 0.27 m3 or 0.65 tonnes 
per year (Iiyama et al., 2014). This demonstrates the dependence on biomass 
for household energy but may also indicate that the unsustainable harvesting of 
biomass (although there are large geographic variations) exists. For example, Bailis, 
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Drigo, Ghilardi and Masera (2015) estimate that 27  to 34 percent of woodfuel 
harvested across the developing world is unsustainable, which contributes to the 
concentration of woodfuel depletion ‘hotspots’ in South Asia and East Africa. 
Hence, it would appear that large efficiency gains can be achieved along the entire 
woodfuel and charcoal value chain, helping to reduce GHG emissions significantly. 
Industry accounted for half of the electricity consumption, with services using 
about 20 percent, and the rest distributed across household energy and agriculture 
(Hogart, Haywood & Whitley, 2015). Most power systems in Africa experience 
major challenges associated with power outages, which has a major knock-on effect 
on the economy and performance of health and education systems. In terms of 
GHG emissions, the power sector accounted for about 63 million tCO2eq, about 
2 percent of the region’s total GHG emissions. This seemingly low share of the total 
indicates the low consumption of electricity on a per capita basis; and the low levels 
of access to electricity in several countries. 
To illustrate the CO2 emissions embedded in the electricity supply system of some 
individual countries and the regional power pool systems, a rough Grid Emission 
Factor (GEF) was assembled using data provided by the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA) to illustrate (see Figure 3.3) over the 2015–2025 period. 
To serve for comparison purposes, Figure 3.3 also consists of national GEF from a 
range of countries from the region and other regions. The GEF serves to quantify 
the amount of carbon dioxide (equivalent) emissions associated with each unit of 
electricity from different sources of power generation fed into the grid and provides 







Figure 3.3  Grid Emission Factor for various electricity generation systems  
(Source: Calculated from IRENA data in Brander, Sood, Wylie, Haughton and Lovel, 2011:4–6)
Figure  3.3 also shows the range of decarbonisation opportunities and challenges 
that countries and power pools will face. Several East African countries show 
considerable room for the development of low-carbon energy systems through a 
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variety of renewable energy and low-emissions options, which is also reflected in 
the GEF for the East African Power Pool (EAPP). The story for the southern and 
northern African regions is different. The transition from fossil-based power system 
is not as straightforward since there is a considerable sunk cost in fossil-based power 
systems that would need to be phased out as part of the decarbonisation pathway. 
In the future, these two regions offer the largest decarbonisation potential in terms 
of reduction of carbon intensity per unit energy as a result of a comprehensive 
strategy of energy efficiency and renewable energy developments. Specifically 
looking at South Africa, one of the major climate change mitigation issues it faces 
is the need to reduce GHG emissions from the power sector, primarily reducing its 
heavy dependence on coal. 
As governments across the region are looking at their progress in reducing their 
emissions, their interventions would need to be compatible with local developments 
and people’s aspirations regarding their wellbeing. This means that energy systems 
would need to be integrated into the fabric of local economies and embrace radical 
notions of modernity. The SDGs offer a useful framework for integrating energy 
across the range of goals, thereby identifying potential energy interventions that 
have multiple benefits.
Distributed energy as a sustainable energy pathway
The past few years have seen the coming of age of distributed generation and 
smart energy systems. There are a number of characteristics that smaller and 
locally embedded systems bring to local development in Africa, for example, 
unlike traditional centralised systems, these locally embedded systems can be 
tailored to local contexts in terms of household needs and socio-economic 
circumstances. As such, a more diversified ownership base can be implemented. 
This base involves large number of households, communities, cooperatives, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, as well as larger companies, which become both 
producers and consumers of electricity. This could allow small and locally-based 
systems to become innovators of grassroots systems where social learning and 
experimentation can take place, creating the evidence for scaling up. This section 
will explore a variety of cases and innovations where bottom-up energy systems 
have been deployed to address concrete needs.
The section will explore questions concerning the efficiency of resource use, social 
justice as well as economic resilience, and the role that needs-focused systems can 
contribute towards such goals. 
88      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Synergies between access, energy efficiency and renewable energy 
Depending on population density and income levels, in many parts of the world 
it is cost-effective to extend the grid where the distance to the transmission and 
distribution (T&D) lines is within a specific range. This range usually includes 
urban and peri-urban areas where human settlement is of sufficient density to 
justify the infrastructure cost. However, this condition does not apply to many 
rural areas. Indeed, human settlement across Africa is highly dispersed, which has 
contributed to a limited dispersion of T&D grids. The current pattern of sparse 
settlements, coupled with low per capita energy consumption levels, at 590 kWh 
in 2012 compared to the world average of 2 970 kWh/capita, make it costly to 
extend the grid to most households in the foreseeable future. Power utilities have 
lacked the finance to improve the situation, while most people have had too little 
money to pay for connections and the electricity that they would consume. This 
does not only apply to households, but also to enterprises in rural areas that continue 
to operate their productive activities at low energy throughput or are heavily 
constrained by the poor reliability of incumbent energy systems. In recent years, the 
emergence of new technologies and the lowering of their cost has made it possible 
for distributed renewable energy systems to be considered as viable alternatives 
in terms of cost, convenience, speed and impact on the natural environment. This 
section discusses the various benefits and costs associated with distributed energy 
production, distribution and use in Africa as critical for meeting sustainability goals. 
Three important points justify the distributed energy thesis.
Firstly, as discussed in earlier parts of this chapter, widening energy access to 
modern energy for rural transformation has been gaining momentum over the 
past ten years, and is now seen as crucial to meeting many of the SDGs (Fuso-
Nerini et al., 2018). Almost all development partners now have an energy access 
programme of some nature, and most countries across Africa have universal access 
to modern energy targets.
Secondly, energy efficiency is now seen as an increasingly important consideration 
in delivering modern and affordable energy services. Improvements in efficiency 
can be considered an additional resource, and so there are benefits in making 
improvements in demand-side efficiency as well as minimising transmission and 
distribution losses for investments in renewables to deliver higher impact for each 
unit investment. A sustainable energy economy requires major commitments to 
energy efficiency before looking at investing in renewable energy development.
Thirdly, as renewable energy continues to gather momentum, more renewables 
are being accommodated in the grid, and off-grid using renewables are becoming 
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cost-effective and reliable options for electrifying rural areas. The flexibility they 
offer in terms of their modularity makes renewables ideal for tailoring to specific 
end-use situations. Innovations that lead to cost reductions in storage systems will 
make them even more attractive than fossil-fuel alternatives in the future. 
Looking closely at the off-grid options, stand-alone renewable energy (RE) home 
systems are simpler to deploy than mini-grids and have been deployed successfully 
in large numbers with support from governments and donors and governments. 
There are over 500 000  solar home systems (SHS) across Africa, mostly in East 
Africa and South Africa (IRENA, 2015). Although there has been an upward 
trend in recent years, the off-grid SHS market is still quite small compared to other 
regions. For example, Bangladesh has significantly more SHS than the whole of 
Africa. As of 2016, over 4 million SHS had been installed, due to a very successful, 
long-running implementation programme impacting more than 12 percent of the 
population in Bangladesh (IRENA, 2016). The pico-scale solar product is another 
stand-alone system that has made a significant impact on the African energy 
landscape. This system addresses lighting and small load end-uses and is driven by 
an increasing number of private firms on a commercial basis (Nygard, Hansen & 
Larsen, 2016).
The pico and SHS systems have been hugely beneficial for households and 
businesses in addressing their lighting needs. However, they support limited services 
and are not suitable for multiple appliances, especially those with higher wattage, 
such as refrigerators. In the off-grid category, mini-grids are being increasingly 
used to supporting larger loads and higher load variance and these systems meet 
the needs of over 5 million people worldwide (IRENA, 2015). Mini-grids offer 
considerable advantages over both grid-based and stand-alone systems where 
grid extension is not economically attractive but where communities live in a core 
village with houses nearby (see Figure 3.4). This avoids the cost of transmission 
infrastructure, which can amount to a significant share of the total electricity bill 
of a power system. According to Bardouille et al. (2012), the average capital cost 
for providing a new connection to a household with a mini-grid starts at  $50, 
whereas the cost of providing a new connection by extending the main grid to a 
household that is sufficiently close to it can start at $500. New connection charges 
in sub-Saharan Africa are among the highest in the world, resulting in low rates of 
electrification in many countries. Smaller independent grids offer more practical 
alternatives in many rural situations, and if operated well, they can scale up and 
become attractive for connecting with the main grid as the local economy grows 
(Mitra & Buluswar, 2015). There are plenty of such experiences across Europe and 
North America. 
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Figure 3.4  The role of mini-grids in an electrification programme 
(Source: Franz, Peterschmidt, Rohrer and Kondev, 2014:20)
Mini-grids offer more transformational potential than stand-alone systems and 
other advantages over grid systems, however they, these systems face significant 
technical, economic and institutional barriers. They involve large up-front costs, 
tariffs that are often higher than those charges to on-grid consumers, and they 
need on board site-specific conditions on resources and institutional arrangements 
(Least Developed Countries Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Initiative 
[LDC REEEI], 2018). This is especially important for countries in Africa where the 
institutional concerns around cost calculations,1 regulatory uncertainties, potential 
conflict among actors and operation and maintenance arrangements could create 
major obstacles due to the limited experience in the development of mini-grids. 
The key is that careful planning and a forward-looking approach to widening 
electricity access wherein mini-grids can be integrated into local livelihoods 
and economies is important. This would need those involved to deal with the 
potential complementarity of grid and off-grid solutions where in the event the 
grid reaches the mini-grid service area, policies and agreements are in place to 
transform the mini-grids into distribution utilities. Such forward planning would 
give investors’ confidence to develop mini-grids in rural and remote areas, knowing 
1 Cost calculation of mini‑grids tend to be more complicated. Unlike the entrepreneurial drive 
that stimulates the growth of stand‑alone systems and highly institutionalised top‑down 
pricing of grid‑based systems, cost calculations of mini‑grids depend on technology and 
geographical location and require more planning and institutional development.
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that their investment will be compensated or allowed to convert their operation 
into an interconnected mini-grid ‘when the big grid connects with the small grid’ 
(Tenenbaum, Greacen, Siyambalapitiya & Knuckles, 2014).
Some African countries, such as Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania, have developed 
rules or regulations that allow mini-grids to become small power distributors or 
sell exclusively to the grid, along with compensation rules should they wish to exit 
the mini-grid business. It is too early to say whether these regulatory rules will be 
implemented or not. Experience from Asia, especially from Cambodia, has been 
quite impressive where the country’s regulatory and subsidy policies enabled 
hundreds of privately-owned diesel mini-grids to make the transition toward grid-
connected small power distributors. According to the World Bank (2017a), the 
conversion has allowed private operators to provide their customers with longer 
hours of service at significantly lower prices – a good sign that mini-grids have 
come of age. 
Needs-based planning: From household to community energy
The chapter has highlighted that the energy system in sub-Saharan African countries 
is inherently complex given its dual nature where the traditional and modern energy 
systems and practices co-exist (Sokona et al., 2012). The provision of services 
through centralised and interconnected infrastructures has its place, particularly in 
the more densely settled urban areas. However, there are large parts of countries, 
often rural and remote, where this approach/model has failed to deliver basic 
services such as sanitation, water and energy services to communities. The high 
dispersal of settlement patterns, the rapid reduction in the cost of renewables, 
and the new policy and regulatory attention devoted to the energy access agenda 
creates ideal conditions for off-grid energy systems to meet local development 
needs in Africa. 
Policymakers also recognise that ‘failing to plan is planning to fail’, and so planning 
the future direction of the energy system needs to embrace all options and scales 
(Mulugetta, Ben Hagen & Kammen, 2019). Often those engaged in energy 
planning start with numbers – numbers of people without access to modern 
energy, the proportion of people who rely on electricity from renewables or the 
cost of per unit electricity. This is then followed by the importance of bringing 
electricity or some other fuel to meet needs. This somewhat linear construction is 
often at odds with a needs-based approach focused on determining citizens’ needs, 
and planning based on people’s lived experiences, needs and aspirations. Over the 
years, several researchers have recommended a bottom-up approach to planning 
where users are placed at the heart of the decisions on technology options for 
planning to be accountable and representative (Goldemberg, Johansson, Reddy & 
Williams, 1985; Hiremath, Shikha & Ravindranath, 2007). 
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Following the long tradition of rural energy planning that emerged following the 
oil crisis of 1970s, organisations such as Practical Action have been developing 
bottom-up energy planning approaches for over a decade. Their total energy 
access (TEA) approach, built on the back of several decades of field experience, 
helps communities to identify the combination of energy access technologies that 
address development and poverty goals (Practical Action, 2016). 
The TEA approach encompasses: 
  all spheres of energy access: households, productive uses and community 
facilities, differentiated by gender; 
  all forms of energy access: electricity, cooking, heating and mechanical power; 
and 
  all feasible and appropriate means of energy provision: grid-connected, mini-
grid, and stand-alone. 
The World Resources Institute (WRI) proposes another bottom-up approach, 
known as ‘bottom-up demand forecasting’ (Odarno, Sawe, Swai, Katyega & 
Lee,  2017). Like the TEA approach, this approach is complementary to the 
SE4ALL’s2 Multi-tier Framework for electricity access as it focuses on different 
levels of access based on differentiated energy needs. Access at different tiers 
can be satisfied by numerous options, and the tiers can vary over time and space. 
For instance, some remote rural communities need only lower-tier levels of 
electricity service in the early stages of access and development. This means that 
bottom-up demand forecasting approach will need to take account of changing 
consumption patterns over time; and may be survey-based or may be derived from 
end-use models. The end-use model quantifies electricity demand based on the 
consumers’ current and projected electricity end-use patterns (Dharmadhikary & 
Bhalerao, 2015).
Such bottom-up concepts work on the premise that the future energy systems 
across Africa will be increasingly diversified and distributed, with increasing 
numbers of actors as energy producers who will meet their own needs. In some 
cases, they may engage in selling their surplus to other users and import electricity 
when needed. With their flexibility, modularity and scalability, smaller distributed 
projects can be initiated simultaneously with significantly reduced construction 
2 The UN’s Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative was launched in 2012. This 
initiative aims to ‘improve the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable people by ensuring 
universal access to modern energy services, increasing the share of renewable energy sources 
around the world, and improving energy’ (International Institute for Environment and 
Development [IIED], 2012).
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times compared to large centralised installations (LDC REEEI, 2018). Given the 
urgency for action in Africa, such systems are vital in providing electrical and non-
electrified systems to provide lighting, heating, cooling, transportation and other 
needs locally. 
Estimations of demand based on end-use data enables planners and service 
providers to seriously think about energy efficiency and demand-side management 
as it can lead to a reduction in cost by doing more with less energy. Efforts in 
energy efficiency need to happen at the supply side as well as the demand side. 
According to IEA (2014), transmission and distribution losses in sub-Saharan 
Africa average about 18 percent with some countries recording over 20 percent 
losses. This transfers considerable resources that could otherwise be reinvested 
in the country’s critical infrastructures. On the supply side, part of the strategy to 
reduce such transmission and distribution losses would also include having a good 
mix of on-grid and off-grid systems. On the demand side, the focus is on reducing 
the overall electricity demand of consumers (end-users) by introducing high-
efficiency appliances and raising awareness about the value of energy conservation. 
For the off-grid contexts, demand-side efficiency improvements have been crucial 
in bringing down the overall cost of stand-alone and mini-grids. 
Typologies of distributed rural energy in Africa
There is a wide range of business models in both the grid-based and off-grid 
systems. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to explore all. Instead, given 
the interest of this chapter in distributed energy for local development, this chapter 
focuses on the business models that relate to stand-alone and mini-grids. 
Although mini-grids have a long history electrifying rural villages, standalone 
systems are now far more common, especially in Africa. According to IRENA 
(2018), about 133 million people accessed lighting and other electricity-based 
services using off-grid renewables in 2016; mostly using pico lighting and solar 
home systems, and about 9 million are connected to a mini-grid. As shown in 
Table  3.2, to an extent these off-grid variants are competing for the same rural 
electrification market, albeit to power different devices, and the growth of one 
will have implications on the other. For example, investment in mini-grids may 
seem to be too risky in areas where small-scale renewables are already established 
as the residual unmet demand may not justify the investment. Similarly, off-grid 
renewables (mainly solar) may not be seen as an option in areas that already have 
functional mini-grids, unless the load exceeds the availability of electricity from 
the mini-grid. 
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Table 3.2 SE4ALL multi-tier framework against technology options
Energy access 
according to 
global tracking  
for SE4ALL
Basic Advanced
Attributes Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Tier 5






Tier 2 and any 
low-power 
appliances
Tier 3 and any 
medium-power 
appliances






3 W 50 W 200 W 800 W 2 000 W
Duration 
(minimum hours)
4 4 8 16 22
Evening supply 
(minimum hours)
2 2 2 4 4
Affordability √ √ √ √
Formality (legality) √ √ √









 ■ Rechargeable 
batteries










Source: Adapted from Franz et al. (2014:26)
Business models for stand-alone systems
Advances in technologies such as solar (photo voltaic or PV system), battery storage 
and LED lighting and rapidly decreasing prices have led to a growth in standalone 
electrification solutions in the past ten years. In some cases, growth has been driven 
by public initiatives, as in the case of the Rural Electrification and Renewable 
Energy Project in Bangladesh. In others, the uptake has been more private sector-
driven, employing upfront cash payment by consumers or through pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) schemes or long-term lease models. 
Bangladesh is a leading example of deploying solar home systems at scale, reaching 
over 18 million people from 4.1 million systems installed as of 2017. According to 
the Infrastructure Development Company Limited (IDCOL), this is expected to 
save 3.6 million tonnes of kerosene worth $1 300 million by 2030 (IDCOL, 2018). 
The Bangladesh government established the IDCOL in the late 1990s to manage 
and oversee funds obtained from international development finance institutions 
and donors for infrastructure and renewable energy. Among others, initiatives of 
the IDCOL focused on developing off-grid energy, including programmes on solar 
home systems, solar irrigation pumps, solar mini-grids and biogas electricity-based 
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production (Oji & Weber, 2017). IDCOL provides grants and soft loans as well as 
necessary technical assistance to some 56 partner organisations (POs) who select 
customers, extend loans, install the systems and provide after-sale service. The POs 
include overseas development finance institutions, suppliers of SHS, local small- 
and medium-sized enterprises and microfinance institutions. 
African countries can draw important lessons from the experience in Bangladesh on 
how a government-owned non-bank financial institution can successfully operate 
a public-private partnership programme to finance off-grid renewable projects. 
One of the lessons learnt is that  the investment management should remain 
independent of interference and pay attention to market signals. Other lessons 
learnt are the importance of a single channel for distributing finance and the design 
of smart subsidies to grow the market. Interest in the IDCOL model is growing 
among African countries, and in the past few years, a number of experience-sharing 
and training programmes have been undertaken. By providing the product, the 
required after-sales service, and the microcredit, the partner organisations in the 
IDCOL model build trust among consumers. 
The recent experience in the PAYG schemes in East Africa resonates well with 
the Bangladeshi experience in their strong customer-centric focus. Pay-as-you-go 
involves households or individuals procuring the system from a supplier through a 
down payment, followed by periodic payments that are set at affordable levels under 
an arrangement of a perpetual lease or eventual system ownership after a defined 
period (IRENA, 2018). Table 3.3 describes different types of PAYG schemes. 
Table 3.3 Differences among PAYG companies’ consumer finance mechanism





 ■ Higher regular payments (for equal 
product specs)
 ■ Consumer/cultural preference for 
ownership
 ■ Theoretical ability to collateralise assets 
after they are paid off
 ■ Perpetual service guarantee reduces 
warranty anxiety
Impact on energy 
access challenge
 ■ Raised capital can reach more 
customers due to faster cost recovery





 ■ Shorter duration of cash flows
 ■ Faster recycling of capital towards new 
customers
 ■ Broader diversification of debt capital 
across a wider customer pool
 ■ Potential for additional income streams 
from collateralised assets
 ■ Longer duration of cash flows
 ■ Higher exposure to technology risk
 ■ Higher exposure to company execution risk
 ■ Higher exposure to currency risk
 ■ Stronger customer relationship
 ■ Better opportunities for upselling to larger 
systems or appliances
Examples: Fenix International, M-KOPA Off-grid Electric
(Source: Orlandi, Tyabji and Chase, 2016:31)
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Payments are made via mobile phones for the electricity consumed and access to 
electricity can be discontinued in case of non-payment. The strength of the PAYG 
business model is less about selling electricity in much the same way as utilities 
or mini-grid operators, but in their focus to provide services such as lighting, 
communications, information and communications (e.g., mobile charging). 
Another key attraction in the PAYG schemes relates to the flexible credit facilities 
tailored to what users can afford and enables them to scale up their solar solutions, 
products and services. Stand-alone PV systems have been developed in a relatively 
unregulated market environment and so the barriers to entering the market are 
reduced and the business case for a profitable business is easier to determine 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2016). 
The firm in a PAYG scheme often plays the three roles of system owner, operator 
and maintenance provider and bill collector (or a separate company may be 
brought in to handle customer collections). But what is clear is that as the market 
has expanded, the firms may build up large portfolios of loans, which are paid in the 
local currency, while the capital that finances the company may be denominated 
in international currency (e.g., USD or euros). Therefore, the emerging business 
models carry currency exchange risks where in the event that the local currency 
is devalued, an additional cost will be levied that is outside of the business and 
operations domain. It is therefore important to explore other business models 
that limit the risk of losses due to potential currency volatility. Some of the market 
leaders in the PAYG market are firms such as M-KOPA, Mobisol and BBoxx, which 
operate through hundreds of service centres or retail shops across Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Rwanda. 
Other business models for the delivery of stand-alone systems also exist. For 
example, the retail or over the counter model is the most common delivery model 
for Tier  1 (task lighting and phone charging) products such as the pico lantern 
(in the $10–$20 price range) and pico solar home systems (in the $100–$200 
price range). Transactions for the pico systems are mostly cash-based, often with 
shops offering short-term credit to their distributors. Given an average lifetime of 
products of between three to five years, the viability of the business is dependent 
on effective marketing, supply and distribution models. 
Business models for mini-grids
Mini-grids are at an earlier stage of development in Africa but given that it is in 
Africa where access to energy remains lowest, the developments there are of 
particular interest. For example, according to the IRENA report (2018), Kenya has 
about 20 MW of operational mini-grids capacity, and Cameroon has over 23 MW. 
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According to the WRI, Tanzania has become a regional leader in mini-grid 
development with over 109 mini-grids, amounting to an installed capacity of over 
155 MW and serving about 184 000 customers. Of the total, 15 percent were 
connected to the national grid with the remaining 85 percent operating as isolated 
mini-grids consisting of hydro, biomass, solar and fossil-based systems (cited in 
Odarno et al., 2017). Mali is another African country that has had some success in 
developing isolated mini-grids where there are more than 200 mostly small diesel 
mini-grids in operation in the country. Around 60 of those are privately run and 
many are in the process of hybridisation (PwC, 2016). 
Business models for mini-grids can often be classified in terms of the operating or 
ownership and financing arrangements. The performance of mini-grid operation 
models will be context-specific and will depend on various factors, such as the 
investment environment, geography and resources, socio-economic conditions, 
and the policy/regulatory environment. By their nature, mini-grid developers focus 
on densely populated areas where there is sufficient load to justify the investment. 
Four main mini-grid operation models are being implemented in different parts 
of Africa. These include mini-grids that are utility-operated, privately-operated, 
community-operated, or hybrids that combine a mix of the others (Table  3.4). 
It is not unusual for a combination of different actors to be involved, owning or 
operating different parts of the system, such as the production, distribution and 
demand management systems. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of mini-grid operator models
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all aspects,  
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regulation.
A private company 
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from an NGO or 
private company.
Pros  ■ Can absorb 
funds easily 
 ■ Less regulation 
needed 
 ■ Connection 
of mini-grid to 




of tariffs, thus 
affordability 
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 ■ Profitability 
ideally allows 
for scaling-up  
of operations
 ■ Faster pace of 
electrification
 ■ Scalability through 
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 ■ Technical know-
how, high reliability
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(Source: Adapted from Orlandi et al., 2016:32)
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In a community-based model, the mini-grid is owned, operated and managed 
by the community or local non-governmental organisation, normally including 
maintenance and tariff collection. Mini-grids are typically financed by grants 
from donors or other external financiers with the local community providing 
contributions in-kind. Mini-grids tend to set tariffs to only cover operation and 
maintenance costs, which often means they are budget-constrained and do not 
generate sufficient profits to scale up. Third parties often carry out the planning 
and procurement of equipment, installation and commissioning, but the systems 
are generally operated by local teams. In many cases, local communities lack 
technical expertise, and the systems may suffer with poor maintenance and lengthy 
repair times. Small community models require effective social and decision-making 
structures in the village to prevent conflicts. Larger community-driven cooperative 
models running generation in the multi-MW scale are more formalised and depend 
less on local structures (Franz et al., 2014).
In a utility-based model, the national electricity utility owns and operates the 
mini-grid, which is often run on diesel. The initial financing is usually provided by 
the national treasury or government or donors. The utility is responsible for the 
installation, maintenance and operation (and sometimes tariff collection) of the 
system. This model is the most common for rural electrification in developing 
countries where, as part of the government’s social objectives, the utility may be 
required to charge tariffs at similar levels as those connected to the national grid. 
This means that tariffs paid by those connected to the national grid may be used 
to cross-subsidise those served by the mini-grids, creating difficulties for utilities 
that may already be cash-constrained (Franz et al., 2014) This has resulted in many 
mini-grids being poorly maintained and short of funds to allow for a smooth and 
long-term operation. 
Private sector-based models are ones where a private investor establishes, owns 
and operates the mini-grid system. In some cases, the investor builds the system 
and transfers it to another actor. Various types of private-sector models include the 
franchise, the ABC (Anchor-Business-Community) and the local entrepreneur 
approaches. Funding usually comes from a mix of private sources, including 
equity and commercial loans, and public sources such as grants, subsidies or loan 
guarantees. Such resources from public or grant funds are important to cover part 
of the project development costs and to keep tariffs at an affordable level for the 
end-users. However, some purely private-sector models do exist, for example, 
Powerhive in Kenya was the first private company in Kenya to receive a utility 
licence to develop, distribute and sell electricity to end-users. This came following 
Powerhive’s successful operation of renewable energy mini-grid projects. The 
Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) connected the grid, which served 
around 1 500 rural customers in four villages, including a cluster of users involved in 
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commercial activities such as welding, carpentry and milling (World Bank,  2017b). 
This also means that Powerhive is regulated as a utility, implying that it can access 
government-sponsored incentives. The collective experiences in mini-grids, not 
only in Africa but elsewhere, shows that establishing mini-grids in the private sector 
will require substantial subsidies as well as an anchor load to sustain them. 
A hybrid business model combines different aspects of the above three models, 
depending on a regulatory framework that allows mixed ownership and 
management. For example, a utility or a private company could implement and own 
a renewable energy mini-grid power system, while a community-based organisation 
manages it on a daily basis and a private company provides the technical back-
up and management advice (Franz et al., 2014). Another model could be that 
the utility owns and operates the mini-grid distribution assets and a small power 
producer would own and operate the generation assets. The relationship is 
transacted through a standard power purchase agreement (PPA), which makes the 
process of interconnection when the grid arrives easier given that the distribution 
assets are already owned by the utility and the generation assets can be relocated to 
another village where there is no grid. 
Tenenbaum et al. (2014) classify Small Power Producers (SPPs) based on three 
characteristics: (i) the fuel or technology used to generate electricity, (ii) whether 
the SPP is connected to the national grids or operates an isolated mini-grid, and 
(iii) whether the SPP is selling at retail or wholesale or both. They go on to argue 
that focusing on the last two characteristics, four types of SPPs can be identified in 
Africa. Figure 3.5 shows the various combinations where an SPP may sell directly 
to final customers from an isolated mini-grid, which represents the most common 
mini-grid business model – a stand-alone, low-voltage distribution grid that is 
supplied with electricity from one or more small generators connected only to the 
isolated mini-grid. Another model is where an SPP sells wholesale to the national 
utility on the main grid but at the same time sells at retail to households and 
businesses on new mini-grids that are electrically connected to the main grid but 
operate as separate distribution businesses. 
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Figure 3.5  Types of electricity sales involving SPPs  
(Source: Adapted from Tenenbaum et al., 2014:3)
Key barriers for scaling up distributed energy systems
There are clear opportunities in expecting transformative change. But there are 
barriers that need to be overcome. The paragraphs that follow consider some of 
these barriers.
Affordability gap in off‑grid systems
Achieving universal access to energy services by 2030 will necessitate a heavy 
investment in off-grid systems. Conventional thinking in this area would argue 
that innovative business models would be needed to mobilise private investment 
to finance stand-alone or mini grids systems because public subsidies are neither 
sufficient to address the shortfall or regarded appropriate financing instruments. 
However, there are two problems with this standpoint. Firstly, there is a significant 
affordability gap with current technologies for low-income users, namely a gap 
between cost recovery tariffs and what the users can spend on energy services. 
For example, even if decentralised PV mini-grids were made available, and even if 
appliances for basic needs were affordable, the cost of electricity (average cost of 
$0.24/kWh) to provide basic services with existing appliances may be too high for 
low-income users (Mitra & Buluswar, 2015). Hence, either the cost of electricity 
needs to come down significantly to be affordable or appliances need to become 
proportionally more efficient, or both need to happen for a similar combined effect. 
The second problem relates to the inadequacy of money to make subsidies viable 
for off-grid programmes in the face of massive public support for the fossil fuel 
industry. In a study for the IMF, Coady, Parry, Sears and Shang (2015) estimated 
post-tax energy subsidies at $4.9 trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2013 and 
projected to reach $5.3 trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2015. The study 
defined fossil fuel subsidies broadly to reflect undercharging for environmental 
costs and general taxes, as well as production costs. 
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This unequal distribution of subsidies creates structural obstacles for off-grid 
programmes to become established. Whilst business models and private capital 
are important, carefully targeted public finance will be critical in closing the 
affordability gap.
Skills and capacity gap
As countries across Africa are looking to invest in their energy sector to transform 
their economies, the effectiveness of these efforts will be dependent on the 
quality (and quantity) of their human resources and institutional capacity. Indeed, 
meaningful country ownership of programmes means having the requisite 
and homegrown technical, policy and managerial skills to build and maintain 
infrastructures. At present, countries in the regions face a critical shortage of hands-
on technical and engineering skills with the ability to build and maintain projects. 
The result of having too few skilled workers means that energy industries rely on 
expatriate skills, often with little contextual knowledge, to the detriment of local 
industries and jobs. Further, Africa lacks its own research and innovation solutions 
with no coherent national strategy across the region to address the system-wide 
gap in skills in the energy sector. Part of the practical steps that could be taken 
would involve improving the conditions of vocational and knowledge institutions, 
building in the right incentive structures for those within, and exploring workable 
and lasting partnerships. 
Weak policy environment out of step with developmental ambitions
Most countries in the region have embarked on ambitious development plans to 
boost growth in agriculture, manufacturing and services to create jobs and raise 
living standards. However, in many cases, these aspirations for transformative 
change have not been matched by correspondingly bold policies on energy. If 
anything, energy policymakers appear stranded in their traditional incremental 
approaches and assumptions, oblivious to the fact that the world around them 
has changed markedly – it has become more interconnected and more complex. 
Economic growth trends and social expectations are such that major energy 
transitions are demanded that take into account environmental and climate change 
considerations. Furthermore, the consensus around the 2030 commitment of 
‘energy for all’ requires the adoption of strategies that extend the provision of energy 
that can be reached through a combination of centralised (grid) and decentralised 
options (APP, 2015). Part of the rationale for this diversified perspective is that 
off-grid options are now mature and competitive and unserved households should 
no longer have to wait 15 to 20 years until grid-connection eventually arrives. 
The technology and cost rationale for inadequate access to modern energy no 
longer applies. 
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Lack of coherent public‑private partnership
The nature of technological and market developments in recent years has underlined 
the continued importance of the state as a facilitator and guardian of good policies 
as well as an investor in energy systems. This means that policymakers need to 
recognise the emergence of the private sector as a major player that requires a stable 
policy and regulatory landscape to invest in the energy market. However, whilst 
much of this is intended to enhance the confidence of foreign investors, domestic 
entrepreneurs are likely to play a pivotal role in growing the overall investment 
envelope. Hence, the question around how to mobilise domestic entrepreneurs 
and national financial institutions to be responsive to the social agenda of clean 
energy access and conducive investment opportunities is critical. Incentivising 
these domestic actors to enter the energy market has additional benefits, namely 
they understand the national business context and carry lower risk thresholds. To 
date, there has been limited dialogue to engage these actors and establish clear roles 
for them to play in the development of the region’s energy future. 
Governance structure is at odds with policies
The development of policies and regulations is important, but their mere existence 
is not sufficient for achieving successful outcomes. The history of power sector 
reform in Africa is replete with missed opportunities and disappointing results, 
since reforms had mainly been founded on a false ‘epistemology’. The architects of 
these early reforms viewed the problem through a techno-economic lens, neglecting 
the broader socio-political context and the essential institutional elements that are 
representative of the system (Thompson & Bazilian, 2013). Sectoral reforms do 
not take place in a societal vacuum, but rather are shaped by the political economy 
terrain that underpins them. To this end, the level of active commitment by 
government and other stakeholders is fundamental to ensure that plans have been 
developed in step with related policy areas and with the full participation of the 
national political institutions.
Discussion: Criteria for success
The debate about the drivers and consequences of energy poverty and lack 
of access has been raging for over four decades. It is now all too evident that 
countries in Africa need sustainable energy master plans that consider current 
and future demands, the mix of resources and infrastructures, as well as scales 
that are appropriate to each country context. Plans must also incorporate social, 
environmental and climate concerns to ensure infrastructures are resilient and 
the services they provide are inclusive. Part of this relates to the fact that energy 
systems cannot be treated in isolation from the wider development agenda and 
the underlying political and institutional structures. Of course, in envisioning 
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such a comprehensive approach, several questions emerge. What makes us think 
that it is different this time around? What has changed in the landscape of our 
policies and innovation systems to expect different outcomes against a litany failed 
experiments? This section will provide some of the reasons for a new sense of 
optimism, supported by cases from the region.
Policy instruments need to be transparent and fit national conditions
Costs for new energy options are falling and technologies such as wind turbines 
and grid-based PV systems are becoming competitive. However, the success of 
implementation depends on the viability of technologies and suitability of policies 
for encouraging the integration of renewable energy supplies into the energy system. 
To this end, debates have intensified on the most effective policy instruments to 
accelerate public-private partnerships and stimulate private sector investment in 
grid-connected renewable technologies. Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) have been the most 
widely used government support mechanism for accelerating private investment in 
renewable energy generation. One encouraging initiative is Uganda’s Global Energy 
Transfer Feed-in Tariff (GET FiT) programme, formally launched in May  2013, 
which has demonstrated how the instrument can be deployed successfully in an 
African context to finance smaller-scale projects. The first two rounds of ‘Request 
for Proposals’ have resulted in 15  projects with a planned installed capacity of 
128 MW, and a promising pipeline for the third Request for Proposals that may 
increase the portfolio to 20 projects (Eberhard, Kolker & Leigland, 2014). 
Competitive tenders or auctions have also emerged in various countries as acceptable 
instruments, especially in emerging economies. South Africa’s Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPP) is an outstanding 
example of this scheme. This programme enables the utility, ESKOM, to enter 
into a PPA allowing Independent Power Producers (IPPs) make firm revenue 
projections. The guaranteed power off-take by ESKOM provides the foundation 
for this highly successful and rapidly growing renewable energy programme. 
According to the United nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
REIPPP has generated 64 new renewable energy IPPs, attracting US$14 billion in 
investment for the construction of 3 922 MW of capacity in technologies like grid-
connected wind, PV, and to a lesser degree, hydro, landfill gas and biomass energy 
(FAO, 2011). REIPPP offers many valuable lessons on how other countries in the 
region procure renewable energy projects rapidly and effectively. It also highlights 
the importance of strong banking, legal and other advisory resources in rolling out 
effective renewable energy programmes.
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Sustained political leadership is fundamental for success
Good governance enhances the ability of any nation to reach its full economic and 
social development potential. This means that governance must be strong at each 
level, in order for countries to maintain rates of growth in an inclusive manner. 
One common feature is that every country that has achieved universal access has 
reached this goal with the support of strong leadership that can establish a common 
vision of the benefits of enhanced energy systems for growth and wellbeing. 
Leadership is critical to drive through comprehensive long-term planning in 
partnership with public, private and civil society stakeholders. At present, Africa 
lacks public administration systems that embody long-term visions, and most 
planning has short-term horizons and little value for laying the foundation for a 
sustainable energy transition. 
This picture is gradually changing though and propelled by new technologies, 
policy reforms and innovative business models, several countries are experimenting 
with new pathways. Ethiopia is one of these countries that has registered rapid 
economic growth over the past decade and has spent considerable political and 
financial capital in renewable energy development as integral to its Growth and 
Transformation Plan. Two parallel visions characterise Ethiopia’s energy plans. 
On the domestic front, the policymakers recognise electricity as a vital enabler of 
economic growth and human development, aiming to minimise the gap between 
demand and supply by increasing hydropower and renewable capacity from 
2 000 MW to over 10 000 MW and raise national electrification rate by 75 percent. 
On the regional scale, the country aims to generate power for export to become one 
of the major contributors to the East African Power Pool. Much of the investment 
for this ambitious expansion programme comes from finances mobilised from local 
sources and concessionary loans, which is a reflection of the political imperative of 
economic transformation. 
Agroforestry as an energy opportunity
Bio-energy will remain an important source of energy for African households, with 
demand continuing to grow. Assuming bio-energy production from non-sustainable 
forests, which is mostly the case in much of Africa, the rate of deforestation and 
net GHG emissions, particularly for charcoal production, is significant (World 
Bank, 2011). The charcoal industry in sub-Saharan Africa had an estimated value 
of approximately $8 billion in 2007. Whilst there are investment opportunities 
in industrial plantations, agroforestry, as an integrated strategy together with 
improved kilns and stoves, can have a significant impact on the reduction of wood 
harvest pressures in forests. Advances in agroforestry science and innovations are 
providing farmers with greater species options and more resilient systems for tree 
developments on farmland. 
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There are numerous initiatives from multilateral organisations and from the 
private sector with innovative business models aimed at improving agricultural 
productivity for food and creating bioenergy development opportunities. Many 
of these initiatives have highlighted improvements in household wealth and 
income diversity, resulting from the sale of fuelwood and other tree products. 
More critically, agroforestry activities provide labour savings to women household 
members by reducing time spent on fuelwood collection. Thus, while there are 
clear benefits associated with agroforestry practices in terms of delivering income 
and wellbeing, one critical challenge is overcoming the length of time (often three 
to four years) when farmers are making initial investments (land and inputs). 
Improving access to loans and farm implements enables farmers to see tangible 
benefits in the short-term before their trees have matures and able to yield financial 
and livelihoods benefits. 
National entrepreneurs and business models are critical for  
unlocking internal investment
Given its abundant natural resources and the many innovative environment-related 
financing instruments available today, Africa has the opportunity to take advantage 
of these opportunities and pursue a clean energy path. The involvement of the 
domestic private sector will be a critical requirement. There is currently a vigorous 
discussion among local entrepreneurs across Africa on how to help fill the gap in 
power generation, especially in off-grid generation. This conversation is not only 
about investing their money in energy, but also how to leverage additional finance 
from external sources in support of strong growth, job creation, and poverty 
reduction on the continent. 
There are a several initiatives such as the US Government Power Africa initiative, 
which is designed to support African entrepreneurs to enter the energy market. 
Through this programme, a growing number of entrepreneurs are getting seed 
money to develop commercially viable ways to deliver power to unserved, often 
rural communities. A broad array of solutions is being developed in Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria, creating incubators for greater 
innovation. Sustaining such initiatives will be predicated on the ability of local 
entrepreneurs to raise sustainable finance for maintaining their activities from 
commercial banks to provide the necessary financing to grow the off-grid energy 
sector. For this to happen, innovative business models such as the ‘pay-as-you-go’ 
models would need to be mainstreamed and the level of risk perceived by investors 
is reduced. Fundamental to this is for entrepreneurs to demonstrate robust profit 
margins to service their loans, and for government to create stable regulatory and 
policy environment. Today, a growing number of companies are operating in at least 
20  sub-Saharan African countries that use digitally-financed off-grid electricity 
services (Welsch et al., 2013). 
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Agro-industry-based co-generation as a local solution 
Agro-industries account for a major source of rural employment and are significant 
contributors to the economy of many sub-Saharan African countries. Agro-
industries in this region, such as tea, coffee and sugar estates, already utilise energy 
for their processing and, on occasions, supply energy to their employees within 
their estates. In the event of non-access to the grid, scaling up electricity service 
would have direct economic and social benefits to rural communities in the vicinity 
of these estates, and offer the agro-businesses a potentially attractive commercial 
opportunity for diversifying into the energy market. Where the industry is 
connected to the grid, feeding into the grid in times of surplus and drawing from 
it when supplies are low makes it very likely that communities will have access 
to electricity. The two ways that agro-industries relate to the energy system and 
influence the outcome in regards to widening energy access are different – the 
off-grid case requires an active engagement in investment and delivery, while the 
grid-based model requires a more passive engagement. 
Mauritius is an African success story in co-generation. The sugar industry in 
Mauritius is currently self-sufficient in electricity and sells the excess it generates 
to the national electricity grid. The industry contributes about 16 percent of the 
electricity supply on the island. The importance of revenue from the sale of excess 
electricity from co-generation is such that it has enabled Mauritian sugar factories 
to remain profitable. A notable achievement has been the use of a wide variety of 
innovative revenue-sharing measures where the island’s co-generation industry has 
worked closely with the government to ensure that substantial monetary benefits 
from the sale of electricity from co-generation are shared by all key stakeholders 
of the sugar economy, including the poor smallholder sugar farmers. There are 
three main success factors of the Mauritian programme: (i) from the outset the 
government has played an instrumental role in putting in place strong policies 
and clear regulations, (ii) the involvement of local private entrepreneurs in IPP 
initiatives allowed for the IPP development to piggy-back on the locally owned 
sugar industry, and (iii) consultations with all relevant stakeholders allowed for a 
negotiated and equitable revenue sharing formula. 
Strengthened capacity as a prerequisite to attract investment 
It is evident by now that three common problems bedevil new energy enterprises 
from entering the energy market: lack of investment finance, weak enabling policies 
and regulations, and inadequate skills and capacity. There is new thinking today 
that the success of projects (and programmes) should be measured in accordance 
with how well they create opportunities for skills and capacity within the countries. 
This is especially needed in areas where there is a lack of the technical, financial, 
and legal skills needed to deliver bankable feasibility studies and bring projects to 
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completion. Introducing new skills, know-how, and technologies into the energy 
industry will help to enable the benchmarking of performance and enhance the 
share of local value in the supply chain. This will facilitate innovations to reduce 
costs and improve efficiencies. 
Conclusion
Africa is a continent under transformation, in terms of economic performance, 
demographic changes as well as settlement patterns towards more urbanisation. In 
connection with this, Africa’s energy demands are increasing, and its energy mix 
are changing, creating the openings for innovations in technologies and policies as 
well as finance to manage the range of energy transitions across the continent. 
This chapter has attempted to grapple with the long-standing challenge of persistent 
energy poverty and how it impacts on development outcomes in Africa. The chapter 
demonstrates that energy issues across sub-Saharan Africa are inherently complex, 
largely due to the dual nature of the energy system itself where traditional and 
modern energy systems and practices co-exist. One of the key characteristics of 
this dichotomy is that a large proportion of people in Africa live without access 
to electricity with the majority of them living in rural areas, which adds to the 
complexity and structural disadvantage that many citizens face across most 
countries. Whilst there is a growing consensus globally that the future of the energy 
systems should be fairer, cheaper, cleaner and climate-friendly, this has particular 
relevance for Africa where investment in infrastructure and systems must reflect the 
hopes and aspirations of people and communities. To this end, African leaders and 
their policymakers are making long-term decisions on infrastructure and services 
that will determine the character of their energy systems over the coming decades. 
The chapter stresses that widening energy access is critical for social and economic 
transformation and to meet many of the SDGs. But Africa needs to be in control of 
its destiny and direction to ensure the solutions are compatible with the reality on 
the ground and offer genuine solutions to communities. For this, policies matter, 
governance is critical and understanding of context is paramount. However, even 
with all the diversity across the region, there are many good reasons why the clean 
energy route makes sense, even for those that have plenty of fossil fuel reserves. 
Some of these reasons are detailed below:
  The continent is richly endowed with green and renewable sources of energy. At 
the same time, there cannot be any talk of structural economic transformation 
without a massive increase in the electricity generation, and what better way 
is there than to generate the electricity from the abundant resources found in 
the continent.
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 Agriculture will remain the mainstay of most African economies into the future. 
As such, Africans need to think hard about modernising the way agriculture is 
done with a view to enhancing productivity. This includes investing in energy 
for irrigation, processing and transport for the benefit of smallholder farmers. 
Much of this would be in the form of modular type energy systems that can be 
adapted to changing demand, thereby optimising the size of the systems. 
  The world has seen rapid cost reduction in renewable energy technologies 
in recent years, in particular of solar and wind energy systems. Together with 
energy-efficiency measures, renewables offer real opportunities to change the 
narrative around energy access for the poor. This can create economic and 
job opportunities and improve air quality and contribute to climate change 
mitigation, thereby delivering significant human health and sustainable 
development co-benefits. African countries need to create enabling conditions 
to take advantage of these opportunities. 
  Investment in clean energy has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2013, for the 
first time, the world added more low-carbon electricity capacity than fossil fuel 
capacity, and over the next 15 years, about US$90 trillion will be invested in 
infrastructure in the world’s cities, agriculture and energy. Africa cannot afford 
to miss out on these investment opportunities. 
This chapter recognises that large-scale energy systems will still be important in 
the energy mix of African countries, and already significant resources and policy 
attention is devoted to such systems. However, distributed energy systems also offer 
serious prospects for the vast numbers of people in settlements far from grid lines 
and without access to energy. The chapter makes a strong argument for scaling up 
such systems, pointing to the fact that the past few years have seen the coming of age 
of distributed generation and mini-grids that are successfully extending electricity 
access to households, communities, cooperatives, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, as well as larger companies. This enables producers and consumers 
of energy to collaborate meaningfully through small and locally-based systems to 
provide energy services for a variety of social and economic needs. Creating the 
policy environment, financing models, as well as appropriate institutions, will be 
critical to enable these bottom-up energy innovations to flourish. This chapter has 
attempted to ask deeper questions about efficiency of resource use, social justice as 
well as economic resilience associated with energy systems of the future in Africa. 
110      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
References 
Africa Progress Panel. (2015). Power, people, 
planet: Seizing Africa’s energy and climate 
opportunities. Africa progress report 2015. 
Geneva: APP.
Allen, M.R., Dube, O.P., Solecki, W., Aragón‑
Durand, F. & Cramer, W. et al. (2018). 
Framing and Context. In: V. Masson‑
Delmotte, P. Zhai, H.‑O. Pörtner, 
D. Roberts & J. Skea et al. (Eds). Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special 
Report on the impacts of global warming of 
1.5°C above pre‑industrial levels and related 
global greenhouse gas emission pathways, 
in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to 
eradicate poverty.
Bailis, R., Drigo, R., Ghilardi., A. & Masera, O. 
(2015). The carbon footprint of traditional 
woodfuels. Nature Climate Change 5: 
266–272. https://doi.org/10.1038/
nclimate2491
Bardouille, P., Avato, P., Levin, J., Pantelias, A. 
& Engelmann‑Pilger, H. (2012). From 
gap to opportunity: Business models for 
scaling up energy access. Washington, DC: 
International Finance Corporation/
World Bank. 
Boden, T.A., Marland, G. & Andres, R.J. 
(2017). Global, regional, and national 
fossil-fuel CO2 emissions. Oak Ridge, TN: 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
U.S. Department of Energy. https://doi.
org/10.3334/ CDIAC/00001_V2017 
[Accessed 18 September 2019].
Brander, M., Sood, A., Wylie, C., Haughton, A. 
& Lovel, J. (2011). Technical paper / 
Electricity‑specific emission factors for 
grid electricity. Ecometrica. https://bit.
ly/31cu7HW [Accessed 1 October 2019].
Bruckner T., I.A., Bashmakov, I.G., 
Mulugetta, Y., Chum, H., de la Vega 
Navarro, A. et al. (2014). Energy systems. 
In: O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs‑Madruga, 
Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner et al. 
(Eds), Climate change 2014: Mitigation 
of climate change. Contribution of working 
group III to the fifth assessment report of the 
intergovernmental panel on climate change. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Castellano, A., Kendall, A., Nikomarov, M. 
& Swemmer, T. (2015). Brighter Africa: 
The growth potential of the sub-Saharan 
electricity sector Africa. https://mck.
co/2MFSjgD [Accessed 22 July 2018.
Coady, D., Parry, I. Sears, L. & Shang, B. 
(2015). How large are global energy 
subsidies? IMF Working Paper WP/15/105, 
International Monetary Fund. https://doi.
org/10.5089/9781513532196.001
Daly, H.E. (1993). Sustainable growth: An 
impossibility theorem. In: H.E. Daly 
& K.N. Townsend, Valuing the earth: 
Economics, ecology, ethics. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press.
Dharmadhikary, S. & Bhalerao, R. (2015). How 
much energy do we need: Towards end-use 
based estimation for decent living.  
Pune, India: Prayas (Energy Group). 
Eberhard, A., Kolker, J. & Leigland, J. (2014). 
South Africa’s renewable energy IPP 
procurement programmes: Success factors 
and lessons. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank Group.
Falcone, P.M. (2014). Sustainability 
transitions: A survey of an emerging field 
of research. Environmental Management 
and Sustainable Development 3(2): 61–83. 
https://doi.org/10.5296/emsd.v3i2.6239
Fleurbaey, M., Kartha, S., Bolwig, S., Chee, Y.L., 
Chen, Y. et al. (2014). Sustainable 
development and equity. In: O. Edenhofer, 
R. Pichs‑Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, 
S. Kadner et al. (Eds), Climate change 2014: 
Mitigation of climate change. Contribution 
of working group III to the fifth assessment 
report of the intergovernmental panel on 
climate change. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Sustainable energy systems in Africa  |      111
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations. (2011). Highlights 
on wood charcoal: 2004–2009. Rome: 
FAO Forestry Department. https://bit.
ly/2OF1il7 [Accessed 15 March 2018].
Foster, C. & Heeks, R. (2015). Policies to 
support inclusive innovation. Manchester 
Centre for Development Informatics 
Working Paper No. 61, University of 
Manchester. https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3433962
Franz, M., Peterschmidt, N., Rohrer, M. & 
Kondev, M. (2014). Mini-grid policy toolkit: 
Policy and business frameworks for successful 
mini-grids roll out. Eschborn, Germany: 
EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue 
Facility EUEI‑PDF. https://bit.ly/2ph16xF 
[Accessed 21 July 2018].
Fuso‑Nerini, F., Tomei, J., To, L.S., Bisaga, I., 
Parikh, P. et al. (2018). Mapping synergies 
and trade‑offs between energy and the 
sustainable development goals. Nature 
Energy 3: 10–15. https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41560‑017‑0036‑5
Geels, F.W. (2005). Technological transitions and 
system innovations. A co-evolutionary and 
socio-technical analysis. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. https://doi.
org/10.4337/9781845424596
Geels, F.W., Kern, F., Fuchs, G., Hinderer, N., 
Kungl, G. et al. (2016). The enactment 
of socio‑technical transition pathways: A 
reformulated typology and a comparative 
multilevel analysis of the German and 
UK low‑carbon electricity transitions 
(1990–2014). Research Policy 45(4): 
896–913. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
respol.2016.01.015
Goldemberg, J., Johansson, T.B., Reddy, A.K.N. 
& Williams, R.H. (1985). Basic needs and 
much more with one kilowatt per capita. 
Ambio 14(4/5): 190–200. https://bit.
ly/2nGtSr1 [Accessed 15 October 2018].
Harlan, S.L., Pellow, D.N., Roberts, J.T., 
Bell, S.E., Holt, W.G. et al. (2015). Climate 
justice and inequality. In: R.E. Dunlap 
& R.J. Brulle (Eds), Climate change 
and society: Sociological perspectives. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o
so/9780199356102.003.0005
Hiremath, R., Shikha, S. & Ravindranath, N. 
(2007). Decentralized energy planning; 
modeling and application – a review. 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
11(5): 729–752. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
rser.2005.07.005
Hogart, J.R., Haywood, C. & Whitley, S. 
(2015). Low carbon development in 
sub-Saharan Africa. London: Overseas 
Development Institute Report, ODI.
Humphreys, S. (2017). Climate, Technology, 
Justice. In: A. Proelß (Ed.), Protecting 
the Environment for Future Generations 
– Principles and Actors in International 
Environmental Law. Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag.
Iiyama, M., Neufeldt, H., Dobie, P., Njenga, M., 
Ndegwa, G. et al. (2014). The potential of 
agroforestry in the provision of sustainable 
woodfuel in sub‑Saharan Africa. Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 
6: 138–147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cosust.2013.12.003
Infrastructure Development Company 
Limited. (2018). Project and programmes: 
Solar home system programme, IDCOL, 
Dhaka. https://bit.ly/318gv0t [Accessed 
10 November 2018].
International Energy Agency. (2014). Africa 
energy outlook – A focus on energy prospects 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Paris: IEA.
International Institute for Environment 
and Development. (2012). What is 
the sustainable energy for all initiative? 
https://bit.ly/2plnwO9 [Accessed 
2 September 2019].
International Monetary Fund. (2019). Regional 
economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, April 
2017. Washington, DC: IIED. https://bit.
ly/2q8nv0x [Accessed 28 April 2019].
112      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
International Renewable Energy Agency. 
(2015). Off-grid renewable energy systems: 
Status and methodological issues. IRENA 
Working Paper, IRENA, Abu Dhabi, 
UAE. https://bit.ly/2q2MQZI [Accessed 
12 August 2018].
International Renewable Energy Agency. 
(2016). Solar PV in Africa: Costs and 
markets. https://bit.ly/35ox1ga [Accessed 
2 August 2018].
International Renewable Energy Agency. 
(2018). Off‑grid renewable energy 
solutions. https://bit.ly/33vKb9B 
[Accessed 15 October 2018].
Kemp, R. & Loorbach, D. (2006). Transition 
management a reflexive governance 
approach. In: J‑P. Voss, D. Bauknecht & 
R. Kemp (Eds), Reflexive governance for 
sustainable development. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Edgar Publishing.
Least Developed Countries Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency Initiative. (2018). 
LDC REEEI: By LDCS for LDCS. http://
ldcreeei.org [Accessed 1 October 2019].
Loorbach, D. (2010). Transition management 
for sustainable development: A prescriptive, 
complexity‑based governance framework. 
Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions 
23(1):161–183. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468‑0491.2009.01471.x
Lovins, A.B. (1977). Soft energy paths: Towards 
a durable peace. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 
Publishing Company and Friends of the 
Earth International.
Lucas, P.L., Nielsen, J., Calvin, K., 
McCollum, D.L., Marangoni, G. et al. 
(2015). Future energy system challenges 
for Africa: insights from Integrated 
assessment models. Energy Policy 86: 
705–717. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2015.08.017
Mitra, S. & Buluswar, S. (2015). Universal 
access to electricity: Closing the 
affordability gap. Annual Review of 
Environmental Resources 40: 261–283. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev‑
environ‑102014‑021057
Mulugetta, Y., Ben Hagan, E. & Kammen, D. 
(2019). Energy access for sustainable 
development. Environmental Research 
Letters 14(2): 1–6. https://doi.
org/10.1088/1748‑9326/aaf449
Mulugetta, Y. & Castan‑Broto, V. (2018). 
Deep mitigation opportunities and 
urbanization patterns in LDCs. Current 
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 
30: 82–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cosust.2018.03.007
Odarno, L., Sawe, E., Swai, M., Katyega, M.J.J. 
& Lee, A. (2017). Accelerating mini-grid 
deployment In sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons 
from Tanzania. World Resources Institute 
and TaTEDO. https://bit.ly/32a0RmM 
[Accessed 10 October 2018].
Oji, C. & Weber, O. (2017). Beyond the grid: 
Examining business models for delivering 
community-based REPs in developing 
countries. CIGI Paper No. 130, Centre 
for International Governance Innovation, 
Waterloo, Canada.
Okereke, C. (2010). Climate justice and 
the environmental regime. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 
13: 462–474. https://doi.org/10.1002/
wcc.52
Okereke, C., Coke, A., Geebreyesus, M., 
Ginbo, T., Wakeford, J. et al. (2019). 
Governing green industrialisation in Africa: 
Assessing key parameters for a sustainable 
socio‑technical transition in the context 
of Ethiopia. World Development 115: 
279–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2018.11.019
Orlandi, I., Tyabji, N. & Chase, J. (2016). 
Off-grid solar market trends report 2016. 
https://bit.ly/2CqPpcE [Accessed 
18 September 2019].
Pachauri, S., van Ruijven, B.J., Nagai, Y., 
Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D.P. et al. (2013). 
Pathways to achieve universal household 
access to modern energy by 2030. 
Environmental Research Letters 8(2): 
024015. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748‑
9326/8/2/024015
Sustainable energy systems in Africa  |      113
Pezzey, J. (1992). Sustainable development 
concepts: An economic analysis. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.
org/10.1596/0‑8213‑2278‑8
Practical Action. (n.d.). Total energy access 
is achievable – Infographic. https://bit.
ly/2ouhv1U [Accessed 1 October 2019]. 
https://doi.org/10.3362/9781780449357
Practical Action. (2010). Poor people’s energy 
outlook 2010. Rugby, UK: Practical Action 
Publishing. 
Practical Action. (2016). Poor people’s energy 
outlook 2016: National energy access 
planning from the bottom up. Rugby, UK: 
Practical Action Publishing.
PricewaterhouseCoopers. (2016). 
Electricity beyond the grid: Accelerating 
access to sustainable power for all. 
https://pwc.to/33C1rdp [Accessed 
19 September 2019].
Raven, R., van den Bosch, S. & Weterings, R. 
(2010). Transitions and strategic niche 
management: Towards a competence 
kit for practitioners. International 
Journal of Technology Management 
51(1): 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1504/
IJTM.2010.033128
Ribera, T., Sachs, J., Colombier, M., Schmidt‑
Traub, G., Waisman, H. et al. (2015). 
Pathways to deep decarbonization. 
New York: SDSN/IDDRI.
Robbins, P. (2004). Political ecology. London: 
Blackwell Publishing.
Roberts, J.T. & Parks, B. (2006). A Climate 
of injustice: Global inequality, north-south 
politics, and climate policy. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Sen, A. (2000). Development as freedom. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Showers, K.B. (2011). Electrifying Africa: 
An environmental history with policy 
Implications. Geografiska Annaler Series 
B Human Geography 93(3): 193–221. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468‑
0467.2011.00373.x
Shue, H. (2013). Climate hope: Implementing 
the exit strategy. Chicago Journal of 
International Law 13(2): 380–402. 
https://bit.ly/35yjNxl [Accessed 
12 September 2019]. 
Sokona, Y., Mulugetta, Y. & Gujba, H. (2012). 
Widening energy access in Africa: Towards 
energy transition. Energy Policy 47, 
Suppl. 1: 3–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2012.03.040
Tenenbaum, B., Greacen, C., Siyambalapitiya, T. 
& Knuckles, J. (2014). From the bottom 
up: How small power producers and 
mini-grids can deliver electrification and 
renewable energy in Africa. Directions in 
Development. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. https://bit.ly/1g4PspF [Accessed 
20 September 2019]. https://doi.
org/10.1596/978‑1‑4648‑0093‑1
Thompson, G. & Bazilian, M. (2013). 
Democratization, energy poverty, and the 
pursuit of symmetry. Global Policy 5(1): 
127–131. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758‑
5899.12103
United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. (2015). World population 
prospects: 2015 revision. Geneva: UNDESA. 
https://bit.ly/2OF2Bk1 [Accessed 
2 October 2019].
United Nations Environment Programme. 
(2017). Atlas of Africa energy resources. 
Nairobi: UNEP. https://bit.ly/2otNVJW 
[Accessed 28 April 2019].
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. (2016). Aggregate effect 
of the intended nationally determined 
contributions: An update. https://bit.
ly/2VBDTSS [Accessed 1 October 2019].
Wang, Y.‑D. (2001). Development of an 
alternative energy system: The challenge 
and its future. In: H‑K. Kim, Energy and 
Korean Life. Seoul: Korean Future Society.
Welsch, M., Bazilian, M., Howells, M., 
Divan, D., Elzinga, D. et al. (2013). 
Smart and just grids for sub‑Saharan 
Africa: Exploring options. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 20: 336–352. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2012.11.004
114      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
World Bank. (2011). Wood-based biomass 
energy development for sub-Saharan Africa: 
Issues and approaches. Washington, DC:  
World Bank. https://doi.org/10.15 
96/26149
World Bank. (2017a). Mini-grids in Cambodia: 
A case study of a success story. Energy 
Sector Management Assistance Program. 
Washington, DC : World Bank Group. 
https://bit.ly/35uM7Rf [Accessed 
18 September 2018].
World Bank. (2017b). Mini-grids in Kenya: 
A case study of market at a turning point. 
Energy Sector Management Assistance 
Program. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group. https://bit.ly/2OJzRXp [Accessed 
20 October 2018].
World Bank. (2017c). State of electricity 
access report 2017. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
World Bank. (2018). Tracking SDG7: The 
energy progress report. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
World Commission on Environment and 
Development. (1987). Our common future. 
New York: United Nations.
World Economic Forum. (2019). Fostering 
effective energy transition. Geneva: World 
Economic Forum.
World Resources Institute. (2014). Climate 




 |      115





The first industrial revolution, which started in the United Kingdom in  the 
eighteenth century, heralded the beginning of the second major social 
transformation in human history. The introduction of coal as the primary energy 
source for socio-economic activity and steam power as the primary driver of 
manufacturing processes were the two significant features that characterised the 
period. Over the subsequent two and a half centuries, the industrial revolution 
has gone through different stages of development that fundamentally reshaped 
the national and global economy. As a result of these developments, global gross 
domestic product output grew by 23-fold from 1900 to 2010 (International 
Resource Panel [IRP],  2014) leading to significant improvement of wellbeing, 
particularly in developed countries. However, this economic growth was registered 
at a considerable price on the natural system which resulted in a ten-fold increase 
in extraction of natural resources, a 34 fold increase in extraction of construction 
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minerals and a 27-fold increase in extraction of industrial ores and minerals 
(IRP,  2014). Besides the destruction of the natural habitat, the unsustainable 
exploitation and use of fossil fuels resulted in the systemic deposition of greenhouse 
gases leading to climate change, which is the most complex challenge faced 
by humanity. 
African countries have been aspiring to industrialise their economies since their 
early years of liberation. By the mid-1960s, many African governments conceived 
bolder plans and programmes on industrialisation. This was given a continental 
scope with the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in April 1980 for the collective 
industrialisation of Africa. Since the 1970s, more specifically as a follow-up to 
the Lagos Plan of Action, many African countries embarked upon ambitious 
industrial development programmes that were primarily driven by massive public 
investment in building physical infrastructure. Nevertheless, except for a couple 
of North African countries and South Africa, most of them failed to achieve their 
stated goals. As a result, for decades Africa’s share of global manufacturing output 
remained minuscule compared to other regions. Over the last decade, Africa has 
seen a renewed interest in industrialisation from within and from the outside world. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) noted that 
industrialisation is an imperative for Africa to meet the objectives of Agenda 2063 
within a global economy constrained by climate change and driven by competitive 
supply chains and complex supply and demand dynamics (UNECA, 2015). 
Industrialisation in Africa, however, does not necessarily need to follow the same 
path of polluting and inefficient industrialisation process that had been followed 
by countries in other regions. Given the complex socio-economic and socio-
ecological challenges faced by African countries and the emerging trends of 
industrialisation, it is not a matter of choice for African countries but to adopt a new 
path of industrialisation that creates jobs and livelihood to its people, particularly 
its large young population, while at the same time maintaining the sustainability 
and integrity of its natural ecosystems.
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overall framework for an industrial 
development in Africa that is inclusive, low carbon and resource efficient. To this 
end, the first section looks at the various stages of industrialisation with a particular 
focus on emerging industrialisations trends and drivers. This is followed with 
a section on status and trends of industrialisation in Africa with a focus on the 
lessons that are drawn from past experiences. The final section presents a generic 
framework for inclusive and sustainable industrialisation in Africa.
Inclusive and sustainable industrial development for Africa  |      117
Drivers of industrialisation and its impact
There is a vast volume of literature on various models of industrialisation that have 
been followed by many countries over the last couple of centuries. While some 
useful lessons could be drawn from the experiences of these countries, neither the 
European model nor the ‘so-much-talked-about’ Asian models of industrialisation 
are appropriate for Africa for the following two main reasons. Firstly, attempting to 
industrialise through the conventional model of industrialisation is neither feasible 
nor sustainable within the available regenerative and assimilative capacity of the 
planetary ecosystem, which is already constrained. The Global Resource Outlook 
produced by the IRP (2019) stated that the decoupling of natural resource use and 
environmental impacts from economic activity and human wellbeing is an essential 
element in the transition to a sustainable future. Secondly, the industrialisation of 
the twenty-first century is fundamentally different from previous industrialisation 
paths, both in terms of its technological drivers and the expected socio-economic 
outcome and impacts. In this context, it is vital that African countries understand 
the fundamental technological drivers and resource constraints of industrialisation 
in the twenty-first century.
The twentieth century was a century of unprecedented economic growth driven 
by a faster pace of industrialisation and globalisation. However, it was also a 
century that saw exponential growth in the volume of resources extracted from 
the natural environment and the related environmental degradation. The need 
for a fundamental transformation in our production and consumption structure 
is already agreed globally through the Paris Declaration on Climate Change 
and the Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While the 
industrialisation process may have a different scope and context from one country 
to another, technological innovation has been one of the common drivers of 
industrialisation. Another critical feature of industrialisation that took a global 
dimension has been the adverse impact of industrial activities on the natural 
environment and the subsequent global reaction to it. This subsection highlights 
the key features of technological innovations that have determined the path and 
pace of industrialisation over the years. It also reviews the dominant thinking that 
emerged on how to address the adverse impact of industrialisation on the natural 
environment.
Technological innovation as a driver of industrialisation 
From a transformative development perspective, innovation holds a central place 
in any form of social transformation in human history. Besides the production of 
various hunting tools, the creation of fire had been the first and, perhaps, the most 
118      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
significant innovation that defined the fundamental distinction between the homo-
sapiens and its closely related animals. This was followed by the domestication and 
use of the bio-energy of animals for productive activities, including for farming and 
mobility, together with the production of various types of farming tools, which 
led to permanent settlement and expansion of agricultural farming. The process 
of technological innovation has been the most potent driver of industrialisation 
and wealth creation since the onset of the industrial revolution. Schwab  (2018) 
identified the following four stages of the industrial revolution in relation to 
technological innovation:
  First industrial revolution: This stage represents the period from the mid-
eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century which transformed every 
sector of production from machine tools to steel manufacturing, the steam engine 
and railways. New technologies led to shifts in cooperation and competition 
that, in turn, created entirely new systems of value production, exchange and 
distribution, and upended sectors from agriculture to manufacturing, from 
communication to transport.
  Second industrial revolution: A new wave of interrelated technologies that 
came from 1870–1930 compounded the growth and opportunity that came 
from the first industrial revolution. This included new communication 
technologies driven by the transformative power of electricity, transportation 
technologies driven by the internal combustion engine, the ability to produce 
diverse materials from plastics to fertilisers driven by the development in 
chemical processes.
  Third industrial revolution: The revolutionary breakthrough that occurred 
around the middle of the twentieth century in information theory and digital 
computing is at the heart of the third industrial revolution. The ability to store, 
process and transmit information in digital form reformatted almost every 
industry and dramatically changed the working and social lives of billions 
of people.
  Fourth industrial revolution: Emerging technologies that drive the fourth 
industrial revolution build upon the knowledge and systems of previous 
industrial revolutions, in particular, the digital capabilities of the third industrial 
revolution. These emerging technologies include artificial intelligence  (AI) 
and robotics, additive manufacturing, new materials and energy technologies, 
biotechnologies, and virtual and augmented reality.
While Schwab looks at the different stages of the industrial revolution from the 
perspective of how productive economies are structured and organised, Jeremy 
Rifkin looks at how energy and communication technologies drove economic 
transitions. Rifkin (2011) argues that significant economic transformations in 
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history occur when new communication technology converges with new energy 
systems. He further notes that the new form of communications became the 
medium for organising and managing the more complex civilisations made possible 
by the new sources of energy. Based on this, Rifkin identifies the following three 
stages of the industrial revolution (Rifkin, 2011):
  First industrial revolution: The introduction of steam-powered technology 
into printing transformed the medium into the primary communications 
tool to manage the first industrial revolution. The advent of public schooling 
between the 1830s and 1890s created a print-literate workforce to organise the 
complex operations of a coal-powered, steam-driven rail and factory economy.
  Second industrial revolution: The convergence of electrical communication 
with the oil-powered mineral combustion engine during the first decade 
of the twentieth century gave rise to the second industrial revolution. The 
electrification of factories ushered in the era of mass-produced goods, the most 
important being the automobile.
  Third industrial revolution: The conjoining of internet communication 
technology and renewable energy represents the latest convergence of 
communication technology and energy systems, thereby laying the foundation 
for the third industrial revolution. This convergence will enable hundreds of 
millions of human beings to generate their own green energy from the roof 
of their homes, offices and factories and share it across intelligent distributed 
electricity networks.
As a result of the significant economic transformation caused by the different 
stages of the industrial revolution, average real income per person in industrialised 
economies has increased around 2 900 percent since the industrial revolution, 
while life expectancy at birth has more than doubled in almost every country 
(Schwab,  2018). Rifkin (2011) noted that the third industrial revolution would 
have as significant an impact in the twenty-first century as the first industrial 
revolution had in the nineteenth century and the second industrial revolution in 
the twentieth century. 
Rifkin (2011) also underlined that the traditional top-down organisation of 
society that characterised much of the economic, social and political life of 
the fossil-fuel-based industrial revolution is giving way to a distributed and 
collaborative relationship in the emerging green industrial era. While Schwab and 
Rifkin may seem to start with different premises, both of them come to similar 
conclusions on the vital role of innovation in industrialisation and the possible 
path of industrialisation in the twenty-first century. Perez (2010) noted that the 
Information and communications technology (ICT)-led shift in the development 
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paradigm needs to be production-centred, pro-development with dynamic locally 
differentiated markets that enhance national identities and reach towards optimum 
worldwide welfare. This is all good news from a developing country context as 
many developing countries are well-positioned to become nodal centres of this 
new global (re-)industrialisation which drives a new period of global growth that is 
more equitable and contributes to unprecedented wellbeing. 
Industrialisation and environment
The natural system possesses self-regulating mechanisms, which are composed 
of a complex web of positive and negative feedback systems operating within the 
context of the carrying, regeneration and assimilation capacity of the respective 
ecosystems. However, the industrialisation of the past two centuries changed the 
ecological dynamics in ways that no one could have imagined. The utilisation 
of coal led to steam engines, and machines replaced land as the central means of 
production. This development led to great material productivity and a world that 
today supports, at least partially, more than seven billion people. The expansion 
of industrialisation led to environmental deterioration from the poles to the 
tropics, from the top of the mountains to the ocean depths (Meadows, Meadows & 
Randers, 1992). The success of the industrial transformation, like the more limited 
successes of the agricultural transformations, led to ecological scarcities, not only in 
terms of natural resource supply but also in terms of the absorptive capacity of the 
natural sinks and species losses.
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) is considered to be the first economist to 
foresee the limits to growth caused by resource scarcity. While he fits into the classic 
economics tradition, Malthus is sufficiently at variance with some basic principles 
(Oser & Blanchfield, 1975). By 1798, many of the evil effects of the industrial 
revolution had surfaced. Unemployment, poverty, and disease were already 
problems calling for remedial treatment. Contrary to the ideas of William Goldwin 
(1756–1836) and Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), Malthus said that the 
vices and misery that plague society are not due to evil human institutions but are 
due to the fecundity of the human race (Oser & Blanchfield, 1975). This led to his 
theory of population dynamics. According to Malthus’s theory, population, when 
unchecked, increases geometrically while subsistence increases arithmetically, at 
best (Oser & Blanchfield, 1975). 
Together with David Ricardo (1772–1823), who fundamentally agreed with his 
population theory, Malthus expressed his ‘environmental limits thinking’ in terms 
of the limits on the supply of good quality agricultural land and the resultant 
diminishing returns in agricultural production (Pearce & Turner, 1990). For 
Malthus, the fixed amount of land available meant that as the population grew, 
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diminishing returns would reduce the per capita food supply. The standard of 
living would be forced down to a subsistence level, and the population would cease 
to grow. Diminishing returns set in, not so much because of absolute scarcity, but 
because the available land varied in quality. The fundamental shortcoming of this 
theory is that, in both cases, the subject of diminishing returns was defined based 
on keeping the total production curve fixed (Pearce & Turner, 1990). In reality, 
technical innovations, such as the use of fertilisers, have shifted the total production 
curve upwards, increasing output per unit of input and offsetting the tendency 
towards diminishing returns. Despite such limitations, the Malthusian theory of 
‘environmental limits’ may be considered a precursor to some of the fundamental 
principles of sustainable development (Mebratu, 2000).
On the political economy front, Roszak (1989) concluded that it would be no 
exaggeration to call Ernst Schumacher the Keynes of post-industrial society, 
by which he meant a society that has left behind its lethal obsession with those 
mega systems of production and distribution that Keynes tried so hard to make 
manageable. The first work of Schumacher appeared in 1959 under the title, 
The Crucial Problems of Modern Living. His works culminated in international 
recognition and fame after the publication of his famous book, Small is Beautiful, 
in 1979. The themes addressed in this book included:
  sharp criticism of over-organised systems as destructive of the human spirit and 
the planet alike;
  concern about the rapid depletion of natural resources and the corresponding 
destruction of the environment;
  the concept of intermediate or appropriate technology and the importance of 
human scale, perhaps the concept for which the book is best known;
  the failure of traditional economics to bring incommensurable ‘noneconomic 
factors’ into the policy-making process; and 
  a need for human beings to be close to the nurturing land, in both fact and spirit 
(McClaughry, 1989).
To a world awakening to the spectre of global pollution, resource exhaustion, 
corporate concentration, and the corresponding diminution of individual 
liberties, Schumacher’s book was ‘a ray of hope’ (McClaughry, 1989). As a result, 
in the mid-1970s, ‘Small is Beautiful’ became a rallying cry while the concept of 
appropriate and intermediate technology became the catchphrase of the following 
decade. Although the book contains some controversial and debatable ideas, 
Schumacher’s concern about the exhaustion of the planet’s resources gave new 
impetus to a whole generation of environmental defenders. His effort of looking 
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at the economic, ecological, and social aspects of a given system added a new 
dimension to the discourse on the ‘scale of organisation.’ 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, there have been numerous efforts to 
address the environmental impacts of industries. Initially, most of the efforts were 
limited to the reduction and/or containment of the adverse effects of industrial 
activities on human health through the end-of-pipe management of industrial 
wastes. As a result, since the middle of the twentieth century, many end-of-pipe 
management technologies and techniques that included treatment and disposal 
techniques were developed and introduced. While such measures led to the 
improvement of the ambient environmental conditions in some areas, it was 
not sufficient to fully contain or reduce the pollution impact. The publication 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, a book on the global problems of pesticides 
published in 1962, heralded the arrival of the contemporary environmental era that 
was characterised by a flurry of environmental activities in the developed world in 
the subsequent decade (Mebratu, 2000). As a consequence, the focus shifted to 
the broader objective of reconciling industrial activities with the ecological balance 
of the natural system starting from the mid-1970s. This required a fundamental 
rethinking of industrial structures and operations which led to the evolution of 
different concepts related to sustainable industrial development, as highlighted in 
the next subsection.
Sustainable industrial development tools
As was noted in earlier sections, the industrial development path that had been 
followed by many of the industrialised countries until the middle of the twentieth 
century had been exclusively based on uncontrolled and unlimited extraction 
of natural resources and discharge of industrial pollutants. This led to numerous 
environmental havocs, which in turn led to public dissent and outcry in most of 
the developed countries in the nineteen sixties and seventies. As a result, the 
improvement of the environmental performance of industries at the plant level 
through the application of end-of-pipe management techniques and technologies 
became the primary focus of industries. The process that started as an end-of-pipe 
management exercise has subsequently led to looking back at the whole process 
of production in the nineteen-eighties and nineties. This led to the evolution 
of numerous concepts that are aimed at improving operational performance at 
various levels. 
Three major aspects of industrial operations have emerged as the principal foci 
of the environmental performance improvement at the plant level. These are 
organisational management, product development, and production processes. The 
introduction of environmental management systems (EMS), extended producer 
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responsibilities (EPR), and eco-industrial parks (EIPs) development are the three 
major industrial development tools that constitute the organisational interventions 
for sustainable industrial development. An EMS is a system by which a company 
controls the activities, products and processes that cause, or could cause, 
environmental impacts and in doing so minimises the environmental impacts of 
its operation (Roberts & Robinson, 1998). Extended producer responsibility 
assists in reaching an environmental objective of a decreased total environmental 
impact from a product by making the manufacturer of the product responsible for 
the entire lifecycle of the product. This especially includes the take-back, recycling 
and final disposal of the product (Lindhqvist, 1998). Taking the concept of an 
ecosystem as a basis, an eco-industrial development is defined as a community 
of local administration, manufacturing and service businesses seeking enhanced 
socio-economic and socio-ecological performance through collaboration in 
managing environmental and resource issues including energy, water, and materials 
(Mebratu, 2000:87). 
Table  4.1 summarises key features and impacts/outcomes of the major tools for 
sustainable organisational management.
Table 4.1 Tools for sustainable organisational management





Promotion of continuous 
improvement 




Promotion of reuse of materials 
through a take-back system
Higher resource reuse and better 
management of toxic substances
Eco-industrial parks Promotion of industrial symbiosis 
between industries
System-level efficiency on 
resource use and recycling 
Sustainable product development and development of product-service systems 
constitute the two major technical shifts observed in the area of product design and 
development. Sustainable product development is defined as resource-, context-, 
and future-oriented product development, aimed at the fulfilment of primary 
needs, a better quality of life, equity, and environmental harmony over the whole 
life cycle of a product (Van Weenen, 1997:15). The product-service system focuses 
on continuous improvement of the functional service provided by products while 
reducing the overall resource and environmental impacts of the product over its 
lifetime (Mebratu, 2000). Under such systems, the consumers only pay for the 
services they acquire from a given product while keeping the ownership of the 
products with the producers or leasing agents, thereby reducing the systemic 
deposition of post-consumer products in the natural system. The progress made 
in this area has led to a significant reduction of the material and energy intensity of 
successive generation of products.
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Table  4.2 summarises key features and impacts/outcomes of the major tools for 
sustainable product development.
Table 4.2 Sustainable product development tools





Optimising the life-cycle impact 
of a product
Reduction of the material and 
energy intensity of a product
Product-service 
systems
Optimising product functionality 
and service delivery of products
Reduction of resource extraction 
and habitat destruction
The introduction of cleaner production (CP), resource efficiency and green 
industry represent significant milestones of the transition within industrial 
production systems. The first United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 
International High-level Seminar held in 1990 defined cleaner production as 
the continuous application of an integrated preventive environmental strategy 
applied to processes, products and services to increase eco-efficiency and reduce 
risks for humans and the environment (UNEP, 2002:08). Resource efficiency is 
a systematic and integrated approach to managing raw material, energy, water and 
chemical inputs efficiently while eliminating or minimising wastes and emissions 
from an industrial system on a sustainable and cost-effective basis (UNEP & United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO], 2010:11–12). Green 
Industry means economies striving for a more sustainable pathway of growth, by 
undertaking green public investments and implementing public policy initiatives 
that encourage environmentally responsible private investments (UNIDO, 2009).
Table  4.3 summarises key features and impacts/outcomes of the major tools for 
sustainable production.
Table 4.3 Tools for sustainable production
Category Major tools Key features Impacts/Outcome
Production 
processes
Cleaner production Reduction of waste 
generation at the source
Improved resource utilisation and 
reduced pollution discharge
Resource efficiency Industrial optimisation 
from a life-cycle approach
Reduction of resource and pollution 
intensity per unit output
Green industry Promoting sector-wide  
transformation through 
strategic  intervention  
Development of new products and 
sectors that are resource efficient 
and inclusive
Even if the above-highlighted tools were presented as a cluster for ease of 
understanding and presentation, most of them are very interdependent on one 
another right from their development stage through implementation. The major 
influences of these and other evolving concepts can be categorised under the 
following points (Mebratu, 2000):
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 Market restructuring: Some of the evolving concepts and tools enhance the 
market restructuring process by facilitating the creation of a new segment 
of consumer behaviour that has a preference for environmentally friendly 
products. In this context, the number of consumers that demand a certain 
level of environmental quality from products and services is on the rise. The 
recognition given to different kinds of environmental (eco-) labelling schemes 
as a marketing tool is an outcome of this change, and this is expected to influence 
the global market structure and global value chain.
  Technological innovation: Environmental considerations promoted through 
the various concepts and tools act as one of the significant drivers of technological 
innovations in product design and processes development. This has led to the 
evolution of new generations of technologies that are both ecologically and 
economically efficient. The advance that is being made in product and process 
development is expected to influence the nature of technology transfer from 
the industrialised world to the developing world and vice versa. 
  Organisational innovation: Most of the concepts that are evolving in response 
to environmental challenges have triggered a corresponding organisational 
innovation process. The critical element of this organisational innovation 
process is the development of a learning organisation that is responsive to the 
dynamic changes. This has posed a challenge to all levels of an organisation 
including the demand for organisational change in the major global institutions. 
In general, the evolving tools and concepts and their subsequent influence 
on the industrialisation process are clear indicators of the beginning of a new 
transformation process. This process is going to pose a significant challenge to 
African economies in terms of keeping and increasing their industrial product’s 
share in the global market. However, it also creates a vast opportunity of 
leapfrogging to more inclusive, resource-efficient and low-carbon economies. 
In this context, Africa needs to keep pace with these evolving concepts and tools 
and make its contribution to the transformation process, if it desires not to be 
left behind.
Industrialisation and Africa
The onset of industrialisation in Europe unleashed a growing appetite for natural 
resource inputs that went beyond the regenerative capacity of the natural systems 
in European countries. This led to a more concerted effort of colonising countries 
in the form of complete occupation or colonising and using them as a source of 
raw materials input. African countries have been aspiring to industrialise their 
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economies since their early years of liberation. These aspirations were reflected 
in the development and promotion of some main regional and national industrial 
development strategies. Unfortunately, the overall progress made in bringing about 
the desired structural transformation in African economies was minimal. This 
section highlights the major features of the main strategies and the performance of 
the industrial sector over the last couple of decades with the purpose of identifying 
the key lessons that need to be considered.
Industrialisation strategies and initiatives
A broad overview of industrial development strategies in Africa shows that 
there have been three major groups of development strategies that attempted to 
influence national development strategies in Africa. The first group consists of 
strategies associated with the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) as a post-
liberation strategy of industrialisation. This was subsequently encapsulated within 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that was developed 
as Africa’s development blueprint in the twenty-first century. The second group 
of industrialisation strategies are associated with national strategies that were 
promoted through the Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA). The 
third group of industrialisation strategies are associated with the broad economic 
policy influence that was imposed by the global financing institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This includes the structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) that were imposed in the 1980s and 1990s.
The LPA is perhaps the most important regional economic development strategy 
that was developed after a thorough assessment of the state of African socio-
economic development, towards the end of the 1970s. The Lagos Plan of Action 
and the Final Act of Lagos for the collective industrialisation of Africa was adopted 
by member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a regional 
economic development blueprint. The adoption of the LPA was based on the 
two principles of self-sustained and self-reliant industrialisation. The Lagos Plan 
of Action, designed jointly by all countries of Africa, constitutes a charter for the 
development of the continent for the period 1980–2000. The Final Act of Lagos, 
adopted in 1980, generated a feeling of optimism and expectation that the last 
two decades of the century would witness a significant breakthrough in African 
economic and social development and establish a firm foundation for progress in 
the twenty-first century.
The LPA not only emphasised industrial growth but, more specifically, self-
sustained industrialisation designed to meet domestic needs. According to 
UNECA, many strategic measures were proposed, including the following:
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 Building up of an industrial production structure capable of meeting changing 
domestic needs through the preparation and implementation of an integrated 
industrial development programme.
  Establishment of a core of production, marketing, research and development 
activities which provide the impetus for economy-wide growth processes.
  Selection of products appropriate to the satisfaction of the basic needs of the 
mass of the population and the promotion of self-sustaining development.
  Expansion and restructuring of domestic markets by integrating the rural 
economy with the modern sector through the construction of the necessary 
infrastructure. 
  Sub-regional economic integration aimed at developing basic and capital goods 
industries in integrated sub-regional markets.
  Generation and use of information and data in economic planning and decision 
making. (UNECA, 1980)
The concept of structural adjustment programmes, as commonly used in the 1980s, 
has its origins in the global economic events of 1973–1974 and the first oil shock 
(Reed, 1992). Throughout the later parts of the 1970s, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and national governments took many crisis management measures, 
but with few positive results. It is under such circumstances that the World Bank 
decided to commit its resources to help correct the pervasive macroeconomic 
imbalances (Mosley, Harrigan & Tate, 1991). The SAP package is based on the 
belief that the market is a more efficient mechanism for promoting optimum 
resource allocation than state planning and ‘dirigisme’. It covered the adoption of 
realistic exchange rates that reflect the true value of a country’s currency and the 
promotion of exports without placing a premium on imports; interest rates that 
are higher than the inflation rates and that will, consequently, encourage savings; 
trade liberalisation and the removal of bureaucratic constraints and controls on 
exports and imports; the avoidance of large budgetary deficits; and the avoidance 
of artificial subsidies (Rasheed & Luke, 1995).
According to UNECA (1991), the analysis of the evaluation carried out by the 
World Bank in 1988 indicated that sub-Saharan African countries implementing 
structural adjustment programmes experienced a severe economic decline after 
the adoption of SAPs. According to this report, sub Saharan African countries’ 
economies registered a decline in gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 
2.7 percent to 1.8 percent, a decline in the investment/GDP ratio from 20.6 percent to 
17.1 percent, a rise in the budget deficit from –6.5 percent to –7.5 percent of GDP 
and a rise in debt service/export earnings ratio from 17.5 percent to 23.4 percent. 
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The only improvement was a minor decline in the current account/GDP ratio from 
–9.4 percent to –6.5 percent. UNECA (1991) concluded that both on theoretical 
and empirical grounds, the conventional SAPs were inadequate in addressing the 
real causes of economic, financial, and social problems facing African countries 
which are of a structural by nature. The big question that was raised by all parties 
was why adjustment did not lead in Africa to its intended consequences. 
From the perspective of the World Bank and the IMF, the cause of Africa’s malaise 
was a direct result of the policies pursued by the governments of Africa before the 
introduction of SAP. However, others argue that the reason is more than policy 
failures on the African government side, even if this has contributed. Howard 
Stein argues that the reason is mainly theoretical. According to Stein  (1998), 
SAPs adjustment theories have their roots in neo-classical economic theory which 
is severely flawed as a guide to understanding how to build economies capable 
of structural transformation and sustainable development. In other words, it is 
not an implementation problem but a conceptual problem. Stein further noted 
that the thinking behind the model is rational deductive and axiomatic and the 
apparent problem with the approach is that the need for adjustment is a product 
of the model of adjustment, and the model of adjustment is a product of a series 
of theoretical premises of abstraction. Thus any divergence of the real cause from 
the premised cause will lead to severe errors in the realm of policy formulation and 
implementation (Stein, 1998).
The Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA) was developed based 
on the LPA and the concept of the United Nations Development Decade. The 
development of the IDDA was based on the recognition of the persistence of 
at least three significant structural weaknesses, namely dependence on a few 
primary export commodities, dependence on broadly the same markets for selling 
primary commodities and for buying capital and consumer goods and services, 
and persistence of market enclaves and dysfunctional relations within national 
economies (UNIDO,  1982). The Industrial Development Decade for Africa 
was based on the much broader concept of designing and constructing internal 
engines of growth in Africa to replace the prolonged and accelerating weakening 
of an external engine of growth resting on trade and economic relations with 
the developed economies of western Europe and the United States. The IDDA 
programme, which consists of objectives, principles and priorities, constitutes 
one small but crucial component in the design, construction and working of 
the internal engine of growth that was enshrined by the LPA. The heart of the 
programme was the production, supply and use of factor inputs for designated core 
industries and the use of the outputs of core industries for promoting the growth of 
strategic sectors.
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During the earlier part of the first IDDA, some public investments were made 
in industrial projects, although funding and other constraints did not permit 
investments of the desired scale. Well-intentioned as these investments were, they 
were not successful. According to a report by the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) of the UN (1992), massive problems have arisen in technology 
absorption, machinery maintenance and management. The net results were that 
input-output ratios were sub-optimal, consumption coefficients were below 
standard, productivity was low, and capacity utilisation was below the break-even 
point. According to this report (UN, 1992), it was roughly assessed that the average 
capacity utilisation of the African industries ranges between 30 to 40 percent. As 
a result, many of the industries set up were running at a loss, and some were at a 
point of bankruptcy. Since many of these plants were in the public sector, they were 
kept going through state subsidies and thus became a burden to the nations.
IDDA-2 and IDDA-3 have followed the first IDDA in the subsequent decades. The 
main goals of the second and third IDDA are not fundamentally different from 
those adopted for the first decade. The vision continued to be that of a programme 
to end the over-dependency which African countries have on the industrialised 
world, to promote internal engines of growth, to build on Africa’s wealth and 
natural resources and progressively to achieve self-reliance and self-sustainment. 
However, it was claimed that there had been a significant departure in the ‘modus 
operandi’ of preparing the programme for the second IDDA (Organization of 
African Unity [OAU], Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] & UNIDO, 1997) 
and preparations of the plan for the second IDDA have moved to the national level. 
Each member state has undertaken the task of framing a national programme for 
the second IDDA keeping in mind the realities, environmental circumstances, 
natural resources and priorities of each member state. This is mainly due to the 
experiences of the first decade, the changing world environment and the adoption, 
by a large number of African countries, of World Bank sponsored structural 
adjustment programmes.
In general, the IDDA process was profoundly influenced by the philosophical 
foundation of the LPA which promotes the interventionist approach with heavy 
reliance on state planning and control. This approach has led to the continuous 
undermining of the development of the private sector and the marginalisation 
of the existing private sector from the development process (Mebratu,  2000). 
Furthermore, as an industrialisation process that is mainly driven by public 
investment, IDDA was primarily focused on the establishment of large-
scale industries. As a result, some industrial projects, that were intrinsically 
uneconomical, were launched in the earlier years of the implementation of IDDA 
while others that could have been competitive were not given sufficient capability 
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and institutional support (World Bank, 1989). This has contributed to the further 
weakening of national economies in Africa. 
There have been different conclusions made on the limitations of development 
strategies promoted in Africa from different perspectives. Mebratu made the 
following conclusions after analysing the major groups of regional initiatives 
developed since liberation:
  The regional strategic initiatives spearheaded through the regional bodies were 
based on the achievement of self-reliance and self-sustainment through active 
state intervention. On the contrary, the initiatives promoted by the international 
financing institutions were based on the promotion of a neo-liberal economy 
that is entirely governed by the market.
  The disoriented and often conflicting emphasis on the self-sustainment 
philosophy of regional strategies and liberalisation of structural adjustment 
programmes was not able to provide a sound basis for the development of 
effective development strategies.
  All groups of strategies were inclined towards transplanting development either 
through foreign investment/technology flow and/or through central planning 
instead of building upon the transformational dynamics of the local socio-
economic factors. 
  The strategies have weak considerations for socio-ecological factors. In cases 
where they considered socio-ecological factors, they have been limited to 
‘environmental policy add-ons’ instead of mainstreaming socio-ecological 
considerations. 
  All groups of strategies have suffered from frozen policy and strategy frame works 
that gave little room for adaptation of the frameworks to changing environments. 
Their review process was limited to minor tinkering of the performance variables 
and finding external explanations for the limited successes.
  Despite the massive effort of promoting the two groups of strategies, the socio-
economic situation in most African countries became worse in the 1980s. 
Even if some sub-Saharan African countries have registered improvements 
in the  1990s, they had a problem of sustaining their socio-economic gains. 
(Mebratu, 2000:136)
At the dawn of the new millennium, African heads of state and government pledged to 
take responsibility, through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
for the future of their continent and to establish a new relationship with bilateral 
development partners and multilateral organisa tions based on mutual trust, respect 
and accountability (African Union [AU], 2001). The New Partnership for Africa’s 
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Development is a comprehensive and integrated sustainable development initiative 
for the revival of Africa through a constructive partnership between Africans 
themselves and between Africa and the developed world. It is the first comprehensive 
development approach initiated, implemented and owned by African governments 
with the full support of the international community. It provides a vision of the kind 
of society and economy that African governments want to build. The broad, long-
term objectives of NEPAD are to eradicate poverty, put Africa on a sustainable 
development path, and halt the marginalisation of Africa. In the NEPAD framework 
document, African leaders identified the following issues and priority areas as 
crucial for achieving the broad objectives of NEPAD:
  Establishing conditions for sustainable development through maintaining 
peace and security and also improving economic, corporate and political 
governance. 
  Promoting investment and policy reforms in priority areas such as infrastructure, 
human resource development, agriculture, the environment, and science and 
technology.
  Strengthening the mobilisation of resources through, for example, boosting 
domestic savings as well as official development assistance and private capital 
flows, reducing external debt, and diversification of production and exports. 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2012)
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development can be considered as a blueprint 
for African development and industrialisation (Muriithi, 2005). Furthermore, it is 
not only a development framework, philosophy or vision, but also a development 
programme with concrete projects geared towards addressing Africa’s development 
needs and challenges. NEPAD is considered as the twenty-first-century version 
of the Lagos Plan of Action with a new model of partnership between African 
countries and Africa and its development partners. NEPAD led to the development 
of many regional framework programmes that are dealing with the key sectors that 
are crucial for Africa’s development. One of these programmes is the Programme 
for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). This programme mainly focuses 
on the development of energy infrastructure as a driver for industrial development 
in Africa. Even if they were launched with much optimism, the implementation of 
NEPAD programmes, including PIDA, has not been as successful as it was expected.
Trends of industrial development in Africa
As noted in the earlier section, until the end of the nineteen seventies the national 
development strategies of most African countries promoted active state intervention 
in development planning and implementation. Throughout the subsequent 
decades, development strategies of most African countries moved between the two 
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extreme positions of active state intervention and laissez-faire approaches, with 
very few countries exclusively endorsing one or another form of the strategy. The 
development effort spearheaded by the development decade concept led to some 
positive, but not satisfactory results in the areas of social development. For instance, 
between 1960 and 1994, life expectancy increased from 40 years to 52 years, while 
since the mid-1980s the proportion of the population with access to safe water was 
almost doubled, from 25 percent to 43 percent of the total (Spark, 1998). During 
the same period, adult literacy advanced from 27 percent to 55 percent. However, 
the economies of most African countries declined in virtually every measurable 
way from the 1970s through to the mid-1990s.
Most of these economies declined in terms of GDP and per capita GDP after an 
impressive start at independence. Rodrik (2016) points out that the low-income 
economies of sub-Saharan Africa have been affected nearly as much by what he 
called ‘premature deindustrialisation’ as the middle-income economies of Latin 
America – though there was less manufacturing, to begin with in the former 
group of countries. The trade liberalisation policy that was pushed through 
globalisation is believed to have made a significant contribution to the transition 
of most sub-Saharan African economies to service economies before having 
meaningful industrialisation. This laid the basis for what is called ‘premature 
deindustrialisation. On the other hand, Africa’s debt has grown geometrically 
during the period from the 1960s to the 1990s. In 1960, the region’s external debt 
amounted to less than three billion USD, and the average debt service ratio was 
only 2 percent of exports. In 1996, the region’s aggregate ratio of debt to exports 
was estimated at 239.9 percent (UNECA, 1996). Africa has also been missing from 
the massive expansion of international trade. Africa’s share of global trade has fallen 
from around 3 percent in the 1950s to about 1 percent in 1995. 
Since the turn of the century, however, some African countries started showing 
signs of economic recovery as reflected in the sustained growth rate in their 
national GDP. According to UNECA, around twenty African countries registered 
an average GDP growth of more than 5 percent during the period from 2000  to 
2014 and more than half of African countries registered an average GDP growth 
rate of more than 4 percent during the same period. Only four countries that are 
plagued with internal conflict and war registered negative GDP growth during the 
same period (UNECA, 2016a). McKinsey Global Institute (2016) reported that 
Africa’s real GDP grew at an average of 3.3 percent a year between 2010 and 2015, 
which is considerably slower than the 5.4 percent from 2000 to 2010. It, however, 
also noted that this average disguises stark divergence as growth slowed sharply 
among oil exporters and North African countries while the rest of Africa posted 
accelerating growth at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent in 2010  to 2015, 
compared with 4.1 percent in 2000 to 2010.
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The improved economic growth rate registered over the last two decades led to 
the change of the narrative about Africa’s prospect for economic development as 
captured by an article in The Economist, ‘The Sun shines bright’ in 2011 and Time 
magazine’s piece, ‘Africa Rising’, in 2012 (UINECA, 2016b). The proponents of 
this narrative (Andersen & Jensen, 2013; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Radelet 
& Sirleaf, 2010; Robertson, Mhango & Moran, 2012) gave some reasons to explain 
why this time around the growth has come to stay. This includes an increase in 
the number of democracies and a more open political domain; a significant drop 
in the level of violence from 55 percent to 24 percent (Africa Progress Panel 
[APP], 2012); and lessons have also been learned from the policy mistakes of the 
1960s and the 1970s. In addition, some claim that a technological revolution has 
taken hold across the continent, most dramatically illustrated by an increase in the 
use of cellular phones. 
However, there are numerous criticisms and reservations expressed with the 
support of some rigorous and more nuanced analysis of economic growth trends 
of African countries which showed that the ‘Africa rising’ narrative misses out 
many essential points. Rodrik (2017) argues that without manufacturing gains, 
the growth rates brought about recently by rapid structural change in low-income 
African countries are exceptional and may not last. UNECA (2016b), highlighted 
the following as some of the major reservation points expressed by different groups:
  Over the same period under consideration, per capita growth in developing 
countries in East Asia and Pacific countries (EAP) averaged 7.71 percent, 
whereas developing countries in Africa registered 2.09 percent. This means 
that developing countries in EAP have been growing over three times faster 
than those in Africa.
  As was pointed out by Arbache and Page (2009), the improved economic 
performance in Africa after 1995 can be mainly attributed to the increase 
in growth accelerations of resource-dependent countries that created a 
commodity price boom. This makes the sustenance of this relatively modest 
growth performance unlikely in the long run for most countries.
  Even if Africa can sustain its recent growth performance, the poor quality of 
recent growth in Africa in terms of employment and poverty makes it doubtful 
that it will have significant positive impacts on the lives of most people.
  The ILO (2014) reported that in 2013 the vulnerable employment rate in 
Africa (excluding North Africa) was estimated at 77.4 percent of all jobs, the 
highest of all developing regions in the world. This is only 2.3 percentage points 
lower than in 2001.
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 From 2000 to 2011, the population share in Africa (excluding North Africa) 
living on less than $2 a day (PPP)1 was reduced from 77.5 percent to 
69.5 percent showing that Africa’s recent growth was also of poor quality in 
terms of its impacts on poverty. 
  From 1980–2013, the share of manufacturing in economic output on the 
continent declined from more than 12 percent to around 11 percent, currently 
the lowest of all developing regions in the world. (UNECA, 2015)
UNECA (2016b) concludes that Africa is doing better in many ways compared 
to 15 years ago. However, in terms of the development of productive capabilities, 
which is the essence of sustained economic development, one can conclude that the 
‘Africa rising’ narrative is mostly hype. On top of all these, most of the rise in GDP 
is associated with sales of commodities from extractive sectors, which left behind a 
huge environmental cost to the countries. Paul Cilliers (2010) notes that resource-
dependent growth tends to stimulate short-term growth but could undermine 
long-term growth. Further growth and development will, therefore, depend on 
whether revenues from resource rent are re-invested in laying the foundation for 
long-term development. Furthermore, the growth in national GDP that has been 
applauded by the ‘Africa rising’ proponents will essentially be wiped out when we 
account for the cost of environmental degradation and destruction caused by these 
extractive industries. Africa as a whole is still projected by the IMF to be the world’s 
second-fastest-growing economy to 2020. Nonetheless, most African countries are 
yet to go through the essential process of structural transformation and reverse the 
recent trend of deindustrialisation.  
Inclusive and sustainable industrialisation 
The fast rate of socio-economic development witnessed over the last couple of 
centuries has clearly shown that the development of the industrial sector in general 
and the manufacturing sector, in particular, is the primary engine for economic 
growth. Recent economic history has also shown that industrial development 
that is exclusively driven by profit maximisation and wealth accumulation leads 
to significant damage to the natural ecosystem and exclusion of billions of people 
from economic prosperity. Progress made in the development of more resource-
efficient production technologies and techniques has also shown that newly 
developing countries do not need to follow the same old inefficient and polluting 
paths of industrialisation that have been followed by industrialised and newly 
1 Purchasing power parity (PPP) is a macroeconomic analysis metric to compare economic 
productivity and standards of living between countries. It is an economic theory that 
compares different countries’ currencies through a ‘basket of goods’ approach.
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emerging countries. As a result, there is a growing global consensus that underlines 
that economic development in the twenty-first century has to be inclusive, low 
carbon and resource efficient.
In this subsection, we will look at some of the major sustainable industrial develop-
ment tools that are relevant to Africa’s industrialisation and propose a framework 
for sustainable industrial development, which could be adopted and implemented 
by African countries.
Strategic considerations for inclusive and sustainable industrial 
development 
Looking back at the economic history of Africa over the last two centuries, it is 
evident that the region has mostly missed all three stages of the industrial revolution. 
We are now faced with the prospect of the fourth industrial revolution, which is 
expected to have a much higher impact on their economies. Depending on how 
they prepare and position themselves, African countries would either be further 
marginalised from the global economy or be an active contributor and beneficiary 
from this transition. African countries need to focus on developing an inclusive and 
sustainable industrial development policy framework in order to be active players 
and beneficiaries of the industrial revolution of the twenty-first century. Such a 
framework has to enhance national capacity to overcome the challenges of getting 
locked-in in an obsolete and inefficient industrial infrastructure and provide the 
basis for effective utilisation of emerging efficient systems and technologies for the 
improvement of the wellbeing of its people. 
Industrial policy is about anticipating important long-term trends of technology and 
market development and providing incentives to adopt the structure of a national 
economy in such a way that it can take advantage of the change (Partnership for 
Action on Green Economy [PAGE], 2017). Besides understanding the current 
and emerging economic and technological dynamics, there are some key lessons 
that African countries should consider from the success and failure of the major 
regional and national industrial development policies and strategies that have been 
implemented in the last couple of decades. The following are some of the critical 
issues that need to be considered in developing and implementing an inclusive and 
sustainable industrial development policy:
  Targeted public sector investment on development of the physical structure 
required for industrial development has a significant catalytic role to play, 
particularly if it focuses on developing the highly needed energy, transportation 
and communication infrastructure. However, such investment needs to be 
coupled with building the required capacity for the effective management 
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and operation of such infrastructural facilities. Building such infrastructure 
with external debt and giving the management of their operation to foreign 
companies, as it is happening in some African countries, is not a right strategy 
that leads to an inclusive and sustainable industrial development.
  The most critical infrastructural prerequisite for industrialisation is the 
institutional infrastructure, which includes creating the required human 
skill-sets and institutional systems that drive the industrialisation process. 
Development of an effective industry-university linkage is one of such 
institutional system besides having a sound and context-relevant policy 
environment. Most of the investment that went into the development of huge 
physical infrastructure across the region so far largely failed to deliver due to the 
limitations in institutional infrastructure development. 
  Enhancing national capacity on effectively managing the selection and 
transfer of industrial manufacturing technologies is a crucial prerequisite for 
successful industrialisation of any country. African countries need to recognise 
that they can never industrialise by becoming a dumping ground for obsolete 
and inefficient industrial production processes in the name of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This is particularly a critical issue now when we consider the 
progress that is being made in different sectors towards more resource-efficient 
industrial systems, which has created the condition for shifting and relocating 
polluting industries to African countries under the guise of FDI. 
  Promoting the development of a dynamic and adaptive innovation ecosystem 
that is responsive to emerging technological trends based on creativity of 
its youth is a critical success factor for any African country. The innovation 
space of the twenty-first century is becoming fundamentally different from 
the conventional innovation systems supported by public institutions. The 
growing influence of open spaces and creative commons as public innovation 
platforms is opening new opportunities and relationships among innovators 
and entrepreneurs. Coupling such innovation ecosystems with different 
forms of blended financing is a key determinant of leapfrogging to a high-
efficiency trajectory.
  African countries should recognise that industrialisation does not involve an 
either-or choice between import substitution and export promotion. Rather 
than focusing on such false dichotomy, countries should focus on an industrial 
strategy that deploys a combination of these components with a focus on 
maximising the return from their comparative advantages and improve the 
wellbeing of its people through job creation and higher value addition to the 
local resource.
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 African countries need to prepare themselves to contain the adverse impact 
and maximise the benefit from the opportunities of digitisation of the global 
economy. They should make a maximum effort to exploit the emerging 
opportunities created by recent development in disruptive technologies. This 
includes the opportunities from development in the application of artificial 
intelligence including block-chain technologies, distributed energy systems 
driven by renewable energy resources, and distributed manufacturing systems 
that include modularisation of industrial processing technologies. This is 
crucial not only for their exponential economic impacts but also because of 
their significant distributional outcomes that promote or discourage inclusivity.
  Industrial development policies of African countries should particularly need 
to consider the possible impacts and positive contributions of disruptive 
technologies, such as block-chain technology, on the global value chain. The 
potential benefit it could provide in terms of facilitating sustainable supply 
chain and distributed manufacturing systems are two key benefits on which 
African countries should mainly focus. This is because of their significant 
contribution to local value addition and job creation.
  Development of industrial parks or estates, which has been promoted as a key 
element of industrial development strategy since the middle of the twentieth 
century, has made a significant contribution to the industrialisation of developing 
countries. However, the economic gains often come at a considerable loss of 
environmental quality and social impacts within and around industrial estates. 
Experience from many developing countries has shown that ecological and 
social issues have often not been adequately considered and integrated into the 
planning and development of industrial parks. As a result, their industrialisation 
has come at a considerable cost of environmental pollution and degradation 
and social displacement. African countries can overcome such challenges by 
developing eco-industrial parks that are effectively integrated, horizontally and 
vertically, with local economies and are resource efficient.
  History and experience demonstrate that urbanisation is closely linked to 
economic growth and the transformation of economies towards productive 
sectors, namely industry and services. Available evidence suggests that urban and 
industrial development in Africa is disconnected, resulting in lost opportunities 
for job creation and improved wellbeing. Reconnecting urban and industrial 
development in Africa through deliberate policies, strategies and investments is a 
priority for the sustainability of both cities and industries (UNECA, 2017).
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Box 4.1: Lessons for the development of eco‑industrial parks
Industrial parks (IPs) in emerging and developing countries provide an institutional 
framework, modern services and a physical and often social infrastructure, which might 
not be available in the rest of the country. The concentration of companies can foster 
innovation, technological learning and company growth. Economies of scale of the supply 
of services and facilities reduce the costs for companies; thus successful IPs contribute to 
high-growth regions and national economic development. However, the economic gains 
often come at a loss of environmental quality within and around industrial estates. This is 
because environmental issues have often not been adequately considered and integrated 
into the planning and construction of IPs (UNEP, 2001).
An industrial park in which companies cooperate with one other and with the local 
community trying to reduce waste and pollution, efficiently share resources and help 
to achieve sustainable development, with the intention to augment economic gains and 
improve environmental quality, can be called an eco-industrial park (EIP). The reported 
potential advantages of environmental management at the level of industrial parks include 
the following: 
 ■ IPs are in line with international standards, and therefore the environmental management 
practices of IP companies become gradually in line with these standards.
 ■ Environmental management should rely on measurements to achieve high efficiency.
 ■ Environment affects investment, and EIPs put more effort into controlling environmental 
quality than regular areas.
 ■ EIPs can serve as special designated areas to test new environmental management 
practices and advanced instruments.
An industrial zone, sector or park can turn into an eco-industrial park through the 
combination of:
 ■ plant-level efficiency: resulting in minimisation of waste and emission generation from 
individual enterprises;
 ■ collective synergies: resulting in optimised resource exchanges between companies;
 ■ common environmental and utility systems and management of park operations; and
 ■ proper zoning and planning.
One of the main recommendation informed by the various case studies is that EIPs are 
valuable especially in developing and emerging countries as they are beneficial in the 
form of local infrastructure and environmental, economic and social benefits. Therefore, 
governments and international organisations should promote the development of EIPs. 
                                                                                                     (Source: Adapted from UNIDO, 2016:4)
Framework for inclusive and sustainable industrial development 
Taking the above points and other issues highlighted in this chapter into 
consideration, the framework for inclusive and sustainable industrial development, 
highlighted in Figure  4.1, is suggested. The framework is proposed as a generic 
framework that could be further adapted in response to the specific contexts and 
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needs of each country. To this effect, it focuses on vital elements of infrastructure 
that are necessary for the development of an inclusive and sustainable industrial 
economy. These are clustered under four group of infrastructure, namely 
institutional, physical, technological, and compliance assistance infrastructure.
 ■ Policy for an inclusive and sustainable industrial development 
 ■ Industry-university linkages strengthening
 ■ Environmental compliance and enforcement
 ■ Integrated industrial infrastructure development
 ■ Eco-industrial development infrastructure
 ■ Infrastructure for distributed manufacturing networks
 ■ Industrial technology centres
 ■ Innovation ecosystems and blended financing
 ■ Technology selection registry
 ■ Common/shared treatment facilities
 ■ Resource efficiency technical support









Figure 4.1 Framework for inclusive and sustainable industrial development
The four subsections that follow explore each of these interventions in turn. Note, 
however, that even though the elements of intervention have been clustered in four 
groups, it is essential to note that their development and implementation has to be 
carried out in an integrated manner. This is important to have a more synergistic 
effect while at the same time assist in avoiding operation bottlenecks that are 
caused by missing one of the elements.
Institutional infrastructure
The key element of the institutional infrastructure is the development of a policy 
for an inclusive and sustainable industrial development that takes into account the 
lessons and issues highlighted under this section. To ensure the soundness and 
context-relevance of the policy framework and ensure its effective implementation, 
African countries need to make the maximum possible effort to strengthen 
industry-university linkages. While most African countries do have environmental 
regulations that are sufficiently detailed, they significantly lack the appropriate 
institutional process and structure for their enforcement. Hence, in parallel with 
the development of the sectoral development policy framework, they need to put 
in place a function of environmental compliance and enforcement mechanisms. 
This may include the establishment of an Environmental Court that is dedicated 
explicitly for adjudicating environmental complaints to be made by the public.
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Physical infrastructure 
Development of the necessary physical infrastructure that is required for efficient 
industrial operation is a fundamental prerequisite for any meaningful industrial 
development process. This includes energy, water, communication, transportation 
and environmental management infrastructure that are necessary for industrial 
operation. The most critical issue in this regard is to develop these infrastructures 
in an integrated manner with primary attention on avoiding any operational 
bottlenecks that could be caused by lack of delay of one of these infrastructures. 
One effective way of achieving such an integrated infrastructural service provision 
is the development of eco-industrial parks that are effectively integrated with the 
local and national economies. While the development of EIPs as the backbone 
of the industrial development strategy is essential, it will be necessary for African 
countries to give equal attention to the development of distributed manufacturing 
infrastructure as an essential vehicle for job creation and value creation at the local 
level. Properly designed and developed EIPs could serve as a strategic anchor for 
developing such distributed manufacturing networks. 
Technology infrastructure
Development of dedicated technology infrastructure is of vital importance in 
light of the significant developments in the field of industrial resource efficiency 
and the critical role that existing and emerging disruptive technologies would 
play in industrial operation in the twenty-first centuries. Establishment of a 
dynamic innovation ecosystem with blended financing mechanisms would assist 
African countries to benefit from the state-of-the-art technologies and techniques 
that are emerging in connection with specific sectors. Recent developments 
in the application of ICT have opened enormous opportunities for industrial 
applications. Supporting the establishment of ICT-based innovation hubs could 
help African countries to gain the maximum benefit from these applications and 
also contain the adverse impacts from disruptive technologies. Establishing a 
technology registry that would be accessible to the industrial community would 
also enable industrial decision-makers and investors to make an informed decision 
about available technologies and their related benefits and impacts.
Compliance assistance to SMEs
Finally, but equally importantly, African countries need to establish a compliance 
assistance infrastructure that will particularly assist small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). This is critical to meet the national regulatory requirement 
and to make them competitive in the international market. Given the capacity 
limitations of most of the SMEs, the compliance assistance infrastructure needs 
to address both the physical and technical constraints they face. Establishment 
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of shared environmental management services and facilities would reduce 
the significant financial burden for these SMEs, while providing technical 
support programmes on how to integrate resource efficiency in their industrial 
operation would enhance their profitability and enable them to comply with the 
environmental regulation requirement. Complementing these with a recognition 
scheme on industrial resource efficiency (refer to Box 4.2) would encourage and 
motivate these industries to become more efficient and competitive.
Box 4.2: AKOBEN: Environmental performance rating of Ghana
Some African countries have introduced annual award schemes that recognise industrial 
efficiency improvement at various levels. The most common award scheme that is 
implemented in some African countries is the awards given for energy efficiency. The 
environmental performance rating that has been implemented by the Environmental 
Protection Agency of Ghana (EPA-Ghana) is one of the unique rating systems that is 
performed by an environmental agency in the region. The AKOBEN programme is 
an environmental performance rating and disclosure initiative of EPA-Ghana. Under 
the AKOBEN initiative, the environmental performance of mining and manufacturing 
operations is assessed using a five-colour rating scheme. The five colours are GOLD, 
GREEN, BLUE, ORANGE and RED, indicating environmental performance ranging from 
excellent to poor. These ratings are annually disclosed to the public and the general media, 
and it aims to strengthen public awareness and participation. 
AKOBEN ratings are evaluated by analysing more than a hundred performance indicators 
that include quantitative data as well as qualitative and visual information. These ratings 
measure the environmental performance of companies based on their day-to-day 
operations once they have successfully cleared their environmental impact assessments 
(EIA) and obtained their environmental permit to operate. These ratings indicate how 
well companies have met the commitments they made in their EIAs at the planning 
stage. AKOBEN, therefore, complements the EIA process and serves as a monitoring and 
verification programme to ensure that companies follow environmental regulations on a 
continuous basis. Besides creating more motivation both through peer-to-peer and public 
pressure by publicly disclosing the individual performance of the industries, EPA-Ghana 
facilitates the provision of technical support to those industries that need to improve their 
performance through the Ghanaian National Cleaner Production Centre (NCPC-Ghana). 
                                                                                                                      (Source: EPA-Ghana, 2019)
Conclusions
Industrialising their national economy has been one of the primary preoccupations 
of successive African governments since the early years of  liberation, and it remains 
to be a priority. However, despite the numerous regional and national efforts made 
over  many decades, none of the sub-Saharan African countries was able to 
industrialise their economy. On the contrary, most of the African countries have 
been exposed to premature deindustrialisation as a result of trade liberalisation 
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through globalisation. Development of the manufacturing sector is at the core 
of industrialisation as it tends to be technologically dynamic, absorbs significant 
quantities of unskilled labour, and it does not face the demand constraints of 
a home market populated by low-income consumers as it is a tradeable sector 
(Rodrik, 2016). Hence, it is of paramount importance for African countries to develop 
their manufacturing sector. However, the development of the manufacturing 
sector cannot and should not follow the development path of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. It cannot because no country could be sustainably competitive 
in the global market by following the conventional manufacturing development 
path. It should not because the emerging technological and knowledge trends 
provide it with unique opportunities to avoid the various pitfalls and drawbacks of 
industrialisation of the last two centuries.
This chapter highlighted the key lessons that could be drawn from experience and 
presented the essential tools and opportunities which African countries can utilise 
in promoting an inclusive and sustainable industrial development. It emphasises 
that developing an integrated industrial infrastructure that effectively covers the 
physical, institutional and human components is at the core of the success for any 
country. This includes the development of eco-industrial parks that are effectively 
integrated with the local economy, both horizontally and vertically, as the backbone 
of the industrialisation. Such an approach will provide a strong basis for the 
promotion and development of distributed economy networks that will serve as a 
vehicle for job creation and value addition at the local level. All these would require 
clarity of vision and high-level political commitment that is adequately captured 
and implemented through national policy and strategy frameworks. I hope the key 
issues highlighted and covered in this chapter will assist national governments to 
make an informed decision in their policy direction.
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Africa is urbanising fast and is largely driven by natural growth.2 Its population is 
young and growing. Historically, the urban transition took 100 to 150 years, but 
today’s transition in developing countries occurs in about 30 years and is thus 
‘traumatic and disruptive’ (Henderson, 2010). In the twenty years between 1995 
and 2015, Africa’s urban population nearly doubled and is projected to almost 
double again by 2035 (Barofsky, 2016). 
Africa’s urbanisation is not only rapid but is also taking place at a lower income level 
than the urbanisation history of other regions. A comparison with East Asia brings 
1 With contributions from Ms Liz Paterson Gauntner, independent consultant, and Professor 
Josephine Musango, Stellenbosch University.
2 Natural growth rates of urbanisation in Africa and Asia are 3 percent and 1.7 percent 
respectively (UNECA, 2016).
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the point home. Africa is 40 percent urbanised with a per capita income of about 
$1  000.3 The figures for eastern Asia and Latin America are $3  617 and $1  860 
when they reached the same level of urbanisation in 1994 and 1950 respectively. 
This reflects the relatively weak link between urbanisation and economic growth 
in Africa (Henderson & Kritikos, 2017). Africa’s rapid urbanisation is also taking 
place in a context of demographic transition, pressing environmental challenges and 
global technological revolution. A space-blind development approach is perilous, 
and the conventional sectorial approach is inadequate. In this chapter, we argue for 
a systemic approach that leverages urbanisation for sustainable development.
According to data from African Economic Outlook 2016: Sustainable Cities and 
Structural Transformation produced jointly by the African Development Bank 
(Af DB), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), two-thirds of the 
infrastructure needed by 2050 are not yet built (Af DB, OECD & UNDP, 2016). 
Even with severe infrastructure deficit, African cities have already become the 
economic powerhouse of national economies; renewable energy is becoming 
increasingly cheaper and accessible; and Africa is endowed with natural resources 
as well as a youthful workforce that is educated and are literate in information 
technology (IT). These are some of the levers that underpin our argument for 
leveraging urbanisation for sustainability.
The chapter identifies urban resource consumption, spatial, housing, infrastructure 
and economic challenges and opportunities. It also highlights the policy issues 
related to these challenges and opportunities and closes with an illustrative list of 
relevant tools to support actions for transformative urbanisation. 
Sustainability through an urban lens: A systemic approach
In 2001, The Economist portrayed Africa as ‘hopeless continent’, and a decade 
later, as a ‘rising continent’. The port city of Onitsha (which elsewhere has been 
mentioned for its worst air pollution, slums or planning failure) was selected to 
portray Africa’s cities as the economic powerhouse of ‘rising Africa’. For the most 
part, the earlier African urban narrative emphasised the housing and infrastructure 
deficiency epitomised by growing slums. In recent times, a narrative that 
emphasises a growing ‘middle class’ and a potential youth dividend appears to 
be in vogue. Each perspective captures some truth but does not provide the full 
picture. African economies are multifaceted, as is the role of cities within them, and 
a more nuanced and systemic outlook is necessary to position urban Africa within 
its regional development agenda of economic transformation and sustainability. 
3 All dollars ($) are US dollars unless otherwise mentioned.
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An urban system is complex and, as illustrated in Figure  5.1, plays a key role in 
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Figure 5.1 Forces shaping the sustainability of Africa’s cities
At macro-level, as shown in the outer ring, demand for resources increase as the 
population grows and incomes rise. But the scale and intensity of demand for 
resources depend on the production and consumption patterns, which in turn 
depends on the way the economy is organised, technology is harnessed, and 
institutions are fashioned. As exhibited in the inner ring, resource consumption at 
city level depends on the size of the urban population on one hand, and the built 
environment on the other. The way urban streets are laid out and infrastructure is 
designed play a critical role. 
If we consider cities as mega living organisms that consume resources and dispose 
of waste, their metabolic (in) efficiency hinges to a large extent on urban streets 
and infrastructure. Poor land use and transport systems that promote sprawl and 
fragmentation lock cities in unsustainable resource consumption. In contrast, 
smart planning and technology that capitalise on urban density and connectivity 
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spur cities to sustainability. As depicted at the centre of the diagram, managing the 
forces shaping urban form is central to achieving urban sustainability. By adopting, 
environment-friendly urban and infrastructure planning and by harnessing 
technology, African countries have the opportunity to leverage urbanisation for 
sustainable development.
The challenges and opportunities of urbanisation in Africa 
These are some key issues concerning the challenges and opportunities of 
urbanisation in Africa:
1. Urban Africa is well below the global average in resource consumption, although 
countries differ considerably. But for many countries, the low average per capita 
consumption is a reflection of resource deficiency. A growing urban population 
is under-serviced and do not have access to energy. Many African countries 
are experiencing rapid urban and economic growth trajectories and Africa’s 
resource consumption and carbon emission are likely to increase in the 
following decades.
2. Africa’s urban space is characterised by primacy, missing middle and rapidly 
growing small towns, a poor economic base, and limited job creation. The 
urban system is imbalanced, underperforming and unsustainable.
3. Prime cities are productive but feature premature diseconomies. The urban 
economy is dominated by informal and less productive economic activities. 
There has been poor job growth and manufacturing is largely absent, however, 
the role of non-industrial sectors including information and communications 
technology (ICT) and service appear to be growing.
4. Besides providing basic shelter, housing plays an important role in economic 
growth, job creation, wealth distribution and resource conservation. The 
housing price to income ratio in Africa is exceedingly high. Slums and 
informality are the default option for the majority. But as income grows, and if 
suitable policy conditions are created, demand for housing can unleash growth 
and drive resource efficiency.
5. Compared to other developing countries, Africa has a low level of infrastructure. 
The levels of investment needed to catch up are overwhelming. The impact of 
the deficit on economic growth and efficiency is significant. However, although 
most of Africa’s infrastructure needs are yet to be met, Africa offers unique 
opportunities to choose sustainable infrastructure design options and harness 
smart technologies.
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Resource consumption 
Based on data from satellite and aerial imagery, the  growth of African cities has 
been characterised by fragmented or leapfrog urban development and  unplanned 
expansion, with infill urban development accounting for a lower percentage of 
new urban development than in any other region except East Asia and the Pacific. 
Informality and peri-urbanisation, which drive urban sprawl and inequality, pose 
long-term challenges for the economy and the environment. Declining density and 
sprawl increase the costs of infrastructure. Between 2000 and 2014, African cities 
expanded their land coverage by an average of 4.08 percent. As shown in Figure 5.2, 
the average density of 16 of these cities declined by 2.48 percent, but with wide 







Source: Data taken from Angel, Lamson-Hall, Madrid, Blei and Parent (2016) 
Countries with better capacity and resources are not much better in managing sprawl. 
According to an article in The Economist, ‘There are fewer people per square kilometre in 
Cape Town than in Woking, a commuter town in Surrey, England’ .4 Considering a huge 
backlog in housing and urban services, and a rapidly growing urban population, demand for 
resources, including land, building materials, energy, food and water is expected to increase 
substantially in the coming decades.  
                                                          
4 Tragedy of the commons, The Economist, 23 August 2018. 
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Figure 5.2  Percentage change in urban extent population density, ca. 2000  
to ca. 2014: Cities and regional averages (Source: Data taken from  
Angel, Lamson‑Hall, Madrid, Blei and Parent, 2016)
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Countries with better capacity and resources are not much better in managing 
sprawl. According to an article in The Economist, ‘There are fewer people per square 
kilometre in Cape Town than in Woking, a commuter town in Surrey, England’.4 
Considering a huge backlog in housing and urban services, and a rapidly growing 
urban population, demand for resources, including land, building materials, energy, 
food and water is expected to increase substantially in the coming decades. 
Using national data and based on scaling relationships and country similarities in 
demographic, economic and climatic parameters, Currie and Musango  (2017) 
have estimated resource consumption of 120  African cities and clustered them 
(Currie, 2015; Currie, Lay-Sleeper, Fernandez, Kim & Musango, 2015). The key 
findings of their work carried out as part of a research on urban metabolism in 
Africa are summarised below (Currie, 2015; Currie & Musango, 2017):
  Of the 120  cities, 71 have per capita consumption levels below 8 tonnes; 
38 cities exceed 10 tonnes per capita, of which only five are over 20 tonnes per 
capita. These consumption levels are below the average of the global North, but 
the low level of consumption largely reflects resource deficiency. ‘On per capita 
basis, the average electricity consumption of Africa, excluding South Africa 
and North Africa, is 160 kWh or 1.3 percent that of the United States’ (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] et al., 2018:20). 
  Cities in northern and southern Africa – regions with higher per capita GDP 
and human development index – exhibit high per capita consumption. They 
may have to prioritise resource efficiency and resource access. 
  Cities of rapidly urbanising regions of eastern and western Africa are promi-
nently missing from the list of relatively big resource consumers. Many of 
the cities in these regions will reach the range of $2 000 to $3 000 per capita, 
which is estimated as the global peaking point for emission intensity per unit 
of income (Stefanski, 2010). Further, the shift in the composition of GDP to 
non-agriculture urban sectors expected to accompany structural transformation 
in the coming decades will make African cities disposed to increased resource 
use and emission intensity.5
  In the broader scheme of things, trends in energy consumption, mix and 
intensity will play critical roles in the urban and sustainability transition of 
Africa. Africa is rich in energy resources but poor in access to electricity. ‘Only 
about a quarter of the population in Africa, excluding North Africa, has access 
4 Tragedy of the commons, The Economist, 23 August 2018.
5 Change in structural transformation influences pollution intensity over time, and the initial 
effect is strictly positive (Stefanski, 2010).
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to electricity, versus about half in South Asia and more than 80 percent in Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa. Only 19 percent of the African 
population has access to clean cooking technologies – when excluding North 
Africa it drops to 14 percent,’ (UNECA et al., 2018:20). Scaling up investment 
in electricity generation to outpace population increase is a big challenge, 
but the expanding possibilities to invest in renewables, which are cleaner and 
increasingly cheaper, is an opportunity. Currently, a third of the total primary 
demand in Africa is met by coal and oil. That means business-as-usual is not an 
option (UNECA et al., 2018).
  The region also lags in energy efficiency. Though the average per capita 
energy consumption and carbon emission of Africa are low in comparison 
to developed economies or the world average, energy intensity levels remain 
significantly higher than the world average. In 2015, at 7.9mJ/US$ 2011 PPP 
GDP, Africa, excluding North Africa, recorded an exceptionally high energy 
intensity. Compared to the OECD average of 4.5 mJ/US$ 2011 PPP GDP, this 
amounts to 73 percent higher. In fact, with an average of 10.5 mJ intensity, a 
unit of output in low-income African countries consumes about 134 percent 
more energy than that of OECD countries. (UNECA et al., 2018).
Resource and energy consumption increase with economic growth. However, as 
shown in Figure 5.3, the correlation is not simple and linear. An array of structural 
factors including climate, affordability and density affect resource efficiency. 
Economic structure and urban form play critical roles in determining the scale and 
intensity of resource consumption. 





Figure 5.3: Material consumption and GDP in selected African cities, 2010 
Source: Data taken from Currie & Musango (2017); World Bank (2019) 
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Figure 5.3  Material consumption and GDP in selected African cities, 2010  
(Source: Data taken from Currie and Musango, 2017; World Bank, 2019)
Spatial challenges and opportunities 
Africa is urbanising at a rate faster than historical trends, and with and without 
economic growth. The contrast between the urbanisation of resource-poor Africa 
and that of rich and industrial Europe is remarkable (see Figure 5.4). This is borne 
out by the following extract:
In Europe, urbanisation accelerated with the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution, rising from 15 percent in 1800 to 40 percent in 1910. Both Africa 
and Asia reached the same rate in half the time, moving from 15 percent in 
1950 to 40 percent in 2010. ( Jedwab, Christiaensen & Gindelsky, 2014:1)
The challenge is that urban planning and investment has lagged urban growth 
for decades in Africa, resulting in chaotic urbanisation characterised by primacy, 
growing slums and informality. Crowding and premature diseconomies are 
constraining Africa’s largest cities, while secondary cities and small towns are failing 
to keep up economically. 
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Prime cities in Africa are an economic powerhouse. The 69  largest cities 
selected from 36 countries for a study on ‘climate economy’ in Africa contribute 
36 percent of the combined national GDP while representing only 16 percent of 
the population (Godfrey & Zhao, 2015). However, Africa’s largest cities are facing 
several factors constraining their full potential. Drawing on a World Bank survey 
of firms, in 188  subnational locations of 45  African countries, a recent UNECA 
report concludes that due to weak infrastructure, first and foremost, because 
of constraints in electricity and transportation, African cities with a population 
over 1 million are underperforming. They are also hampered by institutional 
barriers, including inadequate density, artificial separation and rigid land uses, and 
residential segregation (UNECA, 2017a). Improving these institutional barriers 
and infrastructure constraints, if implemented within a smart and inclusive growth 
framework, can yield economic growth and productivity and contribute to job 
creation and resource efficiency. 
Unfortunately, because of poor infrastructure and weak institutions, smaller cities 
also appear to be impacted by congestion and overcrowding, while lacking a strong 
economic base for sustainable growth and job creation. The result is an excessive 
concentration of urban populations into a single large city, which could ‘detract 
from national income growth as resources are squandered in oversized congested 
cities’ (Henderson & Kritikos, 2017:23). 
Moreover, intermediate cities, which play a critical role in facilitating the 
development of specialised industries and linkages between small and big cities, are 
not growing as much. Henderson and Kriticos maintain that:
smaller cities near the bottom of the size distribution tend to be growing 
faster than larger secondary (but not primate) cities and seem to exist to 
serve agriculture and to house farmers – with their fortunes perhaps rising 
with improved productivity in farming in recent years. (Henderson & 
Kriticos, 2017:31) 




Figure 5.5: Urban population increase in selected European countries, 1800-1910 
and African regions, 1950-2050 
Source: Data taken from Jedwab et al. (2014); United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs [UNDESA] (2018) 
5.1.3 Housing challenges and opportunities  
Housing is the engine of economic growth and social and economic wellbeing. The Asian 
countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have used homeownership to 
boost economic growth, employment and government revenue. In Hong Kong, the property 
sector contributed about 24 percent to GDP and 7 percent of the labour force in the1980s 
and 1990s. In Singapore in the 1980s and 1990s, 15 percent of expenditure was allocated to 
housing. This was in line with the government’s initiative of the ‘Home Ownership for the 
People Scheme’ established in 1964. In developing countries, 3–8 percent of GDP originates 
from the construction sector, and housing constitutes over a third of it. The estimates go 
higher if informal housing activities and their multiplier effect are considered (Harris & Arku, 
2006). 
Besides these economic and social benefits, housing, through efficient use of building 
materials and energy, can deliver a huge environmental dividend and improve the living 
conditions of millions. But at low-income levels, the majority in many African countries 
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Figure 5.4  Urban population increase in selected European countries, 1800–1910 and 
African regions, 1950–2050 (Source: Data taken from Jedwab et al., 2014; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA], 2018)
Housing challenges and opportunities 
Housing is the engine of economic growth and social and economic wellbeing. 
The Asian countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have 
used homeownership to boost economic growth, employment and government 
revenue. In Hong Kong, the property sector co tributed about 24 percent to GDP 
and 7 percent of the labour force in the1980s and 1990s. In Singapore in the 1980s 
and 1990s, 15 percent of expenditure was allocated to housing. This was in line 
with the government’s initiative of the ‘Home Ownership for the People Scheme’ 
established in 1964. In dev loping countries, 3–8 percent of GDP originate from 
the construction sector, and housing constitutes over a third of it. The estimates 
go higher if informal housing activities and their multiplier effect are considered 
(Harris & Arku, 2006).
Besides these economic and social benefits, housing, through efficient use of 
building materials and energy, ca  deliver a huge environmental ividend and 
improve the living conditions of millions. But at low-income levels, the majority in 
many African countries cannot afford even the cheapest housing unit. 
Housing is 55 percent more expensive in urban Africa than in other developing 
countries of similar income levels. Th  typical housing price-to-income ratio in 
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Africa is over 10:1, compared to the global range of 3:1 to 5:1. This is way above 
the affordable rate, even for those with a stable job and income in the public service 
or the formal private sector. This signals a serious structural problem associated 
with the key components of housing provision: urban land, building materials and 
construction, and housing finance (UNECA, 2017a). 
Spending on housing typically begins to increase after the per capita income level 
of $3 000 (World Bank, 2015), which suggests investment in housing is expected 
to grow significantly in the coming decades as countries continue urbanising 
and become middle-income. This is a huge opportunity to spur inclusive growth 
and nudge urbanisation on a path to resource efficiency. Because of its small 
housing stock and limited lock-in forces, Africa can reap huge social, economic 
and environmental benefits while contributing to a reduction of global carbon 
emission,6 from its massive future investments in housing by promoting affordable 
and green building solutions. 
Infrastructure challenges and opportunities
Urban Africa suffers a huge infrastructure deficit. ‘The region lags behind the rest of 
the world in access to electricity, internet penetration and access to improved water, 
and has large road maintenance needs’ (UNECA, 2017a:126). The World Bank 
estimates the annual investment need of Africa for infrastructure at $93 billion, or 
approximately 15 percent of regional GDP (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010).7 
Annual national public spending on infrastructure is exceedingly low with an 
average of 2 percent of GDP in 2009–2015, compared to 5.2 percent in India and 
8.8 percent in China (Muggah & Hill, 2018).
The situation with electricity captures the essence of infrastructure deficiency. 
World development indicators show that in sub-Saharan Africa, less than half of the 
citizens have access to electricity, compared with 85 percent in low- and middle-
income countries as a whole (World Bank, 2019). Power outages are a serious 
problem forcing firms to install back-up generators. It is estimated that formal and 
informal firms lose 6 percent and 16 percent of their sales respectively (Foster & 
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). It is also estimated that the outages result in a loss of 
2.5 percent of GDP to the economy, ranging from 1 percent in Niger to 4 percent in 
Tanzania (Eberhard, Rosnes, Shkaratan & Vennemo, 2011). 
6 Cement-making and the production of steel, half of which goes to building, account 
for 14 percent of worlds’ carbon emission (The house made of wood, The Economist, 
5 January 2019).
7 Yet, at 2 percent of GDP, public spending on infrastructure is exceedingly low, resulting in a 
40 percent decline in firm productivity and slums (Muggah & Hill, 2018).
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Besides its impact on economic productivity, urban infrastructure investment, when 
done cleverly, can also be a game-changer. Two-thirds of investment in African 
urban infrastructure needed by 2050 is yet to be made (Muggah & Hill, 2018) 
and three-fourths of urban areas and infrastructure needed by 2040 in Uganda, 
for example, is yet to be built (UNECA, 2017a). Twice as much as the existing 
infrastructure has to be built in one-third of the time the existing infrastructure was 
built (Collier, 2016).
Urban concentration lowers the unit cost of piped water, sewers and drains, and 
public services, however, these benefits come with challenges. Cities rely on 
infrastructure for the regular flow of ecological services and natural resources 
(food, water and biomass) needed to support urban life and economy, and thus its 
disruption through natural forces or due to climate change poses huge social and 
economic risks. Choices of urban form and infrastructure technologies and systems 
determine whether these risks are mitigated or exacerbated. Bad choices in urban 
and infrastructure systems not only increase future environmental risks, often with 
a higher burden on the urban poor, but also inhibit or distort productive resource 
use or consumption, thus exacting penalties on economic growth and efficiency. 
Economic challenges and opportunities 
Though many African countries have seen strong economic growth in the last two 
decades, for the most part, growth has been jobless. 
African cities lack strong economic bases. A study that investigated sector level 
employment data by city size distribution (prime, secondary, tertiary, small) 
of 11  African countries (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, Ghana, 
Cameroon, Mali, Malawi, Zambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia) covering a population 
of 242 million (of which 62 million were urban) concluded that (i) over 40 percent 
of urban residents in the second quartile and bottom half of cities are engaged in 
agriculture; (ii) manufacturing and tradeable services (finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services) in prime and secondary cities are only around 10 to 
12 percent, much lower than their agglomeration opportunities suggest; and 
(iii) housing and servicing (‘trade’) farmers are the chief economic drivers in the 
bottom 75 percentile of the cities and even in the upper 25 percentile of the cities 
outside prime cities (Henderson & Kriticos, 2017). 
This, in major part, reflects the slow or weak structural transformation character-
ising African economies. Structural change, or the movement of labour from 
low-productivity sectors to higher productivity sectors, typically accompanies 
urbanisation and is part of the economic development process. However, African 
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countries have seen labour shifting into urban informal and non-tradeable sectors 
with low productivity, while the expansion of manufacturing and tradeable services 
has not kept pace with urban population growth. Though there have been some 
positive signs in structural change in recent years, the overall change does not mark 
a turning point. On the contrary, the decline in the share of manufacturing from 
10.6 to 8.4 percent between 2000 and 2015 and the stubbornly high informality is 
troubling. Africa’s urban middle class is expanding, but so are the number of Africa’s 
urban poor (UNECA, 2017a).
The above discussion points to the need for Africa to consider an alternative path 
for structural transformation. Developing on the back of the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector, as East Asia did, may not be a viable option for all countries. 
Some suggest that African countries should pursue industries without smokestacks, 
such as tradeable services, agro-industries, horticulture and agro-business, 
communication technology-based services and tourism. Some signs may support 
this proposition. Between 2000 and 2015, Africa’s service sectors’ share grew from 
44 percent to 55.7 percent; a leap by a historical measure. According to Newfarmer, 
Page and Tarp:
Service exports from Africa grew more than six times faster than merchandise 
exports between 1998 and 2015. In Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa, 
the ICT sector is flourishing. In Rwanda, tourism is now the single largest 
export activity, accounting for about 30 percent of total exports. Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal are all integrated into global horticultural value 
chains, and Ethiopia has become a leading player in global flower exports. 
(Newfarmer, Page & Tarp, 2018:66)
Some of the recent revision of GDP figures following the rebasing that took place 
in a few African countries like Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria reflect the increasing 
contributions of the service industry including ICT, media and entertainment in 
the economy (Sy, 2015).
The role of ICT is of particular relevance for Africa. At 26 percent, mobile internet 
penetration is low, but it is expected to contribute $110 billion, or the equivalent 
of 7.7 percent of GDP and employ approximately 3.5 million people in 2016. 
Penetration is expected to reach 40 percent in 2020, indicating a growing potential 
to accelerate leapfrog growth and transformation (Rogers & Pedros, 2017). Venture 
capital, which reached a $1 billion from a modest start of $40 million in 2012, 
supports African entrepreneurs starting up tech sector businesses across the region, 
including in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa, which is a promising 
sign. Some estimate that 3 500 new tech-related ventures and 200 innovation hubs 
are in existence.
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Prime cities will continue to be important economic drivers, particularly in the 
case of the high-end service sector, innovation and knowledge areas, however, the 
emerging digital economy and service economy in large part favours economic 
dispersion across secondary, tertiary and small cities. 
Key policy and strategic issues for African countries
This section explores some policy and strategic issues concerning African countries.
Key points
These are a few key points regarding policy and strategic issues concerning African 
countries:
  There is room to improve the absorptive capacity and functioning of prime 
cities, but this can only succeed if implemented within a policy framework of 
creating a balanced system of cities and human settlements.
  Making urbanisation a transformative force for economic development and 
sustainability requires promoting distributed economies across the continuum 
of human settlements. Digitisation, green and industrial revolutions can be 
harnessed for leapfrogging.
  The housing issue in Africa is not merely lack of it, but affordability. Investments 
in housing that are not connected to jobs and amenities or implemented outside 
an integrated planning framework are not effective or sustainable. 
  Africa is infrastructure deficient and narrowing the gap in infrastructure is a 
key success factor in Africa’s race to catch-up economically. As the majority 
of infrastructure in African cities is yet to be met, there is the opportunity to 
reap sustainability dividend by adapting compact and dense urban form and by 
shifting to cheaper and cleaner energy. Moving to smart urban infrastructure 
design and technology can be a game-changer.
  The urban policy and strategy issues critical to sustainability transition in 
Africa are centred on four themes: the spatial characteristics of cities, housing, 
infrastructure and productive urban or local economies. They are inter-
connected. Figure  5.5 highlights major policy issues involved within each 
policy theme.
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Figure 5.5 Themes and policy issues for the sustainability of Africa’s cities
  Countries vary substantially in the level and rate of urbanisation and income and 
differ in resource endowment (see Figure 5.6). They also vary in institutions 
and policy thus GDP is not a sole predictor of outcomes in sustainability.8 
Policy  issues and outcomes are context-specific. We are not here proposing 
an all-size-fit silver bullet but outline the broad principles and themes that are 
universally relevant to the shift to sustainability-oriented ‘leapfrog’ development 
advocated in this book.




GDP is not a sole predictor of outcomes in sustainability.8 Policy issues and outcomes 
are context-specific. We are not here proposing an all-size-fit silver bullet but outline 
the broad principles and themes that are universally relevant to the shift to 
sustainability-oriented ‘leapfrog’ development advocated in this book. 
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Figure 5.7: Income, urbanisation and natural resource rents, 2016 
Source: Data taken from development indicators (World Bank, 2019)  
5.2.2 Spatial characteristics: Promoting compact, connected development 
across the continuum of settlements 
Urban growth in many African cities is fragmented and patchy with a flat or declining density 
The growth is characterised by the rapid peri-urban expansion that concentrates the poor on 
the urban fringes with limited or no access to the job market and basic services. This growth 
is characterised by poor planning and inefficient land use on one hand and rapid 
urbanisation, migration, drive sprawl and congestion on the other, especially in the low-
 
8 The Habitat Commitment Index (HCI), prepared to assess progress by countries around the world in implementing their commitment 
to Habitat II principles and commitments, reveals that resources and economic level are necessary but not sufficient conditions in 
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Figure 5.6  Income, urbanisation and natural resource rents, 2016  
(Source: Data taken from development indicators, World Bank, 2019) 
Spatial characteristics: Promoting compact, connected development 
across the continuum of settlements
Urban growth in many African cities is fragmented and patchy with a flat or 
declining de sity. The growth is characterised by the rapid pe i-urban expansion 
that concentrates the poor on the urban fringes with limited or no access to the 
job market and basic services. This growth is characterised by poor planning and 
inefficient land use on the one hand and rapid urbanisation, migration, driving sprawl 
and congestion on the other, especially in the low-income rapidly urbanising 
countries. If unchecked, the trend can harm economic and r source efficiency, and 
in many cases result in premature diseconomies. 
There is room for improving the absorptive capacity and functioning of prime 
ci ies, but this can succeed only if implem nted within a olicy framework of 
creating a balanced system of cities and human settlements. The majority of 
urban populations live in small cities and towns but lack basic services and job 
opportunities, while those in prime cities struggle to survive in the informal 
economy. Thus, improving urban productivity in prime cities is a policy priority, 
but is also inadequate. A balanced system of cities involves decentralising economic 
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activities and connecting villages, towns and cities across the human settlements 
continuum and Africa has a long way to go in this direction. ‘With a few exceptions, 
all countries below the Sahara have primacy rates above 30 percent and several 
above 50 percent (Henderson & Kritikos, 2017:23). 
Second-tier cities are weakly represented in the system of cities in Africa. According 
to Henderson and Kritikos:
The share of Africa’s population in non-primate cities with over 1 million 
population is only 8.5 percent, while for all low- and middle-income 
countries it is 26 percent. Instead, Africa has a high concentration in cities 
under 300 000, as well as primate cities (with Africa at 28 percent versus all 
low and middle-income countries at 17 percent). (Henderson & Kritikos, 
2017:25)
Considering the role of large secondary cities in facilitating job creation and 
labour mobility from rural to urban economies, the missing middle in urban 
Africa is a concern (Christiaensen & Todo, 2014). Secondary cities can be 
pivotal in industrial development. In Nigeria, for example, the recent growth in 
manufacturing has shown to be driven by its mid-size cities (Aba, Ilorin, Onitsha, 
Kaduna and Jos) spread across the different regions. This indicates a positive sign 
of urban differentiation along industrial functions (Bloch, Makarem, Yunusa, 
Papachristodoulou & Crighton, 2015). Guiding such development through better 
urban and infrastructure design by considering the specialised needs of cities of 
different sizes and functions will have a long-term pay off in social, economic and 
environmental terms.
Though such forward-looking investment by countries in their urban future is 
generally constrained by resources, the gap appears to be fundamentally at the policy 
and planning levels. Across the region, it is not uncommon to see resource-intensive 
mega projects and industrial zones planned and implemented without adequate 
consideration of their urban and spatial implications (UNECA,  2017b). Though 
some countries, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, have identified strategic 
secondary cities to help diversify the economy and advance balanced development, 
these are not always fully conceptualised or backed by strategic planning.
In low-income African economies with significant agriculture sectors fostering 
rural-urban linkages is most critical. The debate about the urban-rural divide is a 
recurring one, with some proposing a modular urban model where town-centred 
agro-political districts could be developed in densely populated rural and peri-urban 
areas to expand social and economic opportunities and tame or slow migration 
to cities (Friedman, 1996). Neither the sole focus on agglomeration economies 
nor the utopia of rural cities is realistic. Considering the large employment and 
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output share of agriculture and the realities of circular migration (of back-and-forth 
movement of people between cities and rural areas) observed in Africa,9 fostering 
the links between urban and rural economies is not an option but a priority. 
Small market towns will be crucial in fostering urban-rural linkages. A study that 
simulated urbanisation in Ethiopia and Uganda concluded that reallocation of 
public investment from cities and (rural areas) to towns leads to faster poverty 
reduction, underscoring the role of small cities in facilitating these linkages and 
their impact on income (Dorosh & Thurlow, 2014).
Housing: Promoting affordability and resource efficiency
Because the majority of cities and/or their housing stock is yet to be built in 
Africa, housing is potentially a major economic and resource efficiency driver but 
is constrained by structural impediments. Policy priorities include scale, resource 
efficiency and affordability.
The share of the population with discretionary spending above the threshold 
for decent housing in low-income and/or less urbanised countries is very small. 
These countries may have to prioritise slum reduction and nonconventional 
affordable housing options, including rental housing, while building the necessary 
conditions (land, building regulations, competitive construction industry and 
housing finance) for the housing and real estate sector to flourish. The housing 
issue in Africa is not merely the lack of housing, but affordability. Based on typical 
rental rates in African cities, some estimate a housing cost of $15 000 long-term 
loan interest and principal of $500–$800 a year as affordable to informal housing 
occupants. However, this is a far cry from reality (Collier & Venables, 2014). 
Land use regulations and building standards play an important role in shaping 
affordability. Existing building standards, such as wall thickness, room size, depth 
of foundations, and regulation of minimum lot size, if improved, can also help 
affordability. The minimum legal plot size in of Nairobi and Dar es Salaam is, for 
example, one-sixteenth of an acre and 500  square meters respectively, which is 
unaffordable to ordinary households (Collier & Venables, 2014). 
Technology is also part of the solution. It is estimated that implementing smart 
building solutions could save as much as 30 percent of water usage, 40 percent of 
energy usage and reduce overall building maintenance costs by 10  to 30 percent 
(Honeywell & Ernst and Young, 2015). There are alternative technologies and 
housing solutions that may be applicable even to slum upgrading. The ‘smart 
9 Migration to rural areas has been observed in countries like Zambia in the 1980s and Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mali in the 1990s, perhaps reflecting some level of ‘counter urbanisation’ caused 
by the economic hardship of the urban poor (Potts, 2009).
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shack’ design in South Africa, which resulted from the collaboration between city 
authorities and a local university, is an example (Modisaatsone, 2014).
Often innovation and technology precede changes in institutions and regulations. 
However, low-income countries can reverse this by moving to progressive building 
code and planning practices in phases to take advantage of existing and in pipe 
technology and know-how in energy-efficient housing solutions. In the middle-
income countries, the resource efficiency gains will come from new units and from 
retrofitting of the existing stock. These countries also have a better capacity to 
invest in innovative housing designs and improvement of building materials.
In countries where the majority of the population has reached a disposable income 
threshold and can afford the most basic shelter, the role of government should 
focus on creating a policy environment that encourages research and investment 
into affordable and resource-efficient housing options and innovations, and not 
on building housing units themselves. Innovations can come from local or global 
sources, but their uptake depends on the policy and the institutional environment. 
Indigenous or local knowledge of nature-friendly housing solutions can be 
rediscovered, improved and standardised. Pipeline technologies on building design 
and construction materials (cement, steel, wood) can be learned and adapted.
The prevalence of slums and informality in African cities is to some extent 
symptomatic of a disconnect between planning, infrastructure and housing. The 
current default order of housing, infrastructure and planning should be reversed 
to planning, infrastructure and housing (World Bank, 2015). Studies show that if 
the land is efficiently laid out, housing and service provision can be incrementally 
improved, at much less cost than retrofitting slums. Slum upgrading could cost up 
to 12 times more, compared to service provision in areas with sub-divided plots 
and blocks (Campbell, 2018). There are huge cost savings to be gained from guided 
urbanisation, especially for low-income rapidly urbanising countries, if settlement 
formation is preceded by basic planning and followed by phased investment. 
Middle-income countries devoting big public grants and subsidies to mega housing 
projects should watch the unintended consequences these projects may have, for 
example, on urban sprawl. 
In the end, housing is a core component of good urban planning and imple-
mentation. Housing without proper planning, infrastructure and jobs, is ineffectual 
and spatially inefficient. The majority of urban residents in African cities live in 
slums, signifying the prevalent problem of ‘people without housing’. But the world, 
including Africa, is also replete with examples of ‘housing without people’ where 
houses were built but not occupied because of planning flaws, wrong locations or 
a lack of jobs and opportunities. This is a clear indication of squandered resources 
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due to a lack of coherent policy and proper planning. It is not uncommon for 
subsidised mass housing projects and associated infrastructure investment targeting 
development on the urban edge to end up driving urban sprawl. Though cheaper 
land on the periphery may be the key factor driving such development, the long-
term overall cost to the city resources could be much higher than anticipated. The 
anomaly of ‘housing without people’ and the problem of ‘people without housing’ 
observed in many cities are symptomatic of fundamental urban development flaws 
and resource inefficiencies that should be prevented or mitigated. 
Infrastructure and urban services: Promoting resource efficiency  
and access to services
There is no question that African countries need to step up their efforts in 
infrastructure investment to meet the pent-up and growing demand and accelerate 
growth.10 Estimates suggest Africa could increase its annual GDP growth by 
1.7 percent, 2.2 percent and 2.6 percent if it could close its infrastructure gap with 
other developing regions, Mauritius (with the region’s best infrastructure) or 
East Asian economies respectively (Calderón, 2009). Accounting for efficiency 
gains, Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate the funding gap of Africa 
at $31 billion per year after accounting for potential efficiency gains. Af DB 
(2018) estimates the range between $68 billion and $108 billion. The funding 
needs of low-income, middle-income and resource-rich countries are estimated 
at 23 percent, 10 percent and 12 percent of GDP respectively (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010).11 Urban infrastructure covers both urban-specific public 
utilities and services and productive infrastructure, such as energy generation and 
railways and highways that are national in coverage but critical to the functioning of 
the urban system, and are thus difficult to categorize and estimate with precision. 
But assuming 1/3 of the total investment to be urban, the investment gap for 
African cities could be anywhere between $36 billion and $59 billion (Af DB, 2018; 
Oxford Economics, 2017). 
10 Countries that have achieved and sustained high economic growth had 25 percent or more 
of investment rate and additional investment of  7 to 8 percent of GDP in education, training 
and health (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008).
11 Given the backlog, population growth and economic realities, plugging the gap in 
infrastructure is a long-term undertaking. African countries may not have the luxury of 
building infrastructure first before economic activities, thus the most realistic scenario of 
development is one of strategic investments in key bottlenecks along with massive small-
scale bottom-up investments. But for this two-prong approach to work, clear principles 
and standards of sustainability, efficiency and equity have to be mainstreamed to guide 
prioritisation, planning, financing and implementation of infrastructure investment.
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But an increasing investment is one side of the problem. The way infrastructure 
is designed and provided will impact urban quality and sustainability, thus the 
policy issues involved with infrastructure and services are not simply about how 
to finance the gap, but how to ensure accessibility and achieve resource efficiency. 
Based on a study of 45  countries throughout 2000–2015, The IMF suggests 
that investment efficiency in sub-Saharan Africa can be increased by 35 percent 
(Barhoumi, Vu, Towfighian & Maino, 2018:4). There is room for improvement in 
project preparation and implementation. Coordination across sectors and levels of 
government, along all elements of the project cycle, is particularly important in the 
case of urban infrastructure. 
At a more fundamental level, three issues are critical. Firstly, urban form and design 
determine the nature and configuration of infrastructure. The built environment of 
today’s cities is the product of urban vision and design implemented generations 
ago; the lock-in effect of urban form is long-lasting. Secondly, considering severe 
resource scarcity and the long life cycle of infrastructure, project prioritisation 
should be considered within a strategic framework. Estimates on the return of 
investment in hard infrastructure give electricity generation and connectivity 
infrastructure the top ranking. But even within energy or connectivity sectors, there 
are multiple decision issues that matter, such as choice of technology or energy mix, 
or scale and location. Finally, in the context of sustainability transition, part of the 
investment decisions involve shifting to new technologies or future technologies. 
However, policy inertia and powerful stakeholder interest, if not countered, could 
hamper technological shift and increase the stock of ‘stranded capital. This would 
make ‘leapfrog’ transformation increasingly difficult or costly. 
The majority of infrastructure investment in low-income and less urbanised 
countries is yet to happen. But if sound principles of urban design and sustainability 
are applied, it can provide major environmental, social and economic co-benefits. 
Dense, compact, desegregated and connected cities are resource efficient, inclusive 
and productive. Urban metabolic processes – the way food, energy, water and raw 
materials are conveyed and consumed by households and firms, and the way air 
pollution, waste and sewage are disposed or recovered – have major economic, 
social and environmental implications. The way infrastructure is configured and 
managed determines the nature and size of these implications. In addition, middle-
income countries, in particular, can benefit from infrastructure maintenance and 
rehabilitation and so reap the resource efficiency dividend accruing from good 
infrastructure planning and design.
A dense urban form helps to reduce the cost of network infrastructure – one 
of the underlying benefits of big cities. But beyond a certain size, the cost of 
congestion weighs more than the benefits of density. In the context of Africa, the 
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urban poor, due to limited access and coverage, resort to costly alternatives, while 
prime and large cities, due to poor planning and investment in infrastructure, 
prematurely experience resource inefficiency and diseconomies. The results harm 
both the economy and the urban poor and are unsustainable. African cities are 
expensive and infrastructure services are twice as expensive (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010:4).
This makes optimising the trade-offs between density, congestion and decentral-
isation of urban services important. There are efficiency gains from existing 
infrastructure, by consolidating where development is fragmented and by improving 
urban layout and density. But improving access and coverage in Africa, especially in 
low-income countries, and mitigating and reversing primacy, is untenable without 
a concerted effort to decentralise basic urban services. The balancing act of these 
forces – harnessing agglomerations and decentralising urban services – requires 
careful consideration of different or alternative urbanisation models and their cost 
implications within a long-term national development plan.
At the city and metropolitan scale, African countries, especially rapidly urbanising 
low-income countries, should prepare urban expansion plans while they still have 
time to do it. Land use and supply is a cross-cutting policy issue affecting planning, 
housing and infrastructure. Failing to secure public land for trunk infrastructure 
and transport rights of way pose a barrier to infrastructure investment and causes 
investment costs to escalate. Given the severe resource constraints they face, low-
income African countries may not have the necessary cash to invest immediately, 
but by putting land, basic infrastructure and necessary regulations in place, they 
can signal the direction to the private sector and slowly steer development to a 
sustainable path. 
Investing in new cities is an option, especially for resource-rich countries, but 
the experience so far is not very positive. New cities are costly and take decades 
to complete. More importantly, unless, designed and developed on the basis of a 
new economic and environmental vision, they may not be much different from 
existing cities. Decisions on new cities should be based on rigorous analysis of 
alternatives, including urban expansion and infill development of existing cities, 
and sustainability should be an overriding criterion.
Technology in renewable energy, mobility, and ICT offers new opportunities for 
‘latecomer’ Africa to leapfrog. In the case of high-income countries, economic 
viability considerations and the existence of large stocks of capital from older 
technologies may warrant a delay of investment in new technologies. But for rapidly 
urbanising low-income Africa, this is less applicable, since the forgone output, jobs 
and income due to energy scarcity, for example, is very high, while the stock of 
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existing capital and technology is relatively small. Governments, individually and 
collectively, should adopt policy actions to improve the supply of capital and skills 
that complement and change relative prices in favour of future technologies to 
accelerate growth now, while reducing the cost of a future lock-in by fast-tracking 
the transition to sustainable options.12 
The emerging technology for mini-grid and decentralised energy system is 
particularly important in the context of small cities and rural towns. Information 
technology applications and penetration hold promise for expanding access to 
urban services, even to remote rural areas and market towns. Middle-income 
resource-rich countries or countries with a promising economic growth trajectory 
can step up investment in smart cities or integrated smart systems to improve urban 
management and resource efficiency. How much these opportunities are to be 
exploited depend on institutional capacity and socio-technical conditions. Further, 
in the African context, technological and infrastructure transitions need to consider 
the co-existence of alternative solutions and heterogeneous socio-technical systems 
(Silver & Marvin, 2017).
Reversing subsidies to the carbon economy, especially in resource-rich countries 
should be a policy priority. Governments spend $21 billion in fuel subsidies, notably 
in North Africa, Angola and Nigeria, straining the public budget, disincentivising 
investment in renewable energy and creating carbon-based stranded assets. Re-
channelling subsidies to renewables can accelerate the adoption of renewable 
energy. The cost of renewables is declining fast and becoming competitive and 
affordable. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), ‘compared with 
typical per kWh costs of $0.08 for large-scale hydropower, $0.10 for geothermal, 
and $0.07 to $0.14 for natural gas’ (Avila, Carvallo, Shaw & Kammen, 2017).
Low-income and rapidly urbanising countries will generate long-term co-benefits 
by investing in public transport systems that better connect workers and firms. 
In anticipation of long-term transport needs that accompany rapid urbanisation, 
African countries should leverage current urban planning and infrastructure 
investment to support future electrification of public transportation as well 
as integrating grid-edge technologies (UNECA et  al.,  2018). Middle-income 
countries can use investment in transport infrastructure to remedy poor planning 
legacies that may have disfranchised and segregated the urban poor. Also, these 
countries can improve efficiency and access to the urban poor by integrating urban 
services and by better targeting subsidies. 
12 For a detailed review of the policy trade-offs associated with green technologies facing Africa, 
see Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables, Greening Africa? Technologies, Endowments and 
the Latecomer Effect (Collier & Venables, 2012).
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Productive and inclusive economy: Job creation and  
structural change for sustainability
The success of urbanisation as a transformative force fundamentally hinges on 
the ability of African countries to leverage urban advantages for job-rich growth 
and structural change. Understanding the links between economic and spatial 
development is the starting point. Urban settlements are the indirect outcome 
of many policies interaction with economic agents who must make locational 
decisions (Hamer & Linn, 1987). Macroeconomic policies and sector priorities 
have stronger spatial impacts than urban policies, per se. Prevailing economic 
structures influence the economic geography of infrastructure and the relative 
intensity of capital, energy and labour, and thus impact on resource efficiency 
and job creation simultaneously. Alignment between spatial, infrastructure and 
economic sector planning is the key to sustainable urban development.
Despite some positive signs of structural change since 2000, manufacturing has been 
largely been absent and growth has not been job-rich. Africa’s employment share of 
manufacturing and productivity in industry and services are one-third and one-half 
that of Asia respectively (World Bank, 2013). Some economies are resource-reliant 
and locked in energy- or capital-intensive economic structure. This crowds out 
labour-intensive sectors and hampers economic diversification and the creation 
of employment. Past trends suggest continuing high labour-force growth, a slow 
movement of output and employment into manufacturing, and slow expansion of 
tradeable sectors (Fox, Thomas & Haines, 2017). Informality remains high and the 
impact of the recent GDP growth on the share of vulnerable employment has been 
negligible (see Figure  5.7). This suggests a need for deliberate policies to make 
growth job-rich and inclusive and to explore the potential of ‘non-smokestack’ 
industry and tradeable service sectors as alternative paths for structural change.13
13 In recent times, researchers have suggested, with the right policy and institutional 
environment, non-smokestack industries including tradeable services, agro-industry, 
horticulture and tourism could be potential drivers of structural transformation in Africa 
(Coulibaly, 2019).






Figure 5.8: Economic growth and the decrease in the share of workers in vulnerable 
employment over 20 years (1998–2017) 
Source: Data taken from development indicators (World Bank, 2019) 
Making urbanisation a transformative force for economic development and sustainability 
requires promoting distributed economies across the continuum of human settlements . 
Sustainability and technology, if harnessed, can enable African countries to leapfrog. Figure 
5.9 shows transformative forces for a new economy. As shown in the diagram, two 
revolutions can significantly shape economic transformation in the rapidly urbanising Africa, 




















North America South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
World
Increase in GDP per capita Decrease in vulnerable employment (% of total employment)
Figure 5.7  Economic growth and the decrease in the share of workers in vulnerable 
employment over 20 years (1998–2017) (Source: Data taken from development 
indicators, World Bank, 2019)
Making urbanisation a transformative force for economic development and 
sustainability requires promoting distributed economies across the continuum of 
human settlements. Sustainability and technology, if harnessed, can enable African 
countries o leapfrog. Fi ure 5.8 shows transformative f rces for a new economy. 
As shown in the diagram, two revolutions can significantly shape economic 
transformation in the rapidly urbanising Africa, namely the new industrial 
revolution and the green revolution.
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urban‑rural linkages)
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Figure 5.8 Transformative forces for a new economy
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 New industrial revolution: Many African countries have embarked on 
second-generation industrial policies to reset their industrial development. 
This overlaps with the new industrial revolution, which includes advanced 
automation (robots), additive manufacturing (3D printing), the internet of 
things (IoT) and artificial intelligence. Africa may be lacking an industrial base 
to build on but going by its experience with ICT this should not necessarily 
exclude it from benefiting from some of the industrial applications of the new 
technologies. By investing in research and development,14 Africa can harness 
these technologies to catalyse productivity, decentralise and democratise 
production and innovation in a range of sectors including agriculture, food 
and construction, as well as tradeable service sectors. The fledgling digital and 
green economies, both in the rural and urban contexts, can benefit from the 
new industrial technologies. 
  Green revolution: Africa is a net food importer and over 80 percent of the 
population in many low-income countries remains engaged in agriculture. 
High food prices are suggested by some as the key factor undermining the 
competitiveness of manufacturing in Africa. Modernising and transforming 
agriculture, in a policy context favouring small rural and urban producers, 
offers enormous job and economic opportunities and fosters urban-rural 
linkages, especially in low-income countries. The new twenty-first-century 
green revolution, in contrast to the first green revolution of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, is not only aimed at increasing productivity and income, 
which remain central to combating poverty and achieving food security in 
Africa, but it is also aimed at fostering sustainability. It involves the use of ICT 
tools in a variety of ways, such as market access, weather information, and 
training and extension services. It also draws on agro-ecological approaches, 
bio-technologies, and green economy applications ranging from renewable 
energy to afforestation, water conversation and waste recycling. 
Both low- and middle- income countries can benefit from the new industrial and 
green revolutions. Success hinges on the ability to harness technologies (innovation 
systems that links research and development, industry and finance) and the capacity 
to connect people and economic opportunities (access to skills, market, land, finance 
and infrastructure).
In recent years, the debate around whether industrial development can be a 
pathway for structural transformation in Africa has been intensified. Manufacturing 
14 A 2018 report by UNECA on the performance of SDGs in Africa identified Kenya, 
Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia, among countries investing a larger share of GDP in 
science, technology and innovation to tap on technological opportunities (AU, UNECA, 
AfDB & UNDP, 2018).
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production has doubled since 2000 and has been growing by 3.5 percent annually 
in real terms in the last decade. However, the share of manufacturing in GDP has 
shrunk from 18 percent in 1975 to 11 percent in 2015 and the region remains a 
peripheral player in global manufacturing export. But experience varies across 
countries, ranging from those aggressively promoted FDI in food and garment 
industries through special economic zones (SEZs),15 such as found in Ethiopia, 
to mature economies such as South Africa and Morocco, both of which promoted 
industrial capabilities in automobile industries. Nigeria and South Africa, followed 
by Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Tanzania 
show a relatively strong manufacturing base, while Ethiopia shows strong growth, 
albeit from a low base. Garment and footwear, agro-processing, horticulture 
and automobiles are sighted as promising sectors. Overall, the region faces two 
challenges: First, competition from a new wave of Asian producers like Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and Viet Nam, which mostly benefit from advantages of lower wages, 
higher productivity or better infrastructure (Balchin et al., 2016). Second, the 
potential re-shoring of industry to developed countries that may stand to benefit 
from the fourth (new) industrial revolution.
Hence, Africa needs to narrow the digitisation gap to achieve the unconditional 
convergence gains of manufacturing, which will be increasingly robotised. 
Econometric evidence suggests a slowdown in manufacturing labour productivity 
in sub-Saharan Africa in 2002–2013 compared to 1991–2002. As the economy 
becomes more digital, the impact of technological progress on productivity 
increases, but again this effect is lower in LICs [low-income countries] and 
SSA [sub-Saharan Africa],’ (Banga & te Velde, 2018:vi). An increasing share of 
manufacturing in the twenty-first century will increasingly see an increased demand 
for products associated with higher skills, complexity and technology level.
Africa still has a window of opportunity to exploit its comparative advantages in 
labour-intensive industries, while speeding up narrowing the digital divide. Kenya 
shows the way to go. Kenya’s often-cited promising development in digitisation 
is a result of strategic initiatives including the introduction of mobile money 
(M-Pesa,  2007), the incorporation of ICT as a key pillar in the government’s 
15 Special economic zones (SEZs) are designated geographical areas set aside for specifically 
targeted economic activities. These industrial hubs are supported through special incentives 
and trade laws that differ from the rest of the country. ‘They are typically established with 
the aim of achieving one or more of the following four policy objectives: (i) Attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI); (ii) Serving as “pressure valves” to alleviate large-scale 
unemployment; (iii) Supporting a wider economic reform strategy; and (iv) Acting as 
experimental laboratories for the application of new policies and approaches’ (Farole, 
2011:1). Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape and Coega in the Eastern Cape are examples 
of South African SEZs.
174      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
2030 vision, investment in undersea fibre-optic cables and high-speed internet 
(2010), and the launch of array of programmes, including the Kenya Open Data 
Initiative (2011), the National Broadband Strategy (2013), the National Cyber-
Security Strategy (2014) and the National ICT Masterplan (2017) (Banga & 
te  Velde,  2018). The results of these early initiatives are showing, not only in 
the increased general digital literacy and financial inclusion but also in the new 
generation of industries and capabilities. Examples include: 
Proteq Automation, offering the latest in industrial automation technology 
and machine manufacturing; Homgenius, developing an automated 
bricklaying machine that can make more than 2 000 interlocking building 
blocks per day; AB3D, acting as a one-stop-shop for 3D printing in Nairobi 
and offering low-cost access to 3D printers; and several cloud-based business 
management start-ups. (Banga & te Velde 2018:40)
Where to from here?
In this chapter, drawing on the literature, we have synthesised the growing 
consensus on urban realities in Africa and raised strategy policy issues for 
transformative urbanisation. The next sections introduce illustrative tools that can 
support policy actions. The key messages that came out of the policy discussion 
underscore that business as usual does not work and pairing urbanisation and 
technology offer ‘leapfrog’ opportunities to Africa. But action is needed before 
the window of opportunities closes. Africa may not have a large stock of capital 
or assets of old technology to dispose of or retrofit and thus may not have to deal 
with a big risk of ‘stranded assets’ or lock-in effects. However, structural factors, 
such as poverty, human, financial and institutional barriers and technological gaps, 
remain formidable challenges. This chapter does not offer a new template for urban 
development but highlights the broad sets of principles and levers of change. 
Through the lens of these principles, African countries should assess current urban 
practices, programmes and initiatives at both national and subnational levels. The 
array of initiatives, including smart cities, tech cities and new cities offer a glimpse 
of the future but are neither inclusive nor scalable. Africa needs a new urban model 
that is inclusive and sustainable. Financial considerations may make private sector-
led urban development attractive, but it is questionable whether achieving just and 
sustainable cities without a shared vision and rules of the game and coordination 
across sectors and levels of government is in the interest of the public good. 
Transformative urbanisation should be a priority and should be mainstreamed in 
the policy, investment planning and budgeting cycle.
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Supporting tools for strategic decision-making and planning
As a cross-cutting phenomenon intersecting different themes, there are plenty 
of relevant tools supportive of sustainable urbanisation. But here we focus on 
illustrative and strategic tools, representing national, city and local levels or scales. 
These are related to national development planning, urban planning and local 
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Figure 5.10: Tools at multiple scales  
5.4.1  Integrating urbanisation into national development planning 
Africa is undergoing urban, economic and demographic changes. All three are major forces 
impacting the nature, pace and scale of its transition to sustainability and require a 
concerted policy action at the national scale. National development planning provides a 
strategic platform to do this. Economic sector and infrastructure planning should have a 
spatial lens, and spatial targeting of investments should be based on economic and 
sustainability considerations.16 The paragraphs that follow consider some of the many 
reasons for the need to integrate urbanisation into national development planning. 
Macro‐economic and sector priorities  
Macro-economic and sector priorities as defined in national development plans have strong 
spatial and urban implications. Sector priorities determine whether growth is job-rich or job-
poor and whether there is a potential shift in economic geography and economic prospects 
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Figure 5.9 Tools at multiple scales 
Integrating urbanisation into national development planning
Africa is undergoing urban, economic and demographic changes. All three are 
major forces impacting the nature, pace and scale of its transition to sustainability 
and require a concerted policy action at the national scale. National development 
plan ing provides a strategic platform to do this. Economic sector and i frastructure 
planning should have a spatial lens, and spatial targeting of investments should be 
based on economic and sustainability considerations.16 The paragraphs that follow 
consider some of the many reasons for the need to integrate urbanisation into 
national development planning.
Macro-economic and sector priorities 
Macro-economic and sector iti  as defined in national development plans 
have strong spatial and urban implic tions. Sector prioriti s determine wheth r 
16 Related economic, investment and spatial tools are key to planning and implementing a 
sustainable urban system.
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growth is job-rich or job-poor and whether there is a potential shift in economic 
geography and economic prospects of different regions. Implicitly or explicitly, 
development plans influence trends in urbanisation and urban structure.
Urbanisation
Urbanisation levers growth and transformation but comes at a cost. The present 
and future cost of building new cities and improving existing cities and settlements 
should be factored into investment planning and project programming. Long-
term environmental considerations and growth trajectories determine the nature 
and level of investment, making the cost of urbanisation vary with context and 
development scenarios. According to Harry Richardson, the cost of urbanisation 
includes:
direct investment costs (i.e., the costs of creating jobs), housing and intra-
urban infrastructure costs (primarily the capital costs of urban services such 
as shelter, water, sanitation, electricity, social services, etc.), inter-urban 
(or interregional) infrastructure costs, and growth-management costs. 
(Richardson, 1987:564) 
Urban investment
Urban investment is the total of public, private and household investment. 
Coordinating investment across these three sources is an essential condition for 
building sustainable cities. Failure to coordinate investment by the different actors 
leads to settlements without infrastructure or jobs, or infrastructure without firms, 
or vice versa. This results in dysfunctional cities, a waste of resources and the loss of 
positive externalities.
Public investment
Public investment is heavily directed to infrastructure. The way infrastructure 
is designed determines urban efficiency and sustainability. Therefore, with the 
huge amount of investment going to urban infrastructure in the coming years and 
decades, government becomes a critical lever in influencing Africa’s transition to 
sustainability. With the right policies, technology and institutions, future cities can 
become productive, and at the same time resource efficient. 
A multi-level governance context
In a multi-level governance context, coordination across levels of government is 
also extremely important in achieving sustainable urbanisation. Aligning sector 
and territorial priorities and linking planning and implementation capacities of 
different levels of government is necessary to marshal resources and action for 
sustainable development.
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Box 5.1: Decision-making tools useful in infrastructure investment planning and 
prioritisation17 
Alignment and prioritisation of investment is a complex process with far-reaching and 
long-lasting impacts. The National Research Council (2014) of the US has suggested several 
decision-making tools that may be useful in this process.
Benefit-costs analysis
Benefit-costs analysis (BCA) is embedded in traditional economic analysis. It is now 
being used more and more to analyse the social and environmental impact of decisions. 
Fundamentally, BCA provides a process and way to compare alternatives, and more clearly 
understand trade-offs. It is also important to assess the distribution of benefits and costs 
across different social groups arising from a decision. There may be winners and losers in 
the process. For example, a city may grapple with investing in poor urban areas to reduce 
urban poverty and social disparities or investing in a richer part of the city and achieve 
higher financial return or growth. Most decisions have direct and indirect effects that need 
to be anticipated during the planning and decision phase. Some of these effects are short 
term and others long term. Short-term benefits may be offset by more weighty long-term 
costs, which in some cases, could be irreversible and more damaging to sustainability. 
There also may be unintended consequences that need to be understood as actions are 
implemented and the cascading effects materialise. For example, the decision to invest in 
housing projects on the urban periphery may benefit in the short term from cheaper land 
costs, but over time the development contributes to sprawl, energy and transport costs. 
In the context of urban development, benefits could involve multiple criteria or metrics, 
and therefore analysis may involve looking at the multiple impacts of each decision option. 
There are many critiques of BCA, especially in the context of sustainability. A common 
outcome of BCA analysis is an attempt to monetise as many of the benefits or costs as 
possible of each alternative under consideration and present the results as a single monetised 
result. Costs or benefits that are more difficult to monetise are either ignored, relegated to 
a description that is not given the same weight as the more easily measured and monetised 
effects or they are subject to other controversial economic techniques that attempt to ‘price 
the priceless’ (e.g., contingent valuation). Another challenge of BCA in the context of urban 
sustainability is related to intra- and inter-generational distributional aspects. Benefits 
accruing to different social groups or future generations may require assigning different 
weights and discount rates, respectively, and these can be controversial. 
Cost-effective analysis
A related tool to BCA, cost-effective analysis (CEA) is aimed at selecting the least cost 
option among equally effective decision options. In the resource-scarce or deficient context 
of Africa, identifying the option that provides the maximum benefits with the least cost 
is an overriding objective in decision making. Sometimes the initial cost of intervention 
could appear cheaper or less, but may involve much higher long-term costs and therefore, 
accounting for all future costs in the decision making is critical. Some infrastructure 
investments may look cheap on the face of the initial cost but may end up to be much more 
costly when long-term social and environmental costs or operational costs are considered. 
17 The tools described are adapted from the National Research Council (2014) of the US. 
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Life-cycle assessment
Life-cycle assessment (LCA) approaches to decision making involve considering all relevant 
aspects of a product or system along the different stages or phases of the life cycle. LCA 
helps in that the implications of decisions and their consequences are fully considered as 
part of a larger system, and not as isolated parts. 
Risk analysis
A risk analysis (RA) is done to evaluate the relative merits of options in terms of risk 
management by making more explicit the likelihood and magnitude of consequences. It is 
particularly important in long-term decisions and uncertainties. It involves three questions: 
What can go wrong? What are the chances that something with serious consequences will go 
wrong? What are the consequences if something does go wrong? (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981). 
Part of the reason for involving local officials and communities in urban development 
and planning is to address concerns and risks stakeholders may have and to build trust 
and confidence. 
Urban planning
Resource efficiency and urban productivity hinges on urban form, which is shaped 
by urban layout, density and connectivity, and infrastructure design. Urban 
planning is a key tool for achieving that.
Many African cities had master plans, but for the most part, the grand ideas and 
visions of those plans did not materialise. By the time the plans were completed, the 
realities on the ground had been utterly changed by the rapid forces of urbanisation. 
The cities are poor financially and have a weak capacity to implement, adjust, or 
respond. The plans remain static and rigid, while the realities constantly evolve. 
Big projects involving big players and resources strain local capacity, and in the 
meanwhile the issues and problems the cities face grow in scale and complexity, 
prompting a plethora of projects and bottom-up initiatives. The dynamism and 
ingenuity generated in bottom-up approaches, and the static and rigid planning and 
control interventions struggling to cope with old and new challenges, co-exist with 
limited interaction on the margin, resulting in chaotic urban development.
The failure of large-scale planning in African cities is manifested in the continuing 
growth of slums. The big developers target the rich and the upper-middle class, 
while the majority turn to building shacks. Under the pressure of the market forces 
and land encroachment by the disfranchised urban poor, the dream plans remain 
unfulfilled, and everyone loses. Studies from Latin America indicate that retrofit 
solutions or upgrading of slums are up to 12 times more costly. When land is laid 
out efficiently, the provision of services and incremental housing should offer a 
much cheaper option. 
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Box 5.2: When bottom-up meets top-down: Turning planning on its head
Building sustainable communities and cities demand turning the command and control 
top-down planning process from one of static and deterministic to enabling and generative, 
responsive and facilitative. The top-down planning approach that is fixated on end-
states has relied on complex policies and development control tools. On the other hand, 
bottom-up approaches are guided by simple rules that are informed by practice, norms and 
traditions, but decidedly determined the urban form and development. Unlike top-down 
rigidity, bottom-up approaches are aligned to emergent or adaptive solutions and driven by 
collaborative and self-organised collective actions. 
As highlighted in Figure  5.10, The key remedy to the deficiency of top-down planning 
lies in changing planning from place-making to condition-making. In the new approach, 
cities will be viewed as complex adaptive systems that evolve as living organisms and 
incrementally change through multiple actions of small actors. Thus urbanism is seen 
not as a closed set of rules, but as an open system that continuously interacts and evolves 
with its environment. Planning by government and the ‘emergent vernacular’ of the people 
overlap and interact. Planning in this context provides the essential conditions that set 
the boundaries and constraints within which creativity and innovation flourish to build 
sustainable communities. Simple and tested rules on street and blocks set the essential urban 
order and starter conditions. Platforms, including scalable strategies, codes, standards and 
regulations, provide the foundation and necessary support to accelerate change and growth. 
Defaults provide a typology of solutions at different scales to influence positive choices. 
Finally, activators focus on enabling mechanisms to build social capital in a variety of scales, 
catalysing collective action for change.
The range of tools for each of these planning components include an urban expansion plan, 
which is an incremental approach where the initial effort is focused on land acquisition 
and protection of the right of way, followed by multi-year phased investment;18 grid-based 
simulation for facilitating layouts and testing the metrics for a full range of development 
scenarios; dweller adaptive building systems, which segment actions during development 
and dwelling to allow fit-for-purpose uses and future changes of housing and commercial 
buildings, promote innovation, and balance between distinctiveness and affordability; 
a parameter-based building typologies facilitating meeting a spectrum of needs; and 
citizen engagement tools ranging from neighbourhood gaming technique to participatory 
budgeting geared to fostering collective actions (Campbell, 2018).
18 The New York University Stern Urbanisation Project promotes a simple four-step municipal 
action programme that focuses on preventing the occupation of the urban fringe by formal 
and informal construction, prior to the necessary preparations. These preparations include 
(a) projecting population and urban area per capita growth 25 years out and developing 
maps; (b) creating a single municipal jurisdiction that can execute plans in the entire area 
for expansion; (c) locating an arterial road grid with a 1-kilometer spacing throughout the 
expansion area and transferring the rights-of-way for all roads to the municipality to prevent 
incursion by formal and informal developers (Lamson-Hall et al., 2015). UN-Habitat 
promotes similar approach, coupled with a financing plan and a supportive package of 
urban regulations. 
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Figure 5.11: A new framework for top-down plus bottom-up planning 
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Figure 5.10  A new framework for top-down plus bottom-up planning  
(Source: Adapted from Campbell, 2018:82)
The solution lies neither in the top-down command and control system nor in the 
bottom-up self-development. What is needed is light-touch top-down planning 
to provide guidance and structur  while allowing adaptation and innovation to 
suit diverse needs, and bottom-up initiatives that are spontaneous, adaptive and 
collaborative. The key is transforming the top-down planning from a system that 
con trains to  system that enables by moving from compl x policies aimed at 
fixed end states to policies that provide simple and generative protocols geared 
to facilitating massive small changes that are adaptive, responsive and creative. 
The idea is making planning dynamic and accommodative by focusing on starter 
conditions and enabling behaviours and liberating the forces of creativity and 
collective actions residing in bottom-up approaches (Campbell, 2018). 
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Box 5.3: Financing tools
One of the central challenges African cities face is financing. Local authorities should 
be empowered to raise revenues and access external sources to implement urban plans. 
There are a host of under-utilised local revenue sources and emerging innovative financing 
vehicles. Two such tools are highlighted below:
Urban land value capture
Public investment in infrastructure increases land value, and in many countries, this has 
been an important source of local revenues for investment. By capturing part of the increased 
wealth and value appreciation generated through public investment, cities can expand their 
investment pool and sustain a virtuous link between public investment, growth and taxes. 
Land and property taxes, capital gain taxes, betterment fees and infrastructure exaction 
are some of the instruments available to capture increased land value. Due to political and 
administrative and technical capacity constraints, African cities fail to sufficiently exploit 
this important revenue source, however, there is a potential to change this.19 
Green bonds
Green bonds are generally used to finance green infrastructure projects. In comparison to 
conventional bonds, the volume of green bonds is relatively small but growing. Out of a 
total of $131 billion estimated to have been raised in 2016, only $2.3 billion was invested 
in cities in developing countries (Oliver, 2016). In 2013, AfDB issued a $500 million green 
bond, and over the last five years, two South African metropolitan governments, Cape Town 
and Johannesburg, have issued green bonds. Beyond the additional money generated for 
infrastructure development, green bonds provide an environmental credential that can be 
attractive to a new pool of investors (Duru & Nyong, 2016) and thus should be a financing 
instrument worth pursuing within the context of sustainable development.
Local economic development planning
Distributed economies, a critical component of sustainability in Africa, demand 
harnessing local capacities, resources and skills. Local economic development 
(LED) represents a suite of tools available for harnessing local potentialities. Local 
economic development is essentially inclusive because it is participatory and broad-
based; it is sustainable because it balances social, economic and environmental 
goals; it is strategic because it forces communities to make hard choices that matter 
most to their long-term prosperity and sustainability. Most common local solutions, 
from waste recycling and home-based enterprising to time banking, resonate with 
the tenets of sustainability and distributed economy.
Local economic development is used by both economically vibrant and economically 
distressed cities, urban areas and communities. Cities with agglomeration economies 
use LED to leverage their spatial and natural advantages and stay economically 
19 Land and property tax in Africa is estimated at 0.5 percent of GDP compared to 2 percent in 
developed economies (UNECA, 2019, forthcoming). 
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competitive, while communities in economically less productive areas use LED to 
improve their economic prospect by reimagining and creating new opportunities and 
exploiting their hitherto underutilised resources. Even in developed economies, 
including the US, governments target poor cities, through tax breaks and other 
incentives, to help them lure investment, or create and retain jobs.20
Local economic development planning is a cross-cutting tool used to mobilise 
communities, create a shared vision and mobilise resources to achieve specific 
goals and objectives, such as job creation and local sustainability. The following 
paragraphs discuss some of the variety of tools that can be used in LED planning.
Local economic profiling
Local economy profiling applies different tools to identify and assess the economic 
base and drivers, as well as challenges and threats. It traces underlying changes and 
shifts within and between growing, declining and emerging sectors. It also assesses 
local resources and capacity (human, natural and physical, financial and cultural) 
and their sustainability.
Asset-based community development
Asset-based community development is a local sustainable development approach 
which draws on strength and potentials possessed by host communities. Strength 
could be both tangibles like location, water and land resources, or intangibles such 
as social capital, cultural assets, networking and leadership. Community asset 
mapping is used to take stock of individual assets (talents and skills), associations 
(cultural bodies, interest groups and religious organisations) and local institutions 
(business, industry, education), and other resources that can be deployed to 
promote economic growth and sustainability.
Capacity inventory
As a variant of asset-based community development, this tool identifies and takes 
stock of a range of skills (individual, community and enterprise) and also personal 
interests. The information helps to mobilise and exploit human capacity existing in 
the community for sustainable development.
Urban development LED strategy tools
Urban development LED strategy tools include a host of technical, spatial  and 
regulatory instruments used to promote urban sustainability as a lever for economic 
development. Examples include pedestrian and cycling master plans with  design 
20 The Opportunity Zone Scheme of the US which was introduced in 2017 is one such example 
and targets distressed communities for preferential tax treatment.
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guidelines, green development guides, urban forests, climate adaptation guides, 
energy planning, transportation plans, urban containment boundaries, sustainability 
checklists, zoning bylaws; and smart neighbourhoods.
Sector-specific LED strategy tools
Sector-specific LED strategy tools include sector-specific tools deployed to leverage 
sustainable economic development, for example, tourism planning, agro-industrial 
development plans, and ICT development.
Social enterprising
Social enterprising involves processes aimed at establishing the third sector (neither 
public nor private) to generate solutions in areas where both the public and 
private actors failed or to promote a social economy as the basis for a sustainable, 
prosperous and inclusive society. In a digital economy, social economies can foster 
the power of the web and the community to create a vibrant economy that is 
inclusive and sustainable.
Time banking
Time banking is a mechanism connecting individual assets to foster collective 
action or to facilitate transaction towards meeting individual and social needs 
of sustainable communities. By using time as currency, people can turn their 
assets into economic and social goods. Sweat capital of slum dwellers in slum 
improvement projects or volunteers participating in green projects could also be 
viewed in a similar light.
Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing is an open system used to generate ideas and solutions or to 
mobilise capital and thus support building collective intelligence or unlocking 
financing capacity residing in the local community or beyond. 
Participatory processes
Local economic development is essentially a participatory process built around 
shared aspirations, will and collective actions. Local leadership and demand-driven 
technical support are critical ingredients for success. When linked with resource 
allocation, the participatory process becomes a powerful tool of decision making 
with real consequences. Participatory budgeting which started in Port Alegre 
(Brazil) and adapted in many cities of both developed and developing countries 
is one such tool used to allocate public resources based on priorities set by 
communities.
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Conclusion
Africa is urbanising rapidly in the context of weak industrial development and 
without a green revolution. A comparison with East Asia brings the point home. 
Africa is 40 percent urbanised with an annual per capita income of about $1 000. 
The respective figures for East Asia and Latin America were $3 617 and $1 860 
when they reached the same level of urbanisation in 1994 and 1950 respectively, 
reflecting the relatively weak link between urbanisation and economic growth in 
Africa (Henderson & Kritikos, 2017). 
As a result, African cities face multiple challenges including housing and 
infrastructure deficits, chronic unemployment, growing informality and premature 
diseconomies manifested in urban sprawl, congestion and an increasing cost of 
living and business. 
But urbanisation is inherently good for development, if well managed. Two-thirds 
of investment in African urban infrastructure needed by 2050 is yet to be made 
(Muggah & Hill, 2018), and this has huge implications for investment and job 
creation, and also for charting a non-conventional development path that is low-
carbon, inclusive and sustainable. Considering its speed and scale, urbanisation in 
Africa is disruptive and traumatic, but it is also a force to be reckoned and leveraged 
for sustainable development. Africa does not have much time left to consummate 
its urban transition; an opportunity that should not be missed. The opportunities 
far outweigh the challenges. 
The overarching policy question, therefore, is how to seize these opportunities 
and turn them into development conditions favourable to low-carbon, inclusive 
and sustainable development. The urban policy and strategy issues critical to 
sustainability in Africa are centred on four themes: the system of cities, housing, 
infrastructure and productive urban or local economies. 
Africa is a huge continent and countries are diverse in their context. It is thus 
impossible to spell out the policy agenda suited or relevant to every case. 
Therefore, the policy issues discussed in the chapter are generic, though contextual 
specificities, such as level of income and urbanisation, are considered where 
appropriate. Some of the policy interventions, such as planning urban expansion, 
are beneficial to all countries, albeit with varying degrees of urgency. In many cases, 
urban policy issues cross-cut sectors, geographic scales and governance levels. 
Accordingly, the set of tools presented in this chapter to address the policy issues 
illustrate national, city and local level interventions.
Sustainable urban development in Africa   |      185
Technology in renewable energy, mobility, and information and communications 
offer new opportunities for Africa to leapfrog. The emerging technology for mini-
grid and decentralised energy systems is particularly important in the context 
of dispersing urban functions and promoting distributed economies. In the 
African context, technological and infrastructure transitions need to take into 
consideration the co-existence of alternative solutions and heterogeneous socio-
technical systems. 
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LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT FOR 
SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN AFRICA
Getachew Assefa and Toolseeram Ramjeawon
Introduction
The mobility of people, goods and services, and information through transport, 
energy, water and wastewater, and ICT infrastructure are at the heart of global and 
national socio-economic development. How these people, goods and services, 
and information are moved from one place to another and how the choice affects 
economic, social and environmental quality continues to be the subject of inquiry 
in many fields of research and practice. The type and spread of infrastructure 
systems in any country play a strategic role in influencing its path to sustainable 
development.
The global infrastructure spending between 1992 and 2013 was 3.5 percent of 
world GDP, and Africa spent 3.1 percent of its GDP during that period (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2016). The world is expected to invest around 90  trillion  USD 
in infrastructure over the next 15 years and developing countries will need to 
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nearly double the annual investment to $1.9 trillion1 per year between 2016 and 
2030 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). In addition to its role in society and the 
economy, long operational lifetimes make infrastructure potentially impactful 
on the environment and vulnerable to climate variations over the many decades 
of its use. 
According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), only 
25  percent of the infrastructure that will be in place in 2050 exist today (Egler 
& Frazao,  2016). This provides numerous opportunities for the development of 
developing sustainable infrastructure systems with long lifespans. Typical lifespans 
of infrastructure range from 20 years for roads and petrol stations to 200 for public 
buildings like town halls (Wright et al., 2018).
Africa needs to ensure that its new infrastructure systems leapfrog the inefficient, 
sprawling and polluting systems of the past and must strive to develop systems 
that are sustainable, resource-efficient, low-carbon and climate-resilient. Although 
sustainable infrastructure could increase upfront capital costs by roughly 5 percent 
(Egler & Frazao, 2016), it can have lower operating costs over the life of the 
investment while reducing risks and negative externalities. Petit-Boix et al. (2017) 
identified 28 potential improvement strategies for sustainable infrastructure 
and urban sustainability. Most strategies point to increased process efficiency, 
the implementation of greener materials/designs and the integration of new 
technologies into the existing pool of alternatives. Sustainability and resilience 
must be embedded into standard planning and engineering practice to deliver 
infrastructure that provides a good service of the right quality, on time and at the 
lowest cost. 
The term ‘sustainable infrastructure’ is often represented in different ways 
including interchangeably used with the terms ‘green’ infrastructure or ‘smart’ 
infrastructure. From a life-cycle perspective, we can distinguish the following 
typical stages of infrastructure planning and delivery: Planning, Development 
(outline design), Implementation (detailed design and construction), Operation 
and Decommissioning. In this chapter, sustainable infrastructure is used in 
the context of the definition used by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) as infrastructure that is ‘planned, designed, constructed, operated 
and decommissioned in a manner to ensure economic and financial, social, 
environmental (including climate resilience) and institutional sustainability 
over the entire life cycle’ (IDB, 2018:11). The definition captures a number of 
frameworks, principles and standards and encompasses the four major pillars of 
sustainability, namely economic, social, environmental and institutional. 
1 All dollars ($) are US dollars unless otherwise mentioned.
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Sustainable infrastructure systems enable a community or country to achieve a 
more sustainable form of economic development adaptable to global changes and 
the changing needs of societies. They promote inclusiveness, safety and resilience 
characterised by social, environmental and economic dimensions (Colombo 
et al., 2017; Global Infrastructure Basel Foundation, 2017; International Finance 
Corporation, 2017; International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2017). 
Creating sustainable cities strongly depends on ensuring sustainably developed and 
operated important infrastructure systems supported by life-cycle insights as noted 
by Assefa (2019). Within any one of the life-cycle stages, sustainability can be 
improved by what is done at each stage and particularly by what questions are asked. 
The biggest opportunities are often in the earlier stages of the process and also at 
the very start of each stage (Ainger & Fenner 2014; Braganca, Viera & Andrade, 
2014; Guthrie & Konaris, 2012). A review of existing evaluation tools shows major 
gaps in the coverage of sustainability principles at the upstream planning stage, as 
most focus mainly or entirely on the design stage and stages beyond it. 
Sustainable infrastructure for SDGs and Agenda 2063 in Africa 
There is increasingly significant pressure on the infrastructure of African cities 
due to rapid population growth and urbanisation The population has grown 
at an annual rate of 2.53 percent from 1950 to 2015 and is predicted to increase 
from 1.18 billion in 2015 to 2.44 billion in 2050 (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). At the same time, the continent is experiencing 
rapid urbanisation, at a rate of 3.5 percent during the period 2000 to 2015, the 
highest rate in the world. It is estimated that by 2030, more than 50 percent of 
the population in Africa will be living in cities, and this percentage is expected to 
increase even further and reach over 60 percent by 2050 (United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme [UN-Habitat] & United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa [UNECA], 2015). This means that African towns and cities will 
host 1.26 billion people (Sow, 2015) – nearly a quarter of the world’s urban 
population, presenting considerable demands on infrastructure systems. Each 
year, an additional 14 million people join the urban population in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (UN-Habitat, 2010) with the vast majority (70 percent) living in ‘ informal 
settlements’  and slums because of insufficient infrastructure and poor institutions. 
Current state of infrastructure in Africa
Africa’s infrastructure lags well behind that of other developing countries (see 
Table 6.1). The African Development Bank (Af DB), whose strategy for 2013–2022 
made infrastructure development one of its operational priorities, notes that ‘Africa 
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still has massive infrastructure needs’, yet invests only 4 percent of its gross domestic 
product  (GDP) in infrastructure, compared to China’s 14  percent investment 
(Af DB, 2013).
Table 6.1  Africa’s infrastructure compared to other regions, 2013  
(Source: Adapted from AfDB, 2018:76)
Sector Infrastructure Africa Asia Latin America Europe 
Transport 
Paved road density (km per 100 km2 of land area) 2 25 3 122
Railway line (km) 46 380 197 610 89 002 85 986
Power
Electricity production (per capita kWh) 572 1 930 2 116 3 355
Electricity access (percent of total population) 46 88 97 100
Water and 
sanitation 
Improved water (percent of total population) 69 90 94 99
Improved sanitation (percent of total population) 39 61 82 93
ICT
Fixed broadband (subscriptions per 100 
population)
1 6 9 15
Mobile cellular (subscriptions per 100 population) 73 85 115 119
Africa has 15 percent of the world’s population but only 3.2 percent of world 
electricity-generating capacity. More than half of the world’s population without 
electricity are Africans. According to research from the World Bank Group, 
48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa (with a combined population of 800 million) 
generate roughly the same amount of power as Spain (with a population of 
45 million). Per capita, yearly consumption of energy in sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa) is 180 kWh, against 13 000 kWh in the United States and 
6 500 kWh in Europe (Dethier, 2015). Energy intensity and CO2 intensity in the 
continent are also very high, thus giving evidence of unclean and inefficient energy 
supply chain (Saghir, 2017). It is estimated that only one-third of Africans living 
in rural areas are within two kilometres of an all-season road, compared with two-
thirds of the population in other developing regions.
The African Development Bank, based on a set of targets for 2025, estimated 
Africa’s needs of the total investment for infrastructure at $130 billion to $170 billion 
per year between 2018 and 2025 (Af DB, 2018) with a financing gap of 
$68 billion to $108 billion. Around two-fifths of the investment need is for water 
and sanitation that faces an ambitious target of 100 percent access in both urban 
and rural Africa. 
Africa also faces higher access costs for all infrastructure services compared with 
other developing countries. For instance, freight costs in sub-Saharan Africa per 
ton-kilometre are $0.04–$0.14 compared to $0.01–$0.04 in other developing 
regions, leaving African markets less competitive on the international level. 
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The  situation worsens for the 16  landlocked countries in the continent where 
trading costs are much higher than in African coastal countries (Foster & Briceño-
Garmendia, 2010). According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive 
Index for 2014–15, more than half of the 20 least competitive countries in the 
world are found in sub-Saharan Africa, due, in large part, to the region’s deep 
infrastructure deficit. A World Bank study found that the deficit reduced national 
economic growth by two percentage points every year and cut business productivity 
by as much as 40 percent, making Africa – in spite of its enormous mineral and 
other natural resources – the region with the lowest productivity levels in the world 
(Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). 
Among factors explaining the low infrastructure provision in Africa according to 
Af DB  (2018) is a weakness in infrastructure planning. The continent has more 
countries with low population densities than other developing regions with an 
average population density of 70 people per km2. This is lower than that of other 
low and lower-middle-income countries in the world with 125 and 91 people per 
km2 respectively.
The recognition that Africa’s infrastructure gap is enormous and poses a severe 
threat to development has led to infrastructure programmes at the national and 
regional levels, such as the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA) that promotes regional corridors to create conditions for higher economic 
density and enhanced regional markets. PIDA envisages the development of 
highways, railways, hydroelectric power generation capacity and interconnected 
power lines, throughput capacity at the ports over the years leading to 2040 
(PIDA, 2011). 
Key to success of the UN Sustainable Development Goals  
and Agenda 2063
There are global and continental goals and commitments that are expected to 
shape the infrastructure development in Africa, such as the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) of 2015, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 of 2003, 
the and African Development Bank’s High Five Goals of 2012. The SDGs are 
a global set of 17 goals for all countries of the world to pursue by 2030 based on 
the recognition that all countries are developing countries when it comes to 
sustainable development. Infrastructure is directly included in SDG  9: ‘Build 
resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and 
foster innovation’. Egler and Jurik  (2017), citing OECD’s work on relations 
between infrastructure development and SDGS, noted that more than 80 percent 
of the SDGs are related to infrastructure in different ways. 
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Agenda 2063, adopted by African countries, has a forty-years long vision of criss -
crossing the continent with ‘world-class infrastructure’ (African Union Commission 
[AUC],  2015). Africa’s common priorities outlined in Agenda 2063 are also fed 
into the development of Agenda 2030 through the African Common Position on 
SDGs. There is a strong alignment between SDG 9 and Agenda 2063 as detailed 
by UNECA  (2017). SDG 9 has 8 targets and 12 indicators and is aligned with 
eight goals of Agenda 2063. SDG 9 is thus one of the most critical goals in support 
of Africa’s aspiration for rapid development and transformation and achieving 
the other SDGs and Agenda 2063 targets. Achieving the goals should be done 
in ways that will boost economic development, protect the environment and 
provide African societies with a variety of social benefits. The continental African 
Development Bank has also set its High Five Goals (2013–2022) namely, lighting 
up and powering Africa, feeding Africa, integrating Africa, industrialising Africa, 
and improving the quality of life for the people of Africa. All five areas are related to 
infrastructure development in different ways. Unless the infrastructure deficit in the 
continent is addressed sustainably it will continue to be a significant impediment to 
the achievement of the SDGs, the Agenda 2063 goals and Af DB’s High Five Goals. 
Challenges and opportunities for the African infrastructure sector 
The infrastructure landscape in Africa is marred by challenges such as low levels of 
development, coverage, access, and maintenance of existing systems. The longevity 
of infrastructure poses a challenge when the infrastructure is developed in a sub-
optimal way as any problems associated with it will remain in place for decades as 
part of a broader lock-in effect. Current construction practices are far from allowing 
for separation of the construction materials at the end of the service life of the 
structures for reusing and recycling. Infrastructure systems span over large areas of 
land that could be used for other purposes and the systems affect flora and fauna 
on surrounding areas. Broader socio-economic challenges related to technology, 
manufacturing capability and the human resource underpin the sector. Institutional 
fragmentation, low efficiency and institutional instability should be overcome 
for better planning outcomes. Undeveloped or underdeveloped infrastructure 
associated with low access, low connection and poor quality of infrastructure is a 
challenge for social and economic development. 
On the other hand, the low level of infrastructure development provides an 
opportunity to plan and develop new infrastructure systems sustainably. Abundant 
labour at a relatively low cost, the availability of land, a young population, fast 
economic growth, abundant renewable energy and materials resources, the potential 
for increased intra-Africa trade, and the presence of transnational organisations 
like regional economic communities, provide opportunities for transforming the 
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infrastructure in African countries. If resources are harnessed properly, Africa has 
the opportunity to do more, to do it right, to create jobs, to influence the type of 
economic activities to offshoot, to account for infrastructure interdependency, to 
consider the full life-cycle impact and to adapt to climate change. 
Addressing the challenges and capitalising on the opportunities in the infrastructure 
sector in Africa will be critical in creating an inclusive, low-carbon, climate-resilient 
and resource-efficient society.
Inclusive society 
Intragenerational and intergenerational equity is the cornerstone of sustainable 
development. The challenge in many countries, even as they grow economically 
close to double-digit figures, is the ensuing inequality between low-income and 
high-income segments of the society. The inclusiveness aspect goes beyond the 
income gap in capturing how the vulnerable part of society in Africa are treated. 
These include children, women, youth, old people, people with special needs, 
the poor, rural communities and pastoralists. Lack of education, health services, 
decent work, and social security are among the factors that create the social divide. 
Most, if not all, of these deprivations are associated with connectivity and access 
to infrastructure systems such as schools, hospitals and health centres, transport, 
electricity, waste and wastewater services. A robust economic growth pathway 
that trickles down to people at lower-income levels should be supported by 
infrastructure systems that decrease the social divide through job opportunities 
and equitable access to health services and education (Colombo et al., 2017). 
Infrastructure systems should be planned and developed to support African 
countries to overcome socio-economic vulnerabilities by seizing opportunities 
such as the large young population and increasing middle class in the future. 
Economic conditions and needs of the new generation of Africa in the next four to 
five decades and beyond demands new infrastructure that creates positive socio-
economic dynamics (Pegram, Seddon-Daines, Reddy, Sulieman & Baletta, 2017). 
Filling the quantity and quality gap of infrastructure in rural and urban Africa is a 
step forward in building an inclusive society. Sufficient and reliable infrastructure 
enhances business by creating fair conditions replacing what would otherwise be 
skewed toward the top high-income members of the society (Colombo et al., 2017). 
Low-carbon society 
A carbon-constrained world following the fulfilment of the Paris Climate 
Agreement requires the development of new low-carbon infrastructure systems 
and redeveloping existing assets with a low-carbon goal (Kennedy & Corfee-
Morlot, 2013). The move to a low-carbon society needs to start by targeting the 
high-carbon sectors of the economy in each country for redevelopment and new 
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development plans, such as personal and goods transport, electricity generation, 
agriculture, fossil fuel extraction, transport and manufacturing (e.g., cement). 
A transition to a fossil fuel-free economy requires shifting to low-carbon-
intensity fuels first (e.g., natural gas) as African countries transform and leapfrog 
to an economy powered by renewables. With improved battery technology and 
innovations in personal and goods transport, Africa needs to develop its transport 
sector to facilitate renewably-powered electric cars. Embedded infrastructure, such 
as solar roads where the roads are covered with solar panels to generate electricity 
to power vehicles, is one innovative way of utilisation land for more than one 
infrastructure systems. In areas where there is no other productive use of land, 
large-scale high-efficiency and self-cleaning solar and wind farms can be developed 
where transmission and distribution to where the demand for electricity is viable. 
In urban centres, in addition to solar roofing, which can also be applicable in 
rural areas, building integrated solar PV systems should be considered where 
the insolation and orientation allow economic feasibility. Biofuels can play 
a significant role in the move to a low-carbon society in Africa if it can be done 
without negatively affecting food availability and prices and compromising other 
more important uses of the biomass. The cleanest and most economical way to 
develop in a significantly decarbonised path is, however, to embark on broad and 
substantial improvements in fuel and energy utilisation efficiency at production, 
transmission and distribution, and consumption stages in all sectors. Economic, 
technical and regulatory measures should be in place to incentivise good practices 
and discourage bad practices of energy consumption. Measures of deep cuts in 
building energy use including lighting and air conditioning, the fuel consumption 
of transport vehicles and other types of machinery, and energy consumption in the 
manufacturing sector will accelerate the journey to a low-carbon economy. A new 
economy fuelled by solar, wind, hydro, geothermal and other renewable sources of 
energy can then be built on a high-energy and carbon-efficient foundation. 
Climate-resilient society 
The planning and development of infrastructure systems in Africa must consider 
the operational context beyond two or three decades in the face of new climate 
future. Temperature increases due to climate change in Africa will be one and half 
times greater than the global increase (AUC, 2015). Some areas in the continent 
will get much drier in the coming decades while other parts of Africa will be wetter 
than before. These changes will affect the technical performance and capacity of 
infrastructure systems and will be detrimental to social and economic development. 
They need to be designed beyond mean climate conditions to ‘withstand more 
extreme weather conditions’ (Kennedy & Corfee-Norlot, 2013). The cities of 
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Abidjan, Accra, Alexandria, Algiers, Cape Town, Durban, Casablanca, Dakar, Dar es 
Salaam, Djibouti, Freetown, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Luanda, Maputo, Mombasa, 
Port Louis and Tunis will be severely impacted by climate change (AUC, 2015). 
The urban and regional infrastructure in these cities and small island states need 
to be developed considering resilience and adaptive capacity. The resilience of the 
networks of infrastructure will be undermined resulting in underperformance in 
face of new climate conditions different than what they are planned for (Lempert 
et al., 2015). Kennedy and Corfee-Norlot (2013) rightly argue for coupling the 
development of comprehensive strategic infrastructure plans with national climate 
change goals. These long-lived investments need a built-in mechanism to protect 
the developed infrastructure systems from the damage that would otherwise incur 
greater retrofit and replacement cost (Pegram et al., 2017). Adaptive capacity in 
many countries of the continent should be enhanced given their existing planning 
systems are far from accounting for changes in configuration and capacities of 
the infrastructure in response to future climate change projections. Accounting 
for an adaptation specifically is important in the planning of climate-sensitive 
infrastructure systems, such as water supply infrastructure, irrigation infrastructure 
and hydropower infrastructure. 
Resource-efficient society 
The economic and non-economic wellbeing of African countries depends to a large 
extent on biotic and abiotic resources. A massive amount of material resources is 
entrenched in existing infrastructure stocks and will continue to accumulate unless 
there is a transformational change on how infrastructure systems are planned and 
developed. With increased urbanisation, this material consumption is projected to 
grow significantly. According to a report by the International Resource Panel (IRP), 
domestic material consumption per capital will be around 8–17 tonnes per year 
which will exceed the 6–8 tonnes per capita per year required to decouple quality 
of life from an increase in material consumption. Domestic material consumption 
in urban areas in Africa will see a growth of 790 percent by 2050 relative to 2010, 
which is the largest in the world. The percentage growth in Africa is remotely 
followed by a 220 percent growth in southern Asia while the world average will be 
at 116 percent (IRP, 2018). A resource-efficient economy needs to identify where 
most resources are used and wasted: from the huge amount of resource wastage 
at mining sites to waste generation at processing and manufacturing of materials 
and products facilities. Depending on the type of product, wastage is also rampant 
during consumption. A large amount of resource dissipation occurs also during 
the end-of-life of long-lived technical systems. Sound planning and strategic 
decision-making around infrastructure systems play a big role in addressing 
these inefficiencies and advancing a resource-efficient society. Dematerialisation, 
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material substitution, and reuse and recycling should be part of the portfolio of 
solutions in infrastructure planning. Land, another important resource in relation 
to infrastructure planning, will also see a significant increase in urban Africa, 
and by 2050, will reach a size comparable to that in the highly urbanised North 
American region. 
Planners and politicians play a role in articulating their judgements based on 
technical knowledge and opinions in crafting solutions that mitigate the resource 
challenges of infrastructure systems. During a sustainable infrastructure planning 
process, knowledge from different sectors should be used and appropriate tools 
should be utilised.
Knowledge and tools for sustainable infrastructure
The evaluation of environmental, social and economic sustainability is one of the 
major criteria in the assessment of strategic plans for infrastructure (Dominguez, 
Truffer & Gujer, 2011). The utilisation of emerging knowledge and tools that 
underpin the planning and development of sustainable infrastructure is important. 
Knowledge on the strategic planning of sustainable infrastructure 
For sustainable infrastructure planning, development and management in Africa, 
discipline-specific know-how should be supported by knowledge created and 
deployed through interdisciplinary platforms including technical and non-
technical sources of innovative ways of transforming the planning process. 
Sound decision-making needs inputs from knowledge surrounding planning and 
strategic decision-making, institutions, training and capacity building, accounting, 
and logistics. Knowledge about climate change futures, natural infrastructure 
networks and deep uncertainties arm planners and decision-makers with tools that 
transcend conventional approaches. All these are best served through the creation 
and dissemination of context-specific interdisciplinary and/or transdisciplinary 
knowledge that can be categorised into areas of system dynamics, nature-based 
solutions, smart-city solutions, and integrated and distributed infrastructure 
(Table 6.2). 
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 ■ Mapping and understanding 
systems and interactions
 ■ Modelling and facilitating 
analysis, communication and 
learning about real-world 
problems
 ■ Technical systems, 
social systems and 
environmental systems
 ■ Flows of materials, 
wealth, energy, labour, 
waste and information
Expanding boundaries of 
mental models, and the time 
horizon to see patterns of 
behaviour created by the 
underlying feedback structure, 
beyond most recent events
Nature-based 
solutions 
 ■ Utilising natural systems 
like wetlands, forests, or 
mangroves that can substitute 
conventional man-made 
infrastructure
 ■ Dams and water 
treatments plants, 
wastewater management 
Increasing the levels of 
sustainability and resilience of 
conventional infrastructure
Harnessing their additional 
services and non-use services
‘Smart-city’ 
solutions 
 ■ Using disruptive technologies 
to affect the demand side 
and the supply side of 
infrastructure
 ■ Data-driven planning and 
management of infrastructure 
networks and services
 ■ Transport systems, 
energy systems, 
buildings
Understating the different 
elements of urban systems and 
their interactions






 ■ Planning for infrastructure 
system integrated by data, 
function and governance
 ■ An integrated system of 
man-made and natural 
infrastructure
 ■ Finding the right size and 
location of infrastructure 
networks and striking an 
optimal infrastructure mix 
 ■ Transport systems, 




Capturing synergy between 
infrastructure systems avoiding 
sub-optimal solutions
Addressing value conflicts 
between different aspects
Supra-sectoral institutional 
arrangements for planning 
and managing integrated 
infrastructure systems 
The knowledge base outlined in Table  6.2 and related concepts and guides 
contribute to the transformation of African infrastructure planning bodies that need 
to be supported in embracing discursive strategic planning instead of conventional 
planning (see Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3 Conventional planning versus discursive planning 
Type of 
planning Objective Approach Changes
Number of 
alternatives Scenario Adaptability 
Conventional 
planning 
 ■ Optimising 
the status 
quo
 ■ Withstanding 
events of 
high intensity 










 ■ Reactive 
planning




 ■ Performing 
well across 




 ■ Sustainability 
and 
robustness
 ■ Exploration 




 ■ Proactive 
planning






 ■ Adaptable to 
rapid changes 
in demand 
as well as 
external 
conditions
 ■ Flexibility to 
accommodate 
changes in the 
face of future 
uncertainties
Tools for sustainable infrastructure
In their work on energy policy, which can be reasonably extended to other 
infrastructure systems, Colombo et al. (2017) argue that extending the production-
based approach to a life-cycle perspective that includes a consumption/operation 
phase is important in understanding infrastructural links between sectors and 
economies. This extension spurs life-cycle management (LCM) that integrates the 
supply chain with the value chain in making a significant shift from the traditional 
focus on internal cost savings, compliance and risk management to a broader scope 
that links sustainability to business values and value creation (Rebitzer, 2015). The 
core principle of sustainable infrastructure planning and development should be 
to assess the benefits, impacts and costs and hence viability of an infrastructure 
plan on a full life-cycle basis. Infrastructure systems as long-lasting assets are one 
of the most suitable areas for successful utilisation of LCM insights. Life-cycle 
management is about managing life cycles requiring the cross-organisational 
collaboration of public and private actors at all life-cycle stages and enabling them 
to tap into the body of knowledge and resources of each other (Nilsson-Lindén, 
Baumann, Rosén & Diedrich, 2014). According to Harbi,Margni, Loerincik and 
Dettling (2015), LCM offers a ‘flexible integrated management framework of 
concepts, techniques and procedures’ on how to operationalise sustainable actions 
by, for example, helping manage ‘expectation of stakeholders’ along the life cycle. 
Inspired by Jensen and Remmen’s (2006) definition of product LCM from a 
planning perspective, LCM is defined here as the application of life-cycle thinking 
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to infrastructure planning practice, with the aim to manage the total life cycle of 
infrastructure systems towards more sustainable development and management.
Depending on the level of application, point of entry and degree of analytical 
content, an ecosystem of the LCM toolbox can be classified into two groups: one 
group containing broader qualitative LCM elements; another group containing 
specific quantitative LCM elements. The first group consists of LCM elements 
such as LCM strategies, programmes, systems, processes and concepts, while the 
second group includes LCM tools and techniques and LCM data, information 
and models (Figure 6.1). The LCM tools and techniques that can be employed for 
assessing and addressing different aspects of infrastructure planning are broadly 
divided as procedural and analytical tools. 
Figure 6.1 depicts LCM elements within a decision-making framework.
Concepts of sustainability
Life-cycle thinking, Triple-boom line, 





Issue (re)definion → criteria seng → opon generaon 















   Based on physical 
   metrics
▪  Life-cycle assessment
▪  Material flow analysis 
▪  Energy analysis 
▪  Environmental risk 
analysis
▪  Others
   Based on non-physical    
   metrics
▪  Life-cycle cosng
▪  Social life cycle 
assessment
▪  Cost benefit analysis 
▪  Stakeholder analysis
▪  Others
    Procedural tools
▪  Environmental impact 
assessment
▪  Strategic environmental 
assessment
▪  Sustainability rang 
systems






Mass balance models, Dispersion models, Ecological models, 
Allocaon models, Dose-response models, Fate models, 
Uncertainty analysis, Sensivity analysis, Scenario development, 
Backcasng, Valuaon models, etc. 
Data
Figure 6.1  LCM elements within a decision-making framework  
(Source: Diagram based on Wrisberg et al., 2002:36)
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The following sections present the most commonly used procedural and analytical 
tools for sustainability practice and those that are emerging. The discussion of the 
tools focuses on applicability, key issues involved and limitations.
Procedural LCM tools for sustainable infrastructure
This section discusses three procedural tools for sustainable infrastructure, 
namely strategic environmental assessment (SEA), sustainability rating tools and 
multicriteria decision-making.
Strategic environmental assessment
A strategic environmental assessment addresses sustainability issues earlier in 
the decision process taking the impact assessment upstream into infrastructure 
planning. Considering a greater scale and longer time interval, SEA focuses on 
policies, programmes and plans as strategic decisions points. The entry point and 
how SEA is deployed and for what purpose defines its strategic content and its 
influence on the decisions, avoiding a non-strategic application of SEA late in the 
process after significant decisions are made. The strategic advantage of SEA comes 
from its nesting into the strategic-planning and decision-making processes (Noble 
& Nwanekezie, 2017). Capitalising on the experience of legislated SEA in different 
regions of the world and the requirements of regulatory bodies and financers in 
Africa, SEA should be applied beneficially in the planning and development of 
sustainable infrastructure systems in Africa. 
Sustainability rating tools
Rating tools reward options that go beyond the legal, environmental, social and 
other sustainability minima to achieve distinctive sustainability performance 
influencing planners to consider the important issues at the most appropriate 
time. The rating systems are powerful planning tools that can be used to embed 
sustainable thinking into each decision point in the development of a plan. 
The tools are also helpful in communicating sustainability in a comprehensible 
manner to different stakeholders within and outside the planning institutions. 
The use of sustainability-oriented rating systems for infrastructure systems at the 
planning stage can be built on the experience of existing rating tools, such as the 
Civil Engineering Environmental Quality Assessment (UK), the Infrastructure 
Sustainability Rating Scheme (Australia and New Zealand) and SuRe® (Global). 
Some are applicable across sectors (e.g., Envision, USA) and others are sector-
specific (e.g., GreenroadsTM, USA and international). 
Africa will benefit from the dissemination and application of sustainability 
infrastructure rating systems adapted to the local contexts and developed through 
collaborations between planning institutions and universities. 
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Multicriteria decision-making
Planning for sustainable infrastructure that involves many aspects and variables is a 
subject of multicriteria decision making. Multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
techniques help in managing decision processes typically characterised by many 
assessment criteria, alternatives and actions. MCDA is promoted as an appropriate 
tool to adopt decisions ( Janic, 2003; Tudela, Akiki & Cisternas, 2006) as it 
provides the opportunity to integrate information about impacts and other factors 
with the views and opinions of stakeholders and decision-makers (Geneletti, 2005). 
MCDA techniques are best used as screening tools to refine a shortlist of preferred 
decisions and plans. 
Analytical LCM tools for sustainable infrastructure
The utility of the procedural tools relies on better information and data that comes 
from employing analytical tools used in modelling and visualising the triple-
bottom-line performance of plans and decisions enabling evidence-based decision 
processes that result in sustainable infrastructure. LCM has the potential to put 
life-cycle thinking into planning practice using relevant tools that account for the 
impact of infrastructure not only on the economy but also on the environment and 
society throughout its full life cycle (Sonnemann, Gemechu, Remmen, Frydendal 
& Jensen, 2015). 
Some various analytical tools and methods can provide quantitative insight 
regarding the material and other impact aspects of infrastructure systems. Material 
flow analysis (MFA) and life-cycle sustainability assessment (LCSA) serve the 
function of analysing and appraising alternatives of infrastructure planning and 
development capturing the intricacies of supply chain, the operation and end-of-
life management aspects. They can both be used in ‘hotspot’ analyses that help 
‘identify potential solutions and prioritise actions around the most significant 
economic, environmental, ethical and social sustainability impacts or benefits’ 
of infrastructure plans (Barthel et al., 2015). Table  6.4 includes findings of life-
cycle assessment (LCA) studies from the literature relevant to different types of 
infrastructure.
Table 6.4 Findings of life-cycle assessment (LCA) applied to infrastructure systems 
Attribute Typical environmental impact / highlights
Low population 
density
Impact potentials from mobility take on increased importance (Heinonen, Kyro & 
Junnila, 2011). Dense urban living reduces per capita transport emissions, but an 





Impacts from space conditioning take on increased importance (Goldstein, Birkved, 
Quitzau & Bauschild, 2013).
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Impacts from capital formation (building and infrastructure construction) take on increased 










To improve urban sustainability, development strategies should consider the transport 
infrastructure in addition to building efficiency (Bastos, Batterman & Freire, 2016).
‘Smart-city’ 
solutions at  
the urban  
system level
The importance of choosing solutions with the right focus and optimising the design to 




The life-cycle assessment (LCA) framework can be adapted to environmental assessment 
in land planning and has the potential to provide relevant information in decision-making 
processes (Bistrup et al., 2015; Loiseau, Roux, Junqua, Maurel & Bellon-Maurel, 2013). 
Qi, Zhang, Jiang, Hou  and Li (2019) adapted the existing territory LCA method to 
highlight regional characteristics in urban territories and applied the improved method to 




Occupant transportation phase plays a highly important role in neighbourhood 
performance. Neighbourhood development assessment should consider several 




Active participation by the regional government and by various authorities and institutions 
in the region is a key success factor in fostering a life-cycle management (LCM) approach 
in the building sector. Active participation by and support of industry federations and 
trade associations are also vital as smaller companies – a strong feature of the building 
sector – rely heavily on their advice and guidance. Above all, a dedicated project team is 
essential to start the process and then to coordinate the various actions until all partners 
operate with confidence with LCM (Adibi, Darul, Pasquest, Demaretz & Traisnel, 2017).
Planning of water 
and wastewater 
systems
Slagstad and Brattebø (2014) examined the system-wide life-cycle potential 
environmental impact of operating a city’s water and wastewater system. 
Waste Landfilling is usually found in most LCA studies as the least preferred municipal solid 
waste management (MSWM) option. The strong dependence of each solid waste 
management system (SWMS) on local conditions, such as waste composition or energy 
system, prevents a meaningful generalisation of the LCA results as we find it in the waste 
hierarchy. It is recommended that stakeholders in solid waste management regard LCA 
as a tool, which, by its ability to capture the local specific conditions in the modelling of 
environmental impacts and benefits of an SWMS assists them to identify critical problems 
and propose improvement options adapted to the local specificities.
Roads and 
pavements
LCA studies that have in some way estimated the energy use due to traffic have 
concluded that the energy used for construction, operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure only amounts to a small part of the energy use for traffic. A conclusion 
of this is that if the purpose is to make road transports more energy efficient it can be 
better to accept higher energy use for the infrastructure if it leads to lower fuel use 
of vehicles since it can result in lower total energy use (Carlson, 2011). A proposed 
GIS-based approach shows promising results for usage in LCA at an early stage of road 
infrastructure planning (Karlsson et al., 2017).
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Direct emissions from plant operation represent the majority of the life-cycle emissions 
for fossil fuel technologies, whereas fuel provision represents the largest contribution for 
biomass technologies and nuclear power; infrastructures provided the highest impact 
for renewables. These data indicated that all three phases should be included for 
completeness and to avoid problem shifting. The most important technological aspects 
were identified as the energy recovery efficiency and the flue gas cleaning system for 
fossil fuel technologies; the electricity mix used during both the manufacturing and the 
construction phases for nuclear and renewable technologies; and the type, quality and 
origin of feedstock, as well as the amount and type of co-products, for biomass-based 
systems (Turconi, Boldrin & Astrup, 2013).
Renewable energy 
development
 ■ Renewable energy technologies show clear environmental advantages compared 
to fossil fuel alternatives, including a substantial decrease in life-cycle greenhouse 
emissions of grid electricity as well as a decrease in the extraction of fossil resources. 
Renewable energy substantially reduces impacts on the environment and human health, 
with the exception of material use (UNEP, 2015). There is a need to systematically 
examine end-of-life issues and ensure recycling of products, a responsibility that may  
fall disproportionately on local and regional authorities.
 ■ Wind power often emerges as the renewable technology with the lowest overall 
environmental impact (Hertwich et al., 2015).
Material flow analysis 
Infrastructure development and management play a significant role in the 
movement of materials and their temporary and permanent sequestration. 
Knowledge-driven guidance on decisions about the type, form, quantity and 
specific location of materials used in the construction of infrastructure systems, 
and what happens to the materials at the end of the lifetime of the structure is 
important in identifying interventions and engaging relevant life-cycle actors. In 
urban areas where most of the infrastructure systems are concentrated, tracking 
and understanding the flow and stock of materials, such as steel and concrete, is 
crucial for resource-efficient planning (e.g., Kennedy et al., 2015).
Material flow analysis is the earliest urban metabolism method whereby single 
material flows or more comprehensive lists of metabolic outflows (e.g., food, water 
and fuels) have been accounted for one year through cities, regions and nations. 
MFA should be beneficially applied at the level of the national or subnational level 
where the plan or the strategic decision around infrastructure is envisaged to be 
implemented. UNEP (2013) made the case for examining cities using material 
flows and recommended that cities can be restructured from a materials perspective 
and their infrastructure reconfigured to improve resource productivity and reduce 
environmental impacts. Ioppolo, Cucurachi, Salomone, Shi and Yigitcanlar  (2019) 
proposed the integration of the mandatory procedural tool of SEA and the 
voluntary analytical tool of MFA, which can generate a new framework for 
sustainable development planning. 
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Life-cycle sustainability assessment 
Life-cycle sustainability assessment (LCSA) is composed of environmental 
life-cycle assessment (LCA), economic life-cycle costing (LCC) and social life-
cycle assessment (S-LCA). There is an important utility in using LCA, LCC and 
S-LCA elements of LCSA to capture environmental, economic and social life-
cycle bottom lines throughout the life cycle of the infrastructure. The life-cycle 
thinking empowers the decision-makers with new opportunities of larger spans 
of optimisation that will, in turn, empower designers to harvest synergies and 
improvements by using tools and approaches of design for disassembly, design 
for repair, design for deconstruction and design for recycling. LCA, for example, 
can be employed to calculate an impact footprint of the different alternatives of 
planning using simplified LCA tools that generate impact results, such as global 
climate change, with the help of generic life-cycle inventory database to identify 
hotspots and trade-offs. Beyond the traditional application of LCA as a product-
oriented methodology, a new LCA-based approach called ‘territorial LCA’ has 
gradually emerged to assess geographically or administratively defined systems 
(Loiseau et al., 2018) which would be relevant in analytical aspects of planning for 
sustainable infrastructure.
The economic bottom line assessed through LCC is broader than the traditional 
bottom line considered in current accounting systems and planning systems. Costs 
in LCC can be presented from the perspective of a predefined stakeholder, such as 
a manufacturer, a user, or society at large. Taking the societal perspective during 
decision making and strategic planning of infrastructure systems is both pragmatic 
and beneficial. LCA and S-LCA can respond in an enhanced way to the explicit 
requirements imposed by financiers and regulatory bodies on the environmental 
and social aspects of planning respectively. 
Key policy and strategic issues for African countries 
The megatrends of urbanisation and population growth in the African region 
have critical policy implications. First, as the region urbanises, policymakers must 
plan for resource-efficient and inclusive urban infrastructure development that 
can yield multiple co-benefits. Second, the African region must think strategically 
about urban infrastructure across a range of diverse city sizes: small, medium and 
large. Third, early and anticipatory infrastructure planning efforts at multiple levels 
of government – the national, regional and city levels – are needed to guide the 
sustainable development of these rapidly growing and urbanising areas from the 
outset to address many of the urbanisation challenges. It is becoming increasingly 
important to include the right sustainability and resilience aspects into the planning 
and development of infrastructure systems.
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Infrastructure planning and development in Africa faces several constraints. These 
include geographical constraints, deficiencies in planning, fragmented planning, 
institutional inefficiencies, regulatory bottlenecks, and a lack of planning and 
implementation skills. Key measures to address these challenges should consist of 
the following elements:
  Articulating national strategies and leadership for sustainable infrastructure: 
Aligning policy goals across and within various levels of government including 
a clear long-term vision and targets for sustainable infrastructure. 
  Strengthening urban planning linked with integrated infrastructural 
planning: Promoting and employing integrated infrastructure planning that 
goes beyond sectoral silos. 
  Institutional capacity building and reform: Building human and 
institutional capacity and providing adequate tools to planners and designers.
  Increasing access to LCM skills: Creating new programmes and 
strengthening existing curriculums. 
  Partnerships, knowledge management and community engagement: 
Encouraging collaborations and participation.
Articulating national strategies and leadership for  
sustainable infrastructure 
There is a need for national authorities to clearly articulate a clear and 
comprehensive national strategy for sustainable infrastructure and embed it in 
an overall policy strategy for sustainable and inclusive growth and development. 
Ideally, a single integrated strategy for low-carbon, resource-efficient, climate-
resilient and sustainable development should map to national and local planning 
and sector plans to guide investments. Countries need to adopt the principle of 
sustainable infrastructure as a national policy in all planning processes. This policy 
would be supported by strategies in key infrastructure sectors with clear long-
term goals to incentivise the implementation of sustainability practices. Such an 
integrated strategic framework:
  ensures coherence across public policy actions and investments;
  facilitates coordination across sectors and levels of government; and
  provides the clarity and confidence needed by investors.
Leadership is required for the development of a long-range strategic plan for 
sustainable infrastructure founded on well-understood national and local aspirations 
and aligned with the UN SDGs and the nationally determined contributions derived 
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from the Paris Climate Agreement. A top-down approach to sustainable infrastructure 
planning maintains the focus on broader and strategic policy objectives in helping 
form a strategic view on where investments needs are most pressing. Providing 
stable long-term direction to infrastructure investment whilst retaining the flexibility 
needed to deal with uncertainty over long horizons is critical. 
African countries need to consider setting up national bodies similar to the UK 
National Infrastructure Commission aimed at providing the government with 
independent expert advice on major infrastructure challenges and developing 
a strategic framework for planning major investments beyond the timeframe 
of electoral cycles. These national bodies can be tasked to undertake a national 
infrastructure assessment; make recommendations to the government and then 
hold the government to account on implementation; produce reports, independent 
of government and all stakeholders, based on rigorous evidence; and identify entry 
points and mechanisms to allow for the greatest impact of sustainable infrastructure. 
Addressing fundamental price distortions for natural resources and infrastructure 
services, such as fossil fuel subsidies and the lack of carbon pricing, is also key to 
improving the public policy environment for sustainable infrastructure. In avoiding 
a bias of infrastructure investment toward high-carbon sources of energy, favouring 
unsustainable infrastructure and undermining efficiency in energy use, appropriate 
government actions are needed to address negative incentives and externalities. 
Tools based on life-cycle thinking are needed to integrate sustainability-related 
aspects into the planning and decision-making process. Governments need to 
ensure that such tools and standardised approaches for the implementation of 
the sustainable infrastructure policy are available in the public sector and utilities 
and understood by the private sector so that they contribute to benchmarking and 
create a common language among all stakeholders. 
Strengthening urban planning linked with integrated  
infrastructural planning
Urban planning needs to guide urban expansion and the associated infrastructure 
should be strengthened to reduce sprawl, enhance densification and prevent 
development in precarious environmental zones. New urban planning aimed at 
lowering infrastructure costs and increasing density can help address the issue 
of productivity costs and can reduce the urban sprawl that is putting pressure on 
agricultural land and the environment. 
Using the concept of a compact city, offered as an alternative to urban sprawl and 
adopted as policy by some countries, strategic spatial plans linked to infrastructure 
development can promote more compact forms of urban expansion focused around 
public transport (UN Habitat, 2009). An infrastructure plan is a key element of 
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such strategic spatial plans where transport and land-use linkages are the most 
important taking precedence over other forms of infrastructure such as water and 
sanitation trunk infrastructure that follows (UN Habitat, 2009). The integration 
of land use and transport planning can be improved through the earliest possible 
definition of land-use needs for new and future infrastructure corridors and 
sites, followed by adequate land-use control and acquisition. Without integrated 
planning that promotes sustainability principles and coordination between 
different infrastructure sectors, infrastructure will likely be a source of negative 
environmental and social impacts over the coming decades and opportunities will 
be lost for synergistically advancing the SDGs and sustainable economic growth. 
Planners could use checklists to assist them in developing proactive collaboration 
for infrastructure planning. Barriers to integrated infrastructure planning must be 
addressed. These include insufficient institutional capacity, lack of expertise, and 
political and cultural challenges at the national level.
Institutional capacity building and reform
The provision of ‘hard’ infrastructure can be significantly constrained by weak 
‘soft’ infrastructure such as institutions and capabilities. The institutional capacity 
of African countries to develop robust infrastructure plans and implement them 
is fundamental in facilitating sustainable infrastructure investments. Deficient 
institutional capacity leads to wrong planning and jeopardises the achievement 
of commitments such as the UN SDGs and NDCs. There is a need for more 
awareness-raising activities on sustainable infrastructure to shift the policymakers’ 
mindset in understanding and embracing the sustainable infrastructure imperative, 
and accelerating the development and standardisation of appropriate frameworks 
and tools. There is also a need for institutional reform by governments as part of the 
efforts of building the capacity to develop and communicate long-term sustainable 
infrastructure plans that eventually lead to a pipeline of bankable infrastructure 
projects for investors. 
A key challenge is to develop capacity and practice to systematically incorporate 
climate risks and sustainability criteria into the long-term infrastructure plans. 
In addition to capacity-building courses for practising planners and related 
professionals, efforts should also be focused on stimulating inter-agency and 
inter-ministerial coordination (through a supra-ministerial coordination unit) 
and communication in developing and implementing infrastructure plans that 
overcome silo thinking and reap synergies among different infrastructure plans and 
systems. There is a need to build institutional capacity for sustainability assessment 
by incorporating it into line agencies supported by in-house life-cycle management 
experts or by relevant independent professional associations.
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Part of the institutional reform and capacity building efforts is learning from 
experiences in other countries with some best practices of planning. Boxes 6.1 and 
6.2 provide summaries of best practices of planning from a developed country. The 
exemplary work from the city of Bogotá is shown in Box 6.3 as an example of best 
practice from the developing world. 
Box 6.1: Integrated vision in brownfield development in Sweden
Hammarby Sjöstad is a district in Stockholm that has been under development for years. It 
is an old brownfield of industrial area that has been transformed into a sustainability model 
residential and commercial area visited by many local and international visitors. Its success 
story can be traced to the integrated view of the energy, transport and waste management 
infrastructure which was realised as it was considered from the outset during the planning 
process taking relevant stakeholders on board early. Gu, Vestbro, Wennersten and Assefa 
(2009) underscored how the planning dealt with conflicts of interest and multiple objectives 
such as technical, social, practical, economic and aesthetic objectives. Planning decisions 
were not left to planners from Stockholm’s office of city planning only. The planning team 
included people from the office of environment and those municipal entities responsible 
for roads and real estate, energy, water and waste (Kasioumi, 2011). The planning process 
is highlighted as proactive, visionary, collaborative and communication-intensive where 
planners were helped by national planning systems while using the neighbourhood plans 
to ensure attributes of ‘containments, compactness, environmentally-friendly design, green 
space, and public transit’(Kasioumi, 2011. It was emphasised that an integrated vision of 
interrelated goals is an important starting point. As reported by Berger (2017a), Hammarby 
Sjöstad’s higher upfront cost associated with energy and resource-efficiency investments 
was justified based on the life-cycle cost analyses used to guide planning and investment 
decisions under the direction of Stockholm’s planning and development administration. 
The process behind HS involved ‘thorough analytical work, comprehensive planning, sound 
public policies, adequate financing, and management controls tied to specific deadlines and 
deliverables’ (Berger, 2017a: para. 28).
Box 6.2: Performance target and collaborative process in Sweden
The Stockholm Royal Seaport (SRS) is in another part of Stockholm that builds on the 
experience of planning and developing Hammarby Sjöstad. The integrated view of 
infrastructure has gone even further in accommodating different scenarios in the planning 
process. It aims at reducing the per capita carbon dioxide emission to 1.5 tonnes per person 
per year which is compatible with the global cap of 2oC based on the Paris Agreement. The 
reason for the success story of Hammarby Sjöstad, and later picked up SRS, was attributed 
to the development of a guiding plan or programme that from the outset outlined the vision, 
goals and objectives. In the SRS case, its environmental and sustainability programme 
contains climate-adapted and green outdoor environment, sustainable energy systems, 
sustainable recovery systems, sustainable water and wastewater systems, sustainable 
transport, environmentally-adapted residential and commercial premises, sustainable 
lifestyles and sustainable businesses. (continued on next page)
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The programme was developed through a collaborative process that involved five of 
Stockholm city’s departments (city planning, city development, planning, city environment, 
city traffic and local district administration), developers and construction companies, 
energy, water, waste service providers and academia (Holmstedt, Brandt & Robèrt, 2017). 
Box 6.3: Bus Rapid Transport and land use in Colombia
Bogotá is perceived as an interesting case when considering urban issues. The positive 
changes experienced by this city of eight million people in just a decade have raised 
international interest from policymakers, researchers and multilateral institutions. The 
perception about Bogotá changed from an example of a failed city to an example of a 
sustainable and promising one. The main symbol of this change is indisputably the Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) system called TransMilenio. It is widely recognised as one of the world’s best 
systems, with high-capacity, high-quality buses that make 1.6 million passenger-trips daily. 
TransMilenio has also influenced other aspects of Bogotá’s structure and life, such as land 
use, productivity, road fatalities, and even crime and health issues. However, the mutual 
impacts between land use and transport in Bogotá during the past two decades have also 
been influenced by other elements such as the creation of a regulatory framework for urban 
planning that provided new public instruments, an improvement of local institutions, a 
transport policy that prioritised public transport over car infrastructure, and a political and 
economic context that promoted a dense, transit-oriented city. For a number of developing 
cities in a similar situation, Bogotá is an interesting example. In terms of land use/transport 
links, it serves as a rare and quite useful ‘laboratory’, as it enables the evaluation of changes 
after a new mass transit system was introduced in the main corridors of the city (Bocajero 
& Tafur, 2013:3).
Increased access to LCM skills
The use of life-cycle concepts and tools at the national level in Africa is non-existent 
or very limited due to the lack of a capable workforce and limited availability of 
databases (Machado & Cavenaghi, 2009). They are yet to be incorporated and 
acknowledged, through scientific research, educational programmes, business 
practices and national policies. There is a need to reform existing and developing 
new curricula in many engineering and planning schools in Africa where the 
education and training programmes have not kept up with challenges of supporting 
sustainable infrastructure planning and development. Engineering schools need to 
provide future engineers and technicians with the knowledge, tools and techniques 
that they need to design, build and manage sustainable infrastructure and to take a 
leadership role in making infrastructure sustainable. Courses that prepare engineers 
to interpret/employ life-cycle management within decision-making processes 
will fill the current knowledge and skills gap in professions relevant to sustainable 
infrastructure. Planning schools should embrace innovative planning ideas with an 
increased focus on skills in participatory planning, communication and negotiation, 
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and LCM strategies, programmes, systems, processes and concepts. There should 
be a more systematic approach to the education of infrastructure professionals 
on LCM tools and techniques and a strengthening of the research community 
concerning LCM. The development of LCM analysts as a new profession should 
be considered in training professionals with a basic understanding of infrastructure 
planning and development. In the interim, the necessary capacity and skillsets to 
influence future planners can be developed through the integration of LCM-related 
subjects in disciplines such as economics. 
Expanding and improving technical vocational education and training (TVET) 
programmes in Africa can play an important role in filling the skills gap in sustainable 
infrastructure development in the continent. Better-quality TVET programmes 
with better alignment with skills demand in the sector and well-designed job 
placement programmes upon graduation can be used to improve the role of 
TVET in lowering youth unemployment while creating sustainable infrastructure. 
A complementary action is the strengthening of professional organisations and 
international professional networks to offer continuous professional development 
courses on sustainable infrastructure. Potential drivers for mainstreaming LCM 
application, such as environmental labelling schemes and green procurement, need 
to be developed and expanded building on lessons learned from experiences in 
Europe and North America. 
Partnerships, knowledge management and community engagement 
Efficient policy planning, design and implementation, which drives sustainable 
infra structure development, should rely on integrated and participatory 
approaches. This implies not only alignment of the objectives of the various 
policies (e.g., industrial, trade and infrastructure), but also dynamic consultations 
between all relevant stakeholders including government agencies, the private 
sector, academia, local communities and regional and international partners. 
In tapping into the comparative advantages of each entity, better coordination 
and collaboration between national and regional programmes are needed for the 
successful development of cross-border infrastructure systems such as transport 
and energy corridors, aiming at fostering regional integration. Local authorities 
should encourage collaboration internally across departments, and externally with 
national government agencies. 
A key to successful planning and development of sustainable infrastructure is 
sharing knowledge and experiences among specialists. Web-based knowledge 
platforms on sustainable integrated infrastructures can be developed to help 
promote better engagement, function as a one-stop-shop for easily accessible and 
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reliable information and become a forum for contributing ideas and solutions. 
Good infrastructure relies on and enables effective governance whereby people 
are informed of developments around them and are supportive of them. Visioning 
is an important early step in developing a holistic strategy for infrastructure 
planning Visioning can provide opportunities to educate the community on 
how infrastructure systems work and how factors such as changing technology, 
climate change, and resource management affect our ability to create and maintain 
sustainable infrastructure systems. Community engagement is essential in 
identifying acceptable alternatives that reduce demand on infrastructure systems 
and exploring all options before spending money in planning and developing 
larger systems. 
A framework for strategic planning of sustainable infrastructure  
in Africa 
A framework that can create a collaborative platform for key professionals to work 
in an integrated manner in infrastructure planning is proposed. This framework 
is aimed at ensuring that sustainability is a planned outcome of an integrated 
approach, not a random add-on result. The framework is for use by planners, 
decision-makers and policymakers at the highest levels of national and subnational 
bodies relevant for the planning and operation of infrastructure systems. The 
framework is based on the following principles:
1. Forming broader long-term plans through a strategic planning approach 
instead of a piecemeal approach.
2. Employing a comprehensive life-cycle perspective instead of a limited 
perspective.
3. Adopting a shared vision of sustainable infrastructure based on a common 
understanding of explicitly-articulated performance criteria among 
stakeholders that have traditionally functioned in silos.
4. Considering nature-based solutions in the provision of infrastructure services.
5. Adapting infrastructure systems to climate change and extreme events.
The framework seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
1. To involve public authorities, utility companies, planners, engineers and other 
affected stakeholders starting from the early stages of the planning phase.
2. To measure the value of sustainable infrastructure and its sustainability 
benefits throughout the planning phase.
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3. To weigh the full benefits and costs of options that achieve the intended 
outcome over the life cycle of the infrastructure systems. 
4. To create and strengthen capacity at relevant levels of government 
and industry and enable expertise alignment to deliver on sustainable 
infrastructure.
5. To create economic incentives for sustainable infrastructure that drives 
innovation.
6. To educate, engage and inspire public support for sustainable infrastructure. 
The structure and content of the framework
The framework provides for use of the different elements of the LCM ecosystem 
in enabling decision making for sustainable transformation of infrastructure 
sectors in the face of future uncertainty and rapid changes. The LCM elements 
help in screening and mapping the different trade-offs faced in developing ‘more 
sustainable’ infrastructure (Truffer, Störmer, Maurer & Ruef, 2010). They 
facilitate transparent and reflexive communication while not covering all aspects 
of the overall strategy-making process. Infrastructure planning happens at several 
levels depending on the kind of infrastructure and the functions devolved to the 
different departments, national agencies and subnational spheres of government. 
A life-cycle approach should underpin planning and decision-making. The ability 
to influence the life-cycle economic, social and environmental impact is greatest 
during the earliest stages when sustainability goals are formulated. Figure  6.2 
depicts the framework for a collaborative platform for the integration of sustainable 
infrastructure planning functions at national and local levels and the application of 
different elements of LCM detailed in Table 6.5. 







Levels Plan types Planning entities
Naonal development strategy / Green economy plan, etc. (40 years)
National infrastructure commission
Infrastructure industry development board
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Naonal sustainable infrastructure plan (40 years)
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Sustainable infrastructure development plan (3-5 years)
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Figure 6.2  Framework of sustainable infrastructure planning and the role  
of LCM elements 
Table 6.5 Cascading from national to local planning and LCM elements 
Level of planning Time frame
LCM elements for sustainable 
infrastructure
National Macro National development strategy/
Green economy plan
10–40 years  ■ Mainly broader qualitative LCM 
elements 
 ■ Visioning
 ■ Scenario planning National sector planning
National spatial development plan
National infrastructure commission
Provincial Meso Provincial growth and development 
strategy
 ■ A mix of broader qualitative and 
specific quantitative LCM elements
Provincial spatial development 
strategy
Provincial sector planning
Local Local development strategic plan Ongoing  ■ A mix of broader qualitative and 
specific quantitative LCM elements
 ■ Sustainable infrastructure  
rating tools
 ■ Planning guidelines for sustainable 
integrated infrastructure in cities
Local spatial development plan
Local sector master plans 10–40 years
Local medium-term integrated 
development plan
5 years
Micro Project feasibility studies and 
implementation
1 year  ■ Mainly specific quantitative LCM 
elements
 ■ Sustainable infrastructure rating 
tools
 ■ Sustainable procurement 
programmes 
 ■ Safeguards 
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Applying the framework: Planning process, assessment and 
institutional architecture
In applying the proposed framework, there are five conditions for success that 
should be fulfilled by the supporting tools: (i) covering the full life cycle of 
infrastructure systems, (ii) covering all components of the triple bottom line, 
(iii) enabling the engagement of life-cycle stakeholders, (iv) accounting for 
important material aspects, and (v) employing rating systems. To this end, 
life-cycle management-oriented adaptive strategic planning process; strategic 
environmental assessment with a life-cycle sustainability assessment content; and 
life-cycle management driven institutional architecture are important. 
LCM-driven adaptive strategic planning process
The first step of the process is preliminary consideration of objectives, constraints 
and available options with respect to the analysis of the existing situation. This step 
includes enumerating conditions for success and specifying desirable outcome 
to be included in a base plan. Then an iterative process of incorporating a series 
of additional targeted actions, such as ‘mitigating actions’, ‘hedging actions’, 
‘seizing actions’ and ‘shaping actions’, are incorporated in refining the base plan 
to a final plan (Kwakkel, Walker & Marchau, 2010). These actions are included 
as part of the plan to proactively deal with vulnerabilities, seize opportunities and 
shape external forces. The iteration includes analysis of the base plan and an in-
advance identification of opportunities that will improve the plan’s success and 
vulnerabilities that cause the plan to fail.
Table   6.6 provides an example of these drivers of actions (vulnerabilities, oppor-
tunities and external condition) for an energy plan. 
Table 6.6  Actions for the refinement of a base plan: An example of an energy plan for 
expanding access using a modular renewable energy system based  
on domestically manufactured technologies
Actions Driver Examples of drivers Action (example) 
Mitigating 
action 
Certain vulnerabilities Climate change Include climate-resilient element 
Hedging 
actions
Uncertain vulnerabilities Technology change Plan element that responds to a 
range of changes 
Seizing 
actions
Certain opportunities New university programmes on 
renewable energy 




External conditions  
or events
Low level of public awareness Increase awareness by marketing 
The refined base plan should also include a list of signposts to be monitored once 
the plan is implemented. The purpose of the monitoring system to be included 
as part of the plan is to trigger ‘defensive actions’, ‘corrective actions’, ‘capitalising 
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actions’ and ‘reassessment’ depending on the type of threshold of the monitored 
signposts reached (Kwakkel et al., 2010). Defensive and corrective measures 
deal with actions that can lead to keeping or adjusting the implemented plan 
respectively. Capitalising measures are taken to utilise opportunities that come up 
with the goal to further enhance the performance of the implemented plan. The 
monitoring system that can trigger responsive actions is put in place to make the 
plan an adaptive plan that consists of the planned adaptations and a triggering 
monitoring system.
Table 6.7 depicts an example of an energy plan with signposts that are monitored 
during the implementation of the plan. 
Table 6.7  Actions for adapting a plan under implementation: Example of an energy plan 




of base plan 
Signpost types Example of signposts Action examples (Outcome) 
Defensive 
actions
Triggers that don’t 
require adjusting plan 




Triggers that require 
adjusting the plan
Change in demand pattern Resize the system by adding or 




Opportunities Better technology available 
at lower cost 
Take advantage by using the new 
technology (improved performance 
of plan)
Reassessment Critical analysis and 
assumptions behind 
the plan no more valid 
Domestic capacity didn’t 
develop 
Consider imported technology is 
possible (significant change to the 
plan, discarded plan, new plan)
Each step of the iterative process of developing the final plan will be informed by 
different elements of LCM with the goal of supporting a strategic planning process 
that enhances the prospects for sustainable transitions in infrastructure sectors. 
The planning process is based on the recognition of multiple futures and multiple 
types and sources of uncertainty, such as demand, technological, climate change, 
demographic and lifestyle. The adaptive planning process that emanates from the 
proposed framework outlined requires close collaboration between planners and 
LCM analysts during the steps of analysis of characteristics of the infrastructure 
system (e.g., challenges), identification of key contextual factors, assessment of 
the scope of uncertainties of the future, iterative combination of possible future 
contextual conditions, identification of options for future technological and 
organisational configurations, assessment of the strengths and weaknesses, ranking 
of the options relative to specific stakeholder preferences, synthesis of resulting 
assessment, presentation of plans and recommendations to decision-makers and 
stakeholders (e.g., Truffer et al., 2010). 
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The participatory element of the planning process enables exposition of 
contradicting interests and trade-offs involved in the fulfilment of multiple 
sustainability objectives (Malekpour, Brown & de Haan, 2015). The overall 
purpose is to support greater integration of different social and natural science 
disciplines in a strategic planning process through multi-faceted input and 
engagement to be coordinated by LCM analysts. 
SEA with a life-cycle sustainability assessment content
Exploring the environmental, economic and social bottom lines – collectively 
called the triple-bottom-line of infrastructure development – within a SEA frame 
using life-cycle sustainability assessment can unleash a broader range of synergies 
that would otherwise be left untapped. Diagnostic tools of LCSA to carry out 
analysis feed into operational frameworks of strategic planning and decision-
making using the SEA vehicle to take the planning practice to new modes of 
operation. The simultaneous running of the planning process and the SEA process 
iteratively assesses, finds alternatives and optimises solutions that will continuously 
make up the final plan (Bidstrup & Hansen, 2014). SEA with a life-cycle 
sustainability assessment content enables the advantage of the analytical capability 
of the quantitative and qualitative tools in providing life-cycle insights. As outlined 
in Bidstrup and Hansen (2014), within the process of undertaking SEA, insights 
from LCA and S-LCA can, for example, be used to inform and support a significant 
number of the basic elements of legislated SEA. 
Higher elements of LCM are more practical for use at the higher and broader level 
of the national planning process. The analytical tools can also be applied at the same 
level to broadly assess the alternatives using established databases and indicator 
sets. At this stage, generic LCA databases such as Ecoinvent can, for example, be 
used for the environmental life-cycle part, while S-LCA databases such as PSILCA 
can serve the same purpose for the social life-cycle impacts. Enriching the planning 
process with the LCM elements offers a better understanding of the material and 
non-material components of the infrastructure and in teasing out the different 
subsystems and the interactions between them. The approach that expands the 
system boundary beyond the conventional elements provides opportunities for 
understanding synergies and multiple possibilities of linkages by identifying 
opportunities in renovating existing infrastructure systems and in developing and 
implementing new plans. Red-flagging areas of concern well in advance enables 
planning effective and timely mitigation and adaptation measures. The approach 
also allows for experimenting with the implication of alternative pathways and 
reflexive iteration and adaptation of alternatives. 
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The LCM elements can be introduced in varying dosages at different entry 
points before and after the potential strategies are drafted (see Figure  6.3). For 
example, generic social and environmental databases and available off-the-shelf 
environmental product declarations on major products can be utilised at the stage 
of identifying strategic issues well before developing the strategies by screening out 
underperforming alternatives based on generic comparisons. This will help shape 
the iterative drafting and evaluation of candidate strategies through quick and dirty 
studies. Once a draft list of specific strategies is on the table, the generic databases 
can be complemented with environmental and social data that can be collected 
from primary sources to make a final evaluation of specific strategies. 
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Figure 6.3 Strategic planning process (Source: Diagram adapted from Bryson, 1988:75)
LCM-driven institutional architecture
In the African national and transnational infrastructure development landscape, 
there are a many subnational, national and international institutional stakeholders. 
LCM can be applied to facilitate both technological and institutional reconfiguration 
in supporting new and effective institutional configurations by realigning influential 
and affected stakeholders. Recognising the interplay between facts and values, 
knowledge and opinion, there is a need for moving from conventional evaluation 
processes of plans to an integrated process that leads to more sustainable outcomes 
by positively changing the mental models of decision-makers. LCM-driven 
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institutional configuration brings order to the knowledge and data surrounding 
infrastructure systems. It opens the strategy-making and planning process and 
helps in communicating developed strategies. It facilitates participatory processes 
not only in the overall process but also in sub-processes such as modelling (Pahl-
Wostl & Hare, 2004). LCM assists in structuring the participation of experts and 
stakeholders based on where in the life cycle of the infrastructure their impact 
is more pronounced. LCM analysts can coordinate infrastructure experts and 
stakeholders to integrate their contributions into the planning and the strategic 
decision-making process. 
One important aspect is having a supra-ministry and inter-sectoral entity that 
recognises the whole of infrastructure as one system larger than what is normally 
handled by sectoral ministries, and the need for an independent body of expertise 
that supports such entity. Box 6.4 presents the National Infrastructure Commission 
of the UK, which is a good example of such an independent body that supports the 
government on strategic aspects of infrastructure systems.
Box 6.4: National Infrastructure Commission
The UK’s National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) was established as an executive agency 
of the Treasury to provide impartial, expert advice and make independent recommendations 
to the government on infrastructure systems. 
The NIC operates independently from the government while advising on all sectors of 
infrastructure: energy, transport, water and wastewater (drainage and sewerage), waste, 
flood risk management and digital communications. The NIC considers the potential 
interactions between its infrastructure recommendations and housing supply.
In carrying out its role, the NIC produces:
 ■ a national infrastructure assessment (NIA) once in every Parliament, setting out the 
NIC’s assessment of long-term infrastructure needs with recommendations to the 
government; and
 ■ an annual monitoring report, taking stock of the government’s progress in areas where 
it has committed to taking forward the recommendations of the NIC.
The NIC also produces specific studies on pressing infrastructure issues challenges. These 
are set by the government and take into account the views of the NIC and stakeholders. 
These studies include recommendations to the government.
The NIC takes a strategic approach, which links long-term priorities with short-term 
action and considers infrastructure as a system, not as a collection of silos. This approach 
maintains an international perspective,  engages closely with leading-edge expertise and is 
open to new approaches and ideas.
Reports and analysis from the NIC are of the highest quality and independent of government 
and all vested interests. The reports make recommendations based on rigorous evidence 
and develop an evidence base which sets a standard in its quality and breadth.  
 (Source: NIC, 2017:3)
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Conclusions
Sustainability of infrastructure systems is closely related to the material aspects of 
the structures and networks of moving people, goods and services and information. 
Hence, a better understanding of the use of conventional and new materials is 
critical. The limitation of the current practice of material choices and utilisation 
is the focus on traditional criteria of price and limited technical criteria. The type 
and quantity of materials used should be based on full knowledge of the design, 
construction, operation and maintenance as well as end-of-life fate of the materials 
fixed into the structures and networks in permanency. This environmental lens is 
best complemented by subscribing to the social and economic evaluation of the 
multiple material-related choices along the life cycle of the infrastructure systems. 
Good choices and decisions on how these systems are planned and developed 
have far-reaching impacts on other parts of the economy and society at large. 
Data and information from natural and social sciences and the humanities need 
to be purposefully utilised to avoid short-sighted and narrowly-evaluated and 
approved solutions. 
The core principle of sustainable infrastructure planning and development is 
to assess the benefits, impacts and costs and hence viability of an infrastructure 
plan on a full life-cycle basis. To support the implementation of this principle 
in practice, LCM tool for environmental (LCA), economic (LCC), and social 
impacts (S-LCA) enable engineers, designers, and decision-,makers to better 
understand the environmental, economic and social impacts of infrastructure and 
the opportunities that exist to reduce them. 
Life-cycle management methodologies help in appropriately identifying and 
pricing sustainability-related risks and impacts of non-sustainable infrastructure 
and the broader long-term co-benefits of sustainable infrastructure. This makes 
a convincing case that sustainable infrastructure not only is better for people 
and the environment but also makes business sense (Global Infrastructure Basel 
Foundation, 2017; International Finance Corporation, 2017; International Institute 
for Sustainable Development, 2017). Another important principle of sustainable 
infrastructure development is to consider integrated needs in the early stages of 
planning and delivery for example, integrated approaches linking transportation, 
mixed-use development and the avoidance of developments in flood plains. The 
development planning should also encourage biodiversity in city landscapes 
through the creation of blue-green corridors which integrate water management 
functions with green infrastructure, sustainable urban drainage systems, etc.
Africa needs infrastructure systems that are planned and developed with sufficient 
flexibility to accommodate change. The interaction between disciplines and their 
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influence within a functioning intellectual ecosystem determines the success of the 
planning process. The presence of a strategic planning process equipped with proper 
analytical tools should be matched by a corresponding strategical institutional 
context. LCM is proposed to coordinate the organisational configuration required 
to advance sustainable planning, development and management of infrastructure 
systems in Africa. There is a need for influencing the action space of facts informed 
by specific quantitative LCM elements and the deliberative space of values by 
broader qualitative LCM elements. The implementation of the proposed approach 
is better done through flexible and adaptable processes recognising that planning is 
more than a structured and linear process. 
The proposed approach is meant to contribute to efficiency, increased legitimacy 
and the general quality of decision making. It is best applied early in the overall 
strategic planning process of infrastructure systems where it can ‘take full 
advantage of its capacity to strategically influence the strategic direction of PPPs, 
or the decision-making process itself ’ (Lobos & Partidario, 2014: 39). Such early 
positioning helps to inform the strategic dialogues, define strategic objectives, 
identify strategic issues and formulate strategic options around the type and size 
of infrastructure systems. The LCM elements help to broaden the scope of the 
planning life cycle to account for the full life cycle of the infrastructure system 
and cover a full range of opportunities and risks. Planning and strategic decision 
making are currently done in a fragmented way emphasising or overemphasising 
only part of the bigger reality the planning or the decision making seeks to change. 
This suboptimal departmentalised approach falls short of capturing the full range 
of societal benefits of maximising opportunities and minimising risks. 
There is a need to look at the whole portfolio of infrastructure systems and find 
a way to have a low life-cycle impact portfolio by shortlisting alternatives with 
the best triple bottom line considering external sustainability-oriented economic 
environments. Whenever possible, the strategic planning needs to account for 
a shift from large-scale and centralised infrastructure systems to small-scale and 
diversified capacities. The contribution of LCM to changing the way we currently 
do strategic decision-making and planning is providing better information and data 
input to the process and improving the process of planning and decision making. 
The first entry point of the broadest qualitative LCM elements in the strategic 
planning process is the earliest stage of where the questions of ‘why’ and ‘what’ are 
asked at the highest level of national decision-making and planning rather than the 
‘how’ questions at the middle or lower subnational level of planning. Institutions 
that work with this integration need to have the right level of LCM competence for 
use at each stage of the planning process. 
Life-cycle management for sustainable infrastructure planning …  |      223
There is clearly a lag between acquiring scientific knowledge and utilising the new 
knowledge in practice. A good starting point in dealing with this issue is a gradual 
trickling of relevant components of the knowledge into the different elements of the 
planning practice, and in the process, reconfiguring the associated organisational 
structure to match the new changes. In building the necessary capacity and 
skillsets, integration of LCM-related subjects in disciplines such as engineering and 
economics to influence future planners will be important.
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The global economy has registered a tremendous growth rate in terms of gross 
domestic product (GDP) over the last few decades. This has resulted in significant 
improvement of human development in different parts of the world, and more 
particularly in developed countries and transition economies. However, more than 
two billion people are still deprived of the basic necessities and living in poverty. 
On top of this, the foundation for the global economy has been shaken over the last 
decades by a confluence of multiple economic, environmental and social challenges. 
In his book, Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the founder of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) Klaus Schwab writes: ‘The world is at a crossroads and 
the social and political systems that have lifted millions out of poverty and shaped 
our national and global policies for half a century are failing us’ (Schwab, 2018:vii).
The existing situation is expected to be further aggravated with the projected 
increase of the global population to over nine billion by 2050. Addressing these 
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challenges will require a fundamental transformation of the current global 
production and consumption structure. Achieving incremental efficiency gains 
in all socio-economic activities is a necessary ongoing process of every society. 
However, promoting systems innovation at all levels of society is fundamental to 
address existing and emerging socio-economic and socio-ecological challenges 
adequately.
As noted by Swilling and Annecke (2012), various transitions are already 
underway in response to resource depletion and adverse environmental impacts, 
but something fundamental must change in the way that economies relate to their 
environments. Despite the notable progress made, there is still strong inertia that 
hinders the progress towards a transformational change which is urgently needed. 
Social transformation is inherently a complex process that involves the introduction 
of new thinking, products, processes and organisations that profoundly change 
the basic routines, resource and authority flow and beliefs of the social system. 
Transformational moments require challenging widely accepted logic, practices 
and relationships. This becomes even more complex in an increasingly globalised 
but fractured world as we are in today. However, these transformational moments 
would also provide new opportunities that could be utilised as a driver for change. 
Today, society is standing at a crossroad where the transition to an inclusive, low-
carbon and resource-efficient economy is no more a choice but a global imperative. 
Africa is the region that will face significant adverse impacts from the global 
environmental challenges such as climate change. In addition to addressing the 
environmental challenges, African countries face other key challenges that need to 
be addressed, such as creating jobs for its increasing percentage of young population 
and eradicating poverty There is also the challenge of reducing the adverse impacts 
of emerging technologies, which have exponential implications, while making the 
best out of the opportunities they provide.
This chapter highlights some of the key drivers and opportunities which African 
countries need to recognise and take advantage of in developing their economies. 
It specifically recommends the promotion of distributed renewable economy 
planning in regional and local development to achieve the Sustainable Development 
Goals and meet the aspiration of Agenda 2063. It also highlights some of the key 
steps and planning tools that could be used in planning for a distributed renewable 
economy.
Social transformation and its transition elements 
In general, the concept of societal transformation in the social sciences refers to the 
change in society’s systemic characteristics. According to Nikolai Genov  (1999), 
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this incorporates the replacement of existing parameters of a societal system, 
including technological, economic, political and cultural restructuring. More 
specifically:
  Such a process influences productive infrastructure which can bring about 
new technological changes and new patterns of participation in the division 
of labour. Historically, this has meant alteration of the requirements for 
information flows and technologies.
  Secondly, new structures of economic organisation are developing. This may 
imply a change in ownership rights, as well as in investments, production, 
distribution and supply.
  Thirdly, the distribution and use of political power take qualitatively different 
forms. This involves changes in the structure and performance of state 
institutions and other bodies of decision-making and control.
  Finally, a society’s value-normative system can change, often in a way that 
allows the emergence and stabilisation of pluralist institutions (Genov, 1999).
Swilling and Annecke (2012) noted that besides the unviability of the old regime, 
which manifests itself through different forms of crisis, there have to be conscious 
and purposive innovations that create pathways to a new order. In this section, we 
look at some of the significant shifts and changes that happened over centuries and 
defined the transformation path taken by societies.
Social transformation as a cumulative process
Succession and mobility of plants and animals, as an essential element of the self-
regulation mechanism of the biotic system, played a significant role in the co-
evolution of the natural and social systems. As an integral part of the natural system, 
more particularly the animal kingdom, mobility governed by ecological factors 
has patterned the dominant lifestyle of humanity for millennia (Mebratu, 1998). 
The natural system has been the primary source that provided all the essential 
resource inputs required for all socio-economic functions. Fischer-Kowalski and 
Harbel (2007) identify three major socio-ecological regimes in human history:
  The hunter-gatherer socio-ecological regime that existed for at least 100 000 
years before the agricultural revolution that took place some 13 000 years ago.
  The agrarian socio-ecological regime that existed until the industrial revolution 
nearly 250 years ago. 
  The industrial socio-ecological regime that begins in the 1770s and which is 
currently dominant in the global economy. 
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About 8 000 years ago, after aeons of slow accumulation, the human population 
reached an enormous number of about ten million people (Meadows, Meadows 
& Randers,  1992). These people lived as nomadic hunter-gatherers, but their 
increasing numbers began to create ecological scarcity around them. To resolve 
the problem of dwindling wild resources, some of them intensified their migratory 
lifestyles, while others started to domesticate animals and cultivate plants resulting 
in a sedentary lifestyle. Just by staying in one place, the proto-farmers altered the 
face of the planet and the thought of humankind in ways they could never have 
foreseen (Meadows et al., 1992).
As a result of this change in human behaviour, history from 3 000 BC till the 
advent of the industrial revolution witnessed the development of more advanced 
agriculture, increasingly multiple social divisions of labour and means of 
exploitation. This included the creation of exclusively masculine symbols of divinity 
and the subjugation of women by patriarchal control over their reproductive and 
sexual status (Gottlieb, 1996). The agricultural transformation, as a successful 
response to wildlife scarcity faced by the hunter-gatherer society, resulted in slow 
population growth from about 10 million to about 800 million by 1750 (Meadows 
et al.,  1992). This created new scarcities and social conflict, especially in land and 
energy, and led to the industrial revolution. 
The industrial revolution, which started in the UK with the development of the 
textile industry, is said to have passed through three distinct stages of industrial 
revolutions (Schwab,  2018). The first industrial revolution started with the 
mechanisation of spinning and weaving in the textile industry. The substitution 
of abundant coal for vanishing biomass resulting in the introduction of the steam 
engine. This led to new developments in other manufacturing sectors including 
steel manufacturing and transportation sector. A new wave of interrelated 
technologies that came between 1870 to 1930 further enhanced the growth 
made during the first industrial revolution and created new opportunities. The 
technologies included new communication infrastructure driven by the power of 
electricity, new transportation possibilities driven by internal combustion engines, 
and the production of new materials, such as thermoplastics, as a result of the 
development in chemicals processing. The revolutionary breakthroughs that were 
registered in the area of digital computing and information theory since the 1950s 
provided the foundation for the third stage of the industrial revolution. These three 
stages of the industrial revolution transformed the way human beings create value, 
and the world was changed by the co-evolution of technologies, political systems 
and social institutions.
The unprecedented economic growth registered through the agricultural trans-
formation and the successive stages of the industrial revolution led to new sets 
Distributed renewable economy for Africa …  |      233
of environmental scarcities and crises of a global proportion. These scarcities 
grew exponentially with the fast pace of industrialisation and globalisation that 
was registered during the second half of the twentieth century. The globalisation 
of the twentieth century did not only globalise national economies. It also 
globalised environment pollution and degradation which remained local for 
millennia resulting in global challenges such as climate change. The exponential 
increase in inequality between and within countries is another significant social 
outcome of unbridled globalisation. As reported by Vázquez Pimentel, Ayma and 
Lawson  (2018) in an Oxfam Briefing Paper, the 26  wealthiest people on earth 
in  2018 had the same net worth as the poorest half of the world’s population, 
some 3.8 billion people. These challenges are expected to be further compounded 
with the alarming rate of population growth that is projected to be over nine 
billion by  2050. In a nutshell, humanity is currently faced with a confluence of 
economic, social, and environmental challenges that would require a significant 
social transformation of equal proportion to the agricultural and industrial 
revolution. Africa, as a developing region, may swim through or get drowned by 
this transformational change depending on how it deals with the critical transition 
elements and drivers in the coming decades.
The transition elements
Moments of major social transformations are characterised by the dynamic inter-
action between the socio-ecological and socio-economic systems. These, in turn, 
are shaped by (i) how useful information or knowledge is processed and structured, 
(ii) which kind of energy systems is used as the primary driver, and (iii) how 
the production system is organised by using the first two as primary inputs. 
These factors have determined the key features of the agricultural and industrial 
transformations and will also determine the sustainability transformation of the 
twenty-first century.
Table  7.1 presents a comparative analysis of the key drivers and features of the 
transitions under the agricultural, industrial and sustainability transformation.
Table 7.1 Key elements of major socio-economic transformations





Agricultural transformation Philosophy and religion Bio-energy Subsistence production
Industrial transformation Reductionist science Non-renewables Mass production
Sustainability transformation Systems thinking Renewables Distributed production
The following subsections present a more detailed discussion on the key features 
of the transitions that were recorded in the three principal dimensions shown in 
Table 7.1.
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The knowledge transition
The transition that should happen in our knowledge system is one of the critical 
prerequisites for a successful transformational process. Philosophy, as the earliest 
form of knowledge acquisition, and religions, by way of shaping human conscience, 
played a significant role in determining the path of the agricultural transformation 
and consolidating its gains. The industrial revolution paved the way for substantial 
progress made in science and technology. The classic metaphysical transplant from 
Newtonian physics to social reality was achieved by Adam Smith under which 
gravity became the market, molecules became individuals, and the constancy 
(and reversibility) of time became value (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). At the 
same time, the reductionist idea that advocates nature as a great machine which 
can be understood by studying the parts has become dominant through the whole 
of modern thought and culture. Finding a pattern of thinking about social reality 
which was similar to the pattern set by the natural resources gradually became the 
primary intellectual ambition of social scientists. This dominant thinking led to the 
unprecedented speed and magnitude of economic development, particularly over 
the last century.
However, the mismatch problem that arises from the description of a grey world 
with black-white scientific truth increasingly became the source of the limitation of 
the dominant knowledge model of the last century. As Kosko (1994) suggests, the 
bivalence of modern science ignores or denies or whitewashes, and black washes 
grey truth. On the contrary, the multivalent view says that almost all truth is grey 
and partial truth and it allows mathematical truths to remain black or white as 
extreme cases of grey. This led to the evolution of the holistic view, which asserts 
that natural wholes are always composed of parts under which the synthesis affects 
and determines the parts and, therefore, reciprocally influence and determine 
each other (Smuts, 1993). Under such thinking, the whole is much more than the 
summation of the parts.
Although nobody can deny the enormous positive effect of science and technology, 
it is equally true that science and engineering have been unable to keep pace with 
the second-order effects produced by the first-order victories (Weinberg,  1975). 
Numerous institutional and individual attempts were made to understand the 
impacts of these second-order effects and cope up with prescriptive solutions. 
However, these efforts were not able to adequately address the multidimensional 
challenges that are complex due to the inherent limitations in their epistemological 
foundations (Mebratu, 2000). The key determinant for our success in this process 
is the progress we make in developing a new framework of knowledge and thinking. 
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The initial response to the increasing level of the environmental crisis naturally 
originated within the entrenched domain of the different disciplinary sciences 
(Mebratu, 1998). However, the inherent limitations of these disciplinary sciences 
were soon recognised by the scientific community. This led to the proliferation 
of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches that led to various 
incremental progress in different fields. Nevertheless, as noted by Leroy  (1997), 
the interdisciplinary approach primarily became a question of the transfer and 
integration of methods rather than the forging of substantive theories. In terms of 
the solution, the dominant mechanistic nature of the inclusion process results in 
solutions of detailed complexity, which diverts attention away from systemic causes 
by focusing on symptoms (Ziegler, 1997).
Recognition of these limitations gave rise to what is broadly known as ‘systems 
thinking’ which became increasingly used since the 1970s in different fields. 
According to Kelvin Campbell (2018), there are three common organising 
principles of complex adaptive systems. Firstly, self-organising systems produce 
intelligence only when they can process the diversity of knowledge that resides 
within the entire system. Secondly, counterintuitive to conventional wisdom, which 
believes in a comprehensive set of rules and regulation to achieve effectiveness, 
complex adaptive systems leave the responsibility for control and coordination 
with each of the individual members. Thirdly, order is not preordained before work 
begins but instead emerges through an interactive learning process. 
A key challenge in adopting an approach of doing science with society is to 
develop solution-oriented, or transformative transdisciplinary research approaches 
that are capable of not only explaining and understanding the complex societal 
challenges currently being faced in the world, but also of changing or transforming 
these challenges (Breda & Swilling, 2018; Miller et al., 2014; Scholz, 2011; Seidl 
et al., 2013; Stauffacher, Walter, Lang, Wiek & Scholz, 2006; Wiek & Lang, 2016). 
The transdisciplinary field started to emerge from the increasing recognition of the 
urgent need to generate solutions based on understanding dynamic complexity 
(Mebratu, 2000). 
The systems approach is based on the recognition that all systems are in a state 
of disequilibrium following an irreversible path of development and sustaining 
their systemic function through successive adaptation is their main raison  d’être 
(Mebratu, 2000). Such an approach focuses on defining the basic principles that 
map out the evolutionary paths of any system within a given possibility domain 
rather than generating prescriptive solutions based on applying broad principles 
across socio-economic systems. This provides a sound basis for hybridising and 
cross-fertilising across knowledge systems, including indigenous knowledge 
systems, and promoting social innovation at the local level. 
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Table 7.2 shows some key features of conventional and transformational development.
Table 7.2 Features of conventional and transformational development
Key features Conventional Transformational
Knowledge system Reductionist and mono-disciplinary Systems thinking and transdisciplinary
Innovation regimes Technological regimes Socio-technological regimes
Social outcome Power consolidation and increased inequality Distributive and enhanced inclusiveness
As shown in Table 7.2, the specific knowledge system that is dominant will determine 
the nature of the innovation regimes and the respective social outcomes. Hence, 
the transition in our knowledge system is one of the fundamental prerequisites for 
addressing the confluence of challenges caused by the conventional development 
paradigm. The accumulation and evolution of knowledge through successive stages 
of transitions is an inherent part of social transformation processes. The challenges 
facing humanity today require a new framework of thinking that is guided by 
transdisciplinary methodologies which systematically integrate and deploy all the 
relevant existing knowledge through systems thinking.
The energy transition
Throughout human history, energy has been at the centre of every major social 
transition and transformation. The discovery of fire represented a significant 
turning point in the differentiation of human beings from the animal kingdom in 
the form of production and the use of tools. This was followed by the discovery 
and use of bioenergy as a result of domestication and use of animals for farming 
and domestic purposes. The subsequent development of watermills and windmills 
played a significant role in the agricultural transformation of the first and second 
millennia. The discovery of coal and the subsequent invention of the steam engine 
laid the foundation for the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Subsequently, the discovery and extensive utilisation of petroleum 
played a central role in the development of chemicals and material sciences as a 
basis for diversified products and as a key driver for new modes of transportation 
and communications.
The transition from renewable to non-renewable energy resource as the dominant 
energy provider of national economies also represented a significant turning point 
in society’s relationship with the natural environment. The unregulated discharge 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere, which resulted in the global 
challenge of climate change, led to the systemic deposition of various chemical 
pollutants in the natural environment. This has fundamentally changed the scale 
and scope of impact of human activity on the environment making it of a global 
proportion. Hence addressing the environmental challenges of today would 
require a transition of a global proportion in our energy systems as confirmed with 
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the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and series of scientific reports from the 
International Panel on Climate change (IPCC). 
Decarbonising the global economy through a rapid transition of our energy systems 
to a renewable energy resource basis is of vital importance in light of the urgency 
of addressing the challenges of climate changes. This would require shifting our 
energy production focus from the exploitation of concentrated energy potential, 
which is mostly non-renewable and limited, to the harnessing of the abundant 
and renewable diffused energy potentials within our planetary system. Besides 
the global necessity of making such a transition, African countries can enjoy the 
following additional developmental benefits from such a transition to renewable 
energy systems: 
  According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the 
continent’s biomass, geothermal, hydropower, solar and wind energy resources 
are among the best in the world (IRENA, 2015). Given the abundant potential 
the region has, renewables can play a transformative role in the African energy 
mix and its socio-economic development. 
  About 600 million people in Africa do not have access to electricity, and 
approximately 730 million people rely on traditional uses of biomass 
(International Energy Agency [IEA], 2014). Expanding and ensuring energy 
access for the majority of the population in Africa is at the centre of achieving 
distributional energy justice and eradicating poverty in Africa.
  The distributed nature of renewable energy resources combined with widely 
dispersed settlement patterns of the bulk of the population in the region makes 
the development of distributed energy systems more appropriate for the region.
  The development of local economic networks driven by renewable energy 
provides the foundation for developing distributed economic systems that 
add value to locally available renewable resources and creates jobs that are 
desperately needed in the region.
Africa is one of the regions with significant renewable energy potential, however, a 
very high proportion of its population suffer from energy poverty. Recent progress 
made in renewable energy technologies and the favourable policy environment 
at the global and regional level provides a unique opportunity for the energy 
transition in Africa. This transition could promote a significant level of distributive 
justice if due consideration is given to the right mix of grid- and off-grid based 
renewable energy systems. It could also promote broader socio-economic justice 
if the planning and implementation of renewable energy development are fully 
integrated with the development of sustainable local economies that create decent 
jobs and provide sustainable livelihoods through value addition to local resources. 
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Transition in production systems
Production is the fundamental factor that separates humankind from the animal 
kingdom. As such, change that happens in production systems is at the centre of 
all major social transformation processes. The concept of economy of scale as 
defined by Adam Smith, with cost per unit of output generally decreasing with 
increasing scale, has been the significant driver for the development of mega-
production and distribution systems. Some political economists have challenged 
this dominant notion of economy of scale for decades. Theodore Roszak (1989) 
noted that there were many proponents of subterranean tradition or organic and 
de-centralist economics who insisted that the scale of the organisation must be 
treated as an independent and primary problem. However, he noted that it would 
be no exaggeration to call Schumacher the Keynes of post-industrial society. 
McClaughry  (1989) noted that Schumacher’s book Small is Beautiful published 
in  1989 provided a new sense of hope to a world that is faced with widening 
spectre of global pollution, resource-exhaustion, corporate concentration and the 
corresponding diminution of individual liberties.  
Ayres (1994) defines an economy as an information processing system and 
identifies three kinds of information. These are thermodynamic information, 
associated with the chemical composition; morphological information, associated 
with shape, form and structure; and symbolic information, associated with control 
process and knowledge. He further argues that labour skills, capital and technology 
are more or less embodied or condensed forms of information of a production 
system. Based on this, one can conclude that all production systems are ultimately 
systems that process raw material, energy and information into useful products 
(both goods and services) consumed by society. Industrial development during the 
twentieth century had been mainly driven by various innovations that resulted in 
better management of the dynamics between the thermodynamic, morphological 
and symbolic information of production systems.  
Considering that the thermodynamic content of any production is an input 
provided by the natural environment, the morphological and symbolic information 
become the fundamental factors that determine the distinction in production 
systems. As a result, the level of inventions and innovations that are witnessed 
at each stage of the major social transformations were a function of how the 
morphological and symbolic information was processed and utilised. The critical 
function and role of information in economic systems have taken new dimensions 
and proportions with the unprecedented development witnessed in the field of 
information and communication technology in the last couple of decades. This 
ranges from changing the speed and nature of financial flows, which is another 
form of information flow, to giving rise to new products and industrial operations. 
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The  continued  digitisation  of the global economy is expected to result in funda-
mental changes in the design and development of production systems of the 
twenty-first century.
The transition in production systems starts with the evolution of new production 
systems within the old as a result of the germination of the seeds of change 
within the old production system. This provides the basis for the evolution of 
new production and consumption relationships that are necessitated by the 
fundamental socio-economic and socio-ecological drivers for change. The seeds 
for change concerning production systems of the twenty-first century are already 
sprouting in different sectors and different parts of the world. However, there 
are some fundamental shifts required for these changes to lead to inclusive, low-
carbon and resource-efficient societies. In this context, the transition in production 
systems further includes broad-based transitional changes that should happen in 
the areas of the economy of scale and related energy and information systems.
One recent application of such an approach is the framing of the fourth industrial 
revolution by Klaus Schwab, who proposes that the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution is 
a new chapter in human development, on par with the last three stages of industrial 
revolution, and once again driven by the increasing availability and interaction of a 
set of extraordinary technologies’ Schwab (2018:7). However, the possible impacts 
and benefits of the disruptive technologies of the fourth industrial revolution will 
mostly depend on who would have control over the use of these technologies.
Table 7.3 shows the possible outcomes of some of the key disruptive technologies 
depending on whether we use them for the conventional outcome of consolidating 
dominance by the few or for transformational outcomes that will lead to more 
inclusive and efficient economies.













Consolidation of mass production 
and consumption resulting 
in substantial job losses and 
concentration of wealth
Promotion of distributed 
production aimed at improved 






Speculative capital accumulation 
through crypto-currencies
Promotion of distributed economy 
via efficient supply chain networks 
and local digital currency
Biotechnologies Genetic 
engineering 
A narrow application aimed at 
power control and consolidation in 
the name of human wellbeing
Systemic applications aimed at 
the improvement of human and 
ecosystem wellbeing
The battle is already on between the conventional groups that are bent on making 
the maximum profit and power consolidation out of the emerging disruptive 
technologies and the advocates for the transformational utility of these technologies 
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for the broader and higher benefit to humanity. Schwab outlines the following four 
fundamental principles that are particularly useful in defining a new leadership 
mindset that ensures a more favourable outcome from the fourth industrial 
revolution (Schwab, 2018):
  Systems not technologies: It is essential to focus on systems that deliver 
wellbeing rather than being tempted to focus on technologies themselves. With 
the right engagement of all stakeholders, new technologies can enable better-
performing systems to be put in place, while the absence of them could make 
the existing systems worse. 
  Empowering not determining: It is imperative to value human decision-
making and agency and design systems that harness new technologies to give 
people more choice, opportunities, freedom and control over their lives. 
  By design not by default: Society should not resign itself to the inevitability 
of default options. Design thinking, guided by human-centred design, as well 
as systems-thinking approaches can help the world to appreciate how new 
technologies may shift systems into new configurations. 
  Values as a feature, not a bug: We should recognise that all technologies 
implicitly have values baked in them from the initial idea to how they are 
developed and deployed and hence we need to debate values at all stages of 
innovation rather than reacting after the damage has been caused.
In general, the twenty-first century will be registered as the century of the most 
significant social transformation in human history. This transformation is of global 
proportion and would have a significant immediate impact on Africa’s opportunity 
to develop its economy. As was shown in the chapter on leapfrogging, Africa has a 
unique opportunity to be a significant beneficiary of this transformation. However, 
for Africa to reduce the adverse impact of this transformation on its people 
and maximise its benefit, it has to come out of its passive recipient status and 
prepare itself to be an active player of this transformation by seizing the available 
opportunities. The emerging disruptive technologies, which are inherently 
distributive, provide excellent opportunities for the economic empowerment 
of people provided that these technologies are utilised innovatively. One of the 
strategic approaches for this is to commit to an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-
efficient bottom-up economic development process through the promotion of a 
distributed renewable economy, which is discussed in the following section.
Distributed renewable economy
As it was presented in the other chapters of this book, given their early stages of 
development, African countries have great opportunities to build a more sustainable 
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socio-economic infrastructure that facilitate the transition to inclusive, low-carbon 
and resource-efficient economies. Such a transition could only be successful if it 
is complemented with a bottom-up process of developing distributed economy 
networks that create productive and decent jobs and secure economic livelihood 
to local communities. The following subsection highlights the conceptual and 
practical basis for the development of a distributed renewable economy.
The conceptual basis of a distributed economy
The discussion on distributed economy as a strategy that guides industrial 
development towards a more sustainable development path started towards the 
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. The 
discussion was mainly triggered by the recognition of the limitations of technical 
innovations in the field of pollution prevention and cleaner production in 
addressing the growing resource and environmental challenges. It also recognised 
the need to question the purpose and structure of the dominant production systems 
and ultimately transform them. According to Johansson, Kisch and Mirata (2005), 
distributed economy promotes economies of scale through networking, and offers 
an approach by which different strategies can be pursued in different regions and 
similar or complementary development schemes can be brought together into 
networks providing the advantages of scale without the drawbacks of inflexibility. It 
also optimises resource flows that take place within and across regional boundaries 
through the development of regions where a diverse range of activities are 
organised in the form of small-scale, flexible units that are synergistically connected 
and prioritise quality in their production. Under such circumstances, industrial 
symbiosis becomes more than mere coexistence. 
The International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics noted that 
the dominant economic system of today has mostly been driven by the concept 
of ‘economies of scale’ that is based on the principle that production costs per unit 
output decline as output increases, thus making larger industrial production more 
attractive and profitable (Van den Dool et al., 2009). The belief in this approach 
has created an industrial production system largely dominated by mass production 
and concentrated industrial cores. However, the ‘economies of scale’ that is widely 
applied in the dominant economic model is at best partial and static and thereby 
inefficient. According to Van den Dool et al., the concept of distributed economy 
does not go against the principle of economies of scale. On the contrary, it argues 
that there are many cases where distributed production systems would meet the 
requirement for economies of scale more holistically and dynamically provided 
that the production costs take into account all environmental and social costs and 
benefits associated with it (Van den Dool et al., 2009).
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Another major limitation of the conventional economic model is its assertion of 
the direct correlation between economic growth and wellbeing improvement. 
The persistence of poverty and widening inequality both within and between 
countries despite the fastest global economic growth pose significant barriers to the 
advancement of human wellbeing. It has been claimed for decades that economic 
growth and technological innovation offer the best possibilities to overcome 
these barriers. However, this seems to have failed, resulting in increasing public 
discontent and disappointment in all parts of the world. Furthermore, the dominant 
ways of measuring economic progress in the form of growth of GDP are not only 
misleading but are also misguiding and ineffective, to say the least (Lorenzo, 2017). 
As pointed out by Ayres (1999), the major part of statistical growth amounts to 
running faster and faster to stay in the same place – wheel-spinning – rather than 
actual wealth creation. In this context, Johansson et al. (2005) suggest the following 
major areas of concern that distributed economy attempts to address:
  Wealth creation for a larger number of people: The purpose of economic 
development is to allow people to lead a meaningful life under which many 
basic needs have to be fulfilled and options for individual choices are provided.
  Heterarchies and open innovations: A centralised and hierarchical production 
system is poorly suited for coping with this new era of open innovation. With 
distributed economy, we are talking about heterarchies under which knowledge 
is distributed and the organisation of diversity becomes crucial.
  Flexible and small-scale production systems: Flexible and small-scale 
production systems have inherent advantages to receive relevant market signals 
and to devise and implement innovative solutions that satisfy the dynamically 
changing demands. This will be increasingly important and determinant for 
survival in future economies. 
  Symbiotic relationships: Real value is to appreciate the importance of both 
competitive and non-competitive processes and find a balance between the 
two. The interaction between different entities combines in such a way that the 
system as a whole performs better and is more robust than the performance of 
the individual entity.
  Diversity as a prerequisite: Distributed economies have a high performance, 
not because of the competitive nature of individuals or even because of the 
direct cooperation but because of the diverse elements in the economy. 
  New producer-consumer relationships: Today, relatively small actors can have 
both local and global presence at an affordable cost. In particular, information 
technology has provided us with the possibility of having a global presence and 
satisfying the need of being large or dominant.
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 Social and ecological capital as an advantage: In distributed economies, there 
is a clear emphasis on using social and ecological capital as an advantage. This 
is a form of a natural asset that can deliver unique values in a unique mix if it is 
wisely designed and utilised. 
  A renewed balance of scale: Distributed economies does not advocate 
abandoning large-scale production systems as a whole. On the contrary, there 
will undoubtedly be a need for efficient ways of producing commodities and 
bulk goods. However, new forms of symbiosis and coexistence could bring 
about benefits to both systems.
The notion of distributed economies generally promotes small-scale, flexible 
networks of local socio-economic actors using local resources according to local 
needs in the spirit of sustainable development (Kohtala, 2015). Besides its direct 
economic and environmental benefits, it provides a robust socio-economic basis 
for the empowerment of women and the broad participation of local communities 
in development management. It also provides a fertile ground for socio-technical 
innovations that are driven by local needs and conditions. Thus, the promotion 
of networks of local economies that create more jobs and add more value to local 
economies need to be at the centre of promoting sustainable development in Africa. 
Technological drivers for a distributed economy
As noted in the preceding chapter, technological invention and innovation have 
been central to all major socio-economic transformations that are recorded in 
human history. This includes the agricultural revolution and the various stages of 
industrial revolutions. However, the impact of technological innovations of the 
twenty-first century that are mainly driven by digitisation and the transition in 
our energy and production systems are of exponential proportion. Some of these 
are referred to as exponential technologies owing to their significantly higher 
outcome and impacts compared to their conventional counterparts. In the context 
of this chapter, three major technological innovations determine the path of social 
transformation in the twenty-first century. These are:
  the digitisation of the global economy;
  the development of renewable energy technologies; and 
  the expansion of distributed manufacturing systems. 
The digitisation of the global economy
The increasing digitisation of the global economy as a result of exponential 
development in the field of information and communication technology is one of the 
most defining drivers of the global economy in the twenty-first century. Most of the 
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key technologies behind the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0), including 
artificial intelligence, robotics, additive manufacturing and augmented reality, are 
driven by the innovation, development and the application of information and 
communication technology (ICT) for digital innovation. The foundation for most 
of the development in the ICT sector, including the development of the internet 
and world-wide-web, is driven by the concept of distributed systems. This concept 
is applied widely in the ICT field. The term ‘distributed’ had its roots in computing 
and communication networks when a more robust network that has distributed 
nodes rather than centralising hubs or switches was developed (Baran, 1964). 
Schwab identified two categories of technologies that would determine the nature 
of the fourth industrial revolution. The first group of technologies are those 
technologies that are aimed at extending the benefits from the digital revolution 
of the third industrial revolution that brought us general computing, software 
development, personal computers and connectivity. These include new computing 
technologies, blockchain and distributed ledger technologies and the internet of 
things (IoT). The second group of technologies are the technologies that provide 
the materials of our living environment and interact with both industrial and social 
spaces using the digital infrastructure of the twenty-first century as a foundation. 
These include artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, advanced materials and 
additive manufacturing (Schwab, 2018). 
The distributive nature of the development over the last couple of decades in  ICT 
has led to improving efficiency and enhancing the empowerment of individuals. 
The enormous power of influence that has been created by the widespread use of 
social media with its attendant social hazard is a clear testimony of this distributive 
power. The transition to the digital economy is expected to come with a mix of 
challenges and opportunities. The success of every nation in the twenty-first 
century will depend largely on its ability to effectively manage the challenges, 
harness the opportunities and master the impact of this transition. 
Distributed renewable energy systems
Another technological revolution is taking place between energy supply and 
demand, powered by information, computing, communications and control 
technologies. This is transforming the ability to manage a dynamic electricity system 
that integrates decentralised and variable clean, renewable supply with demand 
(Cooper, 2016). The techno-economic viability of renewable energy options has 
registered significant progress over the last decade owing to the favourable policy 
and investment conditions created at the global, regional and national levels. This 
ranges from various forms of policy and regulatory reforms at regional and national 
levels which are favourable for renewable energy development to direct and indirect 
economic incentives provided by national governments.
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Most African rural communities are characterised by low population densities 
and dispersed settlement patterns, resulting in high connection costs. Smaller 
hybrid energy plants closer to the end-user consisting of multiple energy sources 
are emerging as an alternative to large energy and distribution power plants with 
competitive price and improved reliability and security (Raji & Kahn,  2012). 
Distributed energy resources could be both conventional and nonconventional 
energy sources connected to the primary feeder or secondary feeder of a 
distribution system (Alanne & Saari, 2006). The International Renewable Energy 
Agency describes Africa as the continent of opportunity because of the significant 
potential it has both in terms of the renewable energy resource it has and the 
existing energy gap that needs to be addressed (IRENA, 2013).
Distributed renewable energy (DRE) systems offer unprecedented opportuni ties 
to accelerate the transition to modern energy services in remote and rural areas 
and also provide various co-benefits. According to the Renewables 2017 Global 
Status Report (REN21, 2017), the major benefits include: (i) cost savings when 
compared to the grid in many markets; (ii) fuel availability and/or stability and 
predictability of prices; (iii) modularity, flexibility and rapid construction times; 
(iv) faster technological learning curves and rates of improvement compared to 
fossil fuels; (v) enhanced reliability and resilience; (vi) improved health through 
reductions in indoor air pollution; (vii) contribution to climate change mitigation; 
(viii) reductions in deforestation and environmental degradation; (ix) positive 
effects on women’s empowerment, and (x) reductions of poverty among vulnerable 
groups (REN21,  2017:97). The report also maintains that ‘the old paradigm of 
energy access through grid extension alone is becoming obsolete as bottom-up 
customer demand is motivating hundreds of millions of households to generate 
their own modern energy services through off-grid units or community-scale 
mini-grids’ (REN21, 2017:24).
As mentioned previously, Africa has a substantial potential for renewable energy, 
but at the same time, a large percentage of its population suffers from energy 
poverty. If current African development trends continue, almost 600  million 
people in rural areas will still lack access to electricity in 2030, and an even more 
significant number will require access to clean cooking facilities. According 
to the regional decomposition analysis carried out by Mundaca, Markandya 
and Nørgaard  (2013), Africa appears to be the only region that showed signs of 
grabbing the low‐carbon economy opportunity. Besides facilitating energy access, 
the development of local economic networks driven by renewable energy provides 
the foundation for developing distributed economic systems that are based on the 
efficient utilisation of locally-available renewable resources and hence leapfrogging 
to the low-carbon economy. However, realising this potential would require taking 
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some critical measures aimed at creating the necessary framework for the effective 
deployment of the required physical and institutional infrastructure.
Recent progress made in renewable energy technologies and the favourable policy 
environment at the global and regional levels provides unique opportunities for 
the energy transition in Africa. This transition could promote a significant level of 
distributive justice if due consideration is given to the right mix of grid- and off-grid 
based renewable energy systems. It could also promote broader socio-economic 
justice if the planning and implementation of renewable energy development are 
fully integrated with the development of sustainable local economies that create 
decent jobs and provide sustainable livelihoods through value addition to local 
resources. All of the above major drivers indicate that we are at a moment of a 
significant social transformation process that will require all countries to revisit 
their development planning process fundamentally. The promotion of distributed 
renewable economy as a development planning tool is one key element of this 
transition that responds to all the major drivers highlighted above.
Distributed manufacturing systems
The notion of distributed production is a conceptualisation of a shift in 
consumption and production patterns away from the conventional mass 
production paradigm with its centralising tendencies. This transition also poses a 
challenge to the notion of having strict intellectual property  (IP) regimes as the 
foundation for technological innovation. Based on empirical data from the United 
States, Dafermos  (2015) points out that the dramatic increase in the number of 
patents registered in the United States from 1973 to 2010 has not been paralleled 
by an increase in productivity or technological innovation. On the contrary, based 
on two case studies, he illustrates how innovation in the twenty-first century thrives 
on openness and free sharing of knowledge and presents an alternative model of 
economic and technological development enabled by inclusive IP regimes founded 
on the open knowledge commons. Bauwens and Kostakis  (2015) emphasise 
the need for recomposing productive infrastructures for commons-oriented 
development.
Distributed production is enabled especially by advances in digital manufacturing 
technologies and the internet and is often referred to as distributed manufacturing 
(DM) or personal manufacturing. However, distributed manufacturing goes 
beyond the introduction of intelligent and autonomous systems that are driven 
by digitisation and smart machines. It also includes new societal considerations 
of a highly participative form of decentralised manufacturing that requires 
participation across the manufacturing value chains, including end-users, from 
design to potential production (Srai et  al.,  2016). Furthermore, DM entails a 
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deviation from conventional mass production, not only in terms of scale and 
location but also in terms of the consumer-producer relationships (Kohtala, 2015). 
The implication here is a shift from the long, linear supply chain, economies 
of scale and centralisation tendencies, towards more distributed production 
models (Srai  et  al.,  2016). The user interface is also changing, with the blurring 
of the boundary between consumers and producers leading to higher product 
personalisation and customisation.
At the firm level, DM comprises a category of manufacturing systems characterised 
by autonomy, flexibility, adaptability, agility and decentralisation (Leitao, 2009). At 
the economy level, DM fits into distributed economies that feature different regions 
pursuing different innovative development strategies according to local needs 
and further characterised by flexible networks of diverse actors (Kohtala,  2015). 
Srai  et  al.  (2016) identified the following major characteristics of distributed 
manufacturing based on a cross-case analysis done on different sectors: 
  Digitalisation: A relatively new, pervasive and disruptive phenomenon in 
manufacturing which mainly permits a product to exist perpetually in a virtual 
form ready to be rendered at any time.
  Localisation: Products can be potentially produced anywhere, and possibly 
nearer to the end-user, given the local availability of resources and access to 
new production technologies.
  Enabling technologies: Technologies that can operate at a small scale and 
are agile. This permits their proliferation in many production sites with less 
restriction on where they might be located.
  Personalisation: The enhanced interactive role for consumers resulting in 
better customisation of goods and services through collaborative production.  
Distributed manufacturing systems (DMS) already provide several benefits in 
comparison to traditional centralised production concepts (Seidenstricker, Rauch 
& Battistella,  2017). Megatrends such as sustainability, the democratisation of 
design, open innovation, regionalism and authenticity, and instant availability can 
be provided by DMS and drive the change to modern organisationally decentralised 
production (Matt, Rauch & Dallasaga, 2015; Putnik et al.,  2013). Seidenstricker 
et al. (2017) conclude that the connectivity and achievements in the IoT will drive 
forward the decentralised concepts and will enable other planning and control 
systems in manufacturing based on DMS thinking. 
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the 
World Economic Forum identified DMS among the key emerging trends in global 
manufacturing industries. In a website article, Top 10 Emerging Technologies 2015, 
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Bernard Meyerson  (2015) asserts that ‘distributed manufacturing turns on its 
head the way we make and distribute products’ by decentralising raw materials 
and fabrication and final products manufactured close to the final customer. 
The UNIDO report Emerging Trends in Global Manufacturing Industries argues 
that long-term industrial competitiveness may depend on countries’ ability 
to build and upgrade production-related industrial capabilities and to address 
existing technology gaps. This would require African countries to develop 
their national manufacturing development strategies by taking into account 
emerging technologies and trends such as distributed manufacturing systems 
(UNIDO, 2013). 
Precursors of a distributed renewable economy
Throughout human history, there have been communities that have been living in 
harmony with nature, albeit on a more subsistence basis. This was and still is the 
case with hunter-gatherer societies that utilise mobility as a critical regulating factor 
for their relationship with nature. The fundamental organising principle of these 
communities over the millennia has been to live within the limit of the carrying 
and assimilative capacity of their natural environment. This, however, started to 
change with the onset of the agricultural transformation, which resulted in a new 
set of property ownership and production systems. Except for a few cases that led 
to the downfall of major civilisation, the agricultural society mainly adhered to 
the overall principle of keeping within the limit of the carrying capacity. This is 
primarily due to the local nature of most of the environmental impact caused by the 
agricultural society and its limits within the assimilative and regenerative capacity 
of local ecosystems.
However, the localised nature of environmental impacts started to fundamentally 
change with the industrial revolution, which was based on the total disregard of 
the principle of living within the carrying capacity of nature and was driven by the 
desire to have complete control over natural systems. The drive for full domination 
and exploitation of nature, driven by unchecked industrialisation led to a significant 
depletion and degradation of the natural ecosystems that provide the necessary 
ecosystem services for the whole economy and society. This led to an unbearable 
situation in the second half of the twentieth century – a situation that gave 
governments in industrialised countries a wake-up call. The increasing scientific 
knowledge about the impact of industrialisation on the environment combined 
with the pressure from civil societies and the general public led to the convening 
of the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972. This was followed 
by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in  1992 as the environmental challenge became more of a global proportion. 
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Since the adoption of Agenda 21 at UNCED in 1992, we have seen thousands of 
initiatives that were aimed at reconciling the environment and development goals 
at the local level. The following subsections consider some of these initiatives that 
could be considered as precursors for a distributed renewable economy. 
Sustainable communities
This section covers the guiding principles of the numerous local initiatives on 
establishing sustainable communities as part of the implementation of Agenda 21 
on sustainable development at the local level.
In general, sustainable communities are regarded as those communities that 
meet the economic needs of the community residents, enhance and protect their 
environment and promote more humane local societies. The main focus is on 
increasing local economic diversity that is self-reliant driven by the development 
of local markets, local production and greater cooperation among local economic 
entities. This is all coupled with an emphasis on reduction in the use of energy 
and the careful management and recycling of waste products (Oloyede,  2017). 
Over the last few decades, there have been thousands of local initiatives aimed 
at creating sustainable communities that strive to maintain harmony with their 
natural surrounds while at the same time promoting social inclusivity. Out of the 
many principles developed by different groups, the list that follows describes some 
of the key sustainable community development planning principles established by 
the South African Government, and in particular those in the Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipal area (NMBM): 
  Poverty alleviation and satisfaction of basic needs with a particular focus 
on communities with special needs and gender equality is necessary for any 
planning intervention for sustainable community development.
  Emphasising the environment as a planning principle involves incorporation 
of environmental aspects with the purpose of protection as well as sustainable 
utilisation and management of resources.
  Public participation is a general principle in planning that has specific significance 
at the sustainable community unit level. While the Spatial Development 
Framework deals with vision, long-term strategies and metro-level planning, 
sustainable community planning enable communities to participate in and 
influence planning for development in their area in concrete ways.
  Local economic development is crucial to achieve improved living conditions 
and promote sustainability. At the sustainable communities’ level, local 
economic development is particularly important as it contributes to local 
income earning, local markets and improvement of informal businesses.
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 Mixed-use development is a planning principle that directly provides for 
functional and social integration. The location of different uses in proximity 
to each other facilitates access and promotes efficient urban development. 
It promotes sustainability through more efficient use of resources and 
infrastructure.
  Variation and flexibility involve urban design aspects in the form of different 
types of housing, heights, densities and land use, and provision for different 
land tenure options within a community area. Furthermore, the principle allows 
for changes over time to accommodate a growing or shrinking households and 
alternative economic activities.
  Limiting urban sprawl is closely linked to densification and creation of 
compact urban structures. It is, therefore, an essential aspect of integration and 
sustainability and crucial for efficient infrastructure provision. 
Smart urbanism
Smart urbanism poses the view that the solution to building a better urban society 
lies in mobilising people’s latent creativity. As an antidote to bigness, it looks 
to harness the collective power of many small, bottom-up ideas and actions to 
shape the urban neighbourhood. It is mainly guided by the principles of radical 
incrementalism, which is a deliberate strategy through which a series of small 
changes are enacted one after the other resulting in radical cumulative changes in 
the formation of a neighbourhood. It is iterative, and adaptive learning at its best 
as the feedback you get along the way will initiate, accelerate and modify next 
actions (Campbell, 2018). Based on insights and lessons gained from various 
local initiatives on urban development, Campbell  (2018) further identified the 
following key principles:
  We must shift our centralised system from its top-down, command-and-control 
process to operating in a more enabling role while at the same time dovetailing 
this with an evolving distributed system.
  We need to embrace complexity and see the city in the context of a complex 
adaptive system rather than using traditional planning techniques that do 
not have the flexibility needed to address multifaceted and rapidly-paced 
urban change.
  Urban design must be a generative process, from which a form will emerge and 
one that must incorporate the decisions and needs of local stakeholders not as 
a matter of fairness only but also of the intrinsic quality of the result.
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 Urban neighbourhood development needs to shift from a ‘bigness’ model 
that is characterised by large-scale neighbourhood schemes that are driven by 
top-down capital accumulation to a ‘massive small’ model that is characterised 
by bottom-up land management model which promote diversity of provisions.
  Putting the sustainability agenda which is guided by ‘thinking globally while 
acting locally’ together with the viability agenda, which is guided by ‘thinking 
locally and acting locally’, together gives a powerful signal across the full 
spectrum of local to global and enables the abstract model to work with an 
agent-based model for real difference.
Regenerative economies
Contrary to the conventional economic thinking, which presumes economic 
vigour as a function of the rate of gross national product growth, regenerative 
economies recognise ‘economic vigour as a product of human and societal vitality, 
rooted in ecological health and the inclusive development of human capabilities 
and potential’ (Fullerton, 2015:40). The following are the key and interconnected 
principles that determine systemic health under regenerative economies, as 
highlighted by Fullerton (2015:44-79):
  In right relationship: Humanity is an integral part of an interconnected web of 
life in which there is no real separation between ‘us’ and ‘it’ and the scale of the 
human economy matters in relation to the biosphere in which it is embedded. 
  Views wealth holistically: Real wealth must be defined and managed in terms 
of the wellbeing of the whole, achieved through the harmonisation of multiple 
kinds of wealth or capital, including social, cultural, living and experiential. The 
whole is only as strong as the weakest link.
  Innovative, adaptive, and responsive: In a world in which change is both ever-
present and accelerating, the qualities of innovation and adaptability are critical 
to health. To use the Darwinian expression the most ‘fit’ is the one that is most 
adaptable to a changing environment. 
  Empowered participation: In an interdependent system, fitness comes from 
contributing in some way to the health of the whole. The quality of empowered 
participation means that all parts must be ‘in a relationship’ with the larger 
whole in ways that not only empower them to negotiate for their own needs 
but also enable them to add their unique contribution towards the health and 
well-being of the larger wholes in which they are embedded.
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 Honours community and place: Each human community consists of a mosaic 
of peoples, traditions, beliefs and institutions uniquely shaped by long-term 
pressures of geography, human history, culture, local environment and changing 
human needs. 
  Edge effect abundance: Creativity and abundance flourish synergistically at 
the ‘edges’ of systems, where the bonds holding the dominant pattern in place 
are weakest. Working collaboratively across edges is transformative for both the 
communities and individuals involved. 
  Robust circulatory flow: Just as human health depends on the healthy 
circulation of oxygen and nutrients, so too does economic health depend on 
robust circulatory flows of money, information, resources, and goods and 
services to support exchange, flush toxins and nourish every cell at every level 
of our human networks.
  Seeks balance: Being in balance is more than just an excellent way to be as it is 
essential to systemic health. A regenerative economy seeks to balance efficiency 
and resilience; collaboration and competition; diversity and coherence; and 
small, medium, and large organisations and needs. 
The tens of thousands of local initiatives that have been developed and 
implemented across the globe under these and other similar initiatives have led to 
a massive volume of empirical knowledge on how to plan and implement bottom-
up initiatives that are driven by communities. African countries can gain valuable 
practical insights from these initiatives, which are also happening in their localities, 
and use them as a pilot basis for the development of distributed economy networks.
Development of a distributed renewable economy
Planning for a distributed renewable economy is aimed at creating a local, 
sustainable economy network as a foundation for developing a wellbeing economy 
that continuously fulfils the needs and aspirations of its people while ensuring 
the wellbeing of the natural ecosystem. Figure  7.1 presents the key development 
objectives of a wellbeing economy under human wellbeing and ecosystems 
wellbeing. The fundamental objective of the Wellbeing Economy in relation to 
human wellbeing is fulfilling the basic needs and aspirations of its people while 
continuously enhancing the productive capacity of the community. A wellbeing 
economy recognises that these fundamental objectives of human wellbeing could 
only be achieved by ensuring the wellbeing of the ecosystem which provides 
the primary ecosystem services input within the limits of its regenerative and 
assimilative capacity.







■ Sustainable ecosystems services
■ Biodiversity conservation
■ Regenerative and assimilation capacity
■ Enhanced productive capacity
■ Meeting all basic needs
■ Fulfilment of aspirations
Figure 7.1 Key objectives of a wellbeing economy 
Distributed renewable economy is a planning tool that will enable countries to 
reconcile the above two fundamental objectives at the local level. Based on case 
studies conducted in different countries, Van den Dool et al. (2009) identified the 
following as the potential benefits attributed to a distributed economy:
  Increased local use of renewable resources and wealth creation for more people.
  Decreased pollutant emissions and waste generation at the local and regional 
levels.
  Added value benefits maintained within the region.
  Increased share of non-material inputs (e.g., information, local know-how) and 
higher added value to local materials.
  Diversity and flexibility of economic activities and increased diversity and 
intensity of communication.
  Enhanced collaboration between regional activities.
The basis for a distributed renewable economy
As noted by Fioramonti (2017), the shift towards quality jobs and distributed 
production and consumption require dismantling the vertical approach of the growth 
economy to support a horizontal network across an economy. The distributed 
renewable economy development model is about building the foundation for the 
transition to an inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient society through a 
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bottom-up process that is built upon dynamic interaction between sustainable local 
economy networks. The following are the major theoretical and empirical premises 
that serve as the basis for the development of a distributed renewable economy:
  The current dominant notion of economy of scale, which favours concentration 
and consolidation of the productive capacity of society around a limited number 
of players and actors, is fundamentally constrained to create a sufficient number 
of jobs and promote social inclusion as stated in Agenda 2030 on SDGs and the 
aspiration of Agenda 2063.
  The significant progress made in the areas of renewable energy technology, 
information technology and distributed (modular) manufacturing systems 
in recent decades has also made the dominant economy of scale, which is 
characterised by large scale mass production, increasingly obsolete. This 
provides the basis for distributed economies consisted of dynamic local 
economic networks. 
  The enormous potential that African countries have in terms of renewable 
energy resources coupled with its natural resources provide a significant 
opportunity for African countries to develop more sustainable local economies 
that are mainly driven by distributed renewable energy systems.
  As much as it may have its own threats, recent developments in ICT and 
the increasing digitisation of the global economy open new empowerment 
opportunities for African countries provided that they proactively manage and 
use them in a transformative way. The development of such local economy 
networks in the region would make a significant contribution towards job 
creation and value addition at the local level. This will, in turn, provide the basis 
for a profound social transformation towards a sustainable society.
  Developing and promoting distributed renewable economies that are driven 
by distributed renewable energy systems which utilise the abundant renewable 
energy resource that Africa has, and maintaining the ecological foundation of 
African economies are fundamental for promoting economic development and 
social transformation in the region.
Development framework for distributed renewable economy
Distributed renewable economy is being developed as a planning model that 
reinforces the ongoing work of reorienting macro-economic policies at the 
national level with a bottom-up process that demonstrates the contribution of 
the development process to poverty eradication and sustainable development. 
As a planning tool, distributed renewable economy facilitates the operationalisation 
of the transition to a sustainable economy through efficient management and 
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utilisation of the available resources within a given region or locality. As such, 
it does not come with a ready-made blueprint in the form of ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach. It instead provides a methodological framework to assist and guide 
local communities and development partners to develop and implement their 
own inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient economy which will dynamically 
evolve. It also provides an operational framework through which maximum synergy 
could be promoted between various initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable 
development and thereby promoting effective resource utilisation.
The distributed renewable economy process is guided by key systems and 
evolutionary principles of which the following could be cited as the major ones: 
  Incremental efficiency gains and systems innovation: The sustainability 
transition requires promoting incremental efficiency gains contributing to 
resource decoupling supported with broader systems innovation aimed at 
impact decoupling.
  Technological innovation coupled with social innovation: The systems 
innovation that is required for the sustainability transition would require 
reinforcing the ongoing technological innovation with social innovation 
systems at all levels.
  Self-organising systems through symbiotic relationships: The development 
of a more stable and sustainable economic system that operates as a self-
organising socio-economic system following the principles of industrial 
symbiosis is at the core of a distributed renewable economy.
  Adaptive and inclusive governance: The development and implementation 
of the distributed renewable economy at any level requires the innovative 
engagement of all sectors of the society guided by the principles of adaptive 
and inclusive governance.
Some fundamental shifts need to happen in the overall framing and implementation 
of the planning process to make progress in developing a distributed economy. 
Based on the above principles and the key concepts and empirical lessons covered 
in earlier sections, the following planning framework is proposed as a generic 
framework that could be modified and adapted to local contexts. As shown in 
Figure 7.2, the framework consists of three stages that have nine key steps altogether.
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 ■ Identify anchor natural resource sectors and economic actors
 ■ Decide on specific value-addition products
 ■ Organise innovation incubation space
 ■ Determine resource inputs and develop infrastructure
 ■ Develop first-tier economic networks
 ■ Ensure horizontal and vertical integration within the network
 ■ Facilitate optimal link with regional, national and global economy
 ■ Monitor and recognise performances across network







Figure 7.2 Development framework for distributed renewable economy 
The first stage of the framework covers the planning and organising steps as the 
foundation of the process. The crucial first step of the whole process is to identify a 
natural resource sector and or an economic actor which could be used as an anchor 
for the development of the distributed economy network. The next step is to 
organise an innovation incubation space to identify the specific economic activity 
that may lead to higher value addition and job creation for the local economy.
The second stage is the piloting and implementation stage which focuses on the 
actual development of the distributed economy network around the selected 
resource sector or economic actor. Depending on the level of preparedness and 
the possible success rate, this stage can start with a piloting phase to be followed 
with full-scale implementation. The critical step in this stage is the definition 
and development of the resource input required with a particular focus on the 
provision of energy, knowledge and financial inputs. This would require making 
the best use of the available knowledge, technological and financial resources that 
are highlighted in this section. The initial focus of this stage is on the development 
of the first tier of the economic network around the most promising resource and 
economic actors by ensuring an optimal vertical and horizontal integration across 
the value chain.
The third stage focuses on further consolidating and possibly replicating the 
economic network into a second tier of economic activities. The critical step in 
this stage is the facilitation of an optimal and efficient link of the local economic 
network with the national and global economic system. It is critical to continuously 
monitor the effectiveness of the economic actors in the network with the purpose 
of feeding back the lessons into the process and encourage competition by giving 
recognition to the best-performing actors and stakeholders.
Each of the steps in the development framework needs to be guided by the key 
principles highlighted in this section and supported by the relevant tools that are 
available in connection with local development planning processes.
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Conclusion
Creation of jobs to the youth population that is growing at an alarming rate, 
eradication of poverty, and gender empowerment are three of the most common 
and critical development priorities that are cited in almost all of the continental 
and national development visions, policies and strategies. Evidence from the past 
couple of decades has clearly shown that challenges of job creation and social 
inclusivity continued to be further aggravated across the world, but more severely 
in Africa. The fourth industrial revolution, driven by inappropriate application 
and utilisation of exponentially disruptive technologies is feared to increase the 
number of vulnerable jobs by putting more people out of jobs. It is also expected 
to widen the wealth gap significantly by further reinforcing the concentration 
of wealth in few hands. Fortunately, most of the disruptive technologies of the 
twenty-first century also have significant potential to promote distributional justice 
by empowering people and enhancing the overall socio-ecological efficiency of the 
global economic system.
One of the major areas where the disruptive technologies of the twenty-first 
century would have significant transformation outcomes is in the field of promoting 
distributed economy networks that are aimed at creating more jobs and adding 
multiple values at the local level. Even if this could apply to almost all countries, 
Africa has a unique opportunity to gain the maximum benefit from such a strategic 
approach. A systematic application of distributed economy networks development 
could also assist countries to overcome the limitation and save wastage from the 
fragmented and isolated implementation of development programmes, which is 
an Achilles heel of most development programmes in African countries. Finally, 
it is worth noting that an Africa that is at peace with itself and with its natural 
environment; an Africa that is inclusive, low-carbon and resource-efficient; and 
an Africa that is free of poverty and unemployment makes a critical contribution 
to global security and sustainability. Supporting the proliferation of distributed 
economy networks across the region is one sure way of achieving the ‘Africa We 
Want’ of Agenda 2063 and the ‘Future We Want’ of Agenda 2030.
258      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
References
Alanne, K. & Saari, A. (2006). Distributed 
energy generation and sustainable 
development. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews 10(6): 539–558. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2004.11.004
Ayres, R.U. (1994). Information, entropy, and 
progress: A new evolutionary paradigm. New 
York: American Institute of Physics Press.
Baran, P. (1964). On distributed communications 
network. Reprinted from the IEEE 
Transactions on Communications Systems 
CS-12(1), March. https://bit.ly/2MamttJ 
[Accessed 20 September 2019]. https://doi.
org/10.1109/TCOM.1964.1088883
Bauwens, M. & Kostakis, V. (2015). Towards 
a new reconfiguration among the state, 
civil society and the market. https://bit.
ly/2B666b9 [Accessed 24 May 2018]. 
https://doi.org/10.21721/p2p.2014v1 
n1.p1-24
Breda, J.V. & Swilling, M. (2018). The guiding 
logic and principles for designing emergent 
transdisciplinary research processes. 
Sustainability Science 13(42): 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-018-
0606-x
Campbell, K. (2018). Making massive small 
change: Building the urban society we want. 
London: Chelsea Green Publishing.
Cooper, M. (2016). Renewables and 
distributed resources in a post-Paris low 
carbon future: The key role and political 
economy of sustainable electricity. Energy 
Research & Social Science 19: 66–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.05.008
Dafermos, G. (2015). Transforming the 
productive base of the economy through 
the open design commons and distributed 
manufacturing. https://bit.ly/2B743DC 
[Accessed 16 May 2016].
Fioramonti, L. (2017). Wellbeing economy: 
Success in a world without growth. 
Johannesburg: Macmillan.
Fischer-Kowalski, M. & Harbel, H. (2007). 
Socioecological transitions and global 
change: Trajectories of social metabolism 
and land use. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.
org/10.4337/9781847209436
Fullerton, J. (2015). Regenerative 
capitalism: How universal principles and 
patterns will shape our new economy. 
https://bit.ly/1bDuUrY [Accessed 
15 September 2019].
Genov, N. (1999). Managing transformations in 
Eastern Europe. Paris: UNESCO-MOST.
Gottlieb, R.S. (Ed.). (1996). This Sacred earth: 
Religion, nature and environment. New 
York: Routledge.
International Energy Agency. (2014). Africa 
energy outlook. Paris: IEA. https://doi.
org/10.1787/weo-2014-en
International Renewable Energy Agency. 
(2013). Africa’s renewable future: 
The path to sustainable growth. Abu 
Dhabi, UAE: IRENA. https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315074436
International Renewable Energy Agency. 
(2015). Africa 2030: A roadmap for 
renewable energy future. Abu Dhabi, UAE: 
IRENA. 
Johansson, A., Kisch, P. & Mirata, M. (2005). 
Distributed economies – A new engine for 
innovation. Journal of Cleaner Production 
3(10/11): 971–979. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2004.12.015
Kohtala, C. (2015). Addressing sustainability 
in research on distributed production: 
An integrated literature review. 
Journal of Cleaner Production 106(1): 
654–668. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jclepro.2014.09.039
Kosko, B. (1994). Fuzzy thinking: The new 
science of fuzzy logic. London: Flamingo 
Publishers.
Distributed renewable economy for Africa …  |      259
Leitao, P. (2009). Agent-based distributed 
manufacturing control: A state-of-the-art 
survey. Engineering Applications of Artificial 
Intelligence 22(7): 979–991. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.engappai.2008.09.005
Leroy, P. (1997). Interdisciplinarity within 
Dutch environmental science(s). 
Proceedings of the Conference on Science 
for Sustainability: Integrating Natural 
and Social Sciences. Roskilde: Roskilde 
University.
Lorenzo, F. (2017). Wellbeing economy: Success 
in a world without growth. Johannesburg: 
Macmillan.
Matt, D.T., Rauch E. & Dallasaga, P. (2015). 
Trends towards distributed manufacturing 
systems and modern forms for their design. 
Procedia CIRP 33: 185–190. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.procir.2015.06.034
McClaughry, J. (1989). Preface. In: 
E.F. Schumacher, Small is beautiful. 
London: Harper Perennial.
Meadows, D., Meadows, D. & Randers, J. 
(1992). Beyond the limits (1st edition). 
London: Chelsea Green Publishing.
Mebratu, D. (1998). Sustainability and 
sustainable development: Historical and 
conceptual review. Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review 18(6): 493–520. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0195-9255(98)00019-5
Mebratu, D. (2000). Strategies for sustainable 
industrial development in sub‑Saharan 
Africa. Lund, Sweden: Lund University.
Meyerson, B. (2015). Top 10 emerging 




Miller, T.R., Wiek, A., Sarewitz, D., 
Robinson, J., Olsson, L. et al. (2014). The 
future of sustainability science: A solutions-
oriented research agenda. Sustainability 
Science 9(2): 239–246. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11625-013-0228-2
Mundaca, L., Markandya, A. & Nørgaard, J. 
(2013). Walking away from a low carbon 
economy? Recent and historical trends 
using a regional decomposition analysis. 
Energy Policy 61: 1471–1480. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.083
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. (2007). 
Sustainable community planning guide. 
https://bit.ly/2B8aXZe [Accessed 
10 September 2019].
Oloyede, O. (2009) Developing sustainable 
communities in Africa: Components 
for a Framework. Identity, Culture and 
Politics: An Afro‑Asian Dialogue 10(2): 
56–64. https://bit.ly/316iZww [Accessed 
2 May 2017]. 
Putnik, G., Sluga, A., Elmaraghy H., Teti, R., 
Koren, Y. et al. (2013). Scalability in 
manufacturing systems design and 
operation: State of the art and future 
developments roadmap. CIRP Annals – 
Manufacturing Technology 62(2): 751–774. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cirp.2013.05.002
Raji, A. & Kahn, M.T. (2012). Analysis of 
distributed energy resources for domestic 
electricity users. Journal of Energy in 
Southern Africa 23(2): 50–55. https://
doi.org/10.17159/2413-3051/2012/
v23i2a3163
REN21. (2017). Renewables 2017 global status 
report. Paris: REN 21 Secretariat.
Roszak, T. (1989). Introduction. In: 
E.F. Schumacher, Small is beautiful. 
New York: Harper Perennial.
Scholz, R.W. (2011. Environmental literacy 
in science and society: From knowledge to 
decisions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511921520
Schwab, K. (2018). Shaping the fourth 
industrial revolution. Geneva: World 
Economic Forum.
Seidenstricker, S., Rauch, E., & Battistella, C. 
(2017). Business model engineering 
for distributed manufacturing systems. 
Procedia CIRP 62: 135–140. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.procir.2016.06.112
260      |  TRANSFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Seidl, R., Brand, F.S., Stauffacher, M., Krütli, P., 
Le, Q.B. et al. (2013). Science with society 
in the anthropocene. Ambio 42(1): 5–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-012-
0363-5
Smuts, J. (1993). Holism and evolution. In: 
J.J. Clarke (Ed.), Nature in question: An 
anthology of ideas. London: Earthscan 
Publications.
Srai, J.S., Mukesh, K., Graham, G., Philips, W., 
Tooze, J. et al. (2016). Distributed 
manufacturing: scope, challenges and 
opportunities. International Journal of 
Production Research 54(23): 6917–6935. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2016.
1192302
Stauffacher, M., Walter, A.I., Lang, D.J., 
Wiek, A. & Scholz, R.W. (2006). Learning 
to research environmental problems from 
a functional socio-cultural constructivism 
perspective: The transdisciplinary 
case study approach. International 
Journal of Sustainability in Higher 
Education 7(3): 252–275. https://doi.
org/10.1108/14676370610677838
Swilling, M. & Annecke, E. (2012). Just 
transitions: Explorations of sustainability in 
an unfair world. Tokyo: United Nations 
University.
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. (2013). Emerging trends in 
global manufacturing industries. Vienna: 
UNIDO.
van den Dool, A., Marchington, E., Ripken, R., 
Hsieh, A., Petrasova, M. et al. (2009). The 
future is distributed: A vision for sustainable 
economies. Lund, Sweden: Lund University. 
Vázquez Pimentel, D.A., Ayma, I.M. & 
Lawson, M. (2018). Reward work not 
wealth. Oxfam Briefing paper, January. 
Cowley, UK: Oxfam GB. https://bit.
ly/2q8ejcD [Accessed 13 March 2019].
Weinberg, M.G. (1975). An introduction 
to general systems thinking. New York: 
Wiley-Interscience Publications. https://
doi.org/10.1080/03081077508960832
Wiek, A. & Lang, D.J. (2016). 
Transformational sustainability 
research methodology. In: H. Heinrichs, 
P. Martens, G. Michelsen & A. Wiek 
(Eds), Sustainability science. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-94-017-7242-6_3
Ziegler, H. (1997). Statement at the final panel 
of the conference. Conference of Science 
for Sustainability: Integrating Natural 
and Social Sciences. Roskilde University, 
Denmark (October). 
8
 |      261





Since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007/2008, two key trends 
converged in ways that require a new discussion about the connection between 
‘development’ and ‘sustainability transitions’: the rise of the so-called ‘BRICS-plus’1 
economies as most of the traditional Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) economies plunged into a prolonged depressive malaise 
(Bogdan, Hurduzeu, Josan & Vlasceanu, 2011; Pant, 2013; Van Agtmael, 2012), 
and the emergence of a global narrative that started with the ‘green economy’ 
discourse in 2009 (Death, 2014; Geels, 2013) followed soon after by the adoption 
of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. The primary implication 
1 BRICS is an association of emerging/developing countries namely Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa. The BRICS-plus initiative is aimed at developing the outreach 
activities of the BRICS countries with the global South and building wider partnership  
with emerging markets and developing countries.
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of the convergence of these trends over nearly a decade is the need to rethink the 
relationship between development and sustainability transition. Although Scoones, 
Leach and Newell (2015) make a significant contribution in this regard the focus 
in this chapter is not on the development-sustainability nexus in general. Instead, 
the focus is more on sustainability transitions and ‘developmental states’ – the latter 
usually regarded as having a historic mission to accelerate the development and 
modernisation processes in the spirit of ‘catch up’ (Evans, 2010). 
Building on earlier work with similar aims (see Swilling and Annecke,  2012, 
Chapter 5), this chapter argues that we need to draw on the well-established 
literature on the developmental state (DS) and sustainability transitions (ST) in 
order to better understand the challenge of combining development strategies 
and commitments to ecological sustainability that many states in Africa now face 
since the adoption of the SDGs. This synthesis, in turn, needs to be brought into 
conversation with the African literature on ‘governance for development’.
Given the contested nature of the term ‘development’, it is necessary to declare a 
specific point of departure. For this purpose, I favour the following definition of 
development by Castells and Himanen: 
Development … is the self-defined social process by which humans enhance 
their well-being and assert their dignity while creating the structural 
conditions for the sustainability of the process of development itself. (Castells 
& Himanen, 2014:29)
This definition is useful because wellbeing rather than gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita is at the centre. Following Sen (1999), this definition of 
development is not derived from an abstract categorical imperative but from the 
everyday processes of ‘self-definition’ via dialogical engagement, which are of 
course context-specific. However, these acts of becoming are inseparable from 
the wider process of structural change to ensure the longer-term sustainability of 
development processes. But the former is not conditioned by the latter – instead, 
the latter is the emergent outcome of the continuous struggles over the terms of the 
development process itself. Of course, this is not how ‘Development’ (with a big ‘D’) 
is usually officially defined in mainstream narratives (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2000). 
Nevertheless, this is, most certainly, ‘development’ (with a small  ‘d’) as a process 
of mutual flourishing within communities of human and non-human beings. For 
some, this takes us into what is referred to in the Latin American literature as 
‘postdevelopment’ (Escobar, 2015), while for others it implies ‘degrowth’ (D’Alisa, 
Demaria & Kallis, 2015) or ‘alternative development’ (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2000). 
Either way, wellbeing and a relational perspective seem to be what is common 
across nearly all perspectives that break with ‘Development’ (big ‘D’).
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Following this perspective,2 a ‘just transition’ can be defined as a set of 
complex highly contested socio-political processes that result in (i) significant 
improvements in wellbeing for all (including the eradication of poverty and 
reduced inequalities, in particular asset inequality); and (ii) decarbonisation, 
the simultaneous restoration of degraded ecosystems, and radical improvements 
in resource efficiency. Achieving both via a just transition would require – and 
result in – far-reaching structural transformations that are arguably implied by the 
commitments embedded within the SDGs. An exclusive focus on the former will 
leave planetary systems to collapse resulting in rising prices of increasingly scarce 
resources, starting with the most sensitive which is food, but also water, energy and 
other extracted materials. No matter how progressive the government of the day 
may be, in a highly unequal world, the poor will suffer the most and the rich will be 
able to buy up a shrinking pool of resources. Conversely, strategies that only focus 
on the ecological sustainability of the planetary systems will tend to neglect what is 
needed to build the capabilities of the poor to define their own solutions and the 
capabilities of the state to intervene where required. Where the fusion of these goals 
becomes most explicit is in the idea of a just transition expressed most concretely in 
the call for energy democracy as a way of reorienting the directionality of the global 
renewable energy revolution (Burke & Stephens, 2018). 
The problem, however, is that the literature on developmental states and 
sustainability transitions have evolved in parallel without much cross-over (for a 
key exception and seminal contribution see Johnstone and Newell, 2018). This 
is an opportune moment to synthesise this literature in order to conceptualise in 
a more detailed way the dimensions of a sustainability-oriented polity that holds 
in balance the developmental and sustainability agendas (in a way that avoids the 
usual ‘trade-off ’ narrative introduced by the ‘triple bottom line’ approach).
While the DS literature has been widely used to address the development 
challenges of industrialising economies in the global South (Bagchi, 2000; Chang, 
2007; Chibber, 2002; Edigheji, 2010; Evans, 2010; Jayasuriya, 2001; Kohli, 2006; 
Leftwich, 1995, 2000; Mkandawire, 2001; Noman, Botchwey, Stein & Stiglitz, 
2011; Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi, 2004; Swilling, 2008; Swilling, Musango & 
Wakeford, 2015; Thompson, n.d.), this literature has generally neglected to deal 
with environmental challenges in general and STs in particular. The ST literature 
generally has ignored development (with exceptions such as Scoones, Leach and 
Newell,  2015; Swilling and Annecke, 2012;), but there is an emerging literature 
2 This definition fuses together various strands in development studies, including Sen’s 
capability perspective, the writing on wellbeing, traditional concerns with structure in 
development economics, and ecological and institutional sustainability thinking.
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that has started to be used to address this lacuna, with a significant body of work 
already done on East Asian economies (Angel & Rock, 2009; Berkhout, Angel & 
Wieczorek, 2009; Rock, Murphy, Rasiah, Van Seters & Managi, 2009) and now 
also starting to be applied in the South African context (Baker, 2015; Baker, Newell 
& Philips, 2014; Lawhon & Murphy, 2011; Swilling & Annecke, 2012). 
Scoones et al. (2015) have achieved a significant synthesis of the development 
economics and ST/transformation literature, with specific reference to the ‘politics 
of green transformations’. In a subsequent publication, Johnstone and Newell 
(2018) build on this foundation and offer a perspective on sustainability transitions 
that draws on rich traditions in radical political economy. This chapter builds on 
these works, the ST literature on East Asia plus my previous work on synthesising 
development, institutional and ecological economics to theorise the ‘greening’ of 
the developmental; Swilling, Musango & Wakeford, 2016). The resultant synthesis 
is then brought into conversation with the debates about the African developmental 
state, in particular, the contributions in a volume edited by Noman et al. (2011).
As already noted, the DS and ST literature agree on the need for deep structural 
transformation, but with two different ends in mind: for the DS literature, the 
end is accelerated economic ‘Development’ (big ‘D’) that substantially raises the 
average GDP per capita with a focus on industrialisation and urbanisation; while 
for the ST literature the end is a socio-technical transition that results in a low-
carbon resource-efficient economy. Johnstone and Newell (referred to later) go a 
long way towards achieving such a synthesis, but like most work in the political 
economy field, they neglect the institutional context. I will argue that the synthesis 
of this literature needs, rather, to open up a space for a more detailed discussion 
about governance for a just transition, with special reference to how we deepen our 
understanding of the dynamics of the polity in African governance systems. 
Developmental states
The defining feature of DSs is that they are primarily concerned with the structural 
transformation of modernising economies (Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2006; Noman et al., 
2011). The legitimation of DSs is derived primarily from their ability to promote 
sustained growth and development via aggressive industrialisation (Chibber, 
2002). In practice, the underlying economic rationale for DSs has been an 
acceptance that markets left to their own devices will tend towards disequilibrium 
in unequal developing economies and therefore state intervention is a necessity. 
However, at the ideological level, DSs were excellent at extolling the virtues of 
capitalism and even, when it suited them, the logics of neo-classical economics. As 
summarised by Khan (2008), they promoted sustained growth and development 
by deploying several unique abilities. These included the ability to extract and 
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deploy capital productively, generate and implement national and sectoral 
plans and effect dynamic egalitarian and productivity-enhancing development 
programmes in land, education and training, small enterprise, infrastructure and 
housing sectors. In addition, DSs have been able to manipulate private access to 
scarce resources through, among others, financial sector re-engineering, subsidies, 
taxes, concessions and high levels of lending. 
An authoritarian form of governance was often pursued by states that were 
determined to tightly manage and cultivate a state-dependent national business 
class. The cultivation of close and productive relationships with business on terms 
set by the political elite and enforced via state institutions was the norm. Interest 
groups were managed using corporatist arrangements, often in authoritarian top-
down ways to impose the state’s agenda versus the more consensual type of social 
corporatism that was pursued in South Africa after 1994. Thus the East Asian DS 
was characterised by a capacity to coordinate the efforts of individual businesses 
by encouraging the emergence and growth of private economic institutions, target 
specific industrial projects and sectors, resist political pressure from popular 
forces and, at times, also brutally suppress them. These DSs often mediated and/
or insulated domestic economies from (extensive) foreign capital penetration 
during the early stages and, most importantly, sustained and implemented a project 
of productivity improvement, technological upgrading and increased market 
share that broke them out of a path-dependent low-growth economic trajectory 
(Chang, 2007).
The institutionalisation of the polity of the developmental state has received much 
attention since the 1990s. In a seminal contribution, Leftwich (1995) summarised 
what many regard as the key institutional characteristics of the typical polity of the 
typical DS as follows:
  a ‘determined developmental elite’ committed to the modernisation project;
  ‘relative autonomy’ from major capitalist economic interests who are always 
keen to capture the state;
  ‘a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy’ that enjoys the 
highest possible political support but operates without too much political 
interference;
  a ‘weak and subordinated civil society’ which means there are no rival centres 
of alternative policy formation;
  the ‘effective management of non-state economic interests’ via formal structured 
compacts, incentives and penalties; and
  accessible and usable institutions of ‘repression, legitimacy and performance’.
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What is distinctive about the literature on developmental statism in Africa is 
whether these characteristics – derived from the East Asian context - are applicable 
in the African context (Mkandawire, 2001), especially in light of the pervasiveness 
of neo-patrimonial modes of governance in post-independence Africa (Booth 
& Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013; Pitcher, Moran & Johnston,  2009). 
Originating in Fanon’s classic narrative on the weakness of the ‘national 
bourgeoisie’ in post-colonial Africa (Fanon, 1963), the core questions asked in this 
literature are about whether it really is possible to talk about a ‘developmental elite’ 
acting ‘relatively autonomously’ from capitalist interests by way of a ‘competent 
bureaucracy’ that ‘effectively managed’ developmental compacts with non-state 
actors. Or whether it is preferable to talk about ‘developmental neo-patrimonialism’. 
But before addressing this African debate, the wider conceptual framework needs 
to be put in place. 
Once East Asian DSs had consolidated an industrial base through technological 
capacity building, institutional functionality and human developmental capabilities, 
their focus shifted from the late 1990s onwards from massive investments in the 
material conditions of modernisation to establishing the conditions required 
by the emergent knowledge economy created by the information revolution 
(Evans, 2012). Three new tasks emerged with major implications for the structures 
and logics of the polities that drove the initial phases of development. Together, 
these three tasks clearly defined the slightly more consensual modes of governance 
that emerged during the transition from accelerated heavy industrialisation/
urbanisation to an emphasis on quality and greening – a process often associated 
with ‘de-nationalisation’ of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy (except for 
the China case). 
Firstly, if institutions are accepted as key to an environment that fosters innovation 
(following the logic of the new mainstream institutional economics – see Rodrik 
et al. 2004), then the main challenge becomes the building of networks and new 
value chains as the drivers of growth, the development of leadership capabilities to 
build effective institutions and, more importantly, the facilitation of networks of 
institutions that span multiple sectors of the economy. This new kind of political 
leadership has to strike a very delicate balance between regulation of shared norms/
values (e.g., a patriotic or nationalist commitment to national development) and 
self-managed implementation (especially important for fostering innovation). 
As will be argued, this depended on the political will to re-organise the various 
dimensions of the polity (including political re-alignments), and in some cases, this 
meant using repressive force.
Secondly, no one disputes that knowledge and innovation matter. However, these 
are emergent properties that stem from dense networks of people, working 
together across institutional boundaries within quite well-defined institutional 
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eco-systems, unconstrained by outdated (usually hierarchically organised) norms 
or an atmosphere of fear and conformity (that often prevailed during the earlier 
years of ‘forced march’ industrialisation/urbanisation). The private sector always 
under-invests in human capital and innovation networks because the direct 
returns to the investor are impossible to predict. Without state-led investment in 
these sectors, facilitated by an appropriately configured socio-political regime 
via universities, NGOs and developmental partnerships/compacts, knowledge-
based, innovation-led economic development in the era of the network society 
may be impossible (Castells & Himanen, 2014; Mazzucato, 2011). Indeed, the key 
constituency that gets included in the broadening out of ‘collibratory’ governance 
to support innovation and experimentation are a wide range of knowledge workers 
–  entrepreneurs, researchers, inventors, innovators, venture capitalists, impact 
investors, NGOs, consultants, and so on. 
Thirdly, embeddedness for the twenty-first-century DS might mean building a 
polity that broadens out developmental partnering with networks of civil society 
formations and smaller entrepreneurs rather than focusing only on the investment 
strategies of large corporates (as was the case during the early years when the 
focus was on the construction of a heavy industrial base). This kind of broad more 
consensual mode of governance may be particularly appropriate where the national 
business class is strong. A weak national bourgeoisie has traditionally been a good 
reason for developmentally-oriented states to get involved during the early stages of 
economic development to weld together local business elites into effective drivers 
of national investment-led development. But in situations where the national 
bourgeoisie is fully consolidated, the state has more freedom to integrate a wider set 
of class alliances. This may entail a multiplicity of smallish interventions, rather than 
a few, massive, physical infrastructure investments that satisfy the need for capital 
deepening but do little to redefine the institutional context for the circulation of 
the benefits. This, however, is only possible if there is sufficient capacity to handle 
these transaction costs.
Sustainability transitions 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) is the most influential approach in the ST 
literature. In summary, the MLP makes a distinction between landscape pressures, 
socio-technical regimes, and innovation niches (Grin, Rotmans & Schot,  2010). 
Landscape pressures are longer-term transformative socio-structural conditions 
such as demographic change, climate change, digitalisation, rising levels of 
education over time, ageing, resource depletion and cultural change. Socio-
technical regimes are specific configurations of technologies, markets, regulations, 
institutions, human capabilities and routines that make it possible to reproduce 
societal systems such as energy provision, mobility, market-based property 
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development, food systems, industrial agriculture, water provision and waste 
management. Regimes display a high degree of obduracy in the face of landscape 
pressures. Niche innovations emerge when networks of innovators (technological 
financial, institutional) respond to landscape pressures by collaborating to develop 
potentially new emergent socio-technical regimes (e.g., renewable energy, or 
organic food) that can either replace old regimes or get absorbed by those regimes 
that realise they need to adapt to landscape pressures.
Transition researchers characterise socio-technical regime change – or structural 
transformation – as being predicated on the ways in which shifting landscape 
pressures impinge on a regime and the extent to which responses to these pressures 
are coordinated, both from inside and outside the regime to accommodate or resist 
these pressures (Smith, Stirling & Berkhout, 2005). In this way, the ST literature 
opens up the issue of governance interventions to facilitate regime transformation, 
but for some this has not hitherto been taken far enough (Geels, 2014; Hess, 2014; 
Johnstone & Newell, 2018; Meadowcroft, 2011). It is not only the objective reality 
of these pressures that matters, but more importantly, the adaptive capacity, or the 
relationships, resources and their levels of coordination within the polity that shapes 
responses to these pressures. This can be the outcome of historical processes (e.g., a 
gradual shift in consumer choices or evolution of new technologies) or purposively 
informed by a strategically aligned polity with a shared vision and capacity to 
implement a coherent set of policies. The ST literature is critical of the neo-liberal 
assumptions about the virtues of the market, hence the constant insistence on a 
role for the state. As Johstone and Newell suggest:
In short, within sustainability transitions literatures ‘the state’ has been an 
assumed but underconceptualised, secondary aspect in explorations of 
socio-technical transitions and niche development. ( Johnstone & Newell, 
2018:74)
Johnstone and Newell identify five implicit assumptions about the nature and role 
of the state in the ST literature ( Johnstone & Newell, 2018:74–76). Firstly, there 
is rising awareness of the key role of state institutions in accelerating transitions. 
The supportive role of state institutions in the rapid rise of renewable energy 
across all world regions is a case in point (Mazzucato, 2015). Secondly, there is 
growing recognition of the political role played by coalitions of incumbents that 
resist STs. They can use state institutions, and equally state institutions can be used 
against them. Thirdly, it is becoming increasingly clear that state institutions will 
be required to actively destabilise and discontinue unsustainable socio-technical 
regimes (e.g., oil-based motor vehicle engines) – they are unlikely to simply wither 
away in the face of landscape pressures and niche innovations. Fourthly, the rising 
number of case studies of STs reveals how significant each context is. Regimes, 
niches and transition pathways are profoundly embedded within – and shaped 
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by – the dynamics of each specific context. How these dynamics pan out in South 
Africa will be very different in South Korea, or Europe, or Brazil. Fifthly, despite the 
foregoing four trends, when the state is discussed in the ST literature there is little 
recognition of its relational nature. Instead, ‘[s]trict dividing lines often persist in 
relation to “state”, “market” and “civil society’’’, and as a result the ‘processual and 
dynamic nature of the state in configuring geometries of power between different 
actors … remains largely unexplored’ ( Johnstone & Newell, 2018:75).
Rethinking governance
Drawing from cutting-edge thinking in contemporary political economy, 
Johnstone and Newell proceed to suggest five particular ‘dimensions of state 
power’ ( Johnstone & Newell, 2018:75) that align closely with Jessop’s strategic-
relational approach. Firstly, the assemblages of state institutions evolved historically 
in ways that are specific to each regional and national context. This is why an 
understanding of the dynamics of STs cannot be simplistically derived from 
global dynamics. Contextual specificity matters. The role of the ‘mineral-energy-
complex’ in the South African case is a case in point ( Jaglin & Dubresson, 2016). 
Secondly, the political economy of energy is such that there are global geo‑strategic 
interdependencies that can enhance or constrain energy transitions at the national 
and local levels. For example, states use commercial and military means to 
secure and protect access to fossil fuel supplies in global markets in ways that can 
constrain the expansion of renewables at the national level. The former South 
African president’s determination to procure a Russian nuclear power plant is a 
good example. But the drastic drop in prices of renewables in South Africa due to 
subsidies in other jurisdictions has the opposite effect. Thirdly, there are always 
multiple centres of power in any state system. This is why it is often meaningless to 
talk about ‘the state’ as if it exists in reality as a single unified entity. It can exist as 
an idea or political project, but in reality, it is an assemblage of diverse institutions. 
Fourthly, a relational approach to governance means accepting there are no neat 
dividing lines between polities and societies. State institutions reflect and refract 
particular sets of interests, sometimes in contradictory ways. This often renders 
references to ‘the state’ as distinct from ‘the market’ and ‘civil society’ somewhat 
meaningless. The dependence of economic growth on affordable energy supplies, 
for example, often gives large energy providers a privileged place in the polity 
which they use to protect their positions and systems. Again, this is reflected in 
the way the South Africa polity has worked. Fifthly, there is ‘insufficient attention 
to the material implications of certain technologies in shaping institutional routines 
and practices that may influence the directionality of sustainability transitions’ 
( Johnstone & Newell, 2018:78, emphasis added). In short, as in the South 
Africa case, the dominance of the ‘mineral-energy-complex’ not only retards the 
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diversification of the economy and reinforces social exclusion; it is also premised 
on the ‘normalisation’ of a particular set of technological practices that get inscribed 
into policies, laws and regulatory regimes that serve to (wittingly and unwittingly) 
exclude potentially more productive and inclusionary alternatives.
Whether or not the directionality of the transition to more sustainable modes of 
production and consumption (SDG 12) is oriented towards a just transition (SDGs  
1 and 10) will depend on power dynamics within the polity. With Johnstone and 
Newell’s framework in mind, according to Jessop, the polity is:
the institutional matrix that establishes a distinctive terrain, realm, domain, 
field, or region of specifically political actions. … Further, while the polity 
offers a rather static, spatial referent, politics is inherently dynamic, open-
ended, and heterogeneous. ( Jessop, 2016:17) 
Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational approach’ is useful for understanding the contemporary 
state in both the developed and developing world contexts ( Jessop, 2016). He 
argues that from the 1970s onwards there has been a gradual ‘de-centering’ of 
the polity as the state ‘retreated’ (to use the word Strange used in the 1990s (see 
Strange, 1996) as the primary driver of the policies that shape the future. The result 
is the emergence of a polity that is far more complex than what existed in the old 
state-centric polities. Polities have evolved into complex semi-institutionalised 
partner-based assemblages and dynamic sets of transactions. In the academic and 
policy literature, the notion of ‘governance’ emerged to capture this shift away 
from state-centric conceptions of the polity (Hajer, 2009; Jessop, 2003; Kooiman, 
1993; Offe, 2009). Research agendas also moved away from a preoccupation with 
structures of government to the relational dynamics of governance. Out of these 
emerged what Schot and colleagues refer to as ‘frame 3’ policy-making: a multi-
stakeholder, multi-goal process that requires a far more complex set of institutions 
and leadership skills (Schot & Steinmuller, 2016). Governance, however, is less 
about the long-term directionality of the polity, and more about relational and 
dialogical management of complexity over the short term (Offe, 2009). It is, in 
short, the outcome of political weakening and has, unsurprisingly, generated 
a reaction. Jessop argues there is a counter-trend initiated by forward-looking 
political leaders with long-term visions who are interested in the ‘governance of 
governance’, which is what he refers to as ‘collibration’. This consists of a new set 
of intermediary public institutions that have the capacity and mandate to set the 
terms of governance so that the directionality of the relational polity is determined 
politically rather than through a constellation of negotiated deals.
Jessop’s notion of ‘collibration’ is useful because it addresses a dilemma at the centre 
of the African literature on developmental statism, namely the tension between 
complexity and directionality. For those committed to social democracy, socialism 
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or inclusive development, a return to state-centric polities is essential for achieving 
this kind of long-term directionality (Mitchell & Fazi, 2017; Zenawi, 2011). For 
former Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, contra neoliberal economics, the 
‘activist developmental state’ must be autonomous – but necessarily democratic 
– in order to catalyse accelerated development (Zenawi, 2011). However, this 
assumes that complexity can be rolled back. Under conditions of increasing 
complexity in a globalised digitalised information-rich world, directionality is 
unlikely to be achieved by returning to state-centric polities. The alternative lies 
in Jessop’s notion of ‘collibration’ – the emergence of a new generation of meta-
governance institutions mandated to foster the ‘governance of governance’. The 
core skill required for this is process facilitation.
Drawing on a synthesis of Jessop’s conceptions of the polity and Wilson’s ‘policy 
regime’ theory, a more nuanced conception of the polity starts to emerge (Wilson, 
2000). This is useful for making sense of the kinds of ‘sustainability-oriented 
polities’ that would be required in the African context to drive a just transition.
The polity can be understood as the space or arena that demarcates a specific 
constellation of political and quasi-political actors engaged in a defined set of 
contestations to influence policy outcomes and the actual roles of particular state 
apparatuses. This constellation of actors usually share a sufficient consensus about 
a set of ground rules for conducting the business of everyday politics within and 
outside the formal institutions of the state apparatus. These actors (interests) 
subscribe to certain underlying beliefs about the legitimacy of the system, how 
institutions are controlled in various ways, and the way cooperation and opposition 
work. They get organised into competing factions or alliances – and related policy 
networks – to secure advantages in the policy-making space and the wider polity. In 
other words, a polity goes beyond the governing elite and the state apparatuses that 
the DS literature has tended to focus on. 
The nature and character of the polity demarcate the space within which the 
political game is conducted across various arenas (parliament, executive, media, 
civil society, judiciary, local/regional space-economies, organised business, 
policy networks, personal networks and business sectors). Within this space, all 
the key actors operate in ways that more or less reproduce the overall stability 
of the political system. Their differences are contestations over the direction of 
policy in ways that do not subvert the overall coherence of that political system. 
Some actors, however, operate within the polity on these terms, but also either 
directly or indirectly act via proxies outside and against the polity and the way it 
is configured. These political hybrids have demands that could be revolutionary 
in nature (i.e. replacement of the polity by a completely different configuration of 
political and institutional arrangements), or reformist (i.e. for the reconfiguration 
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of one or more fundamental dimensions of the polity, such as, for example, reduced 
influence of big business or constitutional reform to reduce the powers of the head 
of state). This approach can help understand the dynamics of political instability in 
African polities. Without a sufficiently broad consensus across political elites that 
the polity is an appropriate space within which to engage in political competition, 
the result is episodic political instability. This has been a common phenomenon 
across different African regions.
Policy regime theory suggests that the polity has four dimensions (Wilson, 2000). 
The first of these is where power relations are played out and reproduced within the 
polity. This refers to how political power is constituted, distributed and maintained 
by the ‘power elite’ (Wright Mills, 1956). This applies in particular to the governing 
party and its allies within and outside government. Second, there is usually a shared 
underlying policy paradigm, in particular at the sectoral level (e.g., coal-based energy 
generation) but also at the macro-economic level (e.g., a belief in neoclassical 
approaches to fiscal discipline and monetary policy). A policy paradigm 
incorporates a specific set of beliefs/assumptions which, in turn, determines how 
policy problems are defined (e.g., a faith in markets, or a commitment to the SDGs). 
A shared policy paradigm is understood and narrated by the different policy actors 
who engage in the everyday business of politics, which is why a shared language 
emerges to enter into dialogue and negotiation. 
Thirdly, there is the way government and state institutions are organised and 
legitimised. Although this reflects the underlying power relations and paradigm 
commitments, these power relations do not always determine how a government 
is organised. Organising principles get institutionalised and can have a relative 
autonomy and constitutional fixity that can be at odds at times with the underlying 
power dynamics. This happened in South Africa during Jacob Zuma’s presidency 
(2011–2017) when the Constitution came to be regarded as an obstacle in the 
way of ‘radical economic transformation’. Arguably this is also what is happening 
as the Trump presidency acts against a wide range of constitutional norms. 
Fourthly, there is the policy content of the policies themselves that are debated and 
adopted by policy actors within a given polity – this being the traditional focus of 
policy analysis. 
This four-dimensional conception of the polity is useful for revealing how 
fundamental policy change (fourth dimension) cannot take place without changes 
in the three dimensions of the policy that the fourth depends on: if power relations 
and the policy paradigm do not change, how can we expect the real substance of 
policy content to change? 
Inclusive governance for sustainable development in Africa  |      273
The rise of governance since the 1970s is essentially about the organisation and 
outward expansion of the polity to incorporate policy actors that were previously 
excluded from having any influence on policy. Much of this was to compensate for 
the weakening of the state as complexities mounted. However, collibration is the 
counter-trend, referring to the way key actors within the polity seek –  with varying 
degrees of success – to harness and mobilise governance and, indeed, complexity 
more generally. It is this kind of ‘governance of governance’ that has the potential to 
guide and shape long-term structural transformation. 
The key contribution made by policy regime theory is that it helps explain policy 
‘lock in’ by referring to the complex interaction between all four dimensions of 
the polity, without assuming a priori that any one dimension determines any of 
the others. Determination, after all, is context-specific. This goes way beyond the 
traditional purview of the policy analysis community which is essentially locked into 
dimension 4 (policy content) and to some extent dimension 3 (organisation of 
government). However, the experience of policymakers and a considerable body 
of research suggests that policies do in fact reflect underlying power dynamics 
(dimension 1) and paradigm commitments (dimension 2), and therefore unless 
these are changed, changes in dimensions 3 and 4 will be unlikely. Each context, 
however, will be different. In some instances, policy change (dimension 4) can drive 
changes in the other dimensions (especially policy shifts driven by global dynamics 
or local crises), while in other contexts nothing changes until the underlying power 
dynamics (dimension 1) change, or the policy paradigm shifts in response to 
cultural or knowledge-related trends (e.g., the impact of environmental thinking). 
In reality, polities tend to change in response to ‘stressors’ and ‘enablers’ (Wilson, 
2000), often represented by some kind of external shock to the system (e.g., an 
‘upset’ election, corruption scandal, economic crash, violent conflict, assassination, 
re-alignment of political forces in the governing party, mass uprisings, constitutional 
crisis or warfare). Stressors can emerge when new power players emerge and/or 
external dynamics force policy changes. Examples of enablers would be a paradigm 
shift, such as the gradual realisation that climate change needs to be addressed in 
some way. As a consequence of a shock (or series of shocks) and the nature of the 
enablers and stressors, the dynamics and character of the polity will change through 
some contextually specific combination of power shifts (dimension 1), paradigm 
shifts (dimension 2), a legitimacy crisis (dimension 3), and organisational and 
policy change (dimension 4). A re-alignment of forces and dynamics within the 
polity can emerge from any one of these dimensions, although dimension 1 is 
where the most significant shifts will most often originate.
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As will be shown below, developmentally-oriented polities at the heart of DSs 
reflected the underlying constellation of forces (dimension 1) that were united 
behind a particular developmental paradigm (dimension 2). Government was 
re-organised from time to time (including successive phases of nationalisation 
and de-nationalisation of industries), and long-term policies were crafted and 
implemented by relatively strong bureaucratic elites. STs would require a similar 
alignment to sustain a long-term commitment to structural transformation via a 
just transition, but to date, there is no equivalent stable pattern for STs as in the case 
of the DSs. As will be shown, East Asian DSs were forced to adopt environmental 
policies (dimension 4) because of external pressures (environmental regulations 
adopted by trading partners) that caused a paradigm shift of sorts (dimension 2). 
The introduction of feed-in tariffs in Germany that triggered the renewable energy 
transition in that country was a policy change (dimension 4) (Debor, 2018), but 
reflected a deeper shift in power as the greens and the environmental movement 
got stronger (dimension 1) and an environmental paradigm shift took place that 
transcended party-political divisions (dimension 2). 
Structural transformation, just transitions and the shaping of the polity 
The purpose of the existing DSs was to drive the long-term structural transformation 
process of economic development (most commonly via industrialisation and 
urbanisation) in order to achieve a high level of human wellbeing with respect 
to income, education and health. Building on the ST literature, an ST can only 
be envisaged if a specific combination of state apparatuses facilitates a long-term 
structural transformation process that results in socio-technical transitions to 
more sustainable modes of production and consumption, with special reference to 
decarbonisation, resource efficiency and ecosystem restoration. When these two 
conceptual frameworks and associated goals are combined, it becomes possible to 
imagine a just transition.
A DS, however, is not merely defined by the goals it is committed to. The DS 
literature has paid considerable attention to the capacity of the state to instigate 
transformative developmental processes, paying special attention to the emergence 
of a (sufficiently uncorrupted) developmental bureaucracy and a well-entrenched 
policy management system. In short, this is about the way political leadership 
went about constructing and organising a developmentally-oriented polity 
and, in particular, quite an authoritarian mode of collibration. In many African 
countries, including South Africa, a developmentally-oriented form of collibration 
morphed into neo-patrimonialism (Chipkin & Swilling, 2018; Khan, 2004; Pitcher 
et al., 2009). 
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In contrast, the emphasis in the ST literature (and the transition management 
literature in particular) on collaborative stakeholder engagement reflects quite a 
sanguine view of governance. There is little appreciation of politics and practice 
collibration – the ‘governance of governance’ – as a specific responsibility of 
purpose-built state institutions mandated to set the goals and rules of the game for 
achieving long-term structural transformation via a just transition. Broadening out 
governance to improve stakeholder participation for its own sake ultimately makes 
little real difference other than creating an illusion of legitimation.
The ST literature on East Asia, is, however, somewhat different. Angel and 
Rock show how the considerable governance capacity of the East Asian DSs to 
drive development in ways that contradicted the neo-liberal script (because it 
was so interventionist) has become very useful for driving STs in response to 
environmental landscape pressures, in particular those globalisation dynamics 
that require East Asian economies to be ‘greened’ (Angel & Rock, 2009; Rock 
et al., 2009). However, they correctly point out that landscape pressures, in general, 
are too diffuse and contradictory to be useful for isolating ‘landscape variables in 
directing transition processes’ (Rock et al., 2009:242). As a solution, they proffer 
the notion of a ‘socio-political landscape’ to refer to the ‘institutions, values and 
regulations broadly guiding an economy’ (Rock et al., 2009:242). This seems 
similar to the notion of the ‘polity’ as deployed in this chapter. However, given 
that the defining feature of landscape pressures is that they are long term and slow-
moving, calling this a ‘landscape’ seems like a misnomer – the strategic coalitioning 
and political actions needed to guide structural transformation via a just transition 
are by no means slow-moving and are not nearly as long term as socio-technical 
landscape pressures like climate change, demographic change, resource depletion 
and values change. It, therefore, makes sense to retain the notion of the polity that 
recognises the highly contingent nature of power dynamics and political action.
The conception of the polity advocated in this chapter addresses the challenge 
faced by the ST literature to conceptualise the role of politics and state, and it 
goes beyond the narrow institutionalist perspective that tends to pervade most 
accounts of the DS in the DS literature. This analysis makes it possible to suggest 
that a just transition becomes a realistic outcome if a developmental sustainability-
oriented polity emerges. This would entail agreement within the polity that the 
overall goal of development is human wellbeing (income, education and health) 
within a sustainable world (decarbonisation, resource efficiency and ecosystem 
restoration). For this integrated goal to shape the direction of development, broader 
socio-technical and social-ecological landscape pressures would have to be seen by 
key actors within the polity as nudging historical processes in a way that reinforces 
the normative claims of these goal statements. Game-changing dynamics emerging 
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from niche innovations and experiments should also be coalescing around viable 
future alternatives and coalescing into alternative socio-technical regimes (Avelino 
et al., 2014). However, the structural transformations needed for a just transition 
(at all four levels of transition) will only be achieved when there is a developmental 
sustainability-oriented polity led by a strategic coalition of interests that shares this 
paradigm, uses state institutions to drive a just transition and adopts an appropriate 
policy and legislative programme that is aligned with the overall goal. 
Sustainability-oriented development trajectories in Africa?
The front page of an edition of The Economist magazine in 2000 depicted Africa 
as ‘the hopeless continent’. In its 3 December 2011 edition just over a decade later 
Africa was depicted as ‘the hopeful continent’ and has since waxed lyrical about 
‘Africa Rising’. For eight out of the ten years to 2011, economic growth rates in 
sub-Saharan Africa were higher than in East Asia, and six of the ten fastest-growing 
economies by 2015 were African. This kind of upbeat hype about African growth 
was also reflected in a spate of reports by leading consulting companies (Ernst & 
Young,  2011; McKinsey Global Institute, 2010; Monitor, 2009) and financial 
institutions (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2011; World Bank, 2011) that 
provided extensive data to back up their optimism. 
However, at an African Union summit of Ministers of Finance and Economics 
in Abuja 27–31 March 2014, there were repeated warnings that this economic 
boom is too dependent on the extraction and export of primary resources.3 
Primary resources still make up 86 percent of exports into non-African markets 
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] & African Union 
[AU], 2014:17). There seemed to be complete consensus at this summit that unless 
Africa implements what was repeatedly referred to as ‘structural transformation’, 
the economic fortunes of African economies will be determined by the notoriously 
unstable global commodity markets. Furthermore, extractive industries are seen to 
benefit only a narrow band of employees and shareholders with limited backward 
and forward linkages within the domestic economies.
The challenge, therefore, is how new political coalitions can emerge within African 
polities who realise the need to ensure that resource rents from the extractive sector 
are re-invested in the diversification of African economies to ensure sustained long-
term economic growth. It is this process of change that is referred to in African 
discussions as ‘structural transformation’. However, as Paul Collier has argued, the 
more dependent an economy becomes on the exploitation of natural endowments, 
the less incentive it has to diversify (Collier, 2010). This, in essence, is what the 
‘resource curse’ is all about. Key consequences are state failure and resource 
3 Personal observations by Mark Swilling, who attended the AU Summit. 
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wars resulting from entrenched corporate and elite practices that prevent the 
re-investment of resource rents (Swilling, 2013). 
No other region has had to face the challenge of development by paying attention 
to the resource requirements, carbon emissions and biodiversity impacts of 
development. Ignoring this challenge will mean that the African Union Vision 
2063 will not be realised. More significantly, not tackling this challenge will 
mean ignoring the aspirations of Africa’s youth majority, many of whom are now 
concentrated in Africa’s cities which is where the third wave of African uprisings is 
taking place (Branch & Mampilly, 2015). The first wave got rid of colonialism in 
the late 1950s/early 1960s; the second got rid of the dictatorships (and apartheid) 
in the 1980s/90s. In August 2016, 272 activists from the movements driving 
the third wave of uprisings met in Arusha, Tanzania, and issued the Kilimanjaro 
Declaration. One of the six ‘declarations’ were as follows:
Africa is a rich continent. That wealth belongs to all our People, not to a narrow 
political and economic elite. We need to fight for economic development that 
is just and embraces social inclusion and environmental care. We have a right 
to the ‘better life’ our governments have promised. (Africans Rising, 2016)
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, which has traditionally 
ignored the need to consider sustainability issues, completely changed its tune in its 
2016 Report (UNECA, 2016), which built on the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) call for ‘sustainable structural transformation’ 
(UNCTAD, 2012). UNECA recognised in this report the significance of the 
adoption of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on climate in 2015. 
The starting point for UNECA is the argument it has mounted for many years now: 
‘high rates of growth over the past decade have not translated into the structural 
transformation of the economy. Manufacturing, also, has not made the expected 
contribution to aggregate output, trade or gross domestic product’ (UNECA, 
2016:53). Indeed, manufacturing now contributes less in percentage terms to GDP 
than it did 30 years ago! In its previous three reports, UNECA emphasised building 
state capabilities for fostering industrial policies, with a focus on commodities, 
trade and dynamic interventionist policy management. In its 2016 report, UNECA 
goes beyond this economistic focus and follows thinking that has emerged from 
the International Resource Panel (Swilling, 2016b) by recognising that ‘decoupling 
of growth from resource use’ (UNECA, 2016:59) provides a major opportunity for 
African economies to ‘be among the leaders in designing the new global low-carbon 
economy’ (UNECA, 2016:55). A three-pronged rationale for this conclusion 
is provided: decoupling will spur ‘structural transformation’ (echoing the 
UNCTAD report), ‘increase knowledge intensity in production’, and ‘sustain global 
competitiveness’ in a world committed to decarbonisation (UNECA,  2016:55). 
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Significantly, by industrialisation UNECA does not simply mean manufacturing 
–  instead it can be defined as ‘promoting higher-productivity growth’ across the 
whole economic system by making sure that governments develop ‘capabilities 
to enable their enterprises to compete in global value chains, promote technical 
and economic innovation, develop new sectors (such as green industries), and 
diffuse new technologies (renewables, for example)’ (UNECA, 2016:63). UNECA 
concluded that African governments ‘need to understand how they can launch 
and sustain a holistic process of economic transformation, which greens the entire 
system, and drive the economy in a different manner from business as usual’ 
(UNECA, 2016:65).
UNECA describes three strategies for achieving this, namely ‘transitioning out of 
brown industries; greening existing industries by increasing resource productivity, 
cutting pollution, and managing chemicals more safely; and creating new green 
enterprises, such as producing green capital goods, generating renewable energy 
and providing environmental advisory services’ (UNECA, 2016:69). Significantly, 
the UNECA report repeatedly emphasises that greening includes but is not limited 
to decarbonisation – it is, rather, primarily about resource productivity. This is why 
both are seen as sources of growth driven by innovation, a way of improving trade 
balances, fostering regional integration through cooperation to support innovation, 
stimulating resource efficiency, catalysing knowledge intensity, reducing pollution, 
and restoring ecosystems. Understood in this way, ‘green industrialisation can 
contribute to faster, more equitable and more sustainable patterns of growth’. This is 
a long-term commitment, and ‘[s]trategic vision and leadership at the highest level 
are thus critical to inclusive green industrialisation’ (UNECA, 2016:70–71). These 
normative policy prescriptions are all well and good, but the UNECA document 
and similar perspectives lack an adequate theory of governance that takes politics, 
power and the limits of governance seriously enough. 
Rethinking governance for development in Africa
The implications of the argument thus far for the African literature on develop-
mental states and governance are as follows:
  in the SDG era, the traditional debate about African developmental states must 
now engage the literature on sustainability transitions in order to conceptualise 
sustainability-oriented developmental states; 
  given increasing complexity in a globalised digitised world, the desire to rebuild 
state-centric polities (‘developmental states’) seems unlikely to succeed because 
it of necessity will entail the reduction rather than expansion of complexity;
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 yet, at the same time, the need for purposive directionality to tackle the great 
African challenges of inequality and unsustainability has never been greater;
  hence the usefulness of the notion of collibratory governance – it is a notion 
that makes it possible to reconcile the reality of increasing complexity and the 
normative strategic need for directionality; 
  collibratory governance in practice is about building a new generation of meta-
governance institutions with a mandate and capabilities to facilitate new modes 
of partnering within reconfigured more inclusive polities;
  polities, however, are not merely black boxes – analysis must address the four 
dimensions of the polity that interact in context-specific ways, namely power 
relations, paradigms, organisation/institutionalisation and policy content.  
The African debates will be revisited from this perspective: how do we rethink 
African polities in light of the need to transition to sustainability-oriented 
developmental states with requisite capabilities for fostering sustainable 
infrastructure development?
The eloquent contributions to a remarkable online edited collection by the 
most respected analysts of African governance (Noman et al., 2011) provide a 
conceptually sophisticated and empirically-rich body of scholarship about the 
trajectories of African governance since decolonisation. The primary argument 
made in different ways across the chapters is that widespread adoption of neo-
liberal economic theory by Western governments, development aid institutions, 
development finance institutions and most economists (academics and 
consultancies) from the late 1970s onwards resulted in the introduction of a raft 
of governance reforms across Africa that failed empirically, not least because they 
were theoretically misguided. The alternative they collectively propose is what 
Khan refers to as ‘growth-enhancing governance’ (Khan, 2011). 
In line with the DS literature already discussed, the overall consensus of the 
contributors the volume edited by Noman et al. (2011) is that economic growth is 
the ultimate end and that state-coordinated structural transformation is the means. 
Without in any way opposing the need for markets of all kinds, they disagree with 
the dominant view that minimising the role of the state will automatically result 
in market efficiencies in African economies. Their alternative is fairly obvious: 
because each context is unique, there cannot be a blueprint applicable to all 
contexts. Instead, institution-building in Africa must be about experimentation 
and incrementalism: experimentation to craft through trial-and-error what works 
in specific contexts, and to incrementally build institutions over time in accordance 
with actually existing capabilities rather than pursuing the delusions of ‘big bangery’ 
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thinking. Concluding his critique of neo-liberal ‘institutional monocropping and 
monotasking’, Mkandawire writes:
One costly feature of the lost decades was the reduction in the space for 
experimentation within Africa and the one-size-fits-all institution-building 
tradition has produced a size that seems to fit no one. (Mkandawire, 2011:28)
Unfortunately, unlike the authors of the UNECA report referred to in the previous 
section, the contributors to the volume edited by Noman et al. (2011) do not 
refer to sustainability challenges. Economic growth is the overriding and exclusive 
goal. This is profoundly ironic: for a group that vehemently insists that context 
matters, it provides an analysis that ignores the profound contextual challenges – 
and opportunities – arising from degraded soils, biodiversity loss, depleted water 
resources, resource inefficiencies and the extra-ordinary opportunities in Africa for 
leapfrogging over fossil-fuel-based energy systems (Africa Progress Panel [APP], 
2015). Indeed, repairing the future may well be Africa’s most significant business 
opportunity in the twenty-first century. It may also hold the key to escaping the 
resource curse. But for this to happen, African conceptions of context-specific 
governance must engage with the literature on sustainability transitions. Without 
this, strategically significant African positions like those articulated in the UNECA 
and APP reports, as well as alignment with the SDGs, will remain unsubstantiated by 
an appropriately rigorous re-conceptualisation of African developmental governance. 
Following the logic of the argument thus far, this engagement must address three 
issues: what a sustainability-oriented developmental state means in the African 
context; why collibratory rather than state-centric governance makes sense; and 
how to rethink the form and content of African polities. 
As the UNECA and APP reports acknowledge, Africa’s opportunity to mount 
authentic context-specific development strategies occurs at precisely the historic 
moment when it is generally accepted that all future development has to occur within 
‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockström et al., 2009). No other major world region has 
faced the development challenge within a carbon- and resource-constrained world. 
Ignoring this reality could result in the subversion of development strategies focused 
exclusively on growth. This can, however, be a major developmental opportunity 
if the transition to an ecologically more sustainable world is conceptualised as an 
intrinsic part of the overall commitment to inclusive development in Africa. For 
this purpose, the conceptual distinctions between landscape pressures, socio-
technical regimes and innovation niches offered by the ST literature can help orient 
the experimental and incrementalist institution-building modalities advocated by 
Noman et al. (2011). This is illustrated here by some brief examples. 
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The continent-wide commitment to accelerated infrastructure investments will 
propel African economies into the twenty-first century. Infrastructures are long-
lasting and play a key role in conducting resource flows through modern socio-
economic systems (Hoornweg & Freire, 2013; Swilling, Robinson, Marvin & 
Hodson, 2013; World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2014). 
As the APP report reveals, electrical generation capacity in sub-Saharan Africa 
is equal to what exists in Spain! If Africa energises using fossil fuels, none of the 
climate targets agreed in Paris will be achieved. The world has an interest in Africa 
energising using renewables. And renewables are now cheaper than fossil fuels and 
arguably more technologically robust in countries with weak national grids. In 
short, with climate change and associated global agreements as landscape pressures, 
African developmental states could target renewables as the primary energy regimes 
of African economies. This would open up a myriad of niche-level innovation 
opportunities. Indeed, for countries like South Africa with a manufacturing 
base, such a strategic decision could drive a massive manufacturing boom. There 
are many similar examples with respect, for example, to food systems and agro-
ecological farming to restore the degraded soils, new modes of sustainable water 
governance appropriate for water constrained countries, and radically different 
approaches to urban planning aimed at limiting suburban sprawl and maximising 
the use of public transit (Swilling, 2016a; Swilling et al., 2016).
It is remarkable that while the contributors to the volume by Noman et  al.
(2011) continuously emphasise learning, context-specific institution-building, 
experimentation and incrementalism, they say virtually nothing about how this gets 
done in practice. Furthermore, they also emphasise the importance of collaboration 
between sectors and stakeholders, rather than assuming that for-profit private 
sector organisations are the only viable agents of change (see Zenawi’s discussion 
of state-aided growth-oriented ‘rent creation’, Khan’s discussion of state-supported 
emerging entrepreneurs and Zalk’s conception of industrial policies (Khan, 2011; 
Zalk, 2011; Zenawi, 2011). Again, no reference is made to how these relationships 
are formed and sustained, or who does this work. This neglect of the how of 
governance is all-pervasive in the African literature on governance. 
The argument between state-centric and minimal state positions suffers from a 
failure to distinguish between what Jessop calls the ‘idea of the state’ and the ‘reality 
of the state’ ( Jessop, 2016). The ‘idea of the state’ is a legitimate political project, 
thus making it the subject of debates on the role ‘it’ plays vis-à-vis the market and 
civil society. However, ‘the state’ does not exist in reality. The ‘reality of the state’ is 
a ramshackle assemblage of a range of quite different institutions, from national 
government departments, to subnational governments, parastatals, development 
finance institutions, regulatory and enforcement agencies (like the police). To assume 
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they all form part of a single unified ‘it’ that acts out in a specific way (as implied by 
phrases like ‘role of the state’ or even ‘state intervention) is a complete misnomer. 
Furthermore, in reality there are no clear boundary lines between ‘the state’, the 
‘market’ and ‘civil society’. From the perspective of Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational 
approach’, in reality, state institutions enrol a vast range of actors from within and 
outside the polity and, as such, cannot be assumed a priori to exist in a coherent 
form. They need to get built and specific people need to be the institution-builders. 
State institutions are generally responsible for one or two of the five primary 
governance functions, namely policy formulation (departments, legislatures), 
regulation (departments, special purpose agencies), enforcement (police, tax 
authorities), implementation (departments, subnational governments) and 
evaluation (departments, legislatures, independent agencies). Collibratory 
governance is about recognising the need for a fourth function, namely facilitation. 
To reconcile directionality and complexity (especially if sustainability-oriented 
development becomes the goal) without returning to state-centric polities, it 
will be necessary to build a new set of institutions with facilitation capabilities. 
These become the institution-builders and maintainers. An excellent example 
is the Economic Development Partnership (EDP) in South Africa’s Western 
Cape Province. Set up by government, the EDP comprises 25  professionals 
whose exclusive role is the facilitation of partnerships between, in the first 
instance, government departments across different spheres of government, and 
then also between government and non-state organisations in the private and 
non-profit sectors.  
Finally, it is necessary to move away from a ‘black box’ approach to the African 
polity. Following the argument made earlier in this chapter, detailed granular 
analyses of the inner dynamics of the polity will be necessary. This will need to 
include, firstly, an understanding of the underlying power relations at the very heart 
of the polity (for a good example see Chipkin and Swilling, 2018). Without this, 
facilitated collibratory governance to widen stakeholder involvement in the polity 
will be impossible.  Secondly, an understanding of the potential and limitations 
of the (sometimes even contradictory) paradigm(s) shared by key actors within 
the polity will be required. Without this, learning and innovation will be difficult 
to achieve. Thirdly, how state/government institutions are organised, funded 
and operated will be necessary. This is where ‘lock-in’ and path dependency sets 
in, often conditioning constrained parameters within which policy alternatives 
are considered. Effective collibratory governance may entail reconfiguring and 
reassembling these institutions. Finally, if policy formulation includes taking into 
account all four dimensions of the polity, the chances are much greater that viable 
and implementable policies will be adopted.
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Conclusions
This chapter addressed the question of how best to understand the relationship 
between developmental processes and STs in Africa, with special reference to 
the political dynamics of developmental states. This has become an especially 
important challenge in light of resource-induced economic growth in many African 
economies. These countries want to implement a twentieth-century conception 
of accelerated development inspired by the East Asian industrialisers, but now 
in a climate- and resource-constrained world. Most important of all, after the 
publication of the UN SDGs in August 2015, the global discourse is shifting from 
the old ‘MDGs-plus-green economy’ framework to the globally approved SDG 
framework that firmly and irrevocably inserts the ‘people-planet-prosperity-peace-
partnership’ paradigm into official definitions of sustainable development at global 
and national levels. 
Both the DS and ST literature acknowledge that structural transformation is 
needed, but each with respect to the hitherto separated goals of human wellbeing 
(and more narrowly economic development) and sustainability (and more 
narrowly environmental improvements). Building on the emerging literature on 
East Asia and South Africa that attempts to fuse these separate research trajectories, 
it was argued that an integrated conception of structural transformation will be 
needed that is driven by a commitment to both the goals of human wellbeing 
and sustainability. However, the expected just transition this could give rise to 
will not happen simply because there is a shared normative commitment, as is 
now reflected in the adoption of the SDGs. Nor will much progress be made by 
formulating bland managerialist policy prescriptions that ignore underlying 
power dynamics and paradigm differences. An adequate fusion of the core body of 
concepts in the DS and ST literature will need to make space for an understanding 
of the political dynamics of the polity. The polity is a space of policy-related action 
and engagement by a wide range of actors within and outside the formal political 
system that operates in four dimensions: power dynamics, paradigm commitments, 
state organisation and policy programmes. The sustainability-oriented effects (and 
their counter-vailing tendencies) at landscape, regime and niche levels are played 
out within the polity, resulting in changes over time in power dynamics, paradigms 
shifts, state organisation adaptations and the adoption of new policies. 
In light of the adoption of the SDGs and the circulation of the UNECA and APP 
reports, it will be necessary to conduct many more case studies in the African 
context where developmental and sustainability goals need to be reconciled in 
order to achieve the just transition envisaged by these initiatives. This chapter has 
contributed an approach that could guide this kind of future research.
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INDICATORS 
ON TRANSFORMATIONAL 




As the term suggests, an ‘indicator’ is an instrument that provides an indication 
generally used to describe and/or give an order of magnitude to a given condition. 
There is a significant similarity between the terms ‘indicator’ and ‘index’ and 
the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. However, there are important 
differences at the level of aggregation and representation. Indicators generally 
provide information on the historical and current state of a given system and are 
particularly useful to highlight trends that can shed light on causal relations among 
the elements composing the system. On the other hand, an index is a composite 
statistic – a measure of changes in a representative group of individual data points, 
or in other words, a compound measure that aggregates multiple indicators. 
Indices are particularly useful to summarise and rank specific observations based 
on aggregating multiple indicators.
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Various indicators have been developed over many decades to measure economic 
and social development. Gross domestic product (GDP), which is used to 
indicate the trend in economic growth of national economies, is probably the 
most prominent and famous among these indicators. During the latter part of 
the twentieth century, economists tried to find ways to relate economic growth 
with social development. Arguably, the most prominent among the indicators 
and indices which emerged is the human development index (HDI), which was 
pioneered by the Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen. The need for developing a set 
of indicators to measure progress towards sustainable development, covering 
economic social and environmental sustainability, was globally recognised at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. A different set of sustainable development indicators and 
indices have been developed since then.
The urgency for transformational change in national development efforts received 
unprecedented global consensus and support in 2015. This resulted in the adoption 
of Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the signing of the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change. At the regional level, Africa endorsed its own 
Agenda 2063, which aspires to transform the region along the line of Agenda 2030. 
As noted in the first chapter of this book, Africa has a unique opportunity to seize 
this transformational moment and leapfrog to a more inclusive, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient economy.
The overall purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for measuring the 
progress of African countries in building the transformational infrastructure that 
are covered in this book as a basis for the transition to a wellbeing economy. The 
chapter provides a review of economic development indicators with a focus on 
GDP as a national development indicator and the alternative indicators related to 
sustainable development. This is followed by a discussion on key principles and 
procedures pertaining to sustainable indicators and sustainability assessment. 
The final section provides a generic framework for a ‘leapfrogging indicator to a 
wellbeing economy’ that could be adopted and used by African countries.
Economic development indicators
Indicators are essential instruments in informing policy and decision-makers about 
the current state and future trends of a given system and/or process. The use of 
indicators for measuring organisational performance has been around for a couple 
of centuries. However, the use of indicators for measuring policy performance and 
development targets has become more significant in recent decades. A combination 
of different indicators might be necessary to describe complex phenomena, where 
different concurring causes and effects have to be measured and compared. As a 
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general rule, the choice and combination of indicators should be based on available 
data, the information needed by policymakers, and policy priorities (Pintér, Hardi, 
Martinuzzi & Hall, 2012). 
Both quantitative and qualitative information can be used to define an indicator, 
depending on the issue that needs to be analysed, as well as on the availability and 
quality of data. Quantitative indicators provide a standardised and measurable 
description of a given phenomenon, thereby allowing for a more consistent and 
universal comparison across time and space. Qualitative indicators are often 
expressed quantitatively (e.g., ranks, percentages) to facilitate trend identification 
and comparison. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), before being used for the analysis of trends and 
phenomena, indicators should be assessed against some essential features which 
include the following:
  Policy relevance: The indicator needs to address issues that are of (actual or 
potential) public concern relevant to policy-making. The ultimate test of any 
single indicator’s relevance is whether it contributes to the policy process.
  Analytical soundness: Ensuring that the indicator is based on the best available 
science is an essential feature to ensure that the indicator can be trusted.
  Measurability: The need to reflect the reality on a timely and accurate basis, 
and be measurable at a reasonable cost, balancing the long-term nature of 
some environmental, economic and social effects and the cyclicality of others. 
Definitions and data need to allow meaningful comparison across time and 
countries or regions. (OECD, 2010)
Since the middle of the twentieth century, GDP has been the most dominant 
economic development indicator and served well for the promotion of free-
market economy in the early twentieth century. However, alternative development 
indicators started to emerge during the latter part of the century as the dismal 
failure of the free-market economy in terms of addressing social injustices 
and environmental degradation became more and more evident. This section 
explores the main features of GDP and its limitations as a measure of economic 
development. This is followed by a brief review of the major indicators that have 
emerged as an alternative to GDP and the rationale behind it.
Gross domestic product as an economic indicator
Gross domestic product, as it was defined by its creator, is a measure of the 
market value of goods and services produced within an economy in a given period 
(Kuznets, 1934). It has, therefore, been a reasonable indicator to measure the level 
of economic production in a region or country. However, since its inception in 
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the 1930s, GDP has garnered a disproportionate amount of attention and influence 
from both policymakers and the general public, who have come to see it not 
merely as a measure of economic production, but of human wellbeing and social 
progress more broadly (Nahman, Mahumani & De Lange, 2016). Despite the 
recognition of its limitation as a measure for development by its creator, Thomas 
Kuznets, the unlimited use of GDP has made it the most powerful number in the 
world (Fioramonti, 2013). It has been a couple of decades since the limitations of 
conventional development indicators including GDP has been recognised. This 
became more pronounced as the limitation of neo-classical economics in effectively 
addressing environmental externalities and the failure of its ‘trickle-down’ theory in 
addressing inequality became more evident. Given the significant importance and 
attention given to GDP in national policy and planning processes, it is essential to 
understand its major limitations to be able to define appropriate interventions and 
corrective measures.
Besides the caution given by the economist on its use as a measure of human welfare 
(Kuznets, 1934), the limitations of GDP as an indicator of human wellbeing have 
been well documented by different experts and institutions (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2009; Fioramonti, 2013, Nahman et al., 2016; Pepper, 
Jackson & Uzzell, 2009; Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009; Van Den Bergh, 2009). This 
is because human wellbeing is, in the first place, determined by a wide range of 
factors, such as health, education, governance and political voice, social connections 
and relationships, social equity, environmental quality, meaningful work, leisure 
time, and spirituality, that are not adequately captured by GDP (Bartelmus, 2009; 
Costanza et al., 2007; Sen, 1985; Stiglitz et al., 2009). While GDP does tend to 
correlate with some of these factors (e.g., health and education), in other cases the 
relationship is weak, if not harmful (Nahman et al., 2016). 
GDP also fails to account for the depletion of natural capital used in the production 
of economic goods and services, as well as the negative impacts of economic 
activity on human and environmental wellbeing (Arrow, Dasgupta & Maler, 
2003; Fioramonti, 2013; Hamilton, 1994, 1998; Harris, 2007; Van den Bergh, 
2009). Indeed, because GDP only accounts for market transactions, social and 
environmental costs (such as crime and pollution) tend to be counted as ‘benefits’ 
in the calculation of GDP. On the other hand, socially beneficial activities 
occurring outside of formal markets, such as volunteer work and caregiving, are not 
counted in GDP (Fioramonti, 2013). As a result, the relationship between GDP 
and subjective measures of ‘happiness’ or ‘quality of life’ has been increasingly 
called into question. There is also mounting evidence that a narrow focus on GDP 
is at odds with the broader outcomes of sustainable development, particularly 
those relating to environmental wellbeing and social equity (Arrow et al., 2003; 
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Ayres,  1995; Carson, 2010; Daly, 1996; Kallis, 2011; Latouche, 2010; Nahman 
& Antrobus, 2005; Panayotou, 2000; Van den Bergh, 2011; Van den Bergh & De 
Mooij, 2002).
Gross domestic product is measured on a seemingly infinite scale. This led to 
almost blind faith in economic growth that fuelled unlimited and unsustainable 
consumption and resulted in different forms of environmental degradation and 
social destruction. In the absence of a specified maximum threshold and of a more 
balanced set of indicators that are given the same prominence in policy discussions, 
the goal of modern societies has become to simply maximise GDP, irrespective of 
whether doing so actually improves wellbeing, and with little attention paid to the 
negative social and environmental consequences (Nahman et al., 2016). According 
to Fioramonti (2016), the growth ideology, which is reinforced by the neoliberal 
economists, was instrumental in building an idea of success that boosted markets 
and political conservative forces while producing massive inequalities, ecological 
mayhems and social conflicts.
In a recent report in the Finance and Development magazine, ‘Neoliberalism: 
Oversold?’, a group of IMF economists questioned the very foundations of the 
neoliberal approach to growth, arguing that the free-market reforms enforced 
since the 1980s have not generated development but simply increased inequalities 
(Fioramonti, 2013; Ostry, Loungani & Furceri, 2016). An assessment of the specific 
policies related to the promotion of market competition through deregulation 
and limiting of state intervention as the two major planks of neoliberalism led the 
authors to three disquieting conclusions. Firstly, the benefits in terms of increased 
growth seem relatively difficult to establish when looking at a broad group of 
countries. Secondly, the costs in terms of increased inequality are prominent and 
such costs epitomise the trade-off between the growth and equity effects of some 
aspects of the neoliberal agenda. And thirdly, increased inequality, in turn, hurts the 
level and sustainability of growth and advocates of the neoliberal agenda need to 
pay attention to the distributional effects (Ostry et al., 2016).
Many attempts have been made to address the limitations of GDP as an economic 
and social development indicator by introducing additional indicators that 
cover economic and social costs. This includes the efforts made to develop an 
index of sustainable and economic welfare, a measure of economic welfare, and 
a genuine progress indicator. However, while these efforts represent some level 
of improvement on GDP, the primacy to economic outcomes over social and 
environmental outcomes is still dominant in the framing of these indicators. The 
HDI, which was spearheaded by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), has attempted to incorporate the social dimension in a more integrative 
way. However, this effort is based only on indicators relating to life expectancy, 
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education (two indicators) and income – the environmental dimension is entirely 
neglected (Nahman et al., 2016). Other indicators, such as the ecological footprint 
and the environmental performance index (EPI), focus only on the environmental 
dimension and are, therefore, useful only as complements to social and economic 
indicators. Finally, the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) 
provides a rigorous and standardised methodology for integrating the economic 
and environmental dimensions but ignores the social dimension. The gross 
national happiness index is another emerging indicator that has been applied in a 
specific country context such as in the Kingdom of Bhutan.
Sustainable development indicators
The global effort on developing sustainable development indicators that address 
the economic, social and environmental dimension of sustainable development 
has received a new push since the 1990s. While some earlier initiatives could be 
considered as precursors, the importance of developing indicators for sustainable 
development received global recognition by the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) that was held in 1992. As was 
outlined in Chapter 40 of Agenda 21 endorsed during the conference, the critical 
need for quantitative indicators to drive policy formulation and implementation 
was recognised from the early stage of development of the concept of sustainable 
development (United Nations, 1992:347). In the 1990s, many indicator sets, 
dashboards and composite and aggregated indicators or indices have been 
developed by different institutions and research groups resulting in a plethora of 
indicators on sustainable development.
According to Eurostat (2014), the approaches and methods potentially applied to 
developing sustainable development indicator frameworks can be classified into 
two groups: policy-based approaches and conceptual approaches. The former uses 
existing policy and strategy documents as a frame of reference and are typically 
organised according to strategic issues and targets highlighted in the documents, 
while the latter includes a frame of reference independent from political priorities. 
Both approaches function differently with each having its own processes and 
objectives. However, they both have their place in supporting the different 
stages of a policy cycle that covers policy formulation, policy legitimisation, 
policy implementation, policy evaluation and policy change (Hak, Janoušková & 
Moldan, 2016).
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) 
stipulated that indicators for sustainable development have to be relevant, 
methodological sound, measurable, easy to communicate and access, limited in 
numbers and outcome-focused. The criterion for relevance is further comprised 
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of links to the target, policy-relevance, and applicability at the appropriate level 
(UNDESA, 2007). Despite different concepts of policy cycles and diverse 
processes in the development of indicator frameworks, it seems clear that a 
rigorous indicator framework can be neither a purely conceptual framework nor 
only a policy-oriented frame of reference defined basically by specific development 
goals (Hak et al., 2016). This is because policy relevance and applicability at the 
appropriate level fall into the policy framework, while the link to the target is 
secured within the conceptual framework.
Lester King (2016) argues that in seeking to develop indicators with a maximised 
impact, one has to recognise that the function of selected indicators should be a 
significant determining factor. According to Melkers and Willoughby  (2005), 
consistent top-level support, increased knowledge, and organisational capacity are 
the three primary drivers for an effective measurement system. Top-level support 
can be considered a political function of indicators since this is the basis for setting 
work programmes and focus. Hezri and Dovers (2006) call the knowledge function 
as the conceptual use of indicators, and the organisational capacity function as 
the instrumental use of indicators. Based on this, King provides the functional 
classification of sustainability indicators shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1 Functional classification table of sustainability indicators
Value Leadership functions Knowledge increase functions
Capacity assessment 
functions
Intrinsic (governance) Political and operational Problem recognition and 
awareness
Justificatory
Extrinsic (general public) Normative guidance Communication and opinion 
forming
Monitoring, control and 
reporting
(Source: Adapted from King, 2016:23)
Intrinsic and extrinsic functions are described as the importance of sustainability 
indicators to the internal interests of governance groups versus public needs and 
wants. This difference is critical to recognise in developing indicator programs 
since different actors maintain different interests in the realm of public policy 
(Sommer, 2000). The important distinction here between this extrinsic dimension 
and the intrinsic dimension of the leadership function is that the former is meant 
to recognise the function of empowering the general public through normative 
guidance, while the latter is intended to recognise the integration of internal 
political directives from the leading governance units (King, 2016). On the other 
hand, indicators for the extrinsic dimension of the capacity function should be 
defined by the active participation and involvement of local citizens to provide an 
effective monitoring and control function.
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Bringing separate systems, represented by the balance between the economic, social 
and environmental considerations into a holistic framework for policy evaluation 
is the ideal intrinsic dimension of the knowledge function (Brugmann,  1997). 
Consideration of developing more robust indicators that fulfil the extrinsic 
dimension of the knowledge function of indicators include fostering communication 
and plurality of information and understanding the social and cognitive processes 
that affect public choices (Yli-Viikari, 2009). The administrative feature of the 
intrinsic dimension of the capacity assessment function focuses on justifying the 
governance position which includes resource needs, organisational improvements, 
employee motivation and operational control (Holzer & Yang, 2004).
Experience from the last couple of decades has clearly shown that the development 
of sustainability indicators involves the most complex types of appraisal 
methodologies. This is particularly true in the absence of a systems-based approach 
and methodology. When one considers the issue of sustainability, fundamental 
uncertainties arise from the unpredictability of natural and social systems and 
the interactions between them. The very nature of complex adaptive systems 
involves at least two non-reducible sources of uncertainty (Garnåsjordet, Aslaksen, 
Giampietro, Funtowicz & Ericson, 2012). Firstly, any quantitative representation 
based on a given set of measurable attributes sooner or later will become obsolete 
because of systems-evolutionary changes introducing new definitions of relevant 
attributes and issues (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976). Secondly, their organization 
of multiple hierarchical levels requires the adoption of different scales for their 
perception and representation (Allen & Starr, 1982; Simon, 1962) and makes it 
impossible to adopt just a single mathematical model, no matter how complicated 
it might be (Giampietro, Allen & Mayumi, 2006; Rosen, 2000).
The Stiglitz Commission recognises that uncertainty is normative, as they question 
how measures established today may be used to predict the valuations of future 
generations in situations that may have become very different (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
Despite the uncertainty involved, there are numerous sets of sustainable 
development indicators that have been developed both through scientific research 
groups and the inter-governmental process. Some argue that there is a significant 
obsession with numbers that led to an indicators explosion while others call for 
new and better indicators (Hak et al., 2016; Morse, 2013; Riley, 2001). Neither 
the scientific community nor the users know whether this remarkable worldwide 
effort should be more coordinated and regulated or if the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
principle is still the most efficient one (Dahl, 2012). The United Nations Statistics 
Division (UNSD) sees an explicit need to structure the indicators for Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) into a coherent framework to secure the completeness 
of the indicator sets and emphasise linkages among the indicators thereby avoiding 
arbitrariness in the selection process (UNSD, 2015).
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Sustainability assessment and composite indicators
This section discusses composite indicators related to sustainable development. 
It also considers green economy indicators and describes some of the initiatives 
currently underway aimed at developing green economy indicator sets.
Sustainability assessment as a basis
Concepts such as integrated assessment and sustainability assessment are introduced 
to offer new perspectives to impact assessment and indicators development 
geared towards planning and decision-making on sustainable development (Sala, 
Ciuffo & Nijkamp, 2015). Devuyst (2001) defined sustainability assessment as 
a methodology that can help decision-makers and policymakers decide what 
actions they should take and should not take in an attempt to make society more 
sustainable. Verheem (2002) on the other hand states that the goal of sustainability 
assessment is to pursue that plans and activities make an optimal contribution 
towards sustainable development. According to Sala, Farioli and Zamagni (2013), 
performing a coherent sustainability assessment research calls for:
  adopting a holistic approach for understanding the dynamic interaction 
between nature and society and assessing vulnerability and resilience of 
complex social-ecological systems;
  moving from multi-disciplinarity via interdisciplinarity towards trans-
disciplinarity as characterised by functional integration of different 
methodologies and epistemologies, co-production of knowledge, strong links 
with specific social context and institutional settings, and the inclusion of 
relevant values and common goods perceptions (Lang et al., 2012);
  having a normative function by addressing the strategic and operational 
questions of what viable transition pathways could be identified for 
coupled human-environment systems and strategies for finding solutions to 
sustainability problems (Wiek, Ness, Schweizer-Ries, Brand & Fariolli, 2012);
  promoting social learning and mutual feedback leading to co-production of 
knowledge with other stakeholder groups in a collective process of problem 
identification and resolution; and
  dealing with uncertainties by adopting a probabilistic approach for the 
assessment of scenarios is essential to achieve robust decision-making 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993).
There are different sets of principles employed by different research groups 
and institutions in carrying out sustainability assessments. Out of the available 
alterna tives, the Bellagio Sustainability Assessment and Measurement Principles 
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(STAMP), is considered to represent harmonisation of the major principles 
used by experts in the field. These principles were initially developed by a group 
of measurement practitioners who met at the Bellagio Centre in 1996 and was 
later updated by Pintér et al. in 2012. The following are the main elements of the 
Bellagio STAMP:
  Guiding vision: Progress towards sustainable development should be guided 
by the goal of delivering wellbeing within the carrying capacity of the biosphere 
and ensuring it for future generations.
  Essential considerations: Underlying social, economic, and environmental 
components of the system as a whole should be taken into account as well as 
the interactions thereof and their implications for decision-making, including 
trade-offs and synergies.
  Adequate scope: The assessment of progress towards sustainable development 
should adopt an appropriate time horizon and geographical scope to capture 
both the short- and long-term effects and their local and global effects, 
respectively.
  Framework and indicators: Sustainability assessment should be based on a 
conceptual framework as a basis for identifying core indicators and related 
reliable data, projections and models.
  Transparency: Transparency of data and data sources, models, indicators and 
results are crucial as well as public access to the results.
  Effective communication: It is necessary to use clear and understandable 
language to ensure effective communication and to attract the broadest possible 
audience as well as minimise the risk of misuse.
  Continuity and capacity: Sustainability assessment needs to be complemented 
by a continuous monitoring phase that includes repeated measurement as well 
as responsiveness to change as a basis for continuous learning and improvement.
  Broad participation: Sustainability assessment needs to find appropriate ways 
to strengthen legitimacy and relevance, engaging early on with users of the 
assessment, reflecting the views of the public while providing active leadership. 
(Pintér et al., 2012)
In general, as was noted by Rametsteiner, Pülzl, Alkan-Olsson and Frederilksen 
(2011), the development of sustainability indicators is a process of both scientific 
‘knowledge production’ and of political ‘norm creation’, and both components 
need to be appropriately acknowledged. Studies conducted across different 
sets of indicators have shown that both groups were present in all sustainability 
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indicator processes, albeit in varying degrees, both in design and in practical 
implementations). The challenging question is to determine what is better from 
having a slightly more accurate but politically less relevant set or a slightly less 
accurate but politically more relevant set. From practical expediency perspective, 
going for the latter option, with a built-in adjustment and improvement mechanism, 
could be more beneficial, particularly for developing countries.
Composite indicators 
The use of composite indicators received much attention in the early decades 
of indicators formulation for sustainable development (Moldan, Janoušková & 
Hak, 2012). Wilson, Tyedmars and Pelot (2007) identified the following as some 
of the main composite indicators related to sustainable development that developed 
in the 1990s and the subsequent decade:
  Ecological footprint (EF): The EF provides a quantitative assessment of the 
biologically productive area (the amount of nature) required to produce the 
necessary resources (food energy and materials) and to absorb the wastes of 
a given population (Rees & Wackernagel, 1996). The ecological footprint, 
therefore, ultimately measures the sustainability of human consumption patterns.
  Environmental sustainability index (ESI): The ESI is a composite index 
targeting environmental, socio-economic and institutional indicators as a means 
to assess sustainability. An ESI incorporates 20 indicators, each of which has two 
to eight variables, for a total of 68 underlying datasets. The core components 
of an ESI include environmental systems, reducing stresses, reducing human 
vulnerability, social and institutional capacity, and global stewardship (World 
Economic Forum, Yale University & Columbia University, 2002).
  Wellbeing Index (WI): A WI is a composite index that evaluates human and 
ecosystem wellbeing. It is an equally-weighted average of the human wellbeing 
index (HWI) and the ecosystem wellbeing index (EWI). Both consist of five 
dimensions. The former comprising health and population, knowledge and 
culture, community and equity; the latter consists of land, water, air, species 
and genes, and resource use (Prescott-Allen, 2001).
  Human development index (HDI): The HDI is one of the most widely 
recognised measures of development. It measures three dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and decent standard of living 
(UNDP, 2004). HDI is used as a proxy of sustainability based on the rationale 
that high human development facilitates sustainable development. 
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In recent years, a new metrics called gross happiness index (GHI) has been added to 
this group. The foundation for this index was laid by the United Nations High-Level 
Meeting called Wellbeing and Happiness: Defining a New Economic Paradigm, 
which was hosted by the Kingdom of Bhutan in 2012. The Kingdom of Bhutan is 
the first country that adopted gross national happiness as its primary development 
indicator instead of GDP. This has provided the basis for producing the World 
Happiness Report1 by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network.  
As much as composite indicators may be useful in highlighting interesting 
differences between countries in ways that may contribute to improved knowledge, 
they can seldom be used as a basis for implementing specific policy measures 
(Garnåsjordet et  al.,  2012). Furthermore, different authors (OECD,  2008; 
Paruolo, Saisana & Saltelli, 2011; Saisana, Saltelli & Tarantola, 2005; Saltelli, 2007; 
Stiglitz et al., 2009) indicated that besides leading to severe normative questions, 
aggregation of incommensurable value dimensions might conceal differences in 
underlying indicators rather than clarifying them. Table 9.2 highlights some pros 
and cons of composite indicators as described by Saisana and Tarantola (2005).
Table 9.2 The pros and cons of composite indicators 
Composite indicators
Pros Cons
 ■ Can summarise complex or multi-dimensional  
issues in view of supporting decision-makers
 ■ May send misleading policy messages if they are 
poorly constructed or misinterpreted
 ■ More straightforward to interpret than trying to  
find a trend in many separate indicators
 ■ May invite simplistic policy conclusions
 ■ Can facilitate the task of ranking countries on 
complex issues in a benchmarking exercise
 ■ May be misused, e.g., to support a desired policy 
even if it lacks sound statistical or conceptual 
principles
 ■ Can assess the progress of countries over  
time on complex issues
 ■ The selection of indicators and weights could be  
the target of political challenge
 ■ Can reduce the size of a set of indicators or  
include more information within the existing  
size limits
 ■ May disguise severe failings in some dimensions 
and increase the difficulty of identifying proper 
remedial action
 ■ Can facilitate communications with the  
general public and promote accountability
 ■ May lead to inappropriate policies if dimensions of 
performance that are difficult to measure are ignored 
(Source: Adapted from Saisana and Tarantola, 2002,  
as cited in Garnåsjordet et al., 2012:330)
Even if there are some limitations related to the use of composite indicators, it is 
believed that they can provide valuable insight into policy and decision-making, 
particularly in assessing progress towards agreed goals and targets. Hence, most 
organisations and governments use one or another form of composite indicators 
keeping in mind the possible limitations they may have.
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Green economy indicators
The recent global trend towards a ‘green economy’ has added renewed impetus 
to initiatives aimed at going ‘beyond GDP’. The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) defines a green economy as one that results in ‘improved 
human wellbeing and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental 
risks and ecological scarcities’; that is, an economy which is ‘low carbon, resource 
efficient, and socially inclusive’ (UNEP, 2011:16). Given the multiple economic, 
social and environmental objectives of a green economy, and the inherent 
limitations of GDP, an alternative (or at least expanded) set of indicators is required 
for measuring progress towards a green economy. Several initiatives are currently 
underway aimed at developing green economy indicator sets or frameworks. 
These include:
  work on a green economy index (Nahman et al., 2016);
  a green growth measurement framework (OECD, 2011);
  work on measuring progress toward a green economy (UNEP, 2014);
  the ‘iGrowgreen’2 indicator-based assessment framework to identify country-
specific challenges in promoting greener growth (Eurostat, 2012);
  the Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES)3 global 
partnership, which provides technical support for countries implementing the 
System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA); and
  the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) indicators for green growth 
strategy and planning and the Green Growth Knowledge Platform, a global 
partnership between the GGGI, OECD, World Bank and UNEP, which is 
working towards a common framework of green growth indicators (Benson & 
Greenfield, 2012).
The green economy indicators framework that was developed by UNEP provides a 
set of indicators that focus on measuring progress and trends at the different stage 
of the policy cycle with a particular focus on factors that facilitate the transition to 
a green economy. The framework identifies the following as the main stages of the 
policy cycle covered under the green economy indicators (UNEP, 2014):
  Issue identification: These are instruments that help decision-makers to identify 
and prioritise problems that might undermine the path towards sustainable 
development. Four steps are proposed for the use of indicators in the issue 
2 For more information on iGrowgreen: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/
greenweek2011/sites/default/files/1-8_Bucher.pdf
3 More information can be found at: https://www.wavespartnership.org/
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identification phase, namely: (i) identification of potentially worrying trends, 
(ii) assessing the issue and its relation to the natural environment,(iii) analysing 
more fully the underlying causes of the issue of concern, and (iv) analysing 
more fully how the issue impacts society, the economy and the environment.
  Definition of policy goals and formulation: While indicators for issue 
identification help to frame the problem, indicators for policy formulation help 
to design solutions. The two key steps that constitute policy formulation are 
the identification of policy objectives and the identification of intervention 
options. A multi-stakeholder approach is required to ensure that different 
perspectives are considered and incorporated in the definition of policy 
objectives and targeted interventions.
  Policy assessment phase: In this phase, expected economic, social and 
environmental effects of different policy options need to be measured with 
the help of impact indicators. Also, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
policy option need to be analysed to provide robust evidence in support of 
decision-making. Three steps that are suggested for this phase are (i) estimate 
policy impacts across sectors, (ii) analyse impacts on the overall wellbeing of 
the population, and (iii) analyse advantages and disadvantages and inform 
decision-making.
  Policy monitoring and evaluation: Indicators for policy monitoring and 
evaluation support the assessment of the performance of the intervention 
implemented and allow decision-makers to design timely corrective measures 
when needed. The analysis should include an estimation of co-benefits and 
ancillary benefits for the economy as a whole, as well as the improvement of 
the wellbeing of the entire population.
This approach is consistent with the use of the DPSIR framework through 
the identification of Drivers  (D), Pressures  (P), State  (S), Impacts  (I) and 
Responses  (R) (UNEP, 2008). While indicators for problem identification help 
to frame the issue, and indicators for policy formulation help to design solutions, 
impact indicators support the assessment of the cross-sectoral impacts of the 
interventions chosen. Finally, the use of monetary and financial indicators enables 
the evaluation of the feasibility of each intervention, comparing investment and 
avoided costs, or added benefits, depending on the issue to be solved.
Despite the numerous efforts on developing indicators related to a green economy, 
there has been little progress in developing a green economy dashboard or 
composite index that provides the same level of usability and simplicity offered by 
GDP. In addition, existing initiatives are primarily based on issues identified in the 
context of developed economies and as such tend to emphasise the economic and 
environmental dimensions of the green economy and to neglect social and broader 
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developmental issues of relevance to many developing countries. Furthermore, the 
emphasis in existing green economy indicator frameworks tends to be on indicators 
of relative decoupling, that is, indicators of reduced resource use or environmental 
impact per unit GDP (e.g., CO2 emissions per $ GDP). Indicators of absolute 
decoupling (reduced impact of the economy as a whole) are generally missing from 
these frameworks. 
Indicators of relative decoupling, while necessary in terms of measuring the 
resource or emissions intensity of an economy, can be misleading. Total emissions, 
for example, can still be increasing, as long as they are rising at a slower rate 
than GDP. Furthermore, such indicators are susceptible to hiding the pollution 
that is shipped to developing countries if they are not designed from a life-cycle 
perspective. Indicators of relative decoupling, therefore, fail to reflect the urgency of 
the need for a transition toward a green economy. Given recent evidence suggesting 
that four out of the nine ‘planetary boundaries’ have already been exceeded (Steffen 
et al., 2015) and considering the need for urgent action on issues such as climate 
change, the focus should arguably be on indicators of absolute (rather than relative) 
decoupling. This may necessarily have to be on a per-capita basis (to reflect the 
difference in population size between countries) and over a specified period (e.g., 
CO2 emissions per capita per year).
The proposed framework for leapfrogging indicators
While many lessons could be drawn from existing literature and practical 
experience in developing and utilising sustainability-related indicators, the 
framework proposed in this chapter focuses explicitly on assessing the leapfrogging 
possibilities from transformative infrastructure. The first subsection of this section 
concentrates on presenting the most relevant considerations and criteria for 
selecting the relevant indicators. This is followed by a presentation of the proposed 
framework for developing and utilising indicators that can assist countries to assess 
their progress in laying the foundation for their transition to a wellbeing economy.
Selection criteria for indicators
As was noted by Stiglitz et al. (2009), measuring sustainability differs from standard 
statistical practice in a fundamental way as what is needed are projections of not 
only technological or environmental trends but also projections of how they will 
interact with socio-economic or even political processes. A fundamental property 
of any sustainability indicator is its ability to show changes over time. An indicator-
based sustainability assessment needs to address its historical development as well 
as its possible continuation into the future or provide early warnings of emerging 
threats to sustainability (Garnåsjordet et al., 2012).
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One of the major challenges faced by most developing countries is to identify 
and select the most relevant and practical set of indicators out of the hundreds of 
indicators proposed by different institutions and processes. There are a different 
set of criteria proposed for use by countries and governments in selecting the most 
relevant indicators. This chapter considers the criteria recommended by Cook, 
Saviolidis, Daviosdottir and Johannsdottir (2017). These criteria were developed 
through a two‑stage approach, which involved focus group research that represents 
a bottom‑up approach and indicator selection by a team of experts as a top‑down 
approach. The criteria used by Cook et al. are as follows:
  Policy relevance: Could the indicator be closely related to an existing or future 
policy target?
  Utility: Did the indicator meet the needs of decision and policymakers and the 
public in being fundamentally understandable?
  Soundness: Did the indicator appear to be aligned with a consistent 
methodology for capturing the multiple components of environmental 
sustainability without presenting a risk of duplicating aspects?
  Interpretability: Was the indicator able to communicate meaningful 
information concerning performance relative to environmentally sustainable 
outcomes?
  Data availability and quality: Was the indicator based on sufficiently high‑
quality data with adequate coverage over time?
Proposed framework for transformative leapfrogging indicators 
The overall objective of the indicator framework for leapfrogging to a wellbeing 
economy is to assist African countries to develop the infrastructural foundations for 
building a wellbeing economy that is inclusive, low‑carbon and resource‑efficient. 
Such an economy ensures sustainable livelihood and wellbeing to its people and 
contributes to the global sustainability effort. In this section, we propose the 
preliminary skeleton structure of the framework for the leading indicators with a 
focus on the critical infrastructural elements that will determine the leapfrogging 
possibility of a country towards an inclusive, low‑carbon and resource‑efficient 
economy. As a framework, it needs to be adapted to the specific policy and 
operational context of each country for its effective implementation and use. To 
measure progress on building a transformative development trajectory towards a 
wellbeing economy, it focuses on the fundamental transformational foundations 
that provide the basis for the transition. It also looks at the most appropriate 
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institutional context for effective operationalisation and implementation of the 
transformational process.
The fundamental building blocks of the framework for the leapfrogging indicators 
are defined on the combined consideration of the key principles of the Bellagio 
Sustainability Assessment and Measurement Principles (STAMP), as updated by 
Pintér et al. (2012), and the set of criteria proposed by Cook et al. (2017). The 
framework is also informed by the key issues and conceptual frameworks that 
have been highlighted in the preceding chapters of this book. The following are 
the major elements and features of the proposed framework for the leapfrogging 
indicators:
  Guiding vision: African countries can transition to a wellbeing economy 
which will enable them to fulfil the basic needs and aspirations of their people 
while sustaining the wellbeing of the natural ecosystem as a foundation for 
their development. 
  Essential consideration: An internally driven and context-relevant 
transformative leapfrogging, as opposed to externally-driven incidental 
leapfrogging, is key in avoiding decisions that will lock African countries in 
unsustainable consumption and production patterns.
  Adequate scope: The investment decisions to be made on essential 
infrastructure development within the coming five to ten years will determine 
African countries’ leapfrogging opportunities to a wellbeing economy both in 
the medium and long term.
  Framework and indicators: An African country’s ability to effectively integrate 
the above consideration in their policy, planning and budgeting process is a 
crucial factor in determining its leapfrogging potential towards a wellbeing 
economy.
  Selection criteria: The selection of the specific indicators needs to be based 
on their potential utility function, methodological soundness, ability for 
meaningful and effective communication, and data availability and quality.
Figure 9.1 shows the wellbeing economy development framework. As depicted, the 
framework for transformative leapfrogging indicators is structured under the three 
major components taking the above criteria and the related conceptual frameworks 
into consideration, namely transformative governance, transformative policy 
formulation and transformative policy formulation.





 ■ Life-cycle planning
 ■ Energy systems
 ■ Industrial systems
 ■ Urban systems
 ■ Distributional justice
 ■ Representational justice
 ■ Budget allocation
 ■ Transformational policy
 ■ Human wellbeing
 ■ Ecosystems wellbeing
Policy
Figure 9.1 Wellbeing economy development framework
  Transformative governance: Realising an effective governance system that 
fulfils both distributional and representational justice for communities is one 
of the primary prerequisites for achieving transformational development in the 
twenty-first century. This is mainly dependent on both the policy formulation 
and infrastructure development component, which may create practical 
constraints or act as facilitators for achieving distributional and representational 
justice. It is further reflected on the level of equitable allocation and effective 
utilisation of national budget allocation.
  Transformative policy formulation: High-level political commitment 
expressed in the form of national policy and strategy document is critical for 
any country’s progress towards a wellbeing economy that ensures both human 
and ecosystem wellbeing. This could range from incremental policy measures 
in specific sectors to a more comprehensive policy commitment that influences 
the national development trajectory. This can be assessed through the level of 
commitment for transformational development to wellbeing economy that 
promotes integrated consideration of human and ecosystem wellbeing and the 
policy preference given to transformative infrastructure development.
  Transformative infrastructure development: Decisions that are made on 
types of economic development infrastructure will determine the distributional 
effect of the whole economy besides determining the overall socio-economic 
and socio-ecological efficiency. It also determines the country’s lock-in 
pitfalls and leapfrogging potential. The most critical factor in this process 
is the level of life-cycle consideration in the design and development of key 
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economic infrastructure and the ability of countries to utilise existing and 
emerging knowledge, technology and systems that enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their energy, industry and urban infrastructure.  
Table 9.3 summarises the indicator framework for transformative leapfrogging.
Table 9.3 Indicator framework for transformative leapfrogging





policy and strategy 
formulation
1. Level of integration of human and ecosystems wellbeing 
dimensions in national policies and strategies (1–10)
2. Fiscal policy preference and priority for transformative 
infrastructure that promotes inclusive, low-carbon, and 
resource-efficient development
3. Policy level recognition for adaptive planning that combines 
top-down with the bottom-up planning process
Human wellbeing 
improvement  
4. Percentage increase in productive employment
5. Percentage increase in basic service provisions (food health, 
education, water, energy, etc.)




7. Percentage improvement in basic ecosystems services from 
forests, wetlands, etc.
8. Percentage reduction in CO2 emission and improvement in air 
quality








10. Scope of life cycle considerations in planning, development, 
and management  of infrastructure (1–10)
11. Level of cross-sectoral synergy and integration in infrastructure 
planning and development (1–10)





13. Percentage of the total population with energy access 
14. Percentage increase in renewable energy share of total energy 
generation
15. Percentage increase in GDP per unit energy consumption as a 
measure of energy efficiency




16. Level of horizontal and vertical integration of industries to the 
local and national economy (1–10)
17. Percentage of local value addition to the overall industrial 
output and productivity
18. Number of jobs created per unit of industrial investment
19. Reduction in material energy and pollution intensity per unit 
manufacturing output
Development of urban 
infrastructure
20. The multi-modality and functional synergy of urban 
infrastructure
21. Percentage improvement in job creation and value addition of 
the urban economy
22. The decline in the percentage of the population living in urban 
slums
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23. Presence of conducive polity for a sustainable developmental 
state
24. Level of fair and equitable distribution of resources across 
regions and communities




26. Level of representational participation in planning and 
management of development programmes
27. Level of empowerment of women and youth groups in the 
decision-making process
Budget allocation and 
utilisation
28. Percentage of the budget allocated for transformational 
projects
29. Level of decentralised and equitable allocation and 
management of the budget
30. The ratio of the additional leveraged resource with the 
allocated budget
The indicators listed in Table 9.3 are a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
indicators. The non-quantifiable indicators listed can be assessed through proxy 
values, which can be converted to an aggregated value of 1–10. Each country can 
measure its progress against the indicators either through an internal benchmarking 
that compares its performance with the previous years or through external 
benchmarking that compares its performance with a regional average value or any 
other country’s performance. 
Conclusions
Systemic transitions always involve complex dynamics that need to be understood 
and managed from the systems perspective. This task is even more complicated 
when it comes to social transformations. Fortunately, such moments of social 
transformations always come with some fundamental drivers that will essentially 
determine the most probable trajectory. The challenge for development 
practitioners and policymakers is to understand the dynamics between these 
primary drivers and manage their interactions for broader societal benefits.
Indicators are one of the most useful tools that help us to understand these dynamics 
and guide our policy and planning actions to steer the development process to the 
most desirable outcome. The significant volume of literature that is available on 
sustainability assessment and sustainable development indicators provides a useful 
foundation to make an informed decision on the best use of indicators.
As was noted in the previous chapters, the twenty-first century is a century in 
which humanity is faced with a historic moment of social transformation of a 
global proportion. In this context, African countries are faced with two important 
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and historic choices. These are either being locked in the conventional ‘growth 
economies’ that are exclusive, inefficient and unsustainable or leapfrog into the 
‘wellbeing economy’ that is inclusive, climate-resilient and resource-efficient 
economies of the twenty-first century.
The main objective of this book was to underline the critical importance of the 
path to be followed in developing a given country’s socio-economic infrastructure 
in determining a country’s economic future in this century. It also provided some 
of the major technical and decision-making tools that African countries could 
deploy in making the transition to a wellbeing economy. This final chapter of the 
book attempted to provide a framework of indicators that could be used as a basis 
for countries to assess their progress towards a more inclusive, low-carbon and 
resource-efficient economy. Needless to say, the framework needs to be adapted to 
the specific contexts of application to ensure its effective utility.
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